1. Laudan's Comparativist Philosophy of Science

While all philosophers of science in the historical school, such as Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Laudan, and Toulmin, emphasize theory comparison as a key tool of assessment, Laudan (Reference Laudan1977, 6; Reference Laudan1997, 306) is perhaps the most comparativist because he defines rationality itself in terms of comparative problem solving, not the reverse. He claims that there are no unchanging, empirical assessment criteria and no noncomparative criteria for assessing theories. Rather, the central tenet in LCPS is (what I call) “the necessity claim” (NC), that “the evaluation of theories is a comparative matter. … Decisive is the judgment as to how a theory stacks up against its known contenders. … All evaluations of research traditions and theories must be made within a comparative context … how its effectiveness or progressiveness compares with its competitors” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 71). As such, NC entails that even a “severe test” of a theory means only “that it has survived tests its known rivals have failed to pass,” not vice versa (Reference Laudan1977; Laudan Reference Laudan1997, 314). Such tests of problem-solving effectiveness may deal with “questions about the objects which constitute the domain of any given science”—empirical problems (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 15). Or the tests may deal with conceptual problems, “more serious … higher-order problems” arising when a theory “is in conflict with another theory or doctrine” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 50–51), as when it is “incompatible with … prima facie nonscientific beliefs” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 61–62), such as “religious, ethical, and social beliefs” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 101).

Rejecting the “positivistic doctrine … that any element of our worldview which does not square with science should simply be abandoned,” Laudan says such conceptual problems should be resolved based “upon how well entrenched the nonscientific belief is and upon what problem-solving capabilities we should lose by abandoning it” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 63–66). Even if a “problem is logically inconsistent with [some theory] T,” and even if it has “dozens of ‘refuting’ instances,” neither is decisive, says Laudan (Reference Laudan1977, 38; see 27, 44) “if a theory happens to be the only known theory in a particular domain.” Both a poor theory with no competitors, and the best of all poor theories, are always “good enough” for at least provisional acceptance in LCPS. This LCPS commitment to the best theory, “particularly in cases where certain experiments or practical actions are contemplated, is the operative modality. … The scientist must commit himself, however tentatively, to the acceptance of one group of theories and research traditions and to the rejection of others” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 108–109). LCPS thus evaluate a research tradition as rational, progressive, and successful if it “is a better problem solver than its rivals” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 106–109), even though progressiveness tells nothing about truth, falsity, or confirmability. That is, Laudan accepts (what I call) the Irrelevance Claim (IC): in appraising the relative merits of theories, the class of unsolved problems is altogether “irrelevant. … In determining if a theory solves a problem, it is irrelevant whether the theory is true or false, well or poorly confirmed. … The notion of solution is highly relative and comparative in a way that the notion of explanation is not” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 21–22, 120).

Where do NC and IC leave one? Obviously Laudan is correct to emphasize the importance of conceptual problems in science. Obviously he is right to specify different “cognitive attitudes” that scientists can take toward theories: “acceptance, rejection, pursuit, and non-pursuit” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 119). But has Laudan gone too far in his alternative to “empiricist philosophies of science” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 45, 47)? To answer this question, consider whether LCPS and NC/IC help promote defensible science, at least insofar as these LCPS tenets have influenced population viability assessment (PVA) theories for the Florida panther.

2. The Florida Panther

The golden-haired Florida panther, Puma concolor coryi, is a subspecies of cougar or mountain lion. Once present throughout the United States, cougars are extinct east of the Mississippi, except for a small population in the southern tip of Florida (McBride Reference McBride, Shindle, Cunningham, Land, McBride, Lott and Ferree2003). Development has pushed them to the wild lands of Everglades National Park, Big Cypress National Preserve, and Native American reservations. Since 1981 government has monitored them, tracking their habitat and survival, through radiotelemetry collars. To help address inbreeding depression, in 1995 several Texas panthers were introduced (Land and Lacy Reference Land and Lacy2000). Nevertheless, only 87 cats, including fewer than 20 breeding females, remain in south Florida, mostly on public land (McBride Reference McBride, Shindle, Cunningham, Land, McBride, Lott and Ferree2003). Often traveling 15 miles a night in search of its main prey, deer, this endangered umbrella and keystone subspecies also inhabits land essential to the survival of at least 52 south Florida rare/threatened/endangered species and the Western Everglades itself (Comiskey, Eller, and Perkins Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004, 67). Although the government is spending $8 billion to restore Eastern Everglades, repetition of east coast development in Western Everglades and its watershed now threatens the panther and its unique Everglades habitat. To avert these threats, it is essential to have a reliable PVA theory, built largely on an accurate account of panther habitat, and then to develop panther-preservation policy based on that theory.

