In this important and pioneering work, Wolfgang Kraushaar, now the leading historian of the West German new left and its aftermath in the 1970s, examines a wave of terrorist attacks against Jews and Israeli-associated targets in West Germany in February 1970. He offers an abundance of circumstantial evidence that suggests that the source of these attacks was the extreme left, rather than the extreme right. In the process he challenges two pieces of leftist conventional wisdom, first that the West German government overreacted to the threat of terror, and second that the West German radical left of the 1960s and 1970s made significant contributions to dealing with the memory of the Holocaust and fighting against antisemitism. Drawing on extensive research in recently available police and judicial files as well as his firm knowledge of the mentalities and personalities of the radical left in those years, he tells a quite different story. It is one of local, regional, and national police and judicial authorities who were unable to bring anyone to trial; of a national government that adopted a policy of appeasement toward Palestinian terror; and of a West German radical left that was more focused on hatred of Israel than on the much discussed coming to terms with the Nazi past and the Holocaust.
The attacks began with an attempted hijacking of an El Al airplane at Munich's Riem airport on February 10, 1973, one that was thwarted by the plane's Israeli pilot. One of the Israeli passengers was killed by a hand grenade thrown by one of the terrorists. On February 13, an arsonist poured gasoline on several floors of stairs at a Jewish community center that also served as a home for the aged. S/he then set it on fire and created an inferno in which seven elderly Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were killed. Six were burned to death or were asphyxiated, and a seventh died after jumping from a window to escape the flames. Despite a massive police investigation, West German authorities brought no indictments in the case. There was no trial. The crime remains unsolved. The terrorist wave of February 1970 also included two attacks on planes headed for Israel. On February 21, a bomb exploded on an Austrian Air Lines flight from Frankfurt bound for Tel Aviv with a stop in Vienna. The pilot was able to fly the damaged plane back to the Frankfurt airport. No one was injured and no lives were lost. On the same day, the terrorists had more success. A bomb that exploded in the luggage compartment of a Swiss Air flight from Zurich to Tel Aviv caused the plane to crash, killing all forty-seven passengers and crew.
Three of the four Palestinian terrorists who attacked the El Al flights at Munich-Riem airport were captured. Kraushaar presents compelling evidence from the extensive government investigations that indicated that the attacks at the Munich airport were carried out by members of the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), both of which were connected to the umbrella organization known as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). West German police also identified the leader of the plot to place bombs on the planes as someone with links to the PLO. The three perpetrators captured in the act at the Munich airport were freed in a negotiation following a subsequent airplane hijacking and hostage taking. Those suspected of placing the bombs on the Austrian Air Lines and Swiss Air flights managed to elude West German authorities and were never brought to trial.
Kraushaar's fine work in the files of the Munich, Bavarian, and West German national police and judicial authorities indicates that they had extensive evidence about a network connecting West German leftist radicals to Palestinian terrorist organizations. He uses those massive files as well as the public record of the writings of radical leftist figures to reconstruct the beliefs, mentalities, connections, and activities of the anti-Israeli currents within groups that stood at the beginning of the coming decades of leftist terrorism. Several West German leftists—Dieter Kunzelmann, Ingrid Siepman, and Fritz Teufel—figure prominently in this work. Kunzelmann and Teufel led the far left Tupamaro collectives in West Berlin and in Munich. Siepman communicated with them from the Middle East where she was in touch with various branches of the PLO.
Kunzelmann attracted attention for a 1969 article in the West Berlin leftist journal Agit 883 in which he described Zionism as a “fascist ideology” and called for replacing “our simple philosemitism with clear solidarity with AL FATAH, which has taken up the fight against the Third Reich of yesterday and today and their consequences” (p. 309). In a sentence that Kraushaar made part of the title to this book, Kunzelmann asked when the West German left would “finally begin the organized battle against the holy cow, Israel. When will we relieve the fighting Palestinian people with our practical internationalism? The grenades at the airport in [Munich] Riem only lead to one criticism: the desperate death commandos should be replaced by better organized commandos which should be directed by us and thus could intervene more effectively.” Kunzelmann wrote that “the slogan, ‘Amis out of Vietnam’ has never been transformed into the phrase ‘Out of Germany’ (Raus aus Deutschland)” (p. 312). Kraushaar writes, “Kunzelmann left no doubt that he wanted to fight, persecute, and deport Jews. Persecution of the Jews was, for him, nothing other than practical anti-imperialism” (p. 313). In his past work on the West German new left, Kraushaar has argued that theory and practice of terrorism was not peripheral to some of its central traditions and personalities. In this work he makes a similar argument regarding the importance of anti-Zionism and willingness to countenance attacks on Jewish and Israeli-related targets within West Germany for the radical left in the aftermath of the Six Day War of June 1967.
Kraushaar's second major theme concerns the response of the West German government in the Brandt era to the beginnings of leftist terror. He attributes the absence of indictments and prosecutions in these early years of terrorism to a policy of “appeasement.” There was, he argues, “a lack of political will to carry out appropriate prosecution and punishment” (p. 689). Instead, the search for justice and the truth became subordinate to a “neue Nahostpolitik” that placed greater priority on sustaining contacts with Arafat and the PLO in the early 1970s than with bringing Palestinian terrorists to justice. The result of such a policy was to “turn to deportations to undercut judicial prosecution of Palestinians associated with terrorism.” The attack on the Munich Olympics two years after those of February 1970 showed “that the appeasement policy toward the PLO and the organizations associated with it not only failed. Rather it led directly to a disaster” at the Olympics (pp. 691–692).
While the truth about who perpetrated the arson attack of February 13, 1970, in Munich remains to be revealed, Kraushaar offers a power circumstantial case that its perpetrator or perpetrators came from the milieu of the West German far left. He has made excellent use of archival and published material as well as more than forty oral interviews to depict its personalities and mentalities as well as its connections to Palestinian organizations that openly supported terrorism. Historians have much to learn from Kraushaar's courageous and important book.
