I
These four accounts of how Leo Strauss (1899–1973) understood political philosophy call attention to what he thought about biblical revelation. Each goes its own way to a considerable extent. According to Steven B. Smith, Strauss turns out to have been an atheist. According to Kim Sorensen, on the other hand, Strauss's reflections on Machiavelli indicate his philosophical openness to biblical revelation. Then again, according to Heinrich Meier, Strauss's confrontation with biblical revelation was at the heart of his understanding and defense of political philosophy. Finally, according to Leora Batnitzky, Strauss had his doubts about biblical revelation as construed by modern Jewish thinkers in particular, although or because he understood it better than they tend to. That there should be such disagreement among these four authors seems traceable in part to Strauss's own warning of a basic tension between biblical revelation and political philosophy—between Jerusalem and Athens, as he called them. The following remarks compare what each of these four authors has to say about that tension.
II
According to Smith, Strauss was an atheist in the way that Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) was. Smith's claim is somewhat surprising. Strauss incurred the charge of atheism at least once during his lifetime and prepared a brief refutation, which he never published though it is now available for anyone to read.Footnote 1 Smith does not mention the earlier charge or Strauss's refutation. Instead he offers his own, not very convincing argument for Strauss's atheism, in the course of his book's otherwise engaging overviews of what Strauss had to say about both “Jerusalem” and “Athens” (the titles Smith gives to the two sets of essays that make up his book).
The “Athens” essays include extensive glosses on Strauss's views of Plato, Martin Heidegger (the philosophical godfather of today's deconstructionists), Alexandre Kojève (in his debate with Strauss over the contemporary relevance of Xenophon's dialogue on tyranny), and American democracy. A concluding essay speculates on how Strauss would view current U.S. foreign policy. This last relates closely to Smith's overall aim. He wishes to rescue Strauss from the charges of right-wing doctrinarism often leveled against him these days from both inside and outside the academy. Strauss, he counters, was no ideologue. Smith means to distinguish Strauss in this regard from his politically active and politically conservative disciples. He assures his readers that he himself is not one of these, by identifying himself instead as a purely scholarly admirer of Strauss. In short, Smith's essays showcase Strauss's understanding of political philosophy as nonpartisan and, as such, fully compatible with the variety of political viewpoints prevalent in today's universities. For example, his essay on Strauss's Plato emphasizes a kinship between the “liberalism” of the Platonic dialogues—Socrates' openness to and tolerance of the diverse opinions of his interlocutors for the sake of examining their merits philosophically—and the tolerance of diversity found in modern liberal democracies. Another essay indicates how, unlike Heidegger, Strauss “returned to the ancients not to discover the origins of modern nihilism but to consider an alternative to it.”Footnote 2 A third essay summarizes Strauss's differences with Kojève over whether the proper (or inevitable) role of the philosopher is that of “an adviser to tyrants,” as Kojève maintained, “rather than a rebel or social critic seeking to overthrow the conditions of tyranny.”Footnote 3 And an essay on America—perhaps Smith's most thoughtful—argues that Strauss's legacy to contemporary political science is to recall it to its chief task, namely, “to teach neither a scientific detachment from one's country and its traditions nor a fanatical partisanship that regards the distinction between friend and enemy as the primordial political experience, but rather an ‘unhesitating loyalty to a decent constitution and even to the cause of constitutionalism.’”Footnote 4 The concluding essay on current foreign policy suggests, in the light of the foregoing, that Strauss would be opposed to any war fought “To rid the world of evil.” This suggestion is persuasive, of course, if and only if the phrase is to be understood in its hyperbolic, utopian sense of eradicating evil from the human landscape, as Smith supposes.Footnote 5 It is less so if the phrase is to be understood as referring primarily to clear and present dangers such as global terrorism or tyranny at one's doorstep. Strauss's professed admiration for statesmen like ChurchillFootnote 6 might have encouraged Smith to give more thought to the latter possibility.