Yet PVA theories are difficult to confirm, both because they rely on various modeling assumptions and because they require reliable habitat theories. Yet for the panther, habitat theories are complicated by dramatic changes in panther range, over time, and by geographically isolated populations’ using very different habitats. As a result, there are two main competing PVA theories for the panther, T1 and T2, of which T2 is dominant or most preferred among scientists. According to the less-preferred theory (T1) of Bass, Comiskey, Eller, Gross, McBride, Perkins, Salinas, and others, viable panther populations (i) are adaptable to a wide range of habitats, not only forests, but (ii) require adequate cover and prey, and (iii) require minimal human intrusion (see, e.g., Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004). According to the dominant theory (T2) of scientists like Cox, Deason, Hoctor, Kerkoff, Land, and Maehr (see, e.g., Maehr and Deason Reference Maehr and Deason2002; Maehr, Hoctor, and Harris Reference Maehr, Hoctor, Harris, Maehr, Noss and Larkin2002; Meegan and Maehr Reference Meegan and Maehr2002), viable panther populations (i) have “preferred” forest habitat, while other areas are “avoided”; they (ii) obtain adequate cover and prey only from forests and (iii) can survive on agricultural lands only if there are forests nearby. As a consequence of accepting T2 over T1, T2 scientists have characterized much existing (less forested) south Florida panther range as unsuitable habitat. Instead they have argued for panther recovery by using central Florida agricultural lands, with nearby forests, for the panther population. They also have used T2 in Endangered Species Act consultations and in south Florida land-use-planning decisions, to allow development of existing south Florida panther habitat (Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004, 51). As later sections show, the T1 (habitat adaptability) versus T2 (forest preferred) controversy can be resolved, in part, by showing how T2 acceptance of LCPS and NC/IC appears to have contributed to biased science. It also shows how T1 rejection of LCPS and NC/IC appears to have helped T1 scientists avoid these biases. Although the scientists themselves do not use these LCPS/NC/IC labels in PVA, when they attack their opponents or defend their own positions, they specifically appeal to the content of each of these claims. Thus their flawed philosophy of science appears to contribute in part to flawed T2 science, therefore to flawed land-development policy based on it.

3. Relative Problem-Solving Strengths of Theory T2

Why do dominant panther theorists subscribe to T2? Repeatedly they appeal to the superior problem-solving strengths of T2 over T1 (e.g., Maehr Reference Maehr2001; Maehr and Deason Reference Maehr and Deason2002; Meegan and Maehr Reference Meegan and Maehr2002) and, indeed, using only LCPS criteria like NC/IC for problem solving, T2 does appear to be superior. T2 solves four important problems that T1 cannot solve. First, if one accepts T2, one can explain, in part, why panthers have declined. Because (A) forests have continued to shrink rapidly in the United States (Noble and Dirzo Reference Noble and Dirzo1997), because (B) forested areas have declined more rapidly than nonforested areas (Pinder and Rea Reference Pinder and Rea1999), and because (C) the panther has declined more rapidly in more-forested, eastern United States (Keister and Van Dyke Reference Keister and Van Dyke2002), T2 is better able to explain the alleged causal connection between forest decline and panther decline. Moreover, T2 can “solve” this decline problem better than T1 because there has been less decline in nonforested areas (Pinder and Rea Reference Pinder and Rea1999).

Second, accepting T2 also helps solve another problem, shrinkage of the panther's home range. Land fitting PVA theory T2 (forest) has declined more rapidly than that fitting PVA theory T1, as already noted. If the panther requires T2 habitat, which has declined more rapidly than T1 land, these differential declines help explain the shrinking panther home range. Third, if one accepts T2 over T1, one also can explain why panthers are reluctant to cross the Caloosahatchee River into central Florida; why 95% of them have never done so; and why no breeding-age females have ever been documented as doing so (Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002). Because T1 posits panther adaptability and no forest “preference,” it is less able to explain the cats’ reluctance to cross the river, although they can swim. Thus T2 again seems superior. Finally, accepting dominant T2 also helps explain why the panther is doing better in western, than eastern, United States. East of the Mississippi, 87 panthers remain only in the less-forested Everglades and its watershed. In the West, 20,000 panthers cover a more-forested (than the Everglades) range from California to Texas. Because T1 presupposes panther adaptability and no forest “preference,” T2 better solves the problem of panthers doing better in the West.

