Autocracy Promotion

Often, the term autocracy promotion is brought into discussion by referring to the earlier process of democracy promotion which took place during the 1990s and the 2000s. The literature on democracy promotion defines what promotion means, including a transfer of knowledge and expertise to countries under democratic consolidation (Carothers Reference Carothers2020, 120). However, the literature on autocracy promotion is still in a nascent state; therefore, we could not find a consensus on its definition (Tansey Reference Tansey2016 143). However, this literature highlights the concepts of support, learning, and diffusion, which may help us clarify it.

Autocrats tend to engage in mutual support based on motives such as fear of contamination or economic reasons (Yakouchyk Reference Yakouchyk2019, 3). An example of such fear of contamination is represented by China’s response to the 2014 democracy movement in Hong Kong. The movement was perceived by China as an imminent threat due to its geographical proximity, which could have created an attractive model for Chinese society to follow. Economic reasons are also important in understanding autocratic support because the interdependencies between regimes create a certain financial security, and any change of regime might pose serious threats to these sources of income. An example is represented by Russia’s policy of granting energy subsidies to Belarus (Yakouchyk Reference Yakouchyk2019, 6)

In the context of international relations, learning refers to the intention of a state or autocratic actor to import knowledge about the politics, institutions, and ideas from another political system into their own. Autocratic states can also use learning to avoid certain external events that could be reproduced domestically. In this literature, Russia is given as an example in the context of the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. To avoid a similar scenario of a coloured revolution, the Russian government undermined pro-democracy NGOs and youth organizations domestically so as not to end up in the same situation as the governments of Georgia or Ukraine (Hall and Ambrosio Reference Hall and Ambrosio2017, 149).

Unlike democracy promotion, which is based on a direct intention, diffusion in autocratic regimes can be an unintentional and uncontrolled process (Joroen Van den Bosch Reference Van den Bosch2020, 19). The diffusion of autocratization is thus a process through which autocratic policies in one state end up being adopted and followed in another state. An example of such diffusion comes also from Central Asia, where, during the 2000s, the consumption of Russian popular culture and news by the citizens of those states led to the diffusion of the Russian authoritarian model. Thus, through this soft-power tool, Russia managed to counter the pro-democratic European Neighborhood Policy that was also spreading in the region (Hall and Ambrosio Reference Hall and Ambrosio2017, 150).

Revisionist Foreign Policy

The literature on the impact of populism on foreign policy is still in its early stages since most of the research focuses on domestic politics. Populism’s complex effects on foreign policy manifest in three aspects: populist rhetoric, its impact on diplomacy, and the alliance model favoured by populist governments. Populism only recently became a topic for international relations, and it is conceptualized in this discipline as a domestic response to the state’s restructuring in the post-Cold War era (Chryssogelos Reference Chryssogelos2020, 23). This shift was characterized by the internationalisation of the state, which led to changes in the economy and institutions, but also created a gap between the “people” and the elite, which became more entrenched in international settings, thus giving the impression of leaving the people behind. Populists in domestic political scenes oppose these changes because they perceive them as a loss of national sovereignty and as an incorporation of the state into a global system, a trend for which they blame the national elites (Chryssogelos Reference Chryssogelos2020, 27–33).

Populist rhetoric influences a state’s willingness to compromise in its foreign policy, its views of supranational organizations, and the development of its international relations. Conflict-prone populists may stymie international collaboration, thereby increasing diplomatic misunderstandings with far-reaching consequences (Destradi, Cadier, and Plagemann Reference Destradi, Cadier and Plagemann2021, 675). Furthermore, the threat that populist discourse poses to supranational institutions pushes moves toward unconventional or questionable alliances, as shown by Italy’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative or Hungary’s increasing connections with Russia (Destradi, Cadier, and Plagemann Reference Destradi, Cadier and Plagemann2021, 675).

