Introduction
The north has long been a place that captures the imagination, from the age of exploration to cold war militarisation and today's debates about the possibilities and consequences of a northern oil and gas bonanza. The Arctic, especially the Barents Sea and surrounding land areas, has also long been a concern for the Norwegian government, albeit under different names and policy approaches. Since 2005, this attention has been rebranded and intensified as the ‘High North policy’ of Norway (Jensen and Hønneland Reference Jensen and Hønneland2011). Just as the expression ‘high north’ (nordområdene) is not equivalent to commonly used English-language concepts like the Arctic or the north, Norway's foreign policy distinguishes itself from other circumpolar countries in several ways. This article will argue that compared to the Arctic region's two ‘great powers’, the USA and Russia (Wilson Rowe Reference Wilson Rowe2009; Wegge Reference Wegge2010), Norway is unique in the sheer amount of political capital and discursive space that is showered on Arctic international relations.
This article focuses on one potential motivation for a state's behaviour in international affairs, namely status, in order to shed light on Norway's Arctic politics. The idea that a state's political elite seek national security and economic gain in international politics is well established in international relations (IR) literature. However, another key motivation of human behaviour, seeking status and respect, is often overlooked as a potential factor shaping states’ behaviour (Larson and Shevchenko Reference Larson and Shevchenko2010; Wolf Reference Wolf2011).
The argument proceeds as follows. First, the general contours of circumpolar politics in the post-cold war period are introduced. The literature on status is then discussed and it is argued that hierarchies and status still matter, even though the Arctic as a region does not fit neatly into the classical understanding of international relations as dominated by great powers. The argument subsequently turns to Norwegian ‘high north’ policy and analyses political claims relating to Norway's position in Arctic relations in more detail. As status is an inherently relational concept and is intersubjectively constituted, in other words, status claims mean little if they remain unacknowledged by other states, this article considers how status may play a role in Norway's regional multilateral relations in the Arctic Council (AC) and in its bilateral relationship with an important Arctic neighbour, Russia. In these two cases, the extent to which one can see motivations linked to the quest for status or prestige is discussed, along with the issue of ‘audience’. Who is on the receiving end of status politics and how do they react to Norway's efforts?
Changing Arctic politics and emerging hierarchies
The Arctic has long been viewed from seats of government further south as a remote natural area, a place for scientific study and heroic feats of exploration. During the World War II, the region gained an important military dimension. This was cemented with the rising east–west tensions that characterised the cold war (Young Reference Young1992). Since the end of the cold war, the governments and peoples of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Russia, Canada, Iceland and the United States have increasingly engaged in a variety of cooperative activities designed to address shared issues in the north. The immediate post-Soviet years witnessed high levels of cooperation on environmental, social and military issues (Young Reference Young1992; Heininen Reference Heininen, Einarsson, Nymand Larsen, Nilsson and Young2004; Hønneland and Rowe Reference Hønneland and Rowe2010).
Over the last decade, there has been a heightened level of international attention devoted to Arctic affairs. This has occurred in part because the region is said to hold 25% of the world's undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves. Already today the Arctic produces one-tenth of the world's crude oil and a quarter of its gas (AMAP 2008). Furthermore, receding Arctic sea ice makes for potentially commercially viable shipping routes in the Arctic and greater ease of petroleum development as well as introducing new environmental and security threats relating to a more open sea (AC 2009). Because of these changes, we see that other actors without a direct geographical foothold in the Arctic, such as China or the EU, are becoming increasingly interested in Arctic politics and seeking, for example, observer status in the AC.
Although the Arctic boasts multilateral forums, such as the AC and the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation, a number of key political and economic issues have been traditionally excluded from these forums. In general, such security and economic interests in the Arctic are addressed in national decision-making, more informal and flexible multilateral and bilateral relations, and the UN system. The five Arctic coastal states, Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Norway, Russia and the USA, have been meeting since 2008 as the ‘Arctic 5’, outside the AC. Here they discuss issues of shared concern, such as enhancing expert-level cooperation on the territorial claims process, emphasising the adequacy of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for addressing territorial claims, and mandatory shipping standards for polar waters (Oldberg Reference Oldberg2011). Wegge (Reference Wegge2010: 74) argues that there is no one hegemonic state shaping Arctic politics as international relations literature would suggest, but that this ‘Arctic’ 5 club in some ways fills the void by playing a dominant regional role as a group.
