Yuri Pines's The Everlasting Empire offers a sweeping analysis of “unity and monarchism” in China's political culture. Unlike other works that presume a monolithic Chinese tradition, this book emphasizes that China's tradition is not “monochromatic” (5), pointing out that “preimperial thinkers bequeathed to the empire builders … a variety of conflicting policy recommendations” (4). This book is a masterpiece in its examination of the “paradoxes and tensions” (5) underlying unity and monarchism, but it stops short of confronting the full implications of such contradictions.
Pines begins the book with the Mencian dictum “stability is in unity” (1). He suggests that the “premises of unity and monarchism … were not questioned for millennia” (3). While chapter 1 reinforces this overarching argument by discussing the ideal of “great unity,” subsequent chapters qualify this claim by examining competing premises.
Chapter 2 analyzes monarchism and the “ongoing tension between the monarch's institutional omnipotence and the courtiers' persistent desire to avoid … abuses of power” (55). Chapter 3 discusses the literati and how their dependence on rulers for political appointments was “at odds with their self-proclaimed moral superiority over the throne” (78). Chapter 4 addresses local elites and their “tensions” with the officialdom (104), arguing that the court opted “to maximize stability through relegation of many of the state's tasks to the elites” (133). Chapter 5 examines the people and the “intrinsic tensions between the ostensible respect for the commoners … and their exclusion from political processes, and between hierarchic and egalitarian mind-sets” (135). Classical thinkers such as Mencius and Xunzi even incorporated “the right to overthrow a vicious tyrant” into “the theory of monarchism” (139–40).
If Pines is flexible about the contradictions underlying monarchism, he largely follows official “ideological rigidity” (4) in his judgment of unity.
Pines reiterates the dictum “stability is in unity.” But unity on what terms? According to Mencius, unity should be achieved by the one “who has no proclivity to kill” (18). Other classical thinkers likewise referred to “the True Monarch” (51). In reality, Qin's “unification was attained through resolute military action” (19). Yet Qin's First Emperor “declared himself Sage” (55) in “propaganda efforts” (54).
Does unity by force render the Mencian dictum meaningless? Pines does not think so. He quotes the Lüshi chunqiu, a text commissioned by Qin on the eve of the final wars of unification, that “there is no turmoil greater than the absence of the Son of Heaven; without the Son of Heaven, the strong overcome the weak, the many lord it over the few, they incessantly use arms to harm each other” (44). This quote presents a stark contrast between disunity, which is seen as the recipe for turmoil, and unity, which is seen as the guarantor for peace and stability. But Pines's substantive discussions suggest a rather blurred picture.
Pines aptly points out the circular logic underlying the claim: it is aspirants to unity like Qin that produced “a nightmare of bloodshed and cruelty” (30), which, in turn, “enhanced expectations of renewed unification as the only feasible way out of mutual extermination” (30). This is because the unity ideal “required a life-and-death struggle from which only one legitimate winner could emerge … dooming the fragmented world to a bitter struggle, which allowed no real compromises, no territorial adjustments, and no sustainable peace agreements” (30). In this zero-sum competition, “extermination of the noncombatant population was permissible” (154). Thus, if there was turmoil in China's multistate eras, it was caused by the drive for unity rather than division per se.
Pines agrees that division was not always “gloomy,” pointing to “the ideological richness of the Warring States, the Buddhist flowering under the Southern and Northern Dynasties, and economic expansion and technological innovativeness under many of the post-Tang regional kingdoms” (42). Nevertheless, he immediately returns to his overall argument, that “what most people wanted was peace and stability—and those were unattainable in the ages of division” (42).
Yet Pines in fact provides evidence that peace and stability were possible in division. For instance, “seven relatively stable states” emerged in the Yangzi basin after the collapse of the Tang dynasty (28). Some “astute regional rulers, such as the kings of Wu-Yue (907–78), succeeded at times in ensuring relative stability and peace for their subjects (43). Pines says that post-Tang stability was “an exception” (43). But he also speaks of the “exceptional” ancient period (13). Most significantly, the Song dynasty, which did not unify All-under-Heaven, built a “lasting peace” with the Khitan Liao (39). Are there enough exceptions to challenge the rule?