Three “Jerusalem” essays precede the “Athens” ones and help set the tone for them by presenting Strauss as a “good European” (in Nietzsche's expression), that is, a cosmopolitan modern man who happened to be of Jewish extraction rather than a loyal or practicing Jew. These essays consider, in turn, how Jewish Strauss was (or wasn't), how Strauss compares with his friend Gershom Scholem (the twentieth-century's leading scholarly authority on Jewish mysticism), and how Strauss understood Spinoza. In his entire book, Smith's only substantive criticism of Strauss concerns what he takes to be Strauss's looking to Spinoza as his theological role model. Smith's argument here is rather contrived and not well documented, however. It does not withstand close examination, as I will indicate in a moment.
I must first point out a methodological drawback to Smith's synoptic or bird's-eye-view approach to Strauss. As Smith is aware, Strauss's care and subtlety as a writer were a result of his careful and subtle observations—particularly concerning carefully and subtly written philosophical texts. Strauss began by looking at the obvious things being said by the text in its plain meaning. Only on noticing superficial incongruities did he then search for underlying premises to resolve the incongruities, or at any rate to clarify them where simple resolutions might not be possible. Strauss's subtextual explorations were notoriously deep and wide-ranging, but they never lost track of the surface phenomena that occasioned them. “The problem inherent in the surface of things, and only in the surface of things,” Smith quotes Strauss as saying, “is the heart of things.”Footnote 7 Smith's overviews, in contrast, risk blurring the manifold of textual details that was Strauss's starting point. In such cases, they put at risk the prospects for success in understanding Strauss as he understood himself. Yet this last, as Strauss himself cautioned, is a necessary preliminary for criticizing thoughtful writers, that is, for claiming to understand them better than they understood themselves.Footnote 8 Smith's characterization of Strauss as a Spinozist in theological matters is a case in point.Footnote 9
The difficulty with characterizing Strauss as a Spinozist shows up in that Smith also acknowledges Strauss's deep philosophical and theological debt to Moses Maimonides (1135–1204). Maimonides is the great defender and preserver of Jewish orthodoxy with the help of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, but Spinoza is the great attacker and would-be destroyer of Jewish orthodoxy in the name of biblical criticism and liberal democracy—the two modern institutions of which he is the philosophical originator. Nevertheless Smith has Strauss assimilate them theologically. On the one hand, he imputes to Strauss the view that Maimonides construes biblical Law as “having only instrumental value,” that is, as a mere means to teaching moral virtue, which is in turn subordinate to intellectual virtue, that is, to philosophy.Footnote 10 On the other hand, he attributes to Spinoza (and by implication to Strauss) the view that the Law, coming as it did in the aftermath of the Israelites' deliverance from Egyptian slavery and superstition, was “far from representing a liberation” from these and “merely substituted one form of oppression for another.”Footnote 11 However all this may be, Maimonides and Spinoza according to Smith share a denial that the Law contains or promotes a true understanding of God, as the Law itself claims.Footnote 12 Such is the “atheism” that Smith ascribes also to Strauss. Yet here Smith—unlike Strauss—overlooks the forest for a few trees. Theologically speaking, Maimonides and Spinoza resemble each other now and then only if one disregards the fuller details of their respective accounts of the Law. Maimonides holds that biblical Law differs from all other legal codes in aiming not only at abolishing injustices and inculcating moral qualities that are useful for society as a whole, but also at promulgating true opinions about God.Footnote 13 True opinions as Maimonides understands them are not quite the same as politically useful opinions.Footnote 14 By making the true opinions mandatory, Maimonides says, the Law promotes intellectual virtue and not just moral virtue.Footnote 15 Spinoza, of course, emphatically denies all this, as Smith rightly indicates—though unfortunately Smith goes on to exaggerate Spinoza's deprecation of the Law when he insinuates that according to Spinoza the Law left the Israelites no freer than they had been in Egypt.Footnote 16 On the contrary, Spinoza argues at length that the Law was conceived in terms of an elaborate system of checks and balances, so that when it functioned as intended, the average Israelite had much security for the discretionary use and enjoyment of his private possessionsFootnote 17 and enough freedom of self-expression to be able to communicate his theological opinions as he liked.Footnote 18 At any rate, Smith's allegation that Strauss was theologically a Spinozist as well as a Maimonidean is not supported by the details of what Spinoza and Maimonides themselves say.Footnote 19
III
Sorensen, in contrast, finds evidence of Strauss's philosophical openness to biblical revelation in the latter's reflections on Machiavelli. To this end, he offers a detailed analysis of Strauss's Thoughts on Machiavelli—or rather its culminating chapter, “Machiavelli's Teaching”Footnote 20—with the reason-revelation question in mind. Sorensen is saying more than that Strauss discerned a flaw in the antitheological cast of Machiavelli's thought. After all, a flawed attack on the Bible hardly amounts to a vindication of the Bible. Nor would Strauss's philosophical doubts about Machiavelli's rejection of the biblical teaching prove, without further argument, that Strauss himself was philosophically attracted to that teaching. Sorensen is aware of all this. He therefore starts by considering Strauss's view of revelation as such, apart from his Machiavelli discussion, before looking at the theological implications of Strauss's argument about Machiavelli in particular.
