Mahr & Csibra (M&C) conclude that episodic memory functions to justify claims about past events in collaborative cultural discourse. This implies the emergence of episodic memory from a more general “semantic” base. In contrast, the developmental account here assumes an initial experiential self-memory base and the emergence of semantic memory in contrast to self-conscious experiential memory. This account enables understanding the emergence of long-term autobiographical memory, unique to human life and critical to a theory of human memory in cultural context but not addressed by M&C.
M&C argue against the claim that the key feature of episodic memory is its orientation to and use in future planning. I concur; however, I assume that all long-term memory, in humans and other animals, is oriented to the future, in anticipation of an event's recurrence in whole or in part (Nelson Reference Nelson1993). Episodic memory is not unique in this characterization, although it is useful in future planning.
The developmental story views the emergence of different memory kinds from early experiential memory of infancy. Ample research now exists, revealing that infants as young as 9 months may remember details of an experienced scene for a month or more. Such “prelanguage memory” (in development or in evolution) is necessarily self-memory – memory as experienced by the self. Yet specific experiential memories of infancy and very early childhood – if they exist – are later “lost” in the sense of “childhood amnesia” – the inability of older children and adults to recall memories from the first three years of life. This initial lack contrasts with the ability of most people to recall some episodic memories from later years for many decades. As the latter ability is the essence of episodic memory, its emergence in childhood is an important clue to the episodic function issue addressed by M&C.
The proposal here is that memory (initially confined to self experience) divides in early childhood into episodic (self experiences) and semantic (memory from other sources). The episodic component develops the character of a definite self in experience and of a specific past, the two components identified by Tulving (Reference Tulving1983b). The semantic component then carries general information, whether attained through personal or other source.
Objectively, all infant memory is self-memory, and by virtue of the fact that it is memory, it is about the past; but infants are not conscious of these characteristics. These components develop in childhood as both time concepts (seasons, days and time of day, years) and a self-concept are acquired and elaborated in cultural contexts. The claim here is that both episodic and semantic memory emerge from their source in infant memory as the child engages in social cultural communication through language. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that children learn to elaborate their memories of experience through conversations about the past with parents and other adults (Nelson & Fivush 2004). In these and other exchanges the idea of a unique self, contrasted with the selves of others, becomes salient between 3 and 5 years.
The distinctive source of information, leading to the differentiation of my versus other knowledge develops during this same period (Nelson Reference Nelson2007). The child's introduction to culturally shared knowledge through language – stories, recounted events, general information sharing, videos, and other sources – serves as a catalyst for the eventual emergence of the two “memories”: mine and others' or episodic and semantic, the latter preserving information conveyed by others as well as general knowledge of events.
One of the main claims of M&C is that a memory is not preserved as an episode, but is reconstructed in use. This claim is not conflict with the developmental story: In any case, the elements of the memory that are brought into consciousness must be accessible and realizable as belonging to a particular time and place.
Long-term autobiographical memory that most people in many cultures retain throughout life becomes more understandable in the developmental view where episodic memory has personal value. Episodic memory is focused on self-experience – the self is an important component giving meaning to the experience. These memories have the characteristic of all episodic memories, but they are selected from many briefly retained episodic experiences and constitute the makings of a kind of story of one's life (Nelson Reference Nelson and Wagoner2017). It is these memories, some from decades in the past, that people often report as being not simply recalled but “re-experienced.” There is no generally accepted theory of their selection from among many that are lost over time, brief or extended.
This accumulation of episodic memories is a vital part of that system and demands explanation but is not accounted for by M&C. A general cultural communicative use of memory is sharing information among those in one's cultural group. With language (for the individual or in the group), what had been restricted to personal memory can be shared to everyone's advantage. Your episodic memory then becomes my semantic memory.
This much is in tune with the claims of M&C. But long-term episodic memory – autobiographical memory – seems to require further explanation. It brings the self as a person with a history into the cultural milieu, a contribution with the eventual possibility of its use in history, biography, group planning, poetry, novels, and more.