Diplomacy in populist regimes such as Poland and Hungary undergoes significant changes in terms of rhetoric and orientation. For instance, Poland strategically employs historical memory to shape its diplomatic relations, stressing victimization, historical justice, and moral superiority over EU partners such as Germany (Cadier and Szulecki Reference Cadier and Szulecki2020, 10–12). Meanwhile, Hungary plays a paradoxical role, viewing the West as an impediment to its national progress, which results in inconsistent stances and attitudes in its international affairs (Visnovitz and Jenne, Reference Visnovitz and Jenne2021, 693).

The effects of populism on foreign policy can also be seen in the way populists rebuild their states’ alliances. For instance, after Russia annexed Crimea, Hungary used its veto power to block joint military exercises between Ukraine and NATO (Visnovitz and Jenne Reference Visnovitz and Jenne2021, 694). Another example is Poland, which has threatened to use its veto to block the European Union budget if the rule of law mechanism is triggered against both Poland and Hungary (Visnovitz and Jenne Reference Visnovitz and Jenne2021, 694). When it comes to alliances, Hungary introduced new foreign policy strategies entitled “Eastern Opening” and “Southern Opening.” As stated above, their purpose is to reduce Hungary’s dependence on traditional partnerships by finding new partners on the international stage. Viktor Orbán declared that these new strategies serve the national interest, invoking the right of states to make alliances with any partner, regardless of their ideological character, which is justified by national sovereignty (Visnovitz and Jenne Reference Visnovitz and Jenne2021, 696).

Parliamentary Diplomacy as Authoritarian Diffusion

Despite the existing literature on authoritarian diffusion and the dynamics of foreign policy under populist rule, parliamentary diplomacy as a mechanism of authoritarian diffusion remains understudied due to three reasons: the novelty of the literature on parliamentary diplomacy, its diverse case studies, and a lack of theoretical and conceptual integration in this literature.

The literature on parliamentary diplomacy is new, but the history of the concept is closely related to the field of international relations, even though it was little studied in this discipline. Historically, the focus on parliamentary diplomacy was strongly influenced by the consequences of the First World War, which led to the change of the old system of international relations that was based on bilateral diplomacy of a secret nature. The war led to a rethinking of international relations because it created a new order based on a set of modern principles. As such, new principles such as universality, multilateralism, open diplomacy, and a way to resolve conflicts peacefully emerged after the war, contributing indirectly to the emergence of the term “conference diplomacy,” whose principles resemble those of the United Nations today (Götz Reference Götz2005, 267). Currently, there are two approaches to the definition of this concept. The first one conceptualizes parliamentary diplomacy as a specific instrument or method by which actors reach certain decisions (Götz Reference Götz2005). The second approach emphasises political actors who make decisions in international relations on their own, without intersecting with the traditional diplomatic sphere.

The literature on parliamentary diplomacy is built around a number of cases, most of which have to do with the European Union. The first such case is the intergroup system in the European Parliament. A total of 28 informal intergroups are formed at the level of the European Parliament, each focusing on different themes and certain countries or regions. Two intergroups posed particularly sensitive challenges to the EU’s foreign policy, namely the intergroup dealing with the Tibet region and the one focused on the Western Sahara region. The Tibet Intergroup was founded in 1989 and operated until 2014, when, due to pressure from China and its lobby groups, its activity ceased (Dutoit Reference Dutoit2016, 190). Europarties constitute the second exemplary case for investigating parliamentary diplomacy. These are transnational political parties that can play the role of amplifiers of EU influence in certain regions or states, especially in Europe. An example is the role of Europarties in the EU enlargement policy. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, they sought to make partners among political parties in Central and Eastern Europe to help strengthen their ideological profile and ensure that Eastern Europe would remain on a pro-European path (Chryssogelos Reference Chryssogelos2021, 5).

Despite these case studies, the literature on parliamentary diplomacy has to date failed to provide a well-defined theoretical framework. An indicator that parliamentary diplomacy is not a conceptually and theoretically well-aggregated field is the fact that the literature still uses several terms for this concept, including the term parlomancy. Parlomacy encompasses three broad categories of analysis, namely parliamentarians, political parties and parliaments (whether local, regional or international). Other authors link parliamentary diplomacy to concepts such as transgovernmentalism. This could be defined as an ongoing process of a consultative nature by which national governments form international coalitions. Still, the literature is not entirely clear about the mechanisms of transgovernmentalism and parliamentary diplomacy, except for linking their relationship to the concept of soft power (Cutler Reference Cutler2006., 1).

