Waller R. Newell has written a very dense and rich work on the “dark side” of politics, namely, the regime which has defined evil in politics since the inception of political theory: tyranny. What immediately strikes the reader is Newell's attempt to combine a highly theoretical philosophical approach (strongly influenced by Heidegger and Leo Strauss) with an attention to political reality, including contemporary events, concerning the phenomenon of tyranny. His purpose—as the subtitle of the book reads—is to provide a new interpretation of a historical and practical occurrence, the appearance of tyrannical regimes at many stages of human history. Newell's main contention is that tyranny (and the understanding of it) underwent a dramatic change at the beginning of modernity, with such authors as Machiavelli, Bacon, and Hobbes. Originally, Plato elaborated an interpretation of tyranny which remained canonical in classical political thought: in his powerful representation, the tyrant was characterized by a misguided love for material pleasures; this left the door open to a possible “redemption” through a philosophical education capable of redirecting his eros towards moral and civic virtue. Modern authors dispensed with this explanation in terms of eros: they expunged love from the ruler's soul and transferred “to the secular prince a transformative power of creation ex nihilo formerly reserved for God” (7). Newell maintains that this marked an “ontological shift in man's relationship to nature” (19): modern thinkers like Machiavelli and Hobbes revived the “primordialist ontology” of the Sophists, characterized by strife, chance, and domination, and advocated man's conquest of nature, including human nature. Tyranny thus became the instrument for creating a “new man” as well as for bringing about a perfect and definitive regime, regardless of the means used. Building on Newell's insight, one may add that ancient thinkers (such as Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon) strove to explain tyranny and tried to transform it into a good regime; whereas modern philosophy originated, or at least influenced, modern tyranny.
The part of the book devoted to Plato is very interesting and insightful. Newell very sensibly identifies in the reorientation of eros toward love of the good the heart of Plato's civic pedagogy in the Republic; he has a number of interesting observations on complex topics ranging from the tripartite soul to the notion of freedom and the downfall of the best regime and is at his best in the analysis of the role of eros and thumos. The part on Aristotle is also very interesting, especially the treatment of the notion of “superlative virtue” and the connected question of which regime is preferable, an aristocracy or the rule of a man of such extraordinary virtue to be like a God among human beings. A refined chapter on Xenophon, and especially his Education of Cyrus, prepares the terrain for the entrance of Machiavelli. Newell also finds an important change occurring with St. Augustine and the strain of Christianity originated by him: they identified nature with “the corporeal, lustful, irrational, and perishable” (69) and transformed virtue—which for the classics stood for human excellence—into the suppression of all worldly desires. This deformation of eros paved the way for Machiavelli's preference for fear over eros as the feeling uniting subjects to their ruler and his view of the prince as capable of subjugating Fortuna, depicted as a woman. Machiavelli borrowed from Christianity the notion of a creative will capable of transforming the universe: the prince has to master nature and transform human nature, including his own. In the conclusion, Newell explores the modern discourse on tyranny up to the present era, examining a vast array of authors from Bacon and Shakespeare to the American founders and down to Heidegger and Arendt. He sees two “corridors” opening up in modernity, a “brighter” one which leads through Locke to contemporary liberalism; and a “darker” one which emphasizes Machiavelli's call for the conquest of nature, advocates the complete reshaping of human nature, and issues in regimes such as Robespierre's, Stalin's, and Mao's. This second, dark, “corridor” was powerfully influenced by Rousseau's idealization of a pure, original form of community and his romanticization of “the people,” leading to “the collective tyranny of le peuple and das Volk” (505). Modern tyranny thus became the “instrument for radical political and social change” (478) in the attempt to bring about a definitive state of human affairs: this is a paradoxical pursuit, since modern authors from Machiavelli onwards had criticized the ancients for their alleged “idealism.”
In such a rich and wide-ranging work it is natural to find some matter for dissent. Two points especially arouse my perplexity about Newell's interpretation of tyranny. Firstly, I believe that the bewilderingly vast variety of different phenomena we label tyranny, ranging from Julius Caesar to Pol Pot, shows that this term has been used both in a precise and in an evocative way: to describe the illegal, illegitimate, violent rule over free citizens in a specific historical epoch (in Greece from the sixth to the fourth centuries BCE) as well as to identify an evil ruler or regime of any epoch. In this sense the Roman kings, Caesar, Charles I Stuart, Robespierre, and Stalin have been called “tyrants”; likewise, it is evident that the strict oligarchy which ruled Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War (403 BCE), which went down in history books as the “Thirty Tyrants,” was not composed of actual tyrants in the exact sense of the word but rather of violent and lawless rulers (the tyrant is one by definition). Indeed, I believe there is a hiatus between tyranny as a historical occurrence and the conceptualization of it. For an instance one simply has to refer to Herodotus. In his work one encounters hundreds of historical tyrants, some depicted as good, others as evil rulers, but his judgment on tyranny is always negative: tyrants may be good or evil; tyranny is always evil. I believe it is thus evident that “tyranny” as a concept is an ideological construction (dating back to the origins of democratic thinking at the end of the sixth century BCE); and in fact it has served this purpose of being an ideological weapon throughout the history of Western political thought, proving to be very resilient and adaptable to different contexts. This fact adds a dimension of complexity in analyzing the historical sources because there is a reduced degree of isomorphism between fact and concept. Secondly, it is unfortunate that Newell sometimes seems to follow Heidegger also in bending the texts for his interpretative purposes. For instance, he criticizes Hannah Arendt's sharp distinction between the polis and political life, on one hand, and the household and production, on the other (which contemplates the superiority of the former to the latter). Newell contends that Aristotle in fact never drew such a hard and fast distinction between these two realms and attributed a higher role to the household once the community is established. He then goes on to state that when “Aristotle famously argues that man is by nature a political animal who fulfills himself through deliberation about the meaning of the just, the noble and the advantageous, he says that this teleological activity takes place ‘in cities and households,’ a detail often overlooked in the communitarian reading” (my emphasis). There is a typo here because Newell refers to Politics 1257a17–18 whereas the correct place is 1253a16–18: what Aristotle actually says in this passage is that what is specific to human beings in contrast to the other animals is the fact that they alone have the perception of good and evil, of just and unjust, and of the other values; and the common possession (koinōnia) of these creates (namely, it is the foundation of) the household and the city. There is no deliberation involved here but rather a common perception of the same values, which enables human beings to create the conditions for their flourishing.
Notwithstanding these small reservations, this is an important and rich book, full of original interpretations and insights. Even the readers who happen to disagree with Newell's reading of certain texts, or who interpret differently the subject of tyranny, are rewarded by the impressive amount of fine observations they encounter along the way. These qualities are emphasized by a brisk and elegant style and a good pace of narrative.
