In his 1959 book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life the Canadian sociologist Erving Goffman helped popularize the notion that internal states of mind always manifest themselves in particular forms of social behavior. Rather than focusing on the postwar vogue for psychoanalysis, Goffman proposed that acting out and watching are key aspects of everyday dramaturgical interactions. This has led a number of theorists since the 1970s to examine a wide range of social and political behavior as forms of performance—an orientation theatre historian Tracy C. Davis develops in her inspired reading of the cold war, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense. Goffman's insights are useful for interrogating the ‘cold war consensus’ of the 1950s and 1960s, which led whole populations to share a common purpose in preparing for nuclear attack. Focusing on cold-war civil defense in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, Davis examines the civilian activity in “the planning, practicing, and (if ever needed) the implementation of plans for protection of people, property, and government in the event of a nuclear war” (21). In so doing, Davis shifts focus away from both the elites of government and foreign policy makers on the one hand and the effects of cold-war hostilities on fearful individuals on the other, to examine the many staged rehearsals (such as the “Duck and Cover” self-protection routines promoted by the U.S. government in 1951) which were designed to prepare civilians for nuclear assault.
Davis's central interest is instructive for scholars and students of performance as it demonstrates that theatre in the 1950s and early 1960s was much broader than a renewed interest in Broadway, or the rise of British working-class drama in the 1950s, or the emergence of Off-Broadway performance at the end of the decade. “Theater did not dwindle in stature after the mid-twentieth century,” Davis asserts; “it simply broadened its range of venues” and personnel, drawing on “novel talent: physicists, economists, meteorologists, police, postmasters, wholesalers, tree-trimmers, nurses, truck drivers, bankers, psychologists, clergy, broadcasters, homemakers, and morticians” (23). Although she does not draw on Goffman's theory of everyday performance explicitly, there is no better study of the ways in which cold-war behavior was embodied in day-to-day activities, when “everyone had a role to play” (23), whether it was at work, school, home, or in public life.
The historical reach of Davis's study, from the defense planning of the early 1950s and 1960s to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, is as impressive as her ability to move with subtlety between civil defense in the United States and that in Canada or Britain. Davis utilizes a wide array of primary sources, moving from government advisory pamphlets and official reports, including a 1961 report on civil defense published early in the Kennedy administration with a triadic structure: “recovery, protection, and integration” (22), to grassroots organizations and the impact of nuclear films such as On the Beach (1959), The War Game (1965), and The Day After (1983, TV). Davis also draws from game theory, which was promoted by the Pentagon and the RAND Corporation in the late 1940s (integrated into business techniques for training industrial executives), and the use of computing and cybernetics within the theatrical machinery of nuclear defense. On this theme she argues that “computerization was central to linking active defense to civil defense planners' ability to comprehend” (322) the complexity of Crisis Relocation Planning scenarios, designed to minimize population loss and maximize high levels of domestic manufacture.
The book focuses on various techniques used to prepare for attacks and the rehearsal of nuclear scenarios, but it argues convincingly that the performances were complex interactions in which participants and observers were constantly changing places and where realistic and hypothetical scenarios often blurred. Certainly civil defense activities were forms of psychological protection against ultimate devastation, preventing civilians from thinking too seriously about the consequences of nuclear attack, radiation sickness, and genetic mutation. While acknowledging these private fears, which often emerged in cold-war films of the 1950s and 1960s, Davis's focus is primarily on the “as if” public realm. She argues that cold-war civil defense was not so much like theatre, but that it was “an embodied mimetic methodology that is inherently and crucially theatrical” (2; her emphasis). Davis's interest does not lie with theatrical metaphors, but in examining how theatre “had a utility in twentieth-century governance, education, and social life, central not only to how anxiety was expressed but more importantly how people envisioned ways to identify and resolve anxious problems” (4). Sometimes the rehearsals borrowed directly from theatre, whereas the Casualties Union in the United Kingdom distanced itself from theatrical practices, pulling down the fourth wall to include spectators in forms of “casualty simulation” (207).
The inspiration for Davis's study is the post-9/11 War on Terror under the George W. Bush administration, in which tighter security of borders and institutions and increased surveillance have placed acting out and watching at the heart of public life. Davis establishes this frame of reference at the beginning of the book and returns to it at the end, arguing that although civil defense scenarios (particularly the integration of “preparedness into everyday routines”) were “archived in the 1990s,” with the War on Terror they are current again (332), particularly in the United States but also in Canada and the United Kingdom, with bombings and cybersabotage becoming worldwide phenomena. Davis is not the first critic to draw parallels between the early cold war and the post-9/11 climate: in The Shock Doctrine (2007), for example, Naomi Klein has argued that the “shock and awe” psychological and interrogation experiments during the cold war directly foreshadowed the post-9/11 surveillance culture, while 2004 was dubbed by some commentators the year of “New McCarthyism.” But Davis does provide valuable insights into the ways in which “the new orthodoxy of fear” (336) links patriotism both to good citizenship and to the acting out of disaster scenarios, particularly in airports and public buildings. As such, Davis ends her fascinating account with a serious question: “When we scrutinize the handwriting on our post, look twice at a neighbor's chador, or sign up for a national identity card, is this the modern counterpart to building a family fallout shelter?” (337).
