This edited volume should attract the attention of both political scholars who specialize in regional studies on Southeast Asia and legal scholars who specialize in constitutions of Southeast Asian states. This book consists of four major parts. For each major discussion, four introductory chapters (Chapters 2, 5, 8, and 12) provide comprehensive overviews of the issues in constitutional politics in each of the four areas of contestation, as elaborated below. While all the countries are not given equal coverage, the important and critical issues in each instance have been given due attention. Needless to say, the book is a must-read for scholars interested in politics and constitutions in Southeast Asia.

It will be useful to read Chapter 1 first, because it presents the structure of the book and introduces readers to particular perspectives that will be applied to the analysis of politics and constitutions in Southeast Asia. The editors view the following four points as of critical importance to constitutional practice and regard them as areas of contestation: (1) constitutional drafting and design; (2) individual and religious rights; (3) the role of the military; and (4) the rule of law, courts, and justice. These four points accurately apply to the context of the constitutions in Southeast Asia, because some countries in this region still have problems related to colonial history, religion, political regimes, and a strong military. Although some readers might want to concentrate on written constitutional documents, or to propose points other than the four adopted in this book, no one can deny that the editors have presented important perspectives that capture the essential features of the constitutional politics in this region.

This book should be read not only by scholars interested in Southeast Asia, but also by all those who study politics and constitutions, regardless of which country is the research focus, for its implications are not confined to Southeast Asian countries, but are relevant to countries all over the world. Dynamic changes in constitutions and constitutional politics in Southeast Asian countries can be seen during these past 25 years. Despite hardships, these countries have tried to change their constitutions, strengthen human rights provisions, and put institutional safeguards in place to guarantee those rights. Moreover, since these constitutions were promulgated by authoritarian governments, “constitutions without constitutionalism” can be observed. As executive dominance, military interventions, and human rights abuse have been, and continue to be, prevalent in Southeast Asia, constitutions in this region are classified as a nominal constitution or a semantic constitution, which many Western countries have moved past. Therefore, all constitutional scholars can contemplate the various dynamic changes that have taken place in constitutional politics in this region without having to use a time machine. Not only endemic theory, but also general theory can be learned from Southeast Asia, and there seems to be room for researchers in other areas to contribute to studies in this region. This has already been proven by Croissant, who applies various research methods or conceptions in analyzing comparative constitutions in Chapter 2.

In every nation, taming the military and realizing true civilian control through the constitution are difficult to achieve. The challenges experienced by three countries facing this difficult problem are illustrated and analyzed in three chapters in Part II of this book. In the eyes of a researcher whose country’s constitution declares that no war potential should be maintained (Article 9, which is well known in general), establishing a new constitution while retaining existing military power seems impossible. In fact, as Chambers points out in Chapter 5, though security forces have become institutionalized under constitutions, security officials have received constitutional privileges and gained more political influence in Thailand, the Philippines, and Myanmar. Since the situation of constitution-building in Southeast Asian states is quite different from that in Japan, Japanese practice in this field might be less helpful for these three countries.

Southeast Asian states can be viewed as having recently accepted universal human rights values, and committed to the international human rights system after first refusing it and insisting on Asian values, which are unique and do not fit in with Western ideals. Bünte asserts that this view is too optimistic (but not pessimistic, because of the hope existing in the domestic civil societies and the establishment of National Human Rights Institutions) and that the deep gulf between human rights rhetoric and human rights practice should be focused on. According to him, while these states have rhetorically and tactically agreed with human rights principles, they still have significant problems in this area. Therefore, as far as human rights are concerned, they still have a nominal constitution or a semantic constitution. If the National Human Rights Institutions succeed in accomplishing their objective in this region, there will probably be some influence on countries that do not yet have any domestic human rights organizations independently from governments.

Although it was believed that judicialization of politics was unlikely to occur in the Southeast Asian countries over 20 years ago, these states have changed their constitutions, maintained empowered courts, pursued liberal values, and promoted the rule of law in this time period. It looks like a good change for liberal constitutionalism, because it is generally assumed that courts are critical to the success of constitutional governments as they promote the rule of law, constrain the government, and judicialize governance. However, Dressel calls attention to the negative aspects of judicialization of politics in relation to Southeast Asia. In fact, in some of the countries in this region, it was reported that courts have subverted the rule of law and undermined mechanisms for accountability in order to serve narrow interests. Courts sometimes act as supporters of illiberal and authoritarian governments, depending on the regime, and the Thai Constitutional Court has served as a prime example. In this regard, as Dressel describes it, “[w]hat is happening in Southeast Asia offers new theoretical and empirical insights for the scholarly debate” (p. 266). As a consequence, this book clearly appeals to readers interested in politics and constitutions in other regions.

Finally, straying for a moment from the main subject of this book, the reviewer would like to offer a different opinion from Dressel’s on the Supreme Court of Japan. Chapter 12 tells us that the Supreme Court of Japan has reluctantly declared statutes to be unconstitutional in a few inconsequential cases and avoided ruling on political issues. However, the reviewer, as a specialist on the Japanese constitution, would like to emphasize that the Supreme Court of Japan is no longer passive, but active, which sometimes confuses the government of Japan, especially in the fields of election law and family law, and the dynamic judicial reform established around the year 2000 (which is a significant change in democratic principles and should be recognized as a de facto constitutional change) deserves more than just passing notice. This is not to deny the overall conclusion provided by the author in this chapter. The reviewer also recognizes that it is the responsibility of Japanese scholars to introduce contemporary constitutional politics in Japan into the global scholarly debate, because English-language literature on constitutional politics in Japan is limited, as is that on Southeast Asian countries.