The “problem of Socrates” in McNeill's subtitle refers contextually to Nietzsche's evaluation of Socrates as a decadent in a decadent phase of Greek culture, but thematically it refers to the Socrates who appears in Plato's dialogues. McNeill's method is to use contemporary critiques of Socrates to orient his questioning and defense of Plato's Socrates. The text is thus primarily textually oriented toward a reading of Plato's Republic intended to prove that Socrates is not a decadent but a critic of the decadence of his time. The extensive textual interpretations are detailed and sensitive to the dramatic form of the dialogue, and they make use of pertinent cross-references to other salient dialogues. This considerable scholarly apparatus is placed at the service of a philosophical thesis with significant implications: Nietzsche's critique of Socrates is a condensation of his critique of philosophy as a whole and an exoneration of Socrates would present, in kernel, a defense of philosophy in a decadent culture such as our own—not a symptom but a diagnosis and a way out.
Central to this exoneration is McNeill's contention that Socrates's mimetic narratives within Plato's dialogues illustrate “an image of the soul in speech” which diagnoses decadence by exposing the limits of “doxastic immanence” as practiced by the Sophists, and proposes, through “paradoxical, self-contradictory and manifestly incomplete … imitations which show themselves to be imitations” (278), a superior alternative in which images are not self-enclosed within human experience but point beyond toward transcendence. Socratic transcendence is not, however, simply beyond human discourse but a manifestation within human discourse of what transcends it. Not only Plato but Socrates himself engages in mimēsis through narrative. It is clear from the outset that the quarrel between philosophy and poetry will not be presented in conventional terms as a simple opposition within this argument.
The argument focuses initially on the first book of the Republic. Cephalus is interpreted not simply as an image of old age but of old age in a decadent time focused merely on “repaying his debts” in fear of retribution in the afterlife. While the tradition is still alive enough to motivate fear in the face of injustice done to others, it is already too dead to have restrained him from doing injustice or to provoke the thought and insight that the living Homeric tradition would inspire in old age. Similarly, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus are interpreted as Sophists unable to think beyond self-interest, such that “the comprehensiveness of Socrates's critique derives from the fact that these three modes correspond to the tripartite division of the soul or, more specifically, to the lives associated with the three parts of the soul” (18). McNeill thus interprets book one of the Republic as a foreshadowing of the Platonic view of the soul as developed through a critique of Sophistic as a decadent state of Greek culture.
The claim that book one dramatically telescopes the Platonic doctrine is not new, but I believe the central aspect of McNeill's presentation is: the view that the rest of the Republic is determined in its content by “his way of making imaginatively concrete a mistaken conception of the political character of the human soul” (262). It is an intrinsic misconception of human life, characteristic of politics that is especially dominant in decadent times, that the regime depends upon nothing but the creative power of the rhetorician in forming the fundamental features of communal life. Such a misconception of the soul, where “the distinction between ‘form’ and ‘matter’ is understood as a distinction between that which forms and that which is given form by another” (266), must necessarily take the political form of a tyranny—of a despotic will to form the mass of humans as mere material. Again, the linkage of a Nietzschean creative will to Sophistic (especially to Thrasymachus) is not in itself new, but the argument that Plato presents Socrates as already a diagnostician of these consequences, and therefore doing Nietzsche's work avant la lettre, is certainly innovative, if not unprecedented.
The book shifts its direction at this point to sustain the argument through chapters that interpret the dialogues Gorgias and Protagoras as further instances of Socrates's defeat of Sophistic; return to the Republic to argue that the account of erōs is not Socrates's own but an artifact of the doctrine of doxastic immanence that constitutes the dialogue; sustain the account of Socrates's mimetic activity in the dialogues; connect poetry as mimēsis to psychology as attunement in the soul; and, finally, address the ontology of shame and guilt cultures. As detailed and erudite as these chapters are, they do not add anything substantive to the thesis already presented but rather elaborate its extensiveness and implications. The lowest ebb of McNeill's methodology comes in the last chapter, which is an extended shadowboxing with Bernard Williams's Shame and Necessity and a rather light and selective reading of psychoanalytic contributions. Reading Plato philosophically means, to an important degree, reading Plato as our contemporary and this means reading him in the light of thinkers such as Nietzsche who have rendered the initiating questions alive again. But I doubt that this extends to Williams, who has not redrawn our intellectual map to anything like the same extent. Disappointingly, an adventurous and scholarly book ends with what is little more than an extended book review.