Although the four previous points do not show that T2 is true, and although they present a very naïve and simplified account of the PVA-habitat relationship, nevertheless these reasons are the ones to which T2 proponents repeatedly appeal when they claim that T2 has greater problem-solving ability than T1 (e.g., Maehr Reference Maehr2001; Maehr and Deason Reference Maehr and Deason2002; Meegan and Maehr Reference Meegan and Maehr2002). T1 mainly solves only one problem: why the panther remains viable in the widely varying Everglades habitat. T2 explains its presence there by noting development pressure on earlier, superior panther habitat. Because T2 solves four additional problems better than T1, at least regarding LCPS-style problem solving, it is superior.

4. T2 Comparativist Presuppositions and Spatio-Temporal Biases

Defending the superior problem-solving strengths of T2, and responding to the objections of T1 scientists, dominant T2 theorists (e.g., J. Cox, D. Land, D. Maehr, R. Meegan) have appealed to three LCPS tenets, mentioned earlier, to defend their choice of T2 over T1. Yet conversations with them reveal that they know nothing of Laudan or the labels for these positions. Accepting NC, they point out the problem-solving ability of T2 (over T1), to defend their choice of T2 (e.g., Maehr Reference Maehr2001; Maehr and Deason Reference Maehr and Deason2002; Meegan and Maehr Reference Meegan and Maehr2002). While they admit to having concerns about T2's truth, given their using only daytime, not 24-hour, telemetry to track the nocturnal panther (see Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004, 55), dominant-camp T2 scientists nevertheless accept IC; as a result, they dismiss problems with data representativeness, saying T2 is the “best theory available” (Maehr Reference Maehr1997; Maehr and Deason Reference Maehr and Deason2002; Meegan and Maehr Reference Meegan and Maehr2002). Following LCPS and noting that no other theory has solved this daytime-nighttime problem, they claim that T2 need not do so either; they repeat that T2 should be accepted because it is the best theory available (e.g., Maehr Reference Maehr1997, 36–39). Dominant T2 scientists thus also accept an LCPS corollary of NC, that one ought never reject a theory until a better one is available (Maehr Reference Maehr1997, 36–39; see Maehr and Deason Reference Maehr and Deason2002; Meegan and Maehr Reference Meegan and Maehr2002; Hoctor Reference Hoctor2004). As a result, they dismiss possible representativeness problems and say that they accept T2 because it has more problem-solving ability than T1 (Comiskey Reference Comiskey2003; Shrader-Frechette Reference Shrader-Frechette2004).

T1 scientists, however, say that, in relying on theory comparison and avoiding use of precomparative rules of thumb (e.g., avoid theory choice relying on possibly nonrepresentative data), T2 theorists have done flawed science (see Beier et al. Reference Beier, Vaughan, Conroy and Quigley2003). Because T1 minority-camp scientists, like Bass, Comiskey, Eller, Gross, McBride, Perkins, and Salinas (see Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004) reject both NC and the preeminence of theory comparison, but also accept rules of thumb about representative data, they reject IC and explicitly appeal to these precomparative rules (see Beier, Choate, and Barrett Reference Beier, Choate and Barrett1995; Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004; Beier Reference Beier2003).

In thus accepting LCPS tenets NC and IC, T2 theorists fall victim to at least three representativeness biases, two spatial and one temporal. First, emphasizing western (more forested than the Everglades) and eastern panther-habitat similarities, they use the data they have—possibly nonrepresentative data—about the 60% of panthers living in more-forested areas north of Forida's I-75 (Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004; Beier et al. Reference Beier, Vaughan, Conroy and Quigley2003). As a result, they argue for using those data to justify accepting T2 and abandoning both T1 and future panther-habitat research. T1 theorists, however, do not presume the western-eastern similarities. Instead they call for more data and include both northern, more forested habitat, and that south of I-75—where 40% of panthers live in the Everglades mosaic of prairies, marshes, and tree islands. Yet there is an obvious north-south spatial bias in T2 rejection of a rule of thumb requiring that the northern data be representative. T2 reliance only on these data ignores needed southern data. Likewise, there is an obvious west-east spatial bias in T2 rejection of another rule of thumb—requiring that eastern data be representative of western. Ignoring the west-east representativeness rule, T2 theorists assume that the eastern data reflect the western, merely because they are consistent with them. Yet they ignore the fact that the western and eastern groups of panthers have evolved and adapted in quite different, geographically isolated, ways.