Methodologically speaking, Sorensen's way of establishing Strauss's views is to quote appropriate statements of his so as to let them speak for themselves as much as possible, with a modicum of surrounding commentary. In less capable hands, this procedure might have resulted in little more than a series of insufficiently elucidated or possibly misleading proof texts. But Sorensen supplements his Strauss quotations with a wide sample of quotations from other secondary authorities and from Machiavelli himself (during his Machiavelli discussion), usually with clarifications or critiques as well, and closes each of his book's chapters with a lucid and cogent summary. Occasionally he leaves himself at the mercy of an unadorned proof text or secondary authority, however, from which he then draws inferences that are perhaps all too quick.Footnote 21 Such inferences tend to be about Strauss on revelation, where Sorensen seems less sure-handed than when discussing Strauss on Machiavelli. While the inferences in question do not necessarily impede the drift of Sorensen's overall argument about Strauss's Machiavelli, they indicate that we might do well to approach his account of how Machiavelli figures in Strauss's view of revelation with some caution.
To show how Strauss viewed revelation, Sorensen avails himself of an expression of Strauss's: he was a “philosopher open to the challenge of theology.”Footnote 22 Explicating this expression leads Sorensen to consider, among other things, Strauss's relation to Judaism as presented in a 1962 lecture, “Why We Remain Jews.”Footnote 23 He brings out a number of points. One is that the so-called “Jewish Question”—the question of how Jews as Jews fit or fail to fit in modern society—was, by Strauss's own account, the main theme of his reflections from early on.Footnote 24 Another is that Strauss moved beyond his early political Zionism once he came to see that any purely political solution to the Jewish question could not by itself adequately address Judaism's more-than-political, theological dimension.Footnote 25 Furthermore, even though for Strauss the “only clear solution” to the Jewish question was for modern Jews to return to Jewish orthodoxy, he found that solution to be not quite feasible. It is hard, Strauss remarked, for most Jews today (including himself) to believe in the verbal inspiration of the Torah or in miracles, as Jewish orthodoxy teaches—and yet for Judaism to be viable, it must believe in God as creator of the world (and, therefore, as the author of the Torah and of miracles). Strauss thus found himself at an impasse. Sorensen interprets the impasse by appealing to what Strauss said in his 1962 “Preface to Spinoza's Critique of Religion”Footnote 26 about “intellectual probity” being the barrier preventing modern Jews from returning to orthodoxy. Unfortunately, Sorensen relies entirely on a secondary authority who identifies Strauss's understanding of intellectual probity simply as “an honesty of the heart that is the same as an honesty of the mind” and infers that Strauss meant that the barrier may be overcome once Jews recognize that “teshuvah, a return … to the God of the fathers, is fraught with risk,” that is, is a matter of courage and will, or resolute decision in defiance of the modern conviction that human beings are alone and forsaken in the world.Footnote 27 Sorensen or his authority fails to take into account the further gist of Strauss's critique of intellectual probity, which culminates in the thought that it is not exactly a philosophical virtue—“that its basis is an act of will, of belief, and that being based on belief is fatal to any philosophy.”Footnote 28 Far from endorsing the foregoing vindication of orthodoxy, then, Strauss considered its price unacceptably high. It would entail, as he noted, “the self-destruction of rational philosophy.” Whatever form of religious orthodoxy might be vindicated in that manner, he added, it would not necessarily be Jewish orthodoxy—since “Jewish orthodoxy based its claim to superiority to other religions from the beginning on its superior rationality (Deut. 4:6).” Pace Sorensen, what Strauss as philosopher saw as the “challenge of theology” included the need to resist any modern-day sacrifice of reason, whether in philosophy or in Judaism itself.