It is doubtful that the critique of Protagoras succeeds to quite the same extent as that of the other Sophists. McNeill's assertion that Protagoras conceals his doctrine because it leads to the notion, which he shares with the other Sophists, of a poetic creative will, giving political form to a passive, material mass of citizens, fails to take into account several factors: (1) The extent to which Protagoras's assertion that “everyone teaches Greek” overcomes the form-matter distinction attendant upon Socrates's use of technē as a model of knowledge. If McNeill is right that Socrates only uses this distinction ironically because he believes that the Sophists are committed to it (63), then Protagoras's assertion brings him even closer to Socrates. (2) McNeill's failure to discuss the end of the dialogue where Protagoras's unwillingness to identify courage with the other virtues is not refuted by Socrates and, to that extent, remains a challenge to him, especially if one regards as key the passage in Apology (28d–29b) where Socrates both substantiates his ethos as an Athenian citizen and defies his accusers by recounting his courage in battle. (3) Nor is it clear that Protagoras's praise of Socrates at the end of the dialogue is inauthentic (cf. 174). In sum, Protagoras's views on the sovereignty of poetry seem much like Heidegger's, especially as they are extended by Ernesto Grassi to include Vico and the humanist tradition, on the giving of form to an epoch of Being. “Vico's thesis of the primacy of poetry and ‘imaginative universals’ is based upon two central insights: first, that these ‘universals’ are not derived from particular beings as their abstractions and, second, that … beings emerge from the directive rule of being” (Ernesto Grassi, Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance Humanism: Four Studies [Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1994], 38). Such a view indeed contains the danger that the few may exercise the giving of form over the many conceived as passive material. Heidegger's Nazi period stemmed from just such a view. However, the few-many interpretation of creative will is not a necessary one and very likely does not apply to Protagoras (contra 165–66), as the conception of a knowledge on the model of language in which all participate asserted by Protagoras should remind us. It may well be that Protagoras is Socrates's closest interlocutor rather than his Sophistic enemy, especially if, as McNeill maintains, the doctrines of the Republic are not in Socrates's own voice but expounded as logical implications of Sophistic doxastic immanence. The larger question of the relation between philosophy and humanism, and their dueling claims to overcome decadence, that is implied by McNeill's emphasis on mimēsis is occluded by his reductive account of Protagoras's humanism to the many-few distinction.
It is important to McNeill's account that Socrates does not merely appear in Plato's dialogues but recounts narratives of himself in dialogue with others in them. It is likely true that not enough significance has been attributed to the fact that the Republic itself is recounted by Socrates and is thus “a Socratic fiction imbedded in a Platonic fiction” (8). Both Nietzsche's and Plato's Socrates believe that a narrative of self-justification is implicit in every form of life (273). Socrates's narratives thus present self-justifications of forms of life as made possible by attunements of the soul. The use of this optic to develop an evaluation of Socrates in the light of Nietzsche's critique is the book's most important philosophical contribution. It makes possible the fundamental claim that Plato's Socrates already investigated in the Republic the ground that makes Nietzsche's critique possible and showed it to be an insufficient, doxastic immanence. Socrates's own view of the soul is thus presented, in quite classical terms, as properly attuned only when opened to transcendence.
Since the image of the soul in speech is the central thread, the doctrines of later sections of the Republic are, logically enough, not discussed in detail, but it is rather surprising that other Socratic images of the soul are not systematically compared. McNeill remarks that there are three hypotheses in the Platonic corpus: that human discursive activity is “relatively autonomous and conceived as radically separate from the intelligible realm” (180) which is the deficient hypothesis of doxastic immanence in the Republic, that human discourse is directly dependent on intelligible intuition (explored in Phaedrus), and that discourse is indirectly so dependent (Symposium). As McNeill makes clear, this schematic also allows one to account for the different accounts of erōs and madness in the dialogues. This is a striking and useful synoptic from which to analyze the central doctrine of the soul but it is not systematically explored in this work—whose organization suggests that it is the defeat of Sophistic that is really its main theme and that textual and philosophical defense of the Socratic view of the soul as dependent on transcendence is a larger optic that should have been saved for a future work.
Instead of a comparative analysis of doctrines of the soul in the Platonic corpus, the hypothesis of transcendence is asserted through a reading of Socrates's quotations, misquotations, and interpretations of Homeric poetry, the main contention of which is that “Plato's Socrates seems to believe that each individual comprises more than one such narrative of self-justification” (274) and that Socratic dialogues, like Homeric poetry, perform an objectification that should overcome the duality of the discursive giving of form to a receiving material through “a kind of intelligence that is emphatically contrasted with the notion of the intellect as a kind of self” (270). But even this account remains dominated by previous contentions of the inadequacy of Sophistic accounts and the centrality of mimēsis to the Socratic reply and it really gives very little content to an alternative Socratic conception of the soul other than to repeat its dependence on transcendence—when it is an account of such transcendence that is needed at this point to make the argument convincing. Moreover, it seems to assimilate Socratic philosophy to “the old poetry” in a way that diminishes Socrates's initiation of ethical philosophy (see 152 n. 18).
In short, the book succeeds brilliantly both in scholarly and philosophical terms as an account of Socrates's critique of Sophistic but fails as an account of the image of the soul in speech and thus also fails to address several larger questions that are implicit in its statement of “the problem of Socrates.” The defeat of Sophistic implies that Nietzsche's critique of Socrates misses the mark, but there is no reflection on what this would mean for interpreting Nietzsche or the object of his critique. Was Nietzsche just wrong? If so, why and how has he succeeded in becoming an important philosophical reference point for reading Plato? Or, was he wrong about Socrates but right about what we have come to call “Platonism” in Western culture? Or, right about decadence and wrong about how to combat it? These questions are provoked by the central contention of the book that the doctrines concerning the city, the guardians, their education, music, erōs, and so forth, in the Republic are not Platonic doctrines but doctrines that follow from the hypothesis of doxastic immanence that Socrates criticizes. However, the influence of such doctrines in Western culture was the object of Nietzsche's critique and the exoneration of Socrates only intensifies such questions. It certainly doesn't make them go away.