Some of the many cooperative initiatives founded in the 1990s have continued to flourish, while others have floundered. Cooperative initiatives that faced difficulties tended to be those that were premised on the notion of Russia as a developing country that needed to be ‘helped’ with its northern challenges. Russia's changing attitude towards Arctic cooperation has something to say about Arctic hierarchy. While the notion of western countries, in particular Canada and Norway (see Hønneland and Rowe Reference Hønneland and Rowe2010; Wilson Reference Wilson2007), ‘helping’ Russia with its domestic Arctic governance problems was a workable narrative during the 1990s, the past decade has seen Russia increasingly shedding its ‘transitional country’ cloak and reasserting itself as a global actor. In fact, in their national Arctic strategies, both Canada and Russia define themselves as ‘Arctic powers’ (Canada 2010; Security Council 2009), while the global US superpower refrains from making any status claims at all (United States 2009). Norway, as will be discussed below, defines itself as a ‘leading Arctic state’ (Utenriksdepartementet 2011). Thus three of the five states with Arctic coastlines make some claim to regional power importance or leadership, which suggests that status and hierarchy may be relevant to understanding how regional politics unfolds.
Status-seeking in the international relations literature and a note on method
Although Norway traditionally has been supportive of the establishment of international regimes and working through institutionalised multilateral settings (Leira Reference Leira2007), in the case of the Arctic 5 the country is in complete agreement with its coastal counterparts about the ability of sovereign states to manage the Arctic independently, bilaterally or in already existing coordination bodies like the AC. This all suggests that Norway's approach to the Arctic may differ from its more modest, ‘small-state’ approach to international relations more generally and is in keeping with an increasing desire for the country to stand out as a ‘leading country’ in targeted areas (Skaar Reference Skaar2012). Norway, since the negative outcome of the referendum on EU membership in 1994, has sought to develop subsidiary arenas in which it can pursue international goals and make its presence felt (Hønneland and Rowe Reference Hønneland and Rowe2004: 23).
Furthermore, the familiar terms of small state and great power used above to structure the discussion of Arctic hierarchy may not have as much analytical punch when it comes to analysing international relations in the north. Norway is the biggest fisheries nation in Europe, the world's second biggest exporter of gas and its seventh biggest oil exporter. It would be surprising if Norway's foreign policy remained classically ‘small state’ in a region that attracts attention for just these things—fisheries, oil and gas.
As discussed briefly in the introduction, the concept of status in international relations merits further attention (Wohlforth and Kang Reference Wohlforth and Kang2009). Furthermore, in studies in which status is addressed, it is often in conjunction with ‘great powers’ or ‘emerging powers’ in a competition over status: little is known about what other states may seek or gain in terms of angling for certain kinds of social standing in international society. Social status is acknowledged as one of the most important drivers of human behaviour and research in psychology, particularly exploring social identity theory (SIT), has illustrated how people seek and prefer high status even when it is of no practical use to them and they may not derive any material gain (Wolf Reference Wolf2011). At the same time, higher status in politics as well as in social life often does have its practical benefits. Status can be achieved through a number of means, such as economic might, military prowess, cultural achievement or moral authority, which opens up multiple ways for different kinds of actors to engage in status-seeking behaviour in international relations (Wohlforth and Kang Reference Wohlforth and Kang2009).
Although status is a relatively new object of analysis in international relations, scholars have long asserted that informal hierarchies are a feature of world politics in every international system (Luard Reference Luard1976). The idea of hierarchy is closely linked to status as status implies a social position, either hierarchical (ranking above another country) or categorical (all belonging to the same, selective ‘club’). Wohlforth and Kang (Reference Wohlforth and Kang2009) argue that all states are concerned with status, but that small states may value more categorical status (membership) as opposed to a hierarchic status. The Arctic 5 group can be seen as a club that confers upon all members a higher status when it comes to having a say about Arctic politics.
