Some of the nastiest and most intractable disputes in the world of Hobbes scholarship center on Hobbes's infamous depiction of the state of nature. Does the sage of Malmesbury intend his characterization to refer to an actual prepolitical condition—a chaotic and brutal state of affairs that prevailed in earlier ages and that might obtain even today in certain quarters? Or, alternatively, is the state of nature supposed to be a kind of thought experiment, a heuristic device designed to convince Hobbes's readers about the hypothetical terms upon which civil association might come into being? In this bold, illuminating, and scrupulously documented book, Ioannis Evrigenis traces step by step the evolution of the state of nature imagery throughout Hobbes's corpus—from its early appearance in the Elements of Law through successive iterations in De Cive and the English and Latin versions of Leviathan.
The arc of the story is Hobbes's struggle to get the state of nature right—that is, to craft an image of the evils of the natural condition that will persuade skeptical readers of their obligation to civil authority. The Elements of Law presents “an image of disorder” that is “less powerful than in later accounts,” mainly owing to the fact that evidence for the perils of anarchy is scant: the allegedly savage native Americans of Hobbes's own day, and the Germanic ancestors of contemporary European nations (71–75). As a result, Hobbes's initial foray into the state of nature imagery falls flat. Subsequent depictions of the state of nature in De Cive, especially its striking 1642 frontispiece, and English and Latin variants of Leviathan are attempts to bolster the rhetorical impact of the state of nature imagery. Hobbes's rhetoric shifts from hypotheticals and far-flung anthropological assertions about premodern peoples and fixates instead on a harrowing list of privations that readers might imagine experiencing firsthand. Most effective are familiar examples drawn from the precautionary behavior of readers themselves (147). The state of nature imagery succeeds by threatening readers with the fragility of civil order. This approach works by a quirk of cognitive psychology: we fear losses more than we value commensurate gains, and having rhetorically stripped the reader of the goods of civil association, “the memory of the evil suffered makes one appreciate [civil association] all the more” (148).
Evrigenis ably dissects Hobbes's anecdotes and images, variously biblical, anthropological, and sociological, but one of the most distinctive parts of this book is its consideration of actual illustrations of the state of nature appended as frontispieces to different editions of Hobbes's political writings. We see, for example, an early 1642 edition of De Cive prepared for private circulation among Hobbes's friends that dramatically depicts the savagery of the state of nature, including scenes of primitive warfare, manhunts, and even cannibalism (83). This image was dropped by the publisher of the main 1647 edition in favor of a more regal title page, of which Hobbes disapproved, only to be replaced (presumably by way of satisfying Hobbes's objections) with a crude replica of the original iconography, thereby restoring the centrality of primitive savagery (86).
A second and closely related theme is Hobbes's ambivalence toward rhetoric. Many have noted Hobbes's suspicion of eloquence and his worries that rhetoric will be used to manipulate the gullible masses into rebellion. Even so, and without disputing this bias of Hobbes's political thought, Evrigenis argues that Hobbes's own approach must be understood as itself a species of rhetoric. Rather than opposing eloquence per se, his work is characterized by a consistent “rhetoric of science in the service of his science of rhetoric” (252). Hobbes enlists a panoply of “images and languages of anarchy” whose veracity was to be established not by appeals to authority, but rather by seducing readers into a process by which they are free to accept or reject the validity of the state of nature by their own lights (253). More so than any fantastic, remote, or improbable evidence for the state of nature's existence, Hobbes's rhetoric persuades by engaging the judgment and experience of readers, whose opinions carry the same weight as those of Aristotle or Cicero (255).
By validating the authority of individual judgment, according to Evrigenis, Hobbes manages to seduce dubious readers. Precisely because readers are—on Hobbes's account—proud, distrustful, and invested with the authority to discern individually good from evil, the best way to win their support is by tricking them into thinking that their acceptance is a sign of their wisdom. Not eloquence, so much as a sly kind of flattery, is the best way of enlisting supporters. Acquiescence to the terms of Hobbes's project becomes a way of signaling that one is savvy enough to get the joke.
The book's thesis assumes that Hobbes was deeply influenced by classical sources. However, rather than Hobbes being suffused by Roman or Latin influences, as many have supposed, Evrigenis makes a strong case for Hobbes's enduring relationship with classical Greek texts. Translations of Thucydides's History (1629) and Homer's Iliad (1676) neatly bookend his career (27). No clear bifurcation is possible between Hobbes's so-called humanism and his normative political philosophy; his fascination with rhetoric and science are of one piece, as were his simultaneous commitments to passion and reason. Instead of pitting the humanist against the Euclidean, Evrigenis makes a strong case for the “continuity” of Hobbes's project (28).
From the notion that Hobbes was influenced by Thucydides and other Greek sources, Evrigenis segues to a more controversial set of claims about Hobbes's embrace of Aristotle and Aristotelianism. Evrigenis's attempt to broker a rapprochement between Hobbes and Aristotle is subversive of common narratives of the history of political thought, especially given the number of places in Hobbes's political thought where he looks to reject Aristotelian teleology root and branch. There is, for example, Hobbes's denial of any highest good or summum bonum. There is his affirmation of human equality and sarcastic dismissal of defenders of inequality such as Aristotle. And maybe most decisive is his apparent rejection of any natural or immanent sociability among mankind.
Without denying this, Evrigenis argues that Hobbes's animus is not against Aristotle but various Scholastic reincarnations who twist Aristotle's teleological conception of nature into an innate disposition for society. Rather than “an animal in need of a polis” based on an “inability to be self-sufficient,” Aristotle's misinterpreters deem man to be “naturally social” or motivated by a “native love of other men” (100–101). It is mainly this view, rather than Aristotle's own, that Hobbes aims to indict. This strand of argument is debatable, but it is also worth taking seriously, particularly in light of Evrigenis's survey of Hobbes's discerning Briefe of Aristotle's Rhetoric (52–59).
In conclusion, this is a serious, erudite, and comprehensive book that tackles the puzzles of Hobbes's political theory with sensitivity and originality. It will repay careful study not only by Hobbes scholars but all those interested in rhetoric, early modern political thought, and the reception of antiquity in the seventeenth century.
