Andrew Hurrell has written a comprehensive study of the theoretical frameworks used to describe global orders. He has both an empirical concern and a normative one: what is the nature of order and governance in the world of sovereign states, and how can just governance obtain? Key to answering both of these questions is the recognition of pervasive inequality. The international system is inherently hierarchical, with states' power often, but not always, determining whether they are rule-makers or rule-takers and the effects that the rules have on them. He thus rejects a simple realist rendering of world orders and instead turns to an analysis of cooperation and norm development under conditions of unavoidable hierarchy.

Hurrell takes as his task the job of ‘unpacking’ the conceptions of world order, starting from Hedley Bull's approach to the anarchical society of sovereign states and moving forward to situations characterized by more global governance. This unpacking involves ‘assessing the changing character of institutionalization in world politics, the normative commitment of different varieties of internationalism and ideas about global governance, and the adequacy of existing institutions for meeting practical normative challenges’ (p. 16). He sees a world in which straightforward pluralism envisaged by Bull (‘a united society of sovereign states’) is giving way to ‘liberal solidarism’ (‘an international community’ with a broader range of political and moral purposes) and finally to ‘complex governance above and beyond the state’.

Hurrell sees progress towards more complex governance, but he is quick to realize that what is deemed ‘progress’ may be thought to be so because of Western assumptions. While he assumes a teleology, a movement through history, with the entanglements of globalized life on earth leading to more opportunities for governance beyond the state, he recognizes the possibility of flawed progress, of bad rules that can be made. By recognizing the problematic nature of progress, he avoids falling into the logical trap of assuming that the outcome will necessarily be morally better as we progress into more and more complex governance.

To make these nuanced, careful points, Hurrell begins by explicating the frameworks of global order: pluralism, liberal (i.e., state) solidarism, and complex governance. Because these frameworks represent different forms of international orders, he does not attempt to analyze the same elements of each framework. For the pluralist framework he examines pluralism in relation to the state, power, values, and law. The chapter on state solidarism first describes how this framework differs from a pluralist framework because of the roles played by institutions and rule making and the changing nature of state sovereignty. He then discusses factors and forces that explain the emergence and continued growth of state solidarism. The final framework chapter turns to the deepening of interstate governance and its transformation into a thicker web of normative relations. He then discusses the increased importance of non-state actors in complex governance, specifically the role of civil society, transnational civil society, and market actors. This chapter also returns to earlier questions about the state, power, values (here understood in terms of legitimacy), and law, this time applied to conditions of complex governance; but Hurrell intentionally leaves these unanswered. Outcomes are by no means assured.

The next section of the book applies the frameworks to help explain issues, specifically nationalism and the politics of identity; human rights and democracy; war, violence and collective security; economic globalization in an unequal world; and the problem of global ecology. Nationalism and the politics identity is the foundational issue through which the others can be viewed. The question of nationalism, of self-determination, and identification with a sovereign state seems, at first glance, to reinforce the continuing salience of a pluralist view. Without a system of individual, sovereign states, why would nationalism make any sense? Hurrell asserts, however, that awakening of identity-based conflicts and the consequent growth of global norms concerning human rights and of moral claims that peoples can make undercuts a purely liberal reading.

Sentiments of nationalism and the rights of groups to self-determination feeds directly into the second issue, human rights and democracy. Despite the incomplete nature of global norms and rule-making on human rights and democracy, Hurrell argues that we now exist within in a web of global norms that assert protection of human rights as an obligation of states. While he readily acknowledges that these recent rules can easily ‘[remain] both shallow and all too easily reversible’ (p. 164), their existence becomes part of a complex set of reinforcing rules that, once again, push us toward more complex governance.

War, violence, and collective security, in Hurrell's analysis, can be seen as the prototypical way in which a pluralist view of the world has been institutionalized in such foundational documents as the Untied Nations Charter and in practices such as the conduct of foreign policy during the Cold War. Yet here, too, ‘a changing security agenda’ (p. 172) since the end of the Cold War pushes global actors toward liberal solidarist and possibly complex governance forms of order. While war and other forms of violence remain important problems within the contemporary international system, the global norms governing the legitimate use of violence and coercive force have changed.

The chapters on economic globalization and on the ecological challenge similarly focus on the changing yet still central role of the state in ordering international society. While Hurrell's view of economic globalization does not paint the changing order in rosy hues – he notes the lack of attention to economic rights and distributive justice – he does see the increasing embeddedness of economic globalization having important effects on power relations among states. The fact that economic globalization can affect power relations among states demonstrates that power relations among states remain crucial, even as global norms for trade in goods in services and for other economic interactions become common modes of governance. Powerful states still make the rules. This dynamic can also be seen in states' response to the emerging ecological challenges that face the planet. Governance beyond the state has made important inroads, but states retain power and importance: hence ‘complex governance’.

The final section of the book looks at alternative orders, specifically the role that regional and regionalism plays in the global order and role of the United States as a very powerful actor. Regions, Hurrell suggests, may be part of a world ordered by complex governance, especially if these regions become incubators for the promotion of new norms and the adoption of moral claims. Hurrell's treatment of US power evaluates US ability to lead based on its ability to create a sense of legitimacy versus its resort to the use of power resources for coercive control. ‘In so far the Untied States seeks to pursue a hard, exclusivist conception of its own interests to propound a narrow hegemonic coneption of order’, Hurrell writes, ‘then it is likely to generate not a Pax Americana but rather an empire of insecurity, both for itself and for others’ (p. 283).

The book's conclusion is a normatively rich call for a global order based on justice. Though complex governance may not lead to a just order, a just order may emerge out complex governance. For this positive outcome to come about, the world must pay attention to moral claims, create global institutions that have authority to protect rights, and allow opportunities for political agency. Hurrell sets out a daunting goal, but one that is made more possible by the forces of complex governance that increasingly entangle states and other actors of the world.

All through the book, Hurrell accomplishes his very detailed ‘unpacking’ of the frameworks by working through a precise outline for each point he makes. Here is one example. In discussing the sustainability of hegemony (pp. 273–283), he enumerates five factors. The fourth of these factors has four points. The fourth of these points has two positions. And the first of these positions has three propositions. We have moved down the outline to sub-sub-sub points. The detail is admirable, but I found the constant attention to enumeration ironically distracting: was that ‘fourth’ the fourth point or the fourth sub-sub point?

Also, it is important to remember that this is a book about unpacking theoretical frameworks. Thus a good deal of time is spent teasing out the assumptions and logical connections between components of a theoretical approach, followed by a brief dismantling of the same approach. On the positive side, I think that Hurrell is very fair in his representation of the theoretical approaches he disagrees with. Readers, however, may be frustrated with the amount of time spent on what turns out to be something that Hurrell argues against and the relatively brief time spent reconstituting a more persuasive theory.

Because of these stylistic choices (emphasis on detailed outlines and on reproducing theories that will be discarded), I would hesitate to assign this book for a course. Nevertheless, Hurrell's detailed account of global order will certainly be a useful reference for scholars and graduate students. This is essential reading for those seeking to trace the intellectual history of what has been called ‘English School’ or ‘International Society School’ thought into its present incarnation as the study of complex governance beyond the state.