To show how Strauss's account of Machiavelli opened up for him the Bible's pre-Machiavellian or un-Machiavellian understanding of revelation, Sorensen traces and illuminates the main steps in the argument of “Machiavelli's Teaching.” Strauss's chapter is divided into two main sections: Machiavelli's teaching on religion (to the effect that he is neither a Christian nor a pagan; par. 1–43)Footnote 29 and his teaching on morality and politics (to the effect that he replaces the biblical virtue of humility before God by a purely this-worldly understanding of virtue, and the Aristotelian understanding of moral virtue as residing in a mean between morally undesirable extremes by an understanding of virtue as relocated in a mean between liberty and license or between liberty and tyranny, that is, between humanity and inhumanity; par. 44–87). The first section, about Machiavelli's teaching on religion, is further divided into his critique of Christianity (namely, that its otherworldly teaching has diverted men from dealing effectively with this-worldly matters; par. 1–30) and broader considerations about cosmology and about religion's political utility (which show up in how he both depends on and corrects the Averroist critique of religion; par. 27–43, acknowledging some overlap). Sorensen's analysis of each of these sections is straightforward, clarifying, attractive, and accessible throughout. I must leave a more detailed appreciation of its merits for another occasion. I limit myself here to summarizing Sorensen's conclusions about how Strauss's study of Machiavelli drew his attention to the supra-Machiavellian horizon of the biblical teaching—and, of course, the teaching of the classical political philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon)—which Machiavelli and his legacy had succeeded in obscuring.
Sorensen concludes that what indicates Strauss's openness to biblical revelation is not just that he showed Machiavelli's teaching to be dubious. It is how he showed it. Strauss, he points out, nowhere disputed Machiavelli's contention that Christianity's otherworldly teaching has impaired men's ability to see political life for what it is and to act accordingly. Instead, he argues, Strauss suggested a kinship between Machiavelli and the Averroists, or Aristotelians in Christian garb, who went along with Christianity only outwardly and to the extent that it taught a politically useful morality. Even so, he continues, according to Strauss Machiavelli differs from the Averroists by taking Christianity's cosmological teaching more seriously, including its teaching about divine providence—if only as an expedient for replacing God or Heaven by Fortuna, that is, by chance, which can, in turn, be conquered or mastered by men of a certain sort. In the process of arriving at an understanding of Machiavelli's teaching as understood by Machiavelli himself, then, Strauss simultaneously discerned the outlines and the attractiveness of the competing teachings—biblical and philosophical—which Machiavelli knowingly rejects. Sorensen emphasizes how Strauss's Machiavelli shares with the classical political philosophers the premise that what is good for men, along with what is unqualifiedly Good, is in principle knowable and that human dignity consists in reflection on that Good, that is, in philosophy. If Machiavelli does not leave a place for philosophers to advise judicious rulers and to oppose tyrants in the light of that Good, it is because for all practical purposes, or so Sorensen quotes Strauss as saying of Machiavelli, “there is no good however great which is unqualifiedly good.”Footnote 30 In Sorensen's words, “That Machiavelli eschews the Good, regarding it as an impossible standard for human action, implies that he has no compunction in advising rulers, even tyrants to act against religion, morality, and the common good.”Footnote 31 Sorensen infers from all this that Strauss returned to the morally salutary teachings of the classical political philosophers and the Bible (their further differences notwithstanding) to look into filling the void left by the remorselessness of Machiavelli's teaching. I find Sorensen's overall inference highly plausible.
