This article critically assesses the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), once seen as a flagship of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its failure to deliver on its ambitious promises in Pakistan. Instead of driving economic growth and cohesion, the CPEC exposed deep governance challenges – marked by institutional fragility, lack of elite consensus, and military dominance in policymaking. Strategic and security imperatives often outweighed economic rationale, resulting in a non-transparent process that sidelined parliament and marginalized provincial actors. Projects were selected based on political expediency rather than viability, leading to inefficiencies and delays. The CPEC also re-centralized power, weakening provincial autonomy and intensifying center-periphery tensions, particularly in Balochistan. In Gwadar, local communities saw disruption without benefit, fueling political discontent. Investor confidence waned amid an uneven playing field and the failure of Special Economic Zones to take shape. Far from transformative, the CPEC reinforced narrow elite interests, worsened federal strains, and deepened Pakistan’s economic and institutional uncertainties.

When analyzing the nation-state, studies of Pakistan often portray the Pakistani state as autocratic and dictatorial. While the Pakistani nation-state performs various hegemonic roles, it is also “cultured.” This article illustrates this point by focusing on the nation-state’s patronage of cultural projects in the 1960s (and beyond), tracing the genealogies of sites in Lahore’s Greater Iqbal Park (the Minar-e-Pakistan monument, Hafeez Jalandari mausoleum, and the National History Museum) along with the Quaid-e-Azam mausoleum in Karachi. The article centers these as “sites of memory,” exploring the hybrid tensions between tourism, citizenship, and modern memory in postcolonial Pakistan.

The establishment of state authority over the movement of people and goods across borders became a key marker of statehood after decolonization. In South Asia, India and Pakistan gradually and unevenly asserted territorial and fiscal sovereignty along their new borders. This article examines how the early Pakistani state confronted border anxieties through the bureaucratic practices and discourses of local officials, who embodied state authority at the frontier. This article further explores how the state attempted to regulate and classify cross-border movement and how borderland communities responded—sometimes complying, sometimes negotiating, and at times subverting these controls. Using archival sources and oral histories, the article argues that categories such as “regional” and “national,” “self” and “other” were not fixed or natural, but were produced through contingent interactions between state functionaries and local populations. In doing so, this article highlights the complex and negotiated nature of sovereignty in Pakistan’s borderlands.

As India and Pakistan emerged as two new nation-states after 1947, questions around nationality and citizenship animated official and public discourses. While there were constitutional and legal pronouncements to clarify these matters, this article suggests that particular documents governing mobility became central to how such issues were framed and understood. In particular, this article focuses on the Indian passport and similar documents of mobility control, such as the domicile certificate, permits, and so on, to examine how they worked singly and in conjunction to frame the documentary life of belonging. The article also focuses on particular mobile groups, Muslim minorities and women married to non-Indians, to understand how these documents became central to their claims of citizenship and belonging.

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, though subject to increasing stresses in recent decades (and “suspended” by India in 2025), was long hailed as one of the great success stories of international water disputes. A treaty negotiated to divide the Indus rivers to conform to the new territorial boundaries of the subcontinent’s 1947 partition, the IWT’s ultimate result was to effectively create two separate river basins operating in, and helping to define, distinctive Indian and Pakistani “national spaces” of water control—and “water nationalism.” However, another effect of this approach was also to encourage increasing internal competition—and conflict—over water within each country. This article argues that the roots of this structure go back to the abstract, and environmentally disconnected, form of “nationalism” that dictated the drawing of the original 1947 partition line, and to the ways that state water policy—and the IWT itself—reflected and responded to this.

Pakistan and India were born of conflict and have endured over seventy-five years of rivalry since their birth in 1947. This has led to South Asia being one of the least integrated regions in the world, constraining its economic potential and human development. Yet the relationship has not been one of unending conflict; there have been periods of calm and even hope. Cricket, a common heritage and passion for both, has often delivered episodes of optimism, providing glimpses of what India-Pakistan cooperation could achieve were a conducive environment provided. On several occasions cricket has succeeded in uniting people of the estranged nations, allowing the nascent cultural ties that have existed for centuries to flourish. This article looks at how periods of connectivity and rupture between India and Pakistan have been reflected in the cricketing ties between the two nations and how these ties have been impacted by the wider political environment.

This article examines the interaction of events in the Lahore and Amritsar borderland with the wider course of Indo-Pakistan relations in the early postindependence period. Its findings reveal the ways in which events in this sensitive borderland reflected, symbolized, and influenced wider Indo-Pakistan relations. The examination focuses on the 1951 War Scare and the Cricket Diplomacy four years later. In a foretaste of the use of cricket in 2004–2005 to normalize relations, the India-Pakistan Test Series of January–February 1955 provided an occasion for opening the Wagah border crossing. Here was evidence that despite the human tragedies surrounding Partition, the region of the Punjab could act as a bridge between India and Pakistan.

This paper traces how India and Pakistan have regulated cross-border religious travel over the decades. The Ahmadiyya and Sikh communities are used as foils for a broader analysis of how religious groups separated from their sacred sites by the Partition responded to the loss and attempted to influence the state/s to ensure that their sites were adequately maintained and pushed for permission to travel to them. The paper then examines the negotiations that occurred between India and Pakistan to enable religious travel and the mechanisms and protocols established to regulate this. The regulation of religious travel mirrored the twists and turns of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, and the attempts by both states to regulate and control cross-border travel.

Through a discussion of three recent episodes – the Kartarpur Sahib Corridor linking Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur in Pakistan and Dera Baba Nanak in India, author Haroon Khalid’s book Walking With Nanak, and a recent dispute involving the Sindhi community’s religious practices in Indore, India – this article comments on the present-day experiences and expressions of shared reverence post-1947 with a particular focus on the Sikh community.