In conclusion, the role of parliamentary diplomacy in authoritarian diffusion deserves further exploration, prompting this study on Romania, which examines how the Alliance for the Union of Romanians utilizes parliamentary diplomacy for internal and external legitimacy-building purposes.

Sovereignty as a Political Opportunity Structure

To build a coalition at the European level, a magnet idea is needed. Such a magnet idea represents a political opportunity structure for parties throughout Europe that identify with that idea and want to join that coalition. An “idea” is a set of beliefs about the social, economic, or political domains that are shaped by emotions and values (Béland and Cox Reference Béland and Cox2016, 3). For an idea to gain the political traction that would ensure its popularity and capacity to unify various groups, it needs certain intrinsic features, among which the most important are ambiguity or polysemy, as well as valence. Ambiguity is the capacity of an idea to have several meanings about a specific topic, which would make it appealing to a wide range of people. For instance, the European Social Fund is an ambiguous idea that manages to attract both pro-free market economists and left-wing social policy supporters (Béland and Cox Reference Béland and Cox2016, 5). Valence, or the emotional appeal of a concept, is also important. Political actors strategically deploy concepts with strong emotional valence to establish coalitions to influence policy and gain electoral support (Béland and Cox Reference Béland and Cox2016, 5).

Sovereignty is such a magnet idea that is used to form a coalition at the European level. This coalition is formed by national parties that oppose the effects of globalization. As stated above, globalization has resulted in some parts of state sovereignty being transferred to supranational entities such as the European Union. In response, sovereignist groups at the national level have mobilized around this perceived loss of national sovereignty by stressing the importance of the national realm (Basile and Mazzoleni Reference Basile and Mazzoleni2020, 8). By deploying sovereignism as a magnet idea, these parties have not only managed to form a coalition at the European level but have also managed to secure a firm political position in the EU. The formation of the European sovereignist coalition was thus due to a structure of political opportunities, the seizing of which has increased this coalition’s ability to influence European decision-making (Fligstein and McAdam Reference Fligstein and McAdam2011, 7; Princen and Kerremans Reference Princen and Kerremans2008, 1131), especially in the European Parliament (Steven Reference Steven2016).

Political Entrepreneurship and the European Sovereignist Coalition

The European sovereignist coalition was a political space which existed well before AUR’s emergence onto the Romanian political scene. To integrate into this space, AUR used venue shopping, and one of the means of integrating itself in this venue was the mobilization of a sovereignist rhetoric. The concept of “venue shopping” refers to the process by which interest groups strategically place themselves across European and national access points. The literature highlights cognitive and normative restrictions influencing venue selection, with actors frequently preferring institutional-national settings due to accessibility issues at the supranational/international level (Princen and Kerremans Reference Princen and Kerremans2008, 1137). The importance of responsiveness, which is an attribute of institutions and depends on the venue-seeking actor’s reputation, impacts the success of venue shopping, highlighting the need to fit with the interests and concerns of a chosen venue (Princen and Kerremans Reference Princen and Kerremans2008, 1138).

In venue shopping, political entrepreneurship is critical. Political entrepreneurship is a phrase used to describe players with the ability to forge collective identities, form alliances, and organize support (Fligstein and McAdam Reference Fligstein and McAdam2011, 7). In discursive and political rhetoric terms, the main skill that political entrepreneurs must have is that of constructing frames, namely themes that can forge political identities and can thus connect them with broad populations. In organizational terms, the main skill that political entrepreneurs should possess is the one of forging connections with like-minded entities by using these frames.

