In the opening chapter of Dante's Philosophical Life, Paul Stern attributes the “extraordinarily prominent place” (9) Dante gives to politics in Purgatorio to the poet's concern for the roots of political life in philosophy, understood as Aristotle's “philosophy of human affairs” (5). Dante pursues this philosophy anew in a world unknown to Aristotle, in which has arisen Christianity, to whose doctrine Dante must give “the most serious treatment” (11). In the wake of Augustine's demotion and Aquinas's neglect of politics, Dante embraces as a way of life the unending search for the good that both beckons the soul and eludes its human capacity. This heterogeneity of human love and its highest object calls forth the language of poetry whose reliance on images best suits the embodied human condition. Unlike the merely political poetry of Virgil and the love poetry of his contemporaries, Dante's is a new kind of poetry that extols the love of wisdom. Unlike Inferno and Paradiso, Purgatorio, where souls undergo change, is the appropriate setting for Dante's education in politics, poetry, and philosophy.
Chapters 2 through 6 follow canto by canto Dante's ascent of Mount Purgatory in the course of which the poet gradually learns to love the true good, chiefly through his exchanges with the shades he meets along the mountain, a dialogic mode suited to an education in political philosophy. In chapter 2 in Antepurgatory Dante acquires reasons to go on in response to Belacqua's question, “What good would climbing do?” On the Terraces of Pride, Envy, and Anger in chapter 3 Dante learns about the political character of humanity. In chapter 4 on the central Terrace of Sloth the disrobing of the Siren reveals the truth about the limited good of the philosophy he had followed and the zeal he needs to go beyond it. He learns of the proper desire for his own good on the Terraces of Avarice, Gluttony, and Lust in chapter 5. When he comes to the Earthly Paradise in chapter 6 he encounters his beloved Beatrice, who scolds him for turning from her to Lady Philosophy and bids him write of what he saw and heard and of properly human happiness for the benefit of others who will read his poem.
In the book's final chapter Stern argues for the pertinence in our time of Dante's renewed philosophy of human affairs as an antidote to the contrary certitudes of modern science, which has no need to ask about the good we already know to be the mastery of nature, and of postmodernism, which holds there is no point to asking about a good we cannot know at all.
Nowhere perhaps is Stern more original than in his reading of the figures of Pope Adrian and the poet Statius. On the Terrace of Avarice Dante meets Adrian, whose attachment to the good of peace opened the way for Hugh Capet's unjust power grab. Beyond Dante's usual critique of papal corruption Stern sees a deeper critique of “something nearer the core of Christian belief itself” (163), that “human life would be better if all desire were fully satisfied” (168). Adrian's Christian avarice flies in the face of the desire for “that food which, by satisfying, makes one thirst for more” (158) that Dante learns of and teaches.
Stern sees in Statius, the pagan epic poet and secret Christian convert, “an embodiment of hybridity” (175) who bridges the classical world Dante seeks to renew and the Christian world he inhabits. Statius both admires Virgil's excellence and attributes his conversion to Virgil's prophecy in the fourth Eclogue. Statius, however, misquotes the prophecy such as to make it “point to Dante's own project rather than to Christianity” (178). Dante's readers, too, misread his poem, but some few will interpret it aright and perceive the boldness of his politics and human wisdom.
On several occasions Stern steps back from Dante's text to provide precise and very helpful background on the matter at hand. In one such instance, regarding Casella's alluring song in canto 2, Stern explains Dante's understanding of philosophy in Convivio as Neo-Platonism as opposed to Aristotle's aporetic love of wisdom in the Commedia, a transition from metaphysics to ethics that marks Dante's education in political philosophy. Elsewhere, Marco Lombard's speech in canto 16 occasions a contrast between in the primacy Aquinas accords to the supernatural virtue of charity with its universality and equality and the natural inequality of persons and goods in the primacy Aristotle (and Dante's Marco) assigns to the virtue of justice.
Stern's reading of Purgatorio runs counter to the prevailing view of scholars such as Charles Singleton for whom “the poem's purpose as versified Christian doctrine is plain” (1). Yet, as Stern makes clear, the Commedia does not contain a “secret teaching” (17) despite Dante's frequent mentions of the veil that he invites readers to pierce and that allows them passage to the poem's deeper truth. Stern acknowledges his greatest indebtedness to Teodolinda Barolini and the late Ernest Fortin. In the book's copious endnotes he references numerous other Dante scholars, some of whose views are at odds with his own and others of whose observations adumbrate points that he develops. Just as many are his references to the classical sources that ground his reading of Dante. Chief among these are Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, of whose works Stern displays a discerning command.
In some places Stern's concern to make his case occasions inaccuracies. His contention that the rushes of the “humble plant” that girds Dante in canto 1 will become the paper on which his poem is inscribed is interesting but overlooks the way paper was produced at the time (29 and 243). The “reference to communion” preceding Mary's notice of the lack of wine at Cana in canto 13 is spoken by all three of the spirits who represent the disparate goods Stern distinguishes (102–3). The chastity proper to marriage enjoined in canto 25 does not preclude the generation of new human life as Stern contends (203). In another vein, the name of Aeneas's pilot Palinurus is misspelled as Palinarus (48ff.). None of these greatly affect the force of Stern's argument but they do call for further examination.
Stern's book will be especially welcomed by readers inclined to hearken to Dante's call for a renewed political philosophy and to consider seriously the suspicions of Dante's orthodoxy that date back to his own time. It will make them indebted to Stern for his insights and suggestive readings, of which there are too many to mention here. His book may also make them wonder about Dante's revised Christianity as a kind of civil religion where “salvation … occurs not in a New Jerusalem but in ‘that Rome’ in which Christ himself is a fellow citizen, embracing the political community” (239); and ponder Dante's critique of the Christian “cessation of desire” (192) in light of how Augustine, writing about seeking and finding God, quotes the words Wisdom speaks in the Bible: “Those who eat me will hunger for more, and those who drink me thirst for more” (Sirach 24:21).