Larson and Shevchenko (Reference Larson and Shevchenko2010) suggest that there may be several strategies available to political elites in seeking to negotiate their country's status in international relations. Social mobility implies a mimicking of top-status states’ behaviour in order to achieve a higher place in an international hierarchy. Social competition may mean trying to surpass a dominant group, or alter the criteria upon which high status is assigned. Social creativity means reframing a ‘negative attribute as positive’ or underlining different kinds of achievements in new fields (Larson and Shevchenko Reference Larson and Shevchenko2010: 66–67). As will be discussed below, Arctic politics and, more specifically, Norway's engagement in the region can be understood as based on a social-creative approach to status. In the absence of a great power/small state hierarchy, new opportunities for acquiring status arise.
A key difficulty with exploring the role of status as a motivating factor in shaping political behaviour is that motives are mixed, intertwined and mostly unobservable. In other words, it is difficult to separate a status motivation from a material or security motivation. On the other hand, scholars focusing on material wealth and security also have to make a cognitive leap; these two factors as drivers of international relations also remain largely in the realm of conjecture and assumption (Wohlforth and Kang Reference Wohlforth and Kang2009). This article attempts to shed some light on the role that status-seeking may play in shaping Norway's Arctic engagement. Guided by the literature above, I have carried out two interrelated research tasks. The first was an analysis of Norwegian Arctic policy documents in which I remained especially alert for discussions of leadership and great-powerness. The second research task was two sets of qualitative, semi-structured interviews with representatives (primarily civil servants) of the five Arctic coastal states. One set (12 interviews) was carried out in 2007 and another set (19 interviews) was conducted in autumn 2011. Interviews were conducted in Oslo, Moscow, Washington DC and Copenhagen and interview comments were translated from Russian and Norwegian by the author. Among other issues, interviewees were asked to reflect upon Norway's role in circumpolar politics, as claims to status only gain purchase through the recognition of others.
Norway's high north politics
The north has long been an area where Norway has been an international relations entrepreneur. Norway's first big post-Soviet foreign policy initiative in the Arctic was the Barents cooperation, which was established in 1993 between the Nordic countries and Russia. The aim was to promote regional peace and encourage economic growth through greater regional integration (Hønneland and Rowe Reference Hønneland and Rowe2010). Although deemed a success in promoting people-to-people contact across the former iron curtain, Hønneland (Reference Hønneland2005) argues that by the turn of the millennium the initiative had lost some of its original sparkle. By 2004, the idea of the ‘high north’ as a politically coherent concept emerged, accompanied by a cavalcade of policy documents relating to the Arctic published between 2003 and 2011 and, to a large extent, replacing the Barents focus of the 1990s (Jensen and Hønneland Reference Jensen and Hønneland2011: 1; Jensen and Skedsmo Reference Jensen and Skedsmo2010).
Geographically, the high north is defined as including the land and sea areas north of Sør-Helgeland and eastwards from the Greenland Sea to the Barents and Pechora Seas. As a policy area, it is also defined as encompassing foreign policy efforts in the Barents region, Nordic cooperation, Arctic cooperation and relations with the EU via the ‘Northern Dimension’ (Utenriksdepartementet 2006: 11). In this sense, northern policy has its roots in earlier iterations of ‘neighbourhood policy’ (nærområdepolitikk). This term is, however, now seldom used and, as Jensen and Hønneland put it, ‘Neighborhood policy was out and High North policy was in. Talking about the High North without a sense of optimism and confidence was considered bad manners’ (Reference Jensen and Hønneland2011: 8–10).
Immediately following the 2005 elections, the Stoltenberg coalition government declared the high north to be the most important strategic area for Norway. In 2006, the ‘Government's strategy for the high north’ was released, with key goals including: continuing to develop ‘neighbourliness’ with Russia; sustainable fisheries management; development of the Barents Sea as a European energy province while balancing this pursuit with concern for the environment; and ensuring the quality of life of indigenous and non-indigenous northerners. The policy states itself to be ‘more than just foreign policy or domestic policy. This is about our ability to continue a tradition of responsible resource management, recognisable assertion of sovereignty and a close cooperation with neighbours, partners and allies’ (Utenriksdepartementet 2006: 3). In a 2009 follow-up document, ‘New building blocks in the north’, all of these goals are reiterated with additional attention directed towards the promotion of the application of international law in the Arctic, most notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Departementene 2009).