As a political entrepreneur, AUR employs parliamentary diplomacy at the European level. Its objective is to draw closer to its target venue, namely the sovereignist movement, involving parties from Poland, Hungary, Spain, Italy, and other parts of Europe. To do so, AUR creates a political identity for itself which is aligned with the values of sovereignist parties. This political identity is easily observable in its narrative, which uses a mix of sovereignist frames that could be conducive to its acceptance into the European sovereignist coalition. In essence, AUR strategically employs parliamentary diplomacy as a venue whose dynamics it navigates through adept political entrepreneurship and nuanced frame construction (Fligstein and McAdam Reference Fligstein and McAdam2011, 7; Princen and Kerremans Reference Princen and Kerremans2008, 1138).

The Communication of Sovereignist Political Entrepreneurs

In this part, I emphasise the importance of studying the frames used by AUR in its parliamentary diplomacy. Starting from the literature on the role of ideas and discourses in coalition building, I identify the main frames used in the communication of sovereignist political actors.

The distinctive character of populist communication is its stressing of the idea of “citizens against elites” (Mangset et al. Reference Mangset, Engelstad, Teigen, Gulbrandsen, Engelstad, Gulbrandsen, Mangset and Teigen2019; Morisi and Wagner Reference Morisi and Wagner2020). Thus, citizens have a central place in populist communication, a discursive feature adopted also by sovereignist actors, in the rhetoric of which citizens have a central place along with the idea of sovereignty or loss thereof. Sovereign political actors use three main dimensions or frames in their political communication related to citizens, namely the economic, national and political dimensions. First, when populists refer to citizens economically, they make references to a social class/category of citizens who have been or still are disadvantaged by the globalized economy. This economy is seen as helping the elites more than the common people. Second, when referring to the national dimension, populists appeal to the common experiences of the people and to a unique culture that is threatened by the effects of globalization and multiculturalism. The idea promoted is that citizens risk losing their national identity and purity, all while the elites promote pluralism and the idea of openness. Third, the political dimension has in the foreground the need to keep the authority in the hands of the citizens, whose will must be respected at the expense of the elites who have distanced themselves from the needs of the people. In this context, the elites are also described as technocrats, and the frame “Brussels” is used to emphasize this distance of the elites from the people (Basile, Borri, and Verzichelli Reference Basile, Borri and Verzichelli2020, 3).

I hypothesise that AUR aims to construct its political legitimacy at the European level by seeking to integrate into this sovereignist coalition. The purpose of my analysis is to explore the political communication of AUR to extract the frames that it uses to shop for venues in this coalition. I will thus explore how AUR creates common narratives and interpretations of issues of regional interest, such as the Romanian national interest or the fight against Eurocrats, that it spreads in both its domestic as well as its foreign communication. From a discursive point of view, the challenge that AUR has to overcome is to connect the historical frames of Romanian nationalism with the three dimensions of sovereignism discussed above, namely the economic, national, and political.

In conclusion, my analytical framework conceptualizes the discursive dimension of AUR’s parliamentary diplomacy as several frames whose purpose is to pave the party’s way into the sovereignist coalitions at the European level. At the same time, my analysis shows that the challenge to construct this narrative resides in the combination of the sovereignist elements required by the coalition with the main themes of Romanian nationalism.

AUR and the EU: Eurorealism, Not Euroscepticism

To understand AUR’s stance on the European Union, I explored during the interviews and in the digital ethnography the party’s position on specific European policies and its strategic positioning within the European political landscape. Presenting the results of this analysis, this section highlights how AUR situates itself among sovereignist parties, emphasizing its commitment to the “fight against Eurocrats.” Notably, AUR takes several steps to engage with other conservative parties, as shown by its hosting of a sovereigntist forum and endorsing a joint declaration that reaffirms their fight against European bureaucracy and for a “Europe of nations.” These initiatives represent both direct and indirect interactions with like-minded parties, forming a united front against what they perceive as a common adversary located in Brussels.

