Elizabeth Beaumont’s insightful overview offers me the chance to clarify two aspects of my book, one of which relates to the figure of representative democracy as purely political procedural, and the other to the epistemic theory of democracy as mutation of that figure. I use the analogy of “figure,” not of “health.” The latter is classical in the abundant literature on “the crisis of democracy.” But crisis is not an anomaly in democracy, a political system in which citizens devise procedures and institutions to deal with critical breaks of consensus and the need to make authoritative decisions. Since I presume that democracy entails crisis, I avoid using the classical medical analogy and opt instead for a dis-figure, where democracy’s flourishing form is made of individual secret ballot, majority rule, and institutions consistent with the principle of basic political equality (of vote and voice).
The various constitutional orders that democracy adopted throughout its history are mutations of this recognizable physiognomy. Although unpleasant, the mutations I analyze (epistemic, populist, and plebiscitarian) are internal to the diarchic nature of democracy, which, I argue, consists of will and opinion. Given this premise, I criticize the epistemic theory, although to be able to contain my argument within a single chapter I may have been guilty of simplification.
Epistemic democracy argues that purely political, procedural theories of democracy fail to establish a moral duty to obey collective decisions, because such a duty can stem only from the presumption that political outcomes correspond to an objective standard of normative “truth.” The word “true” is the core of my objection, which intends to reclaim the specificity of political deliberation (hence, of the verisimilar) and the reason why democracy needs a public arena within which each feels free to participate and treats others as equals, and in which the sources of opinions and information can lead each to make up his or her mind, and change it endlessly. Liberty is the motor of this mechanism, rather than the search for truth.
The epistemic rendering of procedural democracy mirrors two tendencies well established in political theory: the identification of legitimacy with unanimity and the identification of rationality with a narrow model of yes/no verdict. Yet we do not need unanimity to have legitimacy based on consent. What we need is an institutional arrangement that allows us to practice a deliberative search for answers to the problems we devise, knowing that no answer is the last one. We need it because and insofar as we accept that our opinions are uncertain, incomplete, incoherent, and actually conflicting as they are based on cognitive differences and even contradictions. The idea of limited rationality is betrayed by the epistemic twist. Politics as well as deliberation presume a model of rationality that is endogenously discursive and in need of openness and freedom, because its goal is not truth in the epistemic sense (in the book, I refer thus to the classical view of politics as rhetorical in character).
The same argument that works for democracy works for representation, which cannot exist if we exclude the public process of opinion formation and communication among citizens. This is the figure of democracy as diarchy and of the representative form of politics as well. Valuing democratic procedures because they keep open the possibility of renewing the debate and dissent openly and freely contradicts the epistemic approach. Moreover, it vindicates the uniqueness of politics, a practice of power that may need cognitive support but is not itself a chapter in epistemic activity.