While all these points speak to relatively long-standing Norwegian foreign policy interests, the strategy documents and surrounding political discourse also indicate a few points where Norway launches new ambitions: a desire to be at the ‘forefront’ in established sectors (such as fisheries) and new fields such as marine bioprospecting. To achieve this position at the forefront, the policymakers who wrote the strategy put their faith in knowledge, arguing that ‘knowledge is the heart of the High North policy’ and that Norway needed to be at the ‘forefront of knowledge in all of these [key] areas’ (Utenriksdepartementet 2006: 6). In a more recent speech to a home audience in southern Norway, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre reiterated the point that the country should be a ‘leader on Arctic knowledge . . . because through competence and presence we will strengthen our ability to influence the development of the entire Arctic’ (Gahr Støre Reference Gahr Støre2011a).
The intertwining of knowledge and science with the pursuit of sovereignty and regional influence has a long history in the Arctic. Northern states with parliaments located well outside the region have often relied upon science to assert sovereignty over their Arctic hinterlands. From the scientific pursuits of early Arctic explorers through to the national emphases on Arctic science in the twentieth century, Arctic state-building has been reliant upon claiming to know the Arctic physical environment through science and through maintaining a physical presence via both military installations and science infrastructure (Bravo and Sörlin Reference Bravo and Sörlin2002). As one Russian diplomat put it in an interview with the author in October 2011, ‘no one knows the Arctic and its challenges like the Arctic states themselves – no one can govern the Arctic better than we can’.
In pursuing this role as a leading ‘knower’ of the high north, the key Norwegian governmental tool has been financial. In the 2011 budget, 1.2 billion Norwegian kroner were dedicated to efforts relating to Norway's northern policy. This included increased funding for mapping of geologic resources, a new polar research centre in Tromsø, a new polar research programme at the Norwegian Research Council and an early warning system for the Barents Sea. Foreign Minister Støre presented the funding, stating, ‘our goal is to continue to be at the forefront of knowledge about the High North and the Arctic. This budget proposal contributes to increased Norwegian activity, knowledge and presence in the High North’ (in Utenriksdepartementet 2010).
The dedicated focus on the north and funding to the social and, especially, physical sciences has not only increased Norway's expert capacity in the research sector, but also has resulted in a strong capacity on northern issues amongst Norwegian civil servants and politicians. The example of Norway's efforts to influence EU policy on the Arctic makes this particularly clear (Wegge Reference Wegge2012). After the EU Parliament passed a resolution in October 2008 calling, among other things, for an international treaty to protect the Arctic environment, Norway and Denmark immediately mobilised to prevent the EU Commission from supporting the parliament's resolution. Multiple bilateral talks between EU leaders and senior Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials took place, as well as a final meeting between the Norwegian prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg, and the EU Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso. After this meeting, Barroso declared that the Arctic was a sea and should be treated as such, implying that UNCLOS was on its way to being recognised as a sufficient legal framework, in line with the adamant position of the ‘Arctic 5’ states. Norway had been so active in this process that a senior EU official on Arctic affairs reportedly exclaimed that he felt ‘surrounded by Norwegians’ (Wegge Reference Wegge2012: 12). Given the commission's lack of experience on Arctic issues, Norway achieved a high level of influence because of its proactive role and the expertise, information and competence it could contribute (or bring to bear) on the process.
Overall, it is clear that Norwegian high north politics have placed great emphasis on leading through knowledge and science, through knowing the high north best. In the case of EU Arctic policy presented above, it is also clear that Norway achieved a high level of influence through its knowledge resources. Perhaps Norway's longstanding commitment to multilateralism and reputation as having a certain moral authority in international politics more broadly allowed the country to play this role as a provider of information to a commission in need, rather than be seen as solely defending its national interests. This is might be described as an assumed status position: that of a privileged informant of Arctic policy formation outside the region itself. To further examine the kind of status Norway may seek in northern relations, the example of Norway's participation in the preeminent multilateral body of the region, the AC, will now be considered, before examining in more detail the country's relationship to its ‘great power’ neighbour, Russia.