AUR’s vision for the European Union is closely aligned with the statements of European conservative parties, which call for all conservatives to fight against what they describe as the neo-Marxist dominance of the EU (Alexandru Nica, Interview 2022; Ionut Neagu, Interview 2022). Members interviewed emphasized the necessity for a right-wing European coalition to oppose the concerted efforts of the leftist parties in the EU (Alexandru Nica, Interview 2022). When it comes to European policies, the interviews highlight two aspects. On the one hand, the party believes that the EU should refrain from interfering in Romanian domestic affairs through supranational policies, particularly those perceived to be influenced by neo-Marxism and thus incompatible with AUR’s core values, such as family and faith (Conservatives – Episode 10, GENDER IDEOLOGY AND SEX EDUCATION, n.d.; Respondent 1, Interview 2022). Notably in this regard, AUR communicators see EU policy recommendations, like civil partnerships for same-sex couples, as damaging to Romanian customs and values (Respondent 1, Interview 2022). Secondly, AUR sees certain EU policies as being beneficial for Romania, illustrating its dual, even paradoxical position on European policies. For example, the party supports the EU’s ban on the usage of toxic pesticides, an action implemented as part of EU environmental policy (Respondent 1, Interview 2022).

Beyond policy critique, AUR’s broad vision of the European Union addresses the post-Brexit fashionable topic of the possibility of Romania exiting the European Union. Rather than advocating Romania’s withdrawal from the EU or other international organizations, AUR adopts the concept of a “Europe of Nations.” To clarify this concept, AUR stresses the need to return to a Christian Europe, arguing for national autonomy, a distinctive path, and decision-making power (Alexandru Nica, Interview 2022; Ionut Neagu, Interview 2022; Mitrea Dumitrina, Interview 2022). Furthermore, AUR defines itself as a Eurorealist party rather than a Eurosceptic one. While there is no specific definition of Eurorealism, the notion implies a commitment to preserving state identity and independence within the EU while understanding and accepting the obligations that come with integration into international systems (Bale Reference Bale2006; Steven and Szczerbiak Reference Steven and Szczerbiak2023).

From the interviews, it became evident that AUR aligns itself with the sovereignist ideals shared by parties in Poland and Hungary. Members interviewed emphasized a common struggle against the federalism promoted by Eurocrats. According to those interviewed, there is a perceived intention to transform the EU into a federal superstate, a development they believe would erode the culture and identity of individual states. AUR communicators argue that the party must resist federalization, asserting that its ultimate aim is to centralize power as close to Brussels as possible, thereby minimizing the role of Central and Eastern European states in decision-making at the European level (Alexandru Nica, Interview 2022; Ionut Neagu, Interview 2022; Mitrea Dumitrina, Interview 2022).

AUR members define sovereignism as the right of the Romanian nation to shape its own path and command respect globally. This concept, as they see it, encompasses two dimensions: the national and the international. From a national standpoint, interviewees, including Ionut Neagu and Ciprian-Titi Stoica, emphasized the crucial importance of each country determining its trajectory. This involves forming alliances, participating in international integration, and nurturing specific communities. Historical examples, such as the significant role played by the Romanian Communist dictator Ceaușescu in global peace negotiations, underscore Romania’s potential as a stabilizing force on a global scale. From an international perspective, AUR’s commitment to sovereigntism is expressed in initiatives like the “Supremacy of National Constitutions over the Brussels Bureaucracy” forum. During this event, the party endorsed the “Bucharest Declaration,” a joint statement of participant parties opposing perceived threats to national ways of life. The forum’s success is evident in AUR’s subsequent invitations to similar events in Poland, Slovakia, and the Netherlands, where conservative leaders from renowned parties convene. (Ciprian-Titi Stoica, Interview 2022; “FIRST BUCHAREST SOVEREIGNIST FORUM – AUR,” n.d.; Ionut Neagu, Interview 2022)

AUR and the West: Conservatism as a Pan-European Ideology

This part will explore how AUR establishes and sustains its external relations in the Western context, detailing its strategy with similar parties to gain support for a future representation in the European Parliament. Additionally, the section highlights AUR’s initiatives related to the Romanian economic diaspora in the West. These actions, guided by shared objectives and employing various strategies, aim to foster relationships and shape the diaspora’s perception of the party.

