The main argument of this volume is that China's exceptional development trajectory provides a fundamental challenge to conventional models of political change. Some scholars would call such a cognitive challenge a “Black Swan.” But, referencing the revolutionary red colours of China, Heilmann instead uses the term “Red Swan” to argue that the uniqueness of the Chinese political process and approach to governance requires a rethinking of traditional models of political systems.
Conventional thinking posits that marketization of communist systems will lead to political liberalization and eventually democratization. However, there are a few dissenting voices arguing that it is not that simple. Andrew Nathan (“Authoritarian resilience,” Journal of Democracy, 14(1) [2003], 6–17) has maintained that the Chinese political system is resilient and not about to fundamentally change. Thomas Carothers (“The end of the transition paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, 11(13) [2002], 5–21) has warned that instead of a linear process from marketization to liberalization/democratization, transitional economies might just as well get stuck in the transition process. Heilmann adds to these discussions of the Chinese Communist Party-state's resilience by introducing his own concept of “experimentation under hierarchy.”
The concept denotes that much change in China takes place as a result of local experimentation, which – if successful – is often then implemented on a national scale. This is not a policy tool invented by reformers in the post-Mao era; rather it is related to the guerrilla-style policymaking conducted by Mao. By pointing to the revolutionary period (1927–1949) as well as the early PRC period as sources and inspirations of local experimentation, Heilmann provides an interesting correction to the literature on the Chinese reform process. In his opinion, the “methodology and terminology of policy experimentation” (p. 48) that are still used today date from the revolutionary period of the Chinese Communist Party and are not inventions of Deng Xiaoping and other reform-oriented leaders.
Heilmann underlines that experimentation takes place under hierarchy. Successful local reform experiments only succeed if they come to the attention of powerful leaders. In the first instance support from local leaders is crucial, but for local experiments to become national models, it is crucial to gain support from central leaders. The secret of successful reform in China is ability to be flexible and experimental while upholding central hierarchal control. Experimentation under hierarchy resembles “fragmented authoritarianism,” but the difference is that the experimentation denotes an unfolding dynamic process, whereas fragmentation has a connotation of immobility. In short “a distinctive policy circle, experimentation under hierarchy, is the key to the emergence of an unexpectedly adaptive authoritarianism in China” (p. 75).
This volume is divided in two parts. The first part consists of four chapters which are revised versions of previously published book chapters and journal articles. They provide a good overview of the experimental dimension of China's policy process. This reviewer has very few critical remarks to this part of the book. However, Heilmann appears to unduly downgrade changes in the SOE sector prior to the 1990s. Actually, already in the 1980s, business groups were formed on the basis of state assets that belonged to central ministries. Thus China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), China Petrochemical Corporation in 1983 and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1988 were carved out of the assets of the Ministry of Petroleum. Also, it appears that Heilmann underestimates the extent of private sector development during the 1980s. Huang Yasheng (Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics, Cambridge University Press, 2008) shows that this was the decade when the private economy really took off.
The last two chapters (five and six) of the volume, look at the policy process from the perspective of the central state. Heilmann argues that, contrary to the widely shared view, “the ‘demise of the plan’ has not taken place” (p. 148). In fact, according to Heilmann the planning system remains one of the driving forces in the economy and shapes relationships at all levels of government. These chapters detail how five-year plans are made and why they continue to function as macroeconomic guidelines for the economic policymaking process. Basing his argument on a good grasp of Chinese sources, Heilmann shows that the NDRC and other planning agencies are constantly engaged in working out outlines and drafts of future plans as well as evaluating current plans. Cadres are evaluated according to how well they meet planning objectives. These chapters, which are also revised versions of previously published publications, leave the impression that the Chinese economic policymaking process is much more centrally directed than the concept of experimentation under hierarchy would leave us to believe.
Finally, the volume carries an Epilogue that is an abridged revised version of an analysis that was originally published in Heilmann's recent book China's Political System (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017). The Epilogue deals with developments in the era of Xi Jinping and concludes that there are “no longer any credible or powerful incentives to permit local policy makers to embrace the political risks inherent in bottom-up policy experimentation” (p. 210). This statement, indicating a departure from the policymaking process and governance model under Deng as well as under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, opens new areas of inquiry that could be further pursued.
This is an interesting analysis of unorthodox policymaking in China and a must for everyone interested in China's unique development process. The volume is also highly recommended for students of comparative politics. One can find the original versions of the various chapters elsewhere, but it is useful to have them collected in one volume.