Norway, status and the Arctic Council
The AC brings together governmental and indigenous representatives from Canada, Finland, Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States and operates on several levels. Senior Arctic officials representing their respective countries meet once a year, while higher-level ‘ministerial meetings’ occur every second year. The AC's six working groups, focusing on different aspects of the Arctic environment and involving both civil servants and expert contributors, meet several times a year. Decision-making within the council is contingent upon full consensus.
The AC has thus far concentrated on producing and disseminating large-scale environmental assessments of the north (climate, pollution, wildlife). Although the scientific information produced under AC efforts is often given political application elsewhere in other forums (Wilson and Øverland Reference Wilson, Øverland, Stokke and Hønneland2007), the policy ambitions of the council itself remain quite modest. While it seems set to remain focused primarily on monitoring rather than policy-making, some signs of change are evident. The recently ratified Search and Rescue Agreement (2010), which was negotiated outside the AC but involved many of the same state representatives, is one indication and active efforts for a similarly legally binding treaty on oil spills in the Arctic are currently taking place. Overall, however, within the council itself ‘few efforts are made to create rules that are more ambitious or more specific than those already embraced in broader international fora’ (Stokke and others Reference Stokke and Hønneland2007: 86).
How might status matter in such a forum and for Norway in particular? The Arctic includes two countries, the USA and Russia, that can be assigned great-power status from their historical or current global roles. Although Russia is certainly reduced in influence when compared to its Soviet past, its status as the largest and most populous Arctic state and the major exporter of Arctic oil and gas ensures that the country has a good deal of regional clout. Thinking first about how the USA and Russia's status positions matter in the AC lays the groundwork for examining the types of status Norway may seek.
Interviewees from the other Arctic 5 states (Norway, Canada and Denmark/Greenland) were unanimous in underlining the importance of the USA and Russia as the regional ‘great powers’. Largely, they shared the aim of working to bring these two states more actively into the Arctic cooperative fold. One North American interviewee noted in 2007 that this was one of the motivations for giving these two countries the chair so early in the AC's life in an effort to ‘bring these countries further into the activities of the Arctic Council’. A Norwegian interviewee noted that AC participants work hard to angle projects and elicit Russian interest, finding ‘ways of making sure Russia stays involved’.
In fact, one of the accomplishments that the Norwegian foreign minister prides himself on is that ‘the High North has been put on the map of many more governments through our active High North diplomacy and international cooperation’ (Gahr Støre Reference Gahr Støre2011b). The most trumpeted of these successes has been the participation of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the 2010 AC ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, marking the first time the USA sent such a high-ranking official. Clearly the involvement of the USA and Russia is considered important by regional practitioners and their great-power or, at least, key-state status is widely acknowledged. Nonetheless, Norway's foreign policy behaviour in the Arctic suggests that there are other useful and politically valuable roles that can be pursued in this regional context.
All interviewees pointed to the leadership role played by Norway in Arctic affairs. Norway is perceived as a strong funder of Arctic activities, particularly in comparison to Russia and the USA. An American interviewee noted in 2007 that Norway ‘often comes through with solo funding and pushes projects . . . including facilitating the reorganisation of the Arctic Council to include a secretariat in Tromsø’. One Norwegian bureaucrat noted in autumn 2011 that Norway is the largest contributor overall to AC activity.
So, what kind of status might Norway seek in the AC? On the one hand, Norwegian civil servants emphasise how important it is to have the regional ‘powers’, meaning the USA and Russia, involved. At the same time, Norway is often in the picture with these great powers as a co-chair of initiatives, has succeeded in ensuring that the AC's first permanent secretariat was situated in northern Norway (Tromsø) and is the most prominent funder of the Council's activities. It is interesting to note, however, that this leading funding role in northern forums is not one to which Norwegian actors draw attention in public statements, possibly preferring to preserve the veneer of true multilateralism in the Council's activities and avoid negative domestic feedback from opposition parties and taxpayers.
