If Steven Pinker were an evangelist, this book would be his revelation and Science, Reason, Humanism, and Progress his horsemen. Those collectively are the principles he calls the Enlightenment, which he defends against the forces of pessimism, cynicism, and faithlessness in modern society. Drawing from historical statistics and contemporary academic scholarship, Pinker demonstrates that, in contrast to conventional wisdom and popular media accounts about a deteriorating state of the world, humanity has never had it so good, things until recently were much worse, and life will likely continue to improve.
Divided into three parts, the book opens with a brief outline of the Enlightenment ideals that emerged in the late eighteenth century, then delves through an exhaustive list of topics on the human condition that have shown progress over time (particularly since the eighteenth century), and concludes with amplifications of each of the three remaining pillars of Enlightenment thinking. Unlike other texts on the Enlightenment, Pinker for the most part eschews philosophical jargon and esoteric theories, writing in plain and elegant prose with surprising anecdotes and the occasional joke leavening his discussions. Also unusual is Pinker’s empirical and quantitative approach to the topic, perhaps to the chagrin of humanities scholars, but consistent with current scholarship in the social sciences and economic history.
Differences in discipline and method aside, does Pinker achieve his aims to show how much has improved since the Enlightenment and that its ideals are worth defending? Yes and maybe. Assuming the data are reliable and consistently measured, the evidence is overwhelming that life in general has gotten better since the eighteenth century. Humans are living an additional 40 years, with improvements in medical technology further extending our expiration dates. Our lives are also healthier (less polio) and wealthier (more refrigerators). These changes are not only absolute, but relative: one may dismiss the observation that extreme poverty levels are at historic lows (10 percent of the world’s population versus 90 percent 200 years ago) given outliers in the upper distribution, but in recent years the global Gini coefficient on per capita income inequality has declined. Besides material gains, more people live in freer societies that engage in fewer and less bloody wars, have less murderous neighborhoods, drive safer cars, mix more freely between races, and discriminate less against women and homosexuals. People now are measurably happier. Even if statistical averages can obfuscate differences between groups, and many of Pinker’s trends vary by time period and country, most point toward improvement. Pinker even slyly counters the bugbear of environmental degradation and climate change with figures showing less deforestation, more land and water protection, and falling carbon intensity per unit of output.
Marshalling this much information in a coherent defense of the Enlightenment is a heroic task, and the quantitative sections are largely illuminating. One may wonder why some figures are weighted or not by population or whether axes measured in levels exaggerate impact given changes in group numbers, but the sources are available for distrustful readers to verify. Less convincing are some general premises of the book such as the assumption that there is agreement on what is at stake and whether the various markers of progress identified are due to the Enlightenment and thus represent a defense of its ideals.
A crucial proposition made early in the book (and amplified in the concluding chapter) is that utilitarianism, the greatest amount of good for the greatest number, should be the metric to gauge human flourishing. As a moral construct, it has the advantages of appearing uncontroversial, egalitarian, and independent of space and time. By this type of “progress accounting,” the world indeed is quantifiably better. However, despite its appeal to economists who think of people as representative agents, utilitarianism exists outside the lived experience of most (and would deprive actuaries of their livelihood). Why should an average rich world citizen, much less one recently laid off from a factory, be heartened that global inequality is decreasing, that he will not be stricken with smallpox, and that his children will outlive him even longer than he will survive his parents? Most people consider themselves above average, which belies the utilitarian’s claim that one sees no difference between oneself and others or that the welfare of a stranger is equivalent to that of a family member or friend. In stating that economic stagnation and authoritarian populism are the two main threats to continued progress, Pinker takes for granted that both occur within a particular time and setting. Is it plausible to assume people can dispassionately evaluate setbacks as temporary deviations from long-run global trends?
Context is also important because it relates to a disconnect between Pinker’s motivation in writing this book, which is to have people to think more critically and to evaluate evidence objectively, and the chances his message will get through. No matter how credible data and analysis are, if the book’s tone ranges from earnest to polemical then Pinker will repel those he thinks may need his corrective most. Readers with an interest, the means, and the leisure to finish this book are probably already sympathetic; others may simply not bother or care.
A more fundamental concern about this book is one that Pinker repeatedly states in the text, that correlation is not causation. Casual readers would be forgiven to think that the Enlightenment was a causal factor behind the progress that took place since. One can make a case for (Granger) causality between a collection of writings and thinkers in nineteenth century Europe and subsequent development spreading from there to the rest of the world, but the same can be said for the contemporaneous Industrial Revolution, the older Protestant Reformation, or even the early millennial “discovery” of the New World and the Black Death. Many of the positive outcomes Pinker observes have direct relationships with industrialization, resource access, trade, technological change, and institutional development, all cumulative processes that do not have precise origins. If the Enlightenment represented a singular paradigm shift in scientific thinking and the application of reason in specific disciplines and institutions, then well-defined, testable hypotheses are needed demonstrate such a causal relationship. Unfortunately, this may be unrealistic given the broad scope of the Enlightenment, whose parameters are still subject to debate. Moreover, basing his argument in terms of Enlightenment principles instead of specifics allows Pinker to sidestep criticism about historical context and practice (e.g., Thomas Jefferson was inconveniently both a slaveowner and the author of the American Declaration of Independence that enshrined life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness). How one reconciles the lofty aims of wealthy white men with the materially and emotionally salient consequences of post-Enlightenment imperialism and military confrontation remains unclear for the modern reader.
Do not let the above dissuade from reading this book, however, as it is an inspiring piece of scholarship. With 75 figures, 1,288 endnotes, and 1,123 works cited, Enlightenment Now could be used simply as a reference, but it exceeds the sum of its parts: readable and authoritative, it brings together a dazzling wealth of data and research across the disciplines of economics, history, psychology, and philosophy. As a follow-up to Pinker’s earlier work The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (London: Penguin Books, 2011), it is an ambitious and worthy successor in letter and spirit.