AUR party placed significant emphasis on external relations, evident in the strategic framework they project. The discussions with interviewees highlighted the importance of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, particularly in anticipation of AUR’s formal admission after the 2024 European elections (Respondent 1, Interview 2022). The party’s parliamentary diplomacy efforts involve establishing connections with parties sharing similar ideologies across Europe. AUR actively engages in networking and dialogue, participating in forums and conferences to explore potential alliances. This is exemplified by their approach to both the European Conservatives group and the Identity and Democracy group, showcasing an adaptable strategy to cultivate connections inside these groups (Alexandru Nica, Interview 2022). Moreover, as AUR was anticipating its success during the European elections, it considered or even aspired to join a conservative pole at the European level, seeking partnerships with right-wing parties, including those aligned with sovereignist, nationalist, and Christian-democratic ideologies (Alexandru Nica, Interview 2022; Mitrea Dumitrina, Interview 2022). AUR’s selective approach is noteworthy because, while maintaining relations with some Christian-democratic parties, it expressed reservations about the European People’s Party group. This is because AUR sees this group as shifting away from its core values (Alexandru Nica, Interview 2022).

The continued strengthening of AUR’s external contacts was crucial in preparing for its membership in the European Parliament. To reduce the possibility of being isolated while there, the party aggressively cultivates broad relationships with peers across Europe. Their links range from local parties like the Forum for Democracy in the Netherlands, the Finnish Party, and Chega in Portugal to major parties like Forza Italia and Fratelli D’Italia in Italy. AUR strengthens these relationships through a variety of tactics, including visits, conversations, and involvement in sovereignist forums. Notably, the party has also established connections with a right-wing think tank in Italy, emphasizing cultural and economic ties between Romania and Italy and advocating for collaboration between Eastern and Southern European countries (“Claudiu Târziu” 2022). Furthermore, AUR has effectively maintained contacts with the VOX party in Spain, thanks to the assistance of a journalist connected to VOX. Claudiu Târziu’s active participation in the Spanish public arena, presenting remarks on right-wing topics and addressing ideological similarities between AUR and VOX, demonstrates the party’s dedication to its external relations strategy (Álvaro Peñas Reference Peñas2022).

In addressing the economic diaspora situation in the West, AUR strategically formulated a framework to fortify the identity of Romanians residing in Western Europe. The party emphasizes the importance of identity as a powerful instrument for evoking emotions and a sense of belonging, eventually seeking political support from the diaspora. Through interviews with AUR members, two distinctive approaches to dealing with the diaspora emerge. The first approach revolves around AUR’s ambition for Romanians abroad to return to Romania. The party maintains constant connection with its diaspora activists and runs summer schools for Romanian expats. While the explicit purpose of these summer schools is not outlined, the assumption is that AUR aims to attract individuals engaged in the party’s issues, thereby garnering increased support and legitimacy externally. Simultaneously, efforts are made to expand party branches in all countries with a significant Romanian diaspora, including the recent addition of Belgium (Respondent 1, Interview 2022). Moreover, certain MPs seek to introduce in Romania laws similar to those initially proposed in Hungary to encourage Romanians abroad to return, such as a bill proposing interest-free state loans for returning immigrant families with children (Ionut Neagu, Interview 2022).

The second approach is marked by acceptance and understanding of the significant scale of the Romanian diaspora, which numbers several million people and is one of the largest in Europe. Acknowledging the diaspora’s rootedness in their current countries, some AUR MEPs actively engage in addressing the issues faced by Romanians abroad. They propose parliamentary projects or file complaints to tackle these concerns (Mitrea Dumitrina, Interview 2022). Additionally, efforts are made to enhance consular services for the diaspora (Ciprian-Titi Stoica, Interview 2022). Moreover, AUR advocates for an increase in the number of diaspora representatives in the Romanian Parliament.