Finally, T2 theorists fall victim to an obvious temporal bias. Ignoring T1 scientists’ appeal to the fact that their daytime-only telemetry might not provide representative habitat data for the nocturnal panther (see Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004, 55), T2 scientists reject a precomparative rule of thumb about temporal representativeness. Given alligator threats and no place to land, fixed-wing aircraft are reluctant to fly over the Everglades at night. Thus daytime data are the only telemetry data. As a result, Maehr (e.g.,Reference Maehr1997) and other T2 scientists dismiss temporal-representativeness problems, in LCPS fashion, by claiming that there is no better competitor theory; as a result, they say T2 is good enough and that it shows forest is “preferred” panther habitat, while all other habitats are “avoided” (Meegan and Maehr Reference Meegan and Maehr2002). Minority-camp T1 panther scientists disagree (Slack Reference Slack, Supervisor, Florida Ecological Services Office, Fish and Service2001, Reference Slack, Supervisor, Florida Ecological Services Office, Fish and Service2002; Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004; Kostyack Reference Kostyack2002; Land et al. Reference Land, Cunningham, McBride, Shindle and Lotz2002; McBride Reference McBride2002). They say that both “field” and “natural-history data” (McBride Reference McBride2002), as well as western-panther data (Beier et al. Reference Beier, Choate and Barrett1995, Reference Beier, Vaughan, Conroy and Quigley2003)—although not telemetry data—show otherwise, namely, alleged “avoided” habitat is not avoided at all. Instead T1 theorists claim (that what T2 theorists call) “avoided” habitat is used more often at night, for breeding, denning, and hunting.

Besides accepting IC and therefore ignoring a precomparative rule about having representative data, T2 panther scientists also ignore a second rule of thumb: scientists should provide uncertainty bounds on data points. Maehr and Cox (Reference Maehr and Cox1995) and others ignore errors caused by the fact that each pixel, generated by panther radiotelemetry, has an average error of 224 meters (Dees, Clark, and Manen Reference Dees, Clark and Manen2001; Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004; Beier et al. Reference Beier, Vaughan, Conroy and Quigley2003). Instead they assume that, provided panthers are within 90 meters of forests for a majority of telemetry locations, they prefer forests (Maehr and Cox Reference Maehr and Cox1995; Maehr Reference Maehr1997, Reference Maehr2001; Maehr and Deason Reference Maehr and Deason2002; Meegan and Maehr Reference Meegan and Maehr2002). By using pixel data, but not providing uncertainty bounds on panther position values, they ignore a typical precomparative rule of thumb. Partly as a result, they overestimate forest importance, ignore the patchy landscape, and fall victim to a second spatial bias. Minority-camp panther scientists, who reject IC and therefore accept precomparative rules of thumb (about uncertainty analysis), do not support T2 and fault the dominant camp for ignoring this rule of thumb (Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004; see Beier Reference Beier2003; Beier et al. Reference Beier, Vaughan, Conroy and Quigley2003).

Because of their accepting IC/BC, therefore rejecting precomparative rules of thumb, therefore falling into spatio-temporal biases, dominant T2 scientists appear to have done flawed science. Minority-camp T1 members, like Comiskey et al. (Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004), avoid these flaws because they reject IC/NC, therefore use both precomparative rules and theory comparison, and therefore do not choose T2 over T1 (see Beier et al. Reference Beier, Vaughan, Conroy and Quigley2003). The same T1 theorists also claim that T2 scientists not only have done biased science, in ignoring these rules of thumb, but also have provided a panther PVA that does not encourage future panther research, because it denies all habitat problems; simply no current PVA theory has solved them. As a result, they say flawed T2 is already biasing both science and future panther-habitat protection. T2 biologists thus make a criticism of T1 that is similar to Doug Allchin's (Reference Allchin1994, 24–25) criticism of LCPS: they cannot not take “lack of evidence” as a negative, because unsolved problems are not counted as problems. Consequently they are less able to reject biased theory assessment than comparativists who also require precomparative rules of thumb.

