Arguing against a scholarly tradition that sees Chinese law as a purely secular instrument of despotic power, Jiang Yonglin (translator of The Great Ming Code: Da Ming lü [Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004]) seeks to place that tradition in the context of a China-centered Chinese history. The result enriches our understanding both of the Chinese legal tradition and of the early Ming.
The book is divided into six chapters. After raising the general issue of a connection between religion and law in imperial China (chapter 1), Jiang examines the cosmology that informed Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang and his closest advisors when reformulating and revising the Code (chapter 2). The next three chapters focus on the ways in which the empire's most authoritative legal document regulated the world of the spirits, the world of men, and the activities of officials (who play a crucial mediating role between the first two realms). The conclusion then argues that, once we look (as we must) “at individuals and institutions in the context of their own values and practices” (p. 179), any attempt to portray the imperial legal tradition as an arbitrary instrument of state power becomes untenable.
Jiang has no trouble demonstrating that Zhu Yuanzhang and many of his most trusted advisors believed implicitly in the reality and influence of the superhuman. Modern historians often read passages in which these concerns are evident as mere figures of speech, seeking to understand the “real” message behind them (when they do not simply ignore them). Jiang insists that they be taken seriously: the layout of the capital and its offices had to correspond with the pattern of the heavens (pp. 22–3); if a planet invaded a lunar mansion, it was urgent evidence of trouble in a specific quarter (pp. 26–7; pp 108–09; p. 145); if the emperor experienced discomfort, it must be the result of sorcery (p. 97). Offices were relocated, troops dispatched, officials cashiered, artisans executed as a result. These beliefs constituted a coherent religious world-view to which many if not all members of the early Ming elite subscribed. Far from mere rhetorical embroidery, the drive to maintain the unity of Heaven, Earth, and Man, and the need to accord with heavenly principle and human sentiment, shaped official action and government policy.
Law was then neither secular nor arbitrary. The provisions of the code embodied an order which was inherent in the nature of the cosmos. It was not however a self-actualizing order. The sage ruler (and, in practice, his officialdom) had to intervene to establish boundaries and maintain hierarchies which actualized that order. Law was the means to achieve this end.
The Ming founder saw himself as engaged not merely in expelling the Mongols and consolidating dynastic power but in carrying out urgently needed social reform. Mongol rule was condemned for its laxity and for its failure even at court to uphold the five cardinal relationships on which civilized existence was based (p. 132). Law in this context was not merely an instrument to punish the guilty and deter the feckless but to educate the good. Focusing on the key issue of marriage, Jiang shows how Zhu denounced the Mongols for the decay of Chinese customs. Yet three of the four abuses (lavish dowries, same-surname marriage, cross-cousin marriage) long predated Mongol rule. The fourth—the levirate—was a steppe practice tantamount to incest in the eyes of classically educated Chinese. The Mongols had however prohibited Han Chinese from adopting the practice—and the laws the Ming incorporated to stamp it out were originally issued by the Yuan (pp. 134–39)!
If the Ming founder's sense that reform was urgent is well-known, so is his willingness to impose extralegal sanctions when and as he saw fit. In such cases, there was little concern for due process, and the punishments inflicted were often cruel. Jiang is certainly aware of these aspects of early Ming law, discussing the most notorious of the cases in passing. At one point (p. 173), he cites a 1963 article by Fu Yiling suggesting that many of those executed as part of the Hu Weiyong and Lan Yu purges more or less deserved their punishment. More broadly, he notes that the founder ordered his heirs not to resort to the extraordinary measures he had employed. The Code, in Jiang's view, was to be “a powerful device for maintaining social boundaries, even for restraining the arbitrary forces of the emperor and his civil and military representatives” (p. 13; see also pp. 173–74, 178).
The skeptical reader may well wonder, how powerful?
Thus, while one can agree that “[w]hether or not …religious rules were practiced cannot change their fundamental orientation” (p. 178), the degree to which a China-centered Chinese history shows that late imperial law effectively protected individuals or restrained the arbitrary exercise of state power remains open to question, even in light of this learned and thoughtful work.