Simultaneously, important communicators from AUR conduct initiatives in Western Europe to interact with the Romanian economic diaspora and the political sphere representing Romanians. This includes trips by AUR leader Claudiu Târziu to Romanian embassies in countries with a large diaspora, such as the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. These trips include the Romanian associative environment, described as an identity foundation of the Romanian economic diaspora, which the Romanian state is neglecting and ignoring. These travels are intended to boost AUR’s external standing as a party devoted to campaigning for the Romanian community abroad and help shape the political legitimacy that AUR seeks to project. Another series of initiatives comprises Claudiu Târziu and other AUR members visiting Romanian communities in the diaspora. These travels are intended to meet Romanians, build relationships, and promote the image of AUR as the only party representing diaspora interests. Official visits to embassies are critical in shaping the political legitimacy that AUR seeks to project, especially in countries with a sizable Romanian community, such as Italy and the United Kingdom. Claudiu Târziu notes that his travel to Italy was intended to better comprehend Romanians’ ambitions and desires, as well as to evaluate AUR’s potential position in Romanian communities around the nation. (Claudiu Târziu 2022).

Another set of measures focuses on the Romanian churches. The appeal to the religious factor is as crucial as the associative environment or embassy visits because, by visiting Orthodox churches in countries such as Italy (Claudiu Târziu Reference Târziu2022e), Spain (Claudiu Târziu Reference Târziu2022d), Portugal (Claudiu Târziu Reference Târziu2022c), the United Kingdom (Claudiu Târziu Reference Târziu2022f), or even Germany (Claudiu Târziu Reference Târziu2022b), the party achieves a more direct connection to the diaspora, influencing its perception among diaspora members.

AUR and Eastern Civilizationalism

AUR strategically projects Poland under the PiS government and Hungary as paramount models for Romania’s foreign policy, underlining its admiration for the distinctive approaches of these nations within the European Union and NATO. This strategic alignment means not just showing unity, particularly against perceived outsider meddling, but also embracing essential components of the policies established by the Polish and Hungarian governments. AUR’s support for Poland is exemplified through expressions of solidarity with the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, denouncing what it perceives as unwarranted interference by the European Commission in national policies (“AUR Expresses Solidarity with the ECR Party in Support of Poland and Hungary” n.d.). AUR perceives Poland as a regional leader that assertively articulates its viewpoints in international forums, thus going beyond mere political posturing. George Simion, the leader of AUR, plays a pivotal role in maintaining relations with Poland, engaging in various public discussions and emphasizing commonalities for a potential alliance among Central European countries (“tvp.info Polska i Rumunia,” no date).

Similarly, AUR regards Hungary as a compelling foreign policy model, although this relationship is more complex due to shared historical traumas. Within AUR’s vision of Hungary’s foreign policy, two distinct components emerge — a recognition of Hungarian patriotism and an acknowledgement of bilateral challenges, particularly concerning the problem of Transylvania. While Hungary’s policies are appreciated for their internal and external coherence, challenges arise from actions perceived as problematic in Transylvania, ranging from symbolic gestures to Hungarian financial support policies for the Hungarian minority in the province (Ionut Neagu, Interview 2022; Respondent 1, Interview 2022). The party navigates this nuanced landscape, balancing the commendable aspects of Hungary’s policies, exemplified by positive sentiments toward the Orban government, with expressed concerns over actions impacting Romania’s interests. Public figures within AUR, including Claudiu Târziu and George Simion, praised Hungary’s policies in response to various issues, such as rising energy prices, presenting them as examples of good governance (Claudiu Târziu Reference Târziu2022a; George Simion 2022). AUR’s nuanced approach to these Eastern European relationships recognizes both shared values and potential areas of divergence, reflecting the intricacies of navigating the foreign policy landscape in the region. The party’s commitment to dialogue and negotiation becomes evident as it addresses historical complexities, national identities, and divergent policy priorities in its pursuit of effective regional collaborations (Interviews with AUR members, 2022).