IV
Meier discovers Strauss's confrontation with revelation—what he called “the theologico-political problem”—not just in the outer reaches of his philosophical activity but at its nerve-center. According to Strauss,Footnote 32 both classical political philosophy and biblical revelation raise the question, “How should I live?” Their answers overlap. The philosopher and the adherent of revelation are each concerned with the well-being of the political community, that is, with justice or morality. Yet both look beyond the purview of morality for support for their respective ways of life. Here the two diverge. The life lived according to revelation is the life of whole-hearted obedience to the declared will of a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and unfathomable, whereas the philosophical life is guided above all by the free quest for evident knowledge. The philosopher cannot avoid calling into question the claims of revelation, therefore, although or because these also are said to rest on knowledge—the all-seeing knowledge on the part of a mysterious God who is known to us only through his deliberate self-revelations and who tolerates no rivals. So too the believer in revelation must consider philosophy anathema. Meanwhile, neither the philosopher nor the believer is able to refute the other, since although both agree on the importance of morality, they disagree on how what exists beyond morality as its ultimate guarantor is to be understood. In sum, the theologico-political problem as Strauss understood it has to do with the unsettling circumstance that the life of obedience to revelation and the philosophical life are mutually incompatible and mutually irrefutable.
Still, Strauss did not leave things at that. Meier's book is meant to indicate why. It is a complex argument, whose diverse features Meier presents in four sinewy chapters. His first chapter is subdivided into three parts. He begins by showing how the theologico-political problem is not just one theme among many in Strauss's oeuvre, nor even the main theme, but the only theme. He then spells out that theme in the abstract by analyzing a 1948 lecture of Strauss's called “Reason and Revelation,” whose previously unpublished text Meier also appends to his book.Footnote 33 Afterwards he comments on Heidegger's theological relevance, or rather irrelevance, to Strauss's theme. A second chapter goes on to show why Strauss's inquiries into the history of political philosophy were inseparable from theologico-political inquiries. A third chapter shows how political theology—as the term was used by Carl Schmitt starting in 1922—is political philosophy's mirror-image. Finally, a fourth chapter shows how theologico-political inquiries are situated within political philosophy.
That the theologico-political theme subsumes all others in Strauss's writings, Meier shows as follows. The key was Strauss's discovery of a statement by the medieval Muslim philosopher Avicenna to the effect that the true understanding of biblical revelation may be found in Plato.Footnote 34 The implication was that one could inquire into the basis and meaning of the revealed Law in the same way, mutatis mutandis, in which Plato had inquired into what it means to found a perfectly just political community. This insight pointed Strauss in several directions. For one thing, it offered a viable alternative to radical historicism—the prevalent but dubious view that philosophical inquiry could never step outside the boundaries of the time and place, or culture, in which the inquirer happened to find himself. For another thing, it led to an understanding of Plato which was independent of Christian Platonism and so made room for a philosophical appreciation of the strictly political component of the question of the right life. Then too, it exposed the glaring weakness of the theologico-political treatises of the founders of modern philosophy (Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza et al.), who had tried to dispose of the challenge revelation poses to philosophy and political life by construing revealed religion simply as one province of culture among others—without, however, actually refuting the claims of revelation but only obscuring them. Meier is saying more than that each of Strauss's wide-ranging inquiries had philosophy's confrontation with revealed religion as its remote point of departure. Rather, each was a test case to learn how philosophy would hold up during the confrontation. As Meier sees it, each amounted to a pressure test. Strauss, he