It is not often that one encounters serious, thoughtful historical scholarship that expresses nostalgia for the Gilded Age, but Steve Fraser's new book, the Age of Acquiescence, is, and very nearly does.
His wistfulness grows from a provocative, counterintuitive proposition: that the “first” Gilded Age—for all its systematic industrial murder, terrible squalor, and money-corrupted politics (none of which Fraser downplays)—offered far more hope to would-be radicals battling inequality than our current moment does. In pursuing this proposition with refreshing disregard to historiographical and methodological boundaries, he has produced a cri de coeur that doubles as an ambitious synthesis of U.S. political economy, society, and culture over the past century and a half. Fraser writes long, but his prose is often as propulsive and powerful as the systems of production, modes of resistance, and mechanisms of subjection it describes. He matches lyrical accounts of mass protests against bracing catalogues of capitalist predations. His book is a fine addition to the reading lists of anyone interested in the social movements, culture, and political economy of the postbellum United States.
For scholars of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, one of the book's most intriguing aspects is its effective erasure of any clear boundary between those two periods. Fraser's “long Nineteenth Century” ends in 1929, and although he ably describes the way workers’ movements helped spur a Progressive expansion of state authority to intervene in economic life around the turn of the century, he stresses instead the continuity of a radical political imagination across the period. That imagination came alive in what he calls (invoking abolitionism's legacy) an “emancipation movement” of and for the dispossessed, steadily ongoing from the Great Strike of 1877 to the U.S. Steel shutdown of 1919, and even onward to the sit-down strikes of 1934. It made of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, in Fraser's telling, a single “Era of Anticapitalism.” In some ways this is a welcome, immanent response to the late Gabriel Kolko, whose skeptical Triumph of Conservatism saw the Progressive Era as the consolidation and tidying of a capitalist takeover already well underway during the Gilded Age.
But Fraser is less interested in collapsing differences within the Gilded Age and Progressive Era than in distinguishing that “Era of Anticapitalism” from the present “Age of Acquiescence.” In this, he rejects the current fashion, which has rendered the phrase “second Gilded Age” an unthinking epithet of both popular and academic discourse. Fraser employs that epithet while exposing its superficiality. Both eras saw inequality increase, but the general standard of living rose then; it falls now. Economic growth depended on “cannibalist” but productive industry then; it relies on what Fraser calls “auto-cannibalism” today, the financial industry's organ-harvesting of the U.S. industrial landscape through successive rounds of dividends-through-layoffs; privatization of public goods; debt securitization; and above all, the denigration of work—with the return of debtor's prison and convict labor among its most detestable manifestations. The term “auto-cannibalism” captures all this in an original, revolting way that the visually anodyne “neoliberalism” never has; it is a brilliant lexical contribution.
Fraser clearly wishes that the current round of dispossession would elicit a collective radical outcry comparable to that of the Gilded Age. Instead, he hears “remarkable silence,” which he attributes to a combination of historical amnesia and libidinal hypnosis (13). In his estimation, would-be anticapitalists in the contemporary United States—in addition to finding themselves subject to a withering political-economic and cultural matrix of delusion that inculcates acquiescence through both desire and fear—lack crucial experiential and rhetorical advantages that their Gilded Age predecessors enjoyed.
First among these advantages was the living memory of a “precapitalist and preindustrial” world “in which wage labor and market relations were limited, one in which household economies, handicraft production, and self-sufficient agriculture remained deeply rooted” (84). Recalling Bruce Laurie and Charles Sellers, Fraser sees a “rough egalitarianism” prevailing in this world of freeholders and journeymen artisans. Although the Gilded Age eroded that world's work rhythms and collectivities through de-skilling, speed-ups, and ruthless new forms of enclosure, the spirit of “coherent social relations” lingered in the dreams of those who engaged in collective struggle (420). The Knights of Labor, American Federation of Labor, Wobblies, anarchists, and other yesteryear leftists used the term “class” with neither apology nor explanation; attached it to terms such as “war,” or “ruling,” decried the “exploitation” of the “plutocracy”; in some cases, they even declared forthrightly for “socialism” (200). They managed this, Fraser suggests, because they remembered a social firmament “outside the orbit of capital accumulation,” and so could speak with a vocabulary and act from a repertoire beyond capitalism's constraints (12–13).
Surely, Fraser is correct in pointing out that today's radicals face myriad difficulties in attempting to speak, act, or even think beyond those constraints, and he analyzes those difficulties incisively. Yet his comparative celebration of earlier radicals is strangely at odds with his periodic acknowledgment of the limits beyond which they failed to speak, act, or think. He recognizes early on that the remembered historical freedoms of their fancy had rested in part on slavery, convict labor, racism, sexism, xenophobia, and murderous settler colonialism. Later he seems to subsume all this under that umbrella of “rough egalitarianism” (86, 98, 127). Rough indeed. Should we really lament the fact that such selective memories cannot provide inspiration to a new generation of anticapitalists?
Fraser expresses doubt about the new generation's capacity to articulate properly anticapitalist solidarity. In doubting, he briefly tilts toward that stalest of explanations for the “death” of left resistance: identity politics dunnit (360). Yet as others have long since pointed out, a critique of capitalism that lacks the willingness to confront the racial and sexual divisions of labor is no critique of capitalism at all, and its solidarities will always be barricades of sand. Whatever their faults or limitations, today's radicals have begun to confront that fact in ways that were nearly unthinkable for their Gilded Age forebears. Fraser's conclusion seems to suggest something similarly hopeful: that after all is said and done, “the enduring legacy the long nineteenth century bequeaths” is not, in fact, the memory of a precapitalist or preindustrial world, but an example of the “ineffable yearnings to redefine what it mean[s] to be human altogether” (421).
At its best, this book is evocative evidence of those yearnings in Fraser. It is also a noble testament to the vitality of radical history's Gramscian heartbeat: pessimism of intellect, optimism of will.
