Perceptions of parliamentary weakness are prevalent, particularly as an influential executive branch emerges from a parliamentary system dominated by a single party. In such contexts, legislatures often are seen as reactive and subordinate to executive-branch elites. In South Africa’s parliamentary system, the executive branch is drawn from the legislature, which means that the cabinet sits in the legislature and needs the confidence of its majority. Until the national elections on May 29, 2024, the African National Congress (ANC)—as the dominant party—consistently secured stable governments and legislative-branch majorities without interruption in the past three decades of democratic consolidation. However, this dominance also weakened the Parliament’s ability to effectively scrutinize the executive branch, which has played a significant role in the prevalence of chronic corruption and maladministration in the country during the past decade.
Until the national elections on May 29, 2024, the African National Congress (ANC)—as the dominant party—consistently secured stable governments and legislative-branch majorities without interruption in the past three decades of democratic consolidation. However, this dominance also weakened the Parliament’s ability to effectively scrutinize the executive branch, which has played a significant role in the prevalence of chronic corruption and maladministration in the country during the past decade.
Constitutional provisions formally bind the Parliament, but practical constraints frequently stem from the party system shaped by the electoral system and the nature of society—in this case, a fragmented society. Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the electoral system has been a closed party-list proportional representation. It has national and regional districts (each consisting of 200 seats) with a Droop quota (i.e., minimum number of votes needed for a party to guarantee it will win at least one seat in the legislature) for the allocation of 400 seats without a legal threshold. South Africa’s party system historically exhibited an effective number of legislative parties index rate of 2.57 until 2024, which indicates the presence of more than two major parties in Parliament. These parties included the ANC as the dominant party; the Democratic Alliance, which held the role of official opposition from 2004 to 2024; and the Economic Freedom Fighters, which emerged as the third largest party in 2014.
In institutional terms, the South African Parliament retains a Westminster-style system inherited from British colonization. As a result, parliamentary parties are structured around party caucuses and whips, and the chair of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) is held by an opposition party. Likewise, this Parliament exhibits a substantial institutionalization in which specialized committees have jurisdiction over government departments. They are vested with the power to gather evidence (i.e., to call witnesses and require the submission of written reports); to initiate amendments on legislation after the first reading on the floor; and to determine their agendas. South African committees typically are composed of only 10 to 20 members. Compared to larger committees, they possess a stronger capacity to hold the government accountable. Except for the Joint Committee on Intelligence, all committee meetings are open to the public unless they are declared closed. Parliament allocates time for questioning ministers and the president. The agenda for the business conducted in the National Assembly is determined by the Program Committee, wherein each parliamentary party is entitled to proportional representation. This ensures that every party has at least one representative on this committee.
For the duration of the previous legislative-branch term (2019–2024), the National Assembly was composed of 25 portfolio committees and four standing committees. The chairs of all committees (except SCOPA) were held by members of the governing party. The party representation at committees is proportional to their representation in the National Assembly. If specialization through parliamentary committees is at the heart of institutionalization, then South Africa qualifies as an institutionalized parliament. However, in terms of scrutiny, shortcomings have been identified within the committees (e.g., gathering and examining evidence), which may require an explanation from department heads. These deficiencies include instances in which the government frequently provides vague or inadequate responses that fail to address the substance of the questions posed. Additionally, party mechanisms (e.g., study groups) are used to assist and train Members of Parliament (MPs) about matters related to executive-branch departments and to instruct committee members on party positions, thereby ensuring a cohesive approach when participating on portfolio committees. In terms of policy making, only half of the bills were amended within these committees in the previous legislative term.
Parliament’s Performance in Constraining Government
During the initial and subsequent democratic parliaments (i.e., 1994–2004), the primary focus of the institution was on repealing apartheid legislation and passing new laws aligned with democratic principles. During this period, Parliament passed 817 bills. Nevertheless, the oversight function of Parliament received comparatively less attention amid the legislative-branch effort. Since 1999, there has been a growing demand in the country for reform to empower Parliament to exercise greater control over the executive branch. This includes reforms and adjustments to enable the National Assembly to use the power that it already has more effectively, as well as external reforms that advocate for the adoption of a constituency-based electoral system. Initially resistant to these demands, the government eventually made some concessions, leading to various changes in parliamentary structures and procedures. In particular, in 2003, Parliament established a Task Team on Oversight and Accountability through the Joint Rules Committee that was tasked with studying the constitutional mandates related to oversight. The Task Team conducted three focus groups (i.e., projects, budget, and committees) to develop an oversight model aligned with the constitution and Parliament’s new strategic vision. The Oversight and Accountability Model, officially adopted by Parliament on March 19, 2008, enhanced existing tools of parliamentary oversight, integrated components of the new oversight model with existing components, and bolstered Parliament’s capacity to fulfill its oversight function.
Despite these initiatives to strengthen the institution, the South African Parliament largely has failed to fulfill its oversight and accountability mandate. This was especially evident during the past decade, which was characterized by rampant corruption within the state and the administration, commonly referred to as “state capture.” In response to these challenges, in 2018, the president appointed a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of corruption and fraud in the public sector. The Judicial Commission’s findings concluded that parliamentary oversight often proved ineffective—even when there was a willingness to oversee the executive branch. The final report, presented by the Judicial Commission in 2021, included recommendations (Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa 2021, 461) meant to fortify oversight and enhance accountability within the legislative branch. The recommendations included procedures related to National Assembly resolutions arising from oversight activities and responses; executive-branch reports and submissions to Parliament; executive-branch attendance; selection of office-bearers in state institutions; establishment of an oversight committee over the presidency; and appointments of committee chairpersons. In response, the Rules Committee of the National Assembly convened on November 23, 2022, to review the Judicial Commission’s recommendations. Currently, the parliamentary Rules Committee is engaged in deliberations regarding these recommendations.
Conclusion
Certain types of reactive legislative institutions may show varying levels of institutionalization. However, the correlation suggesting that institutionalized parliaments possess greater capability to restrain the executive branch than less institutionalized parliaments is not supported in the South African case. As a result of South Africa’s party-dominance system, the legislative branch’s capacity to constrain the executive branch has been significantly jeopardized. South Africa’s Parliament demonstrates a substantial institutionalization in which specialized committees have jurisdiction over government departments. Moreover, they are vested with the power to initiate and amend legislation, collect evidence, and determine their agendas. However, despite the level of specialization exhibited by committees, the Parliament nevertheless is subordinated to the government, which—operating through a disciplined parliamentary majority—can minimize the Parliament’s capacity to constrain the executive branch. Thus, in South Africa—where the executive branch is selected from among the MPs and consists primarily of leaders from a dominant majority party—the legislative-branch oversight has been weakened by MPs who are reluctant to scrutinize or hold accountable a government led by their own party’s leaders. Moreover, the current closed party-list proportional representation electoral system intensifies party discipline because MPs often retain their seats based on the decisions of the party leadership.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The author declares that there are no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.
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