argues, magnified revelation's case against philosophy in order to test philosophy's mettle by provoking the strongest possible argumentative response. In this regard, Meier doubts the widespread opinion—to which both Smith and Sorensen incline, as we saw earlier—that Strauss in his Spinoza Preface was somehow inferring from philosophy's inability to refute revelation that philosophy, like revealed religion, rests on faith. Besides calling attention to Strauss's doubt about whether intellectual probity as a moral virtue is the proper standard for judging the controversy between philosophy and revelation, Meier goes on to ask why Strauss presented the controversy that way in the first place and, in so doing, allowed it to end in a stalemate. His answer is that Strauss was knowingly adopting the radical historicist presupposition bequeathed to contemporary philosophical discussions by Nietzsche and Heidegger—to the effect that philosophy is inseparable from (culture-bound) moral or political beliefs that it does not question—but only for the sake of contesting that presupposition. Strauss, he remarks, had in mind “the philosophical readers of his theologico-political treatises” for whom “the stalemate harbors the demand to question further and to think for themselves; the blind alley contains the appeal to seek after paths that lead out of it.”Footnote 35
Strauss's lecture on “Reason and Revelation” confirms Meier's thesis in the following way. The lecture summons what is “perhaps the most impressive theological argument”Footnote 36 against philosophy and goes on to consider how that argument might be withstood. The argument is that philosophy fails to come to grips with revelation's historical uniqueness but instead collapses revelation into myth. Unlike myth, revelation issues in inescapable moral demands—in the theios nomos or divine Law. Strauss's response is to offer a genealogy of belief in revelation which would account for the moral dimension that separates revelation from myth, as well as for the whole-hearted submission to the divine Lawgiver that distinguishes the believer from the philosopher. The genealogy, if successful, would prove philosophy's superior insight into both the strictly theological and the merely human dimensions of belief in revelation. Strauss's intricate and forceful lecture, along with Meier's concise and illuminating commentary, invites a separate study. Suffice it to say here that, as Meier mentions, Strauss's genealogy resembles those of Lucretius's On the Nature of Things and Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality in tracing the roots of the Law to a presocial neediness in man. The genealogy goes through eleven stages, each of which is an attempt to satisfy that neediness and each of which is an improvement over any previous stage, but only the last of which is both completely satisfactory in its own terms and congruent with how the revealed religions themselves view obedience to the Law. The culminating stage is that of a “full obedience to the Law” that is the product of a unique and final revelation by an omnipotent God, who alone not only guarantees that the Law is the source of all blessings so long as it is obeyed with proper purity of heart, but also provides the requisite purification as a gift.Footnote 37 As Meier emphasizes throughout, just because Strauss's genealogy is designed by a philosopher to show how revelation understands itself to preempt philosophy, it functions as a vindication of philosophy.
Meier rounds out the foregoing with a brief discussion of what Strauss, in his 1935 Philosophy and Law, called Heidegger's “atheism from probity.”Footnote 38 The discussion allows him to say more about Strauss's critique of intellectual probity. When discussing Strauss's 1962 Spinoza Preface earlier, Meier formulates Strauss's understanding of intellectual probity as “the self-satisfaction at the moral merit that derives from renunciation, sacrifice, and the cruelty towards oneself.”Footnote 39 Now he clarifies this formulation by showing it at work in a theological disagreement, cited there by Strauss, between Heidegger and Heidegger's contemporary, the Jewish thinker Martin Buber.Footnote 40 The disagreement has to do with Buber's going out of his way to defend the claim that revelation—which he takes to mean simply the overwhelming and ineffable experience of God's presence—is to be understood as the “absolute experience” (Strauss's expression), as against Heidegger's claim that the absolute experience is instead the call of conscience, which, far