If division is not a synonym for chaos, neither is unity a synonym for stability. The Qin-commissioned Lüshi chunqiu suggests that unity “benefits All-under-Heaven” (44) and the First Emperor declared that he put “the black-haired people… at peace” (20). In reality, Qin's rule did not benefit the people. Pines only notes the “enormous” “weight of … administrative burden” (22). The subsequent Han court faulted the Qin for enslaving the people as the emperor drafted hundreds of thousands to fight expansionist wars and build luxurious palaces and tombs. Although unified rule became less harsh from the Han on, the taxation system was “grossly unfair” (110) and the clerical subbureaucracy was “notoriously corrupt” (114). Huang Zongxi (1610–1695) thus lamented that “the ruler is the one who does the greatest harm to All-under-Heaven” (100). In the modern era, the totalitarian People's Republic could impose state-sanctioned violence without the cushion of semiautonomous local elites. In Pines's view, the Cultural Revolution was “the most devastating mass campaign in China, if not in human history” (179).
As unity was uniformly achieved and maintained by those with the “proclivity to kill,” it is questionable if it enjoyed “uniform acceptance” (19). Pines believes that Warring States populations “acquiesced in Qin's domination” (20). Yet he also writes about “the flurry of popular uprisings that brought about [Qin's] swift demise” (22), with a number of them led by descendants of former ruling houses. The prevalence of rebellions throughout Chinese history belies Pines's claim.
Indeed, why would elites and commoners alike start and join rebellions? In Pines's view, “a rebellion triggered a war of all against all” (153). Rebels would exacerbate “bloodshed and turmoil” to demonstrate that “the ruling house had lost Heaven's Mandate and should be replaced” (156). If rebellions were routinely marked by “apocalyptic … destructiveness” (146), shouldn't elites and ordinary people reason that unjust rule under unity was a lesser evil than great disorder under Heaven? In discussing the “agents of disorder” (145), Pines shares the rebels' view that “officials force the people to rebel” (149). In sympathizing with rebels, Pines implicitly concedes that unity did not guarantee stability and that turmoil was not all bad.
Pines affirms Thomas Meadows's argument that the “right to rebel” was “a chief element of … national stability” (134). Pines approves of the Chinese Communist Party's official line that “the constructive (or perhaps reconstructive) elements of the uprisings have compensated for the huge havoc they wreaked in the political and social fabric” (159). Interestingly, this view is strikingly familiar to scholars of state formation in historical sociology: rebels who could secure “a stable territorial base” would move on to “develop an administrative apparatus” and “reimpose taxation, levies, population registers” (158). Thus, “the common trajectory of most, if not all, rebellions was a shift from war and destruction toward the construction of a renovated imperial order (158).
If war could be constructive of political order, and if unity did not guarantee stability, then Pines would have to disagree with the Lüshi chunqiu's wisdom that “oneness of the ruler brings orderly rule; doubleness brings chaos” (49). The Song era, in particular, was marked by “two Sons of Heaven” but was peaceful, stable, and prosperous (Jing-shen Tao, Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations [University of Arizona Press, 1988]). Unity could be more desirable only when it is achieved and maintained by the Sage.
As Chinese have waited in vain for the Sage for over two millennia, the more realistic alternative today is liberal democracy with institutionalized checks and balances. Pines dismisses “Western democracy” and praises the Chinese leadership for acting as an effective “collective emperor” (169–70). But “Western democracy” was born of the need to make state-society bargains amid interstate competition—and this military basis of citizenship rights existed in divided China. A Pew survey released in October 2012 shows that 52 percent of the respondents in China like American ideas about democracy while 29 percent dislike them. We should be mindful of the “substantial biases” in the official view of Chinese political culture (6).