The historical diaspora is a rarely addressed subject on the agenda of Romanian political parties. Despite this, a portion of AUR’s actions focusing on the Central and Eastern European region revolves around the historical diaspora. The party specifically addresses the status of Romanians in Ukraine and Serbia. AUR’s discourse on the Romanian historical diaspora frames the discussion around the loss of Romanian identity within these diasporas and the need to protect the interests of Romanians beyond the borders. The party emphasizes the challenges faced by Romanians in neighbouring countries and the necessity to engage in dialogue to safeguard their identity and rights (Respondent 1, Interview 2022). When asked about AUR’s actions and interests in the communities of Romanians in Hungary, members of AUR interviewed highlighted the small number of Romanians in the neighbouring country, making it challenging to consider them a distinct community. They pointed out the assimilation of the Romanian community by the Hungarian state (Ionut Neagu, Interview 2022), which has led to many ethnic Romanians no longer identifying as such and not aligning with Romanian identity. Due to these factors, AUR members believe that directly addressing the historical Romanian diaspora in Hungary would be difficult. Instead, they suggest that the most effective method would involve opening a dialogue with Hungarian authorities (Alexandru Nica, Interview 2022), although this seems challenging given the relations between Romania and Hungary.

In contrast to the issue of the historical diaspora in Hungary, AUR is vocal about the historical Romanian diaspora in Ukraine. Party members emphasize in interviews that AUR aims to protect the interests of the Romanian diaspora in Ukraine, including the right to have schools teaching in the Romanian language (Respondent 1, Interview 2022) and equal rights with Ukrainian citizens (Mitrea Dumitrina, Interview 2022). AUR also advocates for the protection of the Romanian language in Ukraine and the implementation of a bilateral agreement to adopt measures for the rights of Romanians (“AUR demands the conclusion of an Agreement regarding the protection of the Romanian language in Ukraine,” Reference Ursan2022). Furthermore, there are proposals to seek guarantees for the diaspora from the Ukrainian government after the end of the war, although the invasion of Russia in Ukraine has temporarily shifted the focus away from any intervention in support of the historical Romanian diaspora. Interviews indicate that, once the situation stabilizes, AUR plans to bring back the issue of the historical Romanian diaspora in Ukraine and its rights to the forefront (Respondent 1, Interview 2022).

AUR also addresses the issue of Romanians in the Timoc Valley region of Serbia. The party takes a firm stance, denouncing the discrimination and forced assimilation that the Romanians in the Timoc Valley face. Some of its members maintain constant connections with the Party of the Romanian People, the ethnic party of Romanians in Serbia, and with associations of Romanians fighting for the community’s rights (Claudiu Târziu Reference Târziu2022g). In terms of actions targeting this community, AUR seeks to engage in dialogue with local authorities, consistently sending parliamentarians on visits. Additionally, financial and political support is provided, with political support involving facilitating a relationship between party representatives and the Romanian diplomacy involved in relations with Serbia, either at the embassy level or at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headquarters. Interviews reveal that AUR parliamentarians are in dialogue with the Consul of Romania in Serbia, and they submit bills to the Romanian Parliament to make it easier for Romanians in the Timoc Valley to obtain Romanian citizenship (Ciprian-Titi Stoica, Interview 2022). Parliamentarians active in addressing the historical Romanian diaspora in Serbia have reported instances of Serbian intelligence infiltrations into Romanian communities in the Timoc Valley. While this topic appears to be of interest, interviewees provided limited details, and one of the AUR parliamentarians active in the historical Romanian diaspora in Serbia declined to grant an interview.

In summary, this section clarified AUR’s dual position concerning Poland, recognizing it both as a model for foreign policy and a regional leader. The party’s nuanced approach to Hungary considers its role as a model while navigating the difficult relationships with Hungarian parties. Importantly, AUR’s proactive engagement with like-minded Polish parties is an integral part of its strategy to foster alliances, foreseeing the party’s entry into the European Parliament after the 2024 elections. Expanding the focus, this section offered insights into AUR’s distinctive perspective on the historical diaspora — a theme often overlooked in both Romanian political and academic debates. The initiatives discussed in this section illustrated AUR’s proactive efforts to address the needs of the Romanian diaspora in Hungary, Ukraine, and Serbia, indicating comprehensive actions and plans dedicated to supporting these Romanian communities.