North American interviewees suggested that Norway has achieved a special status in the Arctic as both a key player and as a ‘convenor’ and bridge builder in Arctic relations. One North American interview put it this way:
There is no question that Norway advances Norwegian interests first in the Arctic. They have been successful in marketing Tromsø as a locus for Arctic cooperation and they are definitely a big Arctic player. Russia and Canada are the geographically bigger northern states, and Norway navigates the waters between these two well. But then if you look at Norway's northern population, economy/wealth and the size of the sea areas that Norway manages, Norway is big too.
Another North American observer noted that Norway has worked hard to
brand itself in the north and has done so successfully. If you look at the northern science locus at Ny Ålesund, the role of Norway as a ‘convenor’ in Arctic relations is evident. Many nations have science stations there, under the auspices of Norway. This is like the Arctic Council secretariat in Tromsø. Norway has used this role as a convenor to good effect in pursuing strategic interests.
This role of a ‘convenor’ is somewhere outside the traditional status dichotomy of great power/small state. By creating an entirely different status for itself and devoting political and material resources to maintaining a unique role not easily filled by others, Norway seems to have created a central niche for itself in the politics of the north.
Russia and Norway: equals in a neighbourhood
Norway and Russia share a 196 km long border in the high north and the idea of being ‘neighbours in the north’ has been an important part of post-cold war relations in this region. Russia is mentioned as a cooperative partner in every single chapter (covering every imaginable sector) of Norway's northern policy documents. The policy states that Norway will pursue a ‘pragmatic, interest-based and cooperation-oriented path when it comes to Russia [as] without Russian engagement . . . we cannot completely secure sustainable resource use and responsible environmental management in the Barents Sea’ (Utenriksdepartementet 2006: 15). This bilateral relationship seems particularly promising to explore for issues of status, given how central it is to Norway's high north policy and also because of the obvious meeting of a big and a smaller state. How does Norway meet a country that considers itself to be a great power?
Both states have a big stake in the politics of the Arctic. Russia is the largest Arctic state geographically and 80% of the Arctic's undiscovered oil and gas reserves are expected to be under Russia's jurisdiction (AMAP 2008). Norway manages northern sea areas that are six times the size of Norway's land territory and has played an important role in developing Arctic multilateralism and international frameworks governing maritime affairs. In the Arctic, Norway is coming to the international relations table with some of its strongest cards to play, a successful oil and gas industry, thriving northern fisheries and possession of widespread, populated Arctic territories and surrounding sea areas.
Norwegian civil servants interviewed in 2011 were on the whole very optimistic about their efforts and their relationship with their big neighbour. One Norwegian civil servant noted, ‘we have a very positive dynamic between the two countries . . . because we work on concrete issues of mutual interest[;] . . . this gives us a platform to take up other issues’. Another stated that it ‘is Norway and Russia in the Arctic. We are natural partners for cooperation.’ Some of this positive outlook in the 2011 interview set may be fuelled by the 2010 resolution of a long-standing dispute over the maritime delimitation line between the two countries in the Barents Sea. The contested area to which both countries laid claim was divided rather neatly in half. For example, a Russian civil servant with duties in the Arctic noted: ‘The Norwegian-Russian agreement has been a mutually beneficial agreement that was a positive influence [on] the whole region, showing how diplomacy and international law can be successfully applied’. Russian interviewees also regularly pointed to the value of Norway's experience in developing offshore petroleum resources. The delimitation agreement was widely referred to as a delimitation and cooperation agreement in Russia, highlighting how Russia and Norway would cooperate on any border-crossing petroleum structures and how this experience would be a positive one for the Russian oil and gas sector (Moe and others Reference Moe, Fjærtoft and Øverland2011).
At the same time, Norwegian interviewees underlined that it was changes internal to Russia that were critical to precipitating an agreement after 40 years of intermittent negotiations around the delimitation line. One stated, ‘the Russians began to see the benefit of a settled border and wanted to be modern in the Arctic, taking the lead when they can . . . . The Arctic is a dream situation for them – they are recognised as a great power.’ Another Norwegian interviewee put it this way: ‘the Russians became more oriented towards clarity and law. For Norway, this was a window of opportunity because the Russian regime has legitimacy and the ability to ensure that the agreement went through.’ Here we see that although the outcome was an equitably 50/50 division of the contested area, the power to move the negotiations forward or stall them was seen by Norwegian interviewees as resting primarily in the hands of Russia.
This suggests that Norwegian policymakers and diplomats have, despite the emphasis on the relatively status-free concept of ‘neighbours’, few illusions about claiming or achieving a greater status vis-à-vis Russia. In referring to the Barents Sea agreement, the Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre put it this way: ‘good neighbours can resolve complex issues by means of peaceful negotiations. [It is an example of] big player–small player cooperation through agreed principles and international law. This is important for Norway’ (Gahr Støre Reference Gahr Støre2011c). Here we see reference not only to the neighbourhood idea, but also to small and big states. Another more quotidian example of policymakers’ awareness of this relationship comes from an interviewee with responsibilities in the Norwegian-Russian bilateral relationship. This official referred to a conversation with Moscow where they were working to plan their bilateral cooperative activities for the coming year. Their Russian counterpart put the ball squarely in the Norwegians’ court, stating, ‘We are the great power (velikaya derzhava). You make the suggestions.’
While Norway retains its ‘small state’ role in relation to Russia, albeit with additional layers coming from shared concerns, geographic proximity and success in areas of northern activity also of interest to Russia (fisheries, petroleum), this relationship may allow Norway to make different kinds of status claims in relation to other Arctic countries. A Norwegian interviewee with responsibilities relating to environmental cooperation put it this way: ‘The Canadians are envious of our relationship with Russia; how frank we can be with our Russian counterparts and what we achieve. They call upon us as bridge builders.’ A North American interviewee echoed this point: ‘Norwegians present themselves as a channel to the Russians and help other countries interpret Russian positions and messages. They are useful in playing this role and recognised by others as useful.’ It seems that Norway derives a certain level of prestige and a uniquely important role through its closer relationships with a ‘great power’, Russia, in the north: some of Russia's Arctic status seems to rub off on its neighbour.
Concluding thoughts
Status-seeking is a likely, although difficult to pin down, factor shaping how political elites represent and pursue their countries’ interests in international relations. Status can be an end in itself, but most often is intertwined with more quotidian interests in security and material gain. Looking at Norwegian foreign policy in the Arctic region, it is evident that a language of great powers and small states exists to some extent alongside latitude for social creativity or redefinition of what matters for Arctic hierarchy, given that the regional ‘great powers’ have a large portfolio of concerns that direct their attention to other regions of the world. As Larson and Shevchenko (Reference Larson and Shevchenko2010: 66–67) describe it, social creativity involves recasting negative attributes as positive or seeking to assign value to different kinds of achievements in new fields. The role of an information provider (for example, to the EU), a convener and a bridge to Russia that Norway has achieved in Arctic multilateral settings gives the country an acknowledged status that is outside the more commonplace great power/small states hierarchy of international relations. This status seems be attended by an important degree of influence, for example in the EU and within the Arctic Council.
In considering their country's bilateral relationship with Russia, Norwegian policymakers are alert to the underlying great power/small state dynamic and seek to work around this by maintaining a positive atmosphere. An alternative vocabulary for this great power–small state relation is promoted, replete with references to mutual interest, international law and cooperation. The positive and dense relationship with Russia gives Norway added clout and special status in Arctic multilateralism as it is also able to offer a gateway for others to Russian policymakers.
That Norway has been able to pursue and utilise a creatively designed role in the Arctic as a convenor of states says much about the political climate of the region itself. One European interviewee argued that great power or small state may not be a terribly important distinction for Arctic politics, arguing that ‘it isn't what you are, but what you do and what you are interested in doing in the Arctic’. Given the Arctic region's relatively peaceful nature and the emphasis on circumpolar cooperation, space has been made for creative approaches to status. Size and military or economic greatness are less decisive factors for taking a lead in today's Arctic politics. As Vincent Pouliot argues (Reference Pouliot2011), status positioning is not solely about how much power or influence one country has, but what counts as power in a particular political setting in the first place. The question remains, consequently, as to the extent to which Norway could maintain a central role in Arctic politics if the political environment of the region and the attending rules of the game were to change.
Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges two anonymous reviewers for their comments on the text. Thanks also to Iver Neumann, Benjamin de Carvalho and William Wohlforth for useful discussions on status-seeking in international relations and to the interviewees for sharing their insights on Arctic politics.