from being a welcome experience that offers us comfort or security (as the biblical God may be thought to do), is an unwelcome experience that discloses our ultimate insecurity in the world.Footnote 41 Strauss notes in passing that Heidegger replaces God by nothingness or death.Footnote 42 Buber replies to Heidegger's atheistic claim by insisting that it is revelation that is the experience of our ultimate insecurity, on the grounds that God's demands aim at shattering any and all complacency on our part. According to Strauss, however, Buber's reply does not rest on an understanding of revelation as the Bible understands itFootnote 43 but is driven by a wish to compete with Heidegger in showing how human “authenticity” consists in being able to take moral satisfaction in one's “radical unprotectedness, loneliness, and exposedness.”Footnote 44 Strauss intimates that Buber's I-can-be-more-terrifying-than-thou competition, if followed out to the bitter end, is one that Heidegger would win. As Meier explains, Heidegger's vindication of the call of conscience has, at bottom, no basis other than conscience itself. “Once intellectual probity is emancipated from the love of truth,” Meier comments, “the good—or bad—conscience becomes the highest court of appeal.”Footnote 45
Christianity is rarely featured in an above-board way in Strauss's inquiries into the history of political philosophy, although the first two of Meier's last three chapters show how it plays more than a cameo role. In the first place, Christianity entered the scene after the establishment of the tradition of political philosophy by Plato and Aristotle and others; it made a late entrance into the “cave”—to use Plato's image for political society by which he portrays the activity of the philosopher as an ascent from the ruling opinions of one's own time and place (Republic 7). During the Christian Middle Ages, however, philosophy became, as Meier puts it, “an instrument in the service of faith … that used philosophy for its own purposes and that adopted concepts, arguments, and insights from philosophy in order to strengthen its own doctrine.” Medieval Christian theology thus tended to blur the difference between philosophy's way of transcending politically authoritative opinions and its own, since “philosophy, by its natural sense, is neither a tool nor a weapon but a way of life—and, in fact, a way of life whose raison d'être excludes its subordination to any authority.”Footnote 46 Meier's larger purpose here is to explain why Strauss engaged in philosophical inquiries into the history of philosophy. Strauss saw a pressing need to ascend from what he called the second, artificial cave lying beneath the “natural cave,” before being able to ascend from the cave proper.Footnote 47 The cave-beneath-the-cave consists of authoritative opinions that, like medieval Christian theology, appropriate philosophy for unphilosophical purposes and thereby add to the difficulty of ascending from the natural cave by claiming that a strictly philosophical ascent is either unnecessary or impossible. Closer to our own time in this regard is the currently authoritative decision, first set forth in the theologico-political treatises of Machiavelli and Bacon and others, to enlist philosophy into the modern project of progressively transforming nature and human living conditions—a practical project that puts philosophy at risk by forgetting that it is a way of life in itself (a forgetting made easier by the ongoing theologico-political effects of the long tradition of Christian theology) and by treating it instead as a mere contributor to that project.Footnote 48 Such, in outline, is Strauss's understanding of the historical backdrop to radical historicism's claim that we cannot understand previous philosophers as they understood themselves but only as they contribute to our current state of self-understanding. It was to rescue philosophy from the cave-beneath-the-cave carved out by radical historicism in particular that Strauss in his historical inquiries endeavored, in defiance of radical historicism, to understand each philosopher first and foremost as he understood himself. This endeavor required Strauss as historian to shift the focus of inquiry from the supposed contribution of the philosopher in question to his philosophical intention as such.Footnote 49 With that shift, as Meier observes, came his philosophically salutary merging of historical inquiry with philosophical inquiry.Footnote 50 It was Strauss's way of refuting radical historicism ad oculos.
