No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2004
Following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the Bush administration sought to reinvigorate the peace process. Rather than begin a new round of bilateral talks, however, the administration undertook a radically different approach in opening the Madrid Conference. Based on a pragmatic, functionalist approach to the conflict, officials such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, Daniel Kurtzner, and Edward Djerejian convinced the president and Secretary of State James Baker to initiate a series of multilateral negotiations centered on three issue areas: arms control, economic cooperation, and the environment (including water issues). These talks, which became known as the multilaterals, lasted from 1991 through 1996 and included Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the Palestinians.
Following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the Bush administration sought to reinvigorate the peace process. Rather than begin a new round of bilateral talks, however, the administration undertook a radically different approach in opening the Madrid Conference. Based on a pragmatic, functionalist approach to the conflict, officials such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, Daniel Kurtzner, and Edward Djerejian convinced the president and Secretary of State James Baker to initiate a series of multilateral negotiations centered on three issue areas: arms control, economic cooperation, and the environment (including water issues). These talks, which became known as the multilaterals, lasted from 1991 through 1996 and included Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the Palestinians.
Some have dismissed the talks because they did not lead to major breakthroughs in any single relationship and were soon overshadowed by the “handshake” that followed the Oslo Accords in September 1993. Dalia Dassa Kaye argues that to point toward specific outcomes as the way to judge the success or failure of these talks ignores their more important contribution to the peace process. Kaye resists defining cooperation in terms of outcomes but, rather, argues that it is “a process of interactions, interactions which may themselves be quite conflictual. But these interactions can also lead to new understandings which may prove as important to explaining regional developments as more tangible outcomes” (p. 185). Her idea of cooperation as a “process of working together to achieve common understandings” (p. 7) captures the essence of the multilateral idea. The meetings of the three working groups created new vocabularies and, in so doing, shaped the interests of the participants in new ways. This process, described by Kaye in four substantive narratives, demonstrates the relevance of recent constructivist theories of international affairs. Rather than assuming that states come to negotiations with interests set in stone, a constructivist account explores how interests might be shaped by the process of negotiation, leading to more peaceful outcomes.
Kaye's theoretical chapters introduce the reader to recent debates in international relations and conflict-resolution theory. Although it retains the flavor of a dissertation at times, the review does place her argument in a larger theoretical debate. It also serves the more important purpose of demonstrating the non-intuitive nature of her argument—that is, why would a process that did not lead to a new policy outcome be seen as a good thing? By demonstrating how cooperation can be better understood as an ongoing process that shapes interests, Kaye has made a valuable contribution to how we should evaluate such negotiations.
Her substantive narratives of the different tracks will be of great interest to those interested in the Arab–Israeli conflict and especially the U.S. role. The descriptions of the three working groups seamlessly weave together her theoretical and empirical material. The research for the working groups is based largely on interviews with participants in the talks. One concern is that looking through the footnotes, it appears that her subjects were mainly Israeli and American diplomats, which raises the question of how much access she had to Arab state delegations. The work does not seem skewed toward an Israeli perspective, however, which suggests she did have access to a wide array of participants.
The book is perhaps most useful for understanding the American perception of how to resolve the conflict, especially the beliefs of those involved in the last two presidential administrations. The team of Ross, Indyk, Kurtzner, and Djerejian was influential in shaping the first Bush and the Clinton administrations' approaches to the conflict. Their focus on integrating Israel into the region by focusing on pragmatics rather than difficult political decisions has been a hallmark of the past fifteen years of U.S. policy. As Kaye points out, this approach was nurtured in Washington-area think tanks, such as the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs, which Indyk created and Ross currently directs. While some of these individuals and institutes continue to have an influence in the current Bush administration, they have largely been eclipsed by the approach of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, which seeks to create democracy by force and hopes that other Arab states will follow suit.
The refusal of Syria and Lebanon (and Iraq) to participate in the multilaterals is noted but not explored at any length. This might have been useful to examine as an alternative case, one that demonstrates how interests sometimes do not change as a result of negotiations. Especially since Syria and Israel undertook a six-year process of negotiations during the same time period—one that led to very little in the way of changed interests—a chapter on what happened here might have been a useful comparison.
Despite these suggestions, this is an excellent book. It makes an important theoretical con- tribution by demonstrating the relevance of the constructivist thesis for negotiation and conflict resolution. It also provides important historical details on the course of the multilateral negotiations. The book would be an excellent addition to an undergraduate course on the Arab–Israeli conflict and graduate-level courses in conflict-resolution and international-relations theory. One can only hope for more work from this author and others in this important area.