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Mahr & Csibra (M&C) conclude that episodic memory functions to justify claims about past events in collaborative cultural discourse. This implies the emergence of episodic memory from a more general “semantic” base. In contrast, the developmental account here assumes an initial experiential self-memory base and the emergence of semantic memory in contrast to self-conscious experiential memory. This account enables understanding the emergence of long-term autobiographical memory, unique to human life and critical to a theory of human memory in cultural context but not addressed by M&C.
M&C argue against the claim that the key feature of episodic memory is its orientation to and use in future planning. I concur; however, I assume that all long-term memory, in humans and other animals, is oriented to the future, in anticipation of an event's recurrence in whole or in part (Nelson Reference Nelson1993). Episodic memory is not unique in this characterization, although it is useful in future planning.
The developmental story views the emergence of different memory kinds from early experiential memory of infancy. Ample research now exists, revealing that infants as young as 9 months may remember details of an experienced scene for a month or more. Such “prelanguage memory” (in development or in evolution) is necessarily self-memory – memory as experienced by the self. Yet specific experiential memories of infancy and very early childhood – if they exist – are later “lost” in the sense of “childhood amnesia” – the inability of older children and adults to recall memories from the first three years of life. This initial lack contrasts with the ability of most people to recall some episodic memories from later years for many decades. As the latter ability is the essence of episodic memory, its emergence in childhood is an important clue to the episodic function issue addressed by M&C.
The proposal here is that memory (initially confined to self experience) divides in early childhood into episodic (self experiences) and semantic (memory from other sources). The episodic component develops the character of a definite self in experience and of a specific past, the two components identified by Tulving (Reference Tulving1983b). The semantic component then carries general information, whether attained through personal or other source.
Objectively, all infant memory is self-memory, and by virtue of the fact that it is memory, it is about the past; but infants are not conscious of these characteristics. These components develop in childhood as both time concepts (seasons, days and time of day, years) and a self-concept are acquired and elaborated in cultural contexts. The claim here is that both episodic and semantic memory emerge from their source in infant memory as the child engages in social cultural communication through language. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that children learn to elaborate their memories of experience through conversations about the past with parents and other adults (Nelson & Fivush 2004). In these and other exchanges the idea of a unique self, contrasted with the selves of others, becomes salient between 3 and 5 years.
The distinctive source of information, leading to the differentiation of my versus other knowledge develops during this same period (Nelson Reference Nelson2007). The child's introduction to culturally shared knowledge through language – stories, recounted events, general information sharing, videos, and other sources – serves as a catalyst for the eventual emergence of the two “memories”: mine and others' or episodic and semantic, the latter preserving information conveyed by others as well as general knowledge of events.
One of the main claims of M&C is that a memory is not preserved as an episode, but is reconstructed in use. This claim is not conflict with the developmental story: In any case, the elements of the memory that are brought into consciousness must be accessible and realizable as belonging to a particular time and place.
Long-term autobiographical memory that most people in many cultures retain throughout life becomes more understandable in the developmental view where episodic memory has personal value. Episodic memory is focused on self-experience – the self is an important component giving meaning to the experience. These memories have the characteristic of all episodic memories, but they are selected from many briefly retained episodic experiences and constitute the makings of a kind of story of one's life (Nelson Reference Nelson and Wagoner2017). It is these memories, some from decades in the past, that people often report as being not simply recalled but “re-experienced.” There is no generally accepted theory of their selection from among many that are lost over time, brief or extended.
This accumulation of episodic memories is a vital part of that system and demands explanation but is not accounted for by M&C. A general cultural communicative use of memory is sharing information among those in one's cultural group. With language (for the individual or in the group), what had been restricted to personal memory can be shared to everyone's advantage. Your episodic memory then becomes my semantic memory.
This much is in tune with the claims of M&C. But long-term episodic memory – autobiographical memory – seems to require further explanation. It brings the self as a person with a history into the cultural milieu, a contribution with the eventual possibility of its use in history, biography, group planning, poetry, novels, and more.