In the second place, Christianity is also the backdrop for the notion of “political theology” as formulated by Schmitt, whose quasi-dialogue with Strauss Meier writes about elsewhere.Footnote 51 Meier shows how Schmitt transformed the meaning of that traditional Christian term by appropriating the untraditional, polemical meaning given to it by the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who spoke disparagingly of the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini's “théologie politique.”Footnote 52 Schmitt took Bakunin's term of reproach and gave it some substance by thinking through its “metaphysical” implications.Footnote 53 The term now came to mean, in Meier's words, any “political theory or … political doctrine that claims to be founded on faith in divine revelation.”Footnote 54 By ascribing “political theologies” equally to all political actors who at some point appeal to the truth of their theologico-political creeds—whether conservatives or liberals, revolutionaries or counterrevolutionaries, Catholics or Protestants or Jews or Muslims, or even antitheological ideologues—Schmitt implied that political differences are at bottom those of true-believers for whom there are no “neutral parties.”Footnote 55 From the viewpoint of the various political theologies that divide up political life, then, everyone is either a friend or an enemy, that is, either a fellow-believer or a heretic. Political theology as Schmitt understood it is thus the exact contrary to political philosophy as Strauss came to understand it. “From the very beginning,” Meier explains, “political theology denies the possibility of a rational justification of one's own way of life.”Footnote 56
Pursuant to the foregoing, Meier locates the subject matter of political theology within political philosophy, but he does not mean that Strauss conceived the relation between the two as simply that of a subspecialty within a subspecialty. Strauss, Meier argues, understood political philosophy in the light of its Platonic-Xenophontic origins. Plato responds to the fourfold critique of (the “pre-Socratic”) Socrates in Aristophanes' Clouds: Pre-Socratic philosophers lack self-knowledge; they cannot justify their own activity; nor can they defend it from outside attack; and their grasp of human and political life is inferior to the poets'.Footnote 57 The Platonic Socrates' turn to political philosophy, and likewise Strauss's, is characterized by the need to address these interrelated charges in a comprehensive way. First, the subject-matter of political philosophy is political life itself, including its conflicting claims about what is the right way of life, with a view to discovering the true answer to this question. Second, political philosophy's investigation of political things brings to light the precariousness of the situation in which the philosopher finds himself in political life and, with that, both the necessity and the possibilities for a political defense of the philosophical life. Then, too, it also calls for a strictly philosophical justification of that life. Finally, political philosophy is, for the foregoing reasons, the locus for the self-knowledge of the philosopher as human being and citizen. Political theology, in turn, comes under consideration in due course as part of the third of these four components of political philosophy—the justification of the philosophical life. As we have already seen, however, since political theology (unlike political philosophy) claims the backing of divine revelation, it presents the most powerful challenge to philosophy. Consequently, it is not just a legitimate object of philosophical scrutiny. It is also philosophy's inseparable adversary. Philosophy, Meier infers unanswerably, “has every reason to confront a position thoroughly that not only can endanger it politically but also places its very principle in question.”Footnote 58
V
I cannot do justice to Batnitzky's elaborate theological vindication of Strauss here, but must be content with summarizing it rather freely, since she addresses it to fellow specialists in Jewish thought rather than to political philosophers. She sets up a comparison between Strauss and the reputable post-Heideggerian Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas. Who, she asks, provides a better justification for Judaism? Levinas starts with the recognition of the individual's capacity as an individual to respond to other persons with whom he comes face-to-face by assuming moral responsibility for each of them. It is an “infinite responsibility,”Footnote 59 in that it not only places an infinite number of unique moral demands on the individual but also indicates that he has the freedom to set about meeting these demands and that the free response to them as they come up is not just what the individual does but what he is, ontologically speaking. The whole-hearted, ongoing and unremitting response to these demands on the part of all individuals, however counterfactual this might appear to be here and now, is said to be what Judaism calls the “messianic age.” In any event, Batnitzky points out that Levinas espouses Jewish messianism on the basis of a strictly atheistic view of the self and for the sake of understanding the self as such. His messianism is a philosophical construct that he superimposes onto political life; unlike Strauss, he does not start by trying to understand political men as they understand themselves. Hence, Levinas's thought is both “philosophically problematic and politically dangerous”; his views are not “rationalist but are a leap of faith”; he leaves us with “no criteria for [philosophical or political] judgment.”Footnote 60 Nor, then, does he supply us with rational grounds for why Jews (or anyone else) should adhere to Jewish Law in particular.
Strauss, according to Batnitzky, does not supply a positive justification for Jewish Law either, though he leaves room for it and shows a need for it in the following way. The key is what she calls his “philosophical skepticism.”Footnote 61 By this she means that Strauss considered reason incapable of discerning or devising political laws that would be morally binding on all human beings. Batnitzky infers that Strauss was saying that we must therefore rely instead on revelation as our moral teacher. If so, it follows that he would have held revelation to be not only irrefutable, as we have already learned from our previous authors, but irreplaceable. For, she asks rhetorically, “if we are only left with skepticism, how, intellectually, can religion be anything else, in a modern democratic society, than an accommodation to current political structures?”Footnote 62