5. Policy Consequences

If the preceding analysis is right, it suggests that Laudan may be wrong in a number of ways, both epistemic and practical. Although he claims to support theory development (e.g., Laudan Reference Laudan1997, 314), he denies precomparative rules of thumb, defines rationality in terms of theory comparison, and denies problems before they are solved—all of which do not fully encourage theory development. Instead these moves allow LCPS to accept the best theory as “good enough.” Thus accepting the best theory, T2 majority-camp scientists avoided recommending additional panther-habitat work (Maehr Reference Maehr1997). Eager to save money, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission consequently cut panther-research funding. Laudan of course would not condone funding cuts. Yet because he accepts NC/IC, he provides inadequate tools for policing flawed science, flawed philosophy of science, and resulting flawed policy recommendations. Laudan's “thin account” of theory assessment thus plays into the hands of those whose political and economic interests are served by poor science—developers who want to use T2 to justify their taking current south Florida panther habitat and alleging that the cats instead can return to central Florida. Yet, as T1 theorists note, the panthers left central Florida, years ago, as humans and agriculture encroached on them. It is unrealistic to think that T2 preference, for central Florida habitat, makes it more viable for future panthers than it was in the past (Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Bass, Gross, McBride and Salinas2002, Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004).

Touted as “the foremost expert on the Florida panther” (Agripartners 2001, 3), one dominant-camp T2 researcher has repeatedly used his T2 in paid testimony for developers seeking permits to dredge, fill, and develop Western Everglades, the only remaining Florida-panther habitat. Maehr (Reference Maehr2001) says denying the permits “is not necessary to protect the panther” because T2 shows that panthers could expand into central Florida habitats (Agripartners 2001, 1; see NWF 2001; Thoemke and Payton Reference Thoemke, Manager, Wildlife Federation (NWF), Payton, FL Field Representative and WF2001; Kostyack Reference Kostyack2002; Slack Reference Slack, Supervisor, Florida Ecological Services Office, Fish and Service2002). Although developers’ taking advantage of T2 obviously does not prove that Florida-panther scientists made flawed epistemic choices for T2, it does show a weakness in LCPS. By accepting NC and IC, thus only solved scientific problems as problems, and by rejecting precomparative rules of thumb, LCPS have fewer tools than other comparativists to criticize cognitive and practical biases in theory choice (Comiskey Reference Comiskey2003; Shrader-Frechette Reference Shrader-Frechette2004).

T2 rejection of precomparativist tools to detect scientific bias also has encouraged reductions in panther land and its compensation (Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004, 59, 62, 65). Accepting T2, developers have had to pay mitigation costs for only a tiny fraction (the forested part) of the land they develop in Western Everglades. For example, when Florida Rock Industries wanted to mine rock in the only remaining Florida-panther habitat, they hired T2 proponent Maehr, then used his T2 table in court, “showing the [mining] impact to panther habitat (forested cover types only)” (Slack Reference Slack, Supervisor, Florida Ecological Services Office, Fish and Service2002, 8). As a result, in February 2003 the developer obtained a permit for 6,071 acres of protected panther habitat, yet paid mitigation for only about 1% of total acres used (Slack Reference Slack, Supervisor, Florida Ecological Services Office, Fish and Service2002, 10)—only the forested part which, for T2, is preferred panther habitat. As a result of T2 acceptance, the developer was able to argue both for paying mitigation for less land and for using cheaper, central Florida land for mitigation (for loss of panther habitat). Maehr (see Maehr and Meegan Reference Maehr and Meegan2001) and other T2 proponents made similar arguments regarding the Daniels development case (see Comiskey et al. Reference Comiskey, Eller and Perkins2004, 65–66). Yet, without LCPS, NC, and IC, such flawed policy conclusions would have been less easy to draw.

6. Objections

In response to these arguments that T2 scientists’ acceptance of LCPS tenets NC and IC appear to have left them with inadequate ways to police bad science, therefore poor policy, several objections can be made. Perhaps the most obvious is that, for this account of T2 error to succeed, it must argue for the adequacy of the precomparative rules of thumb to which it appeals. This is correct. The panther argument presupposes the plausibility of rules of thumb about representativeness and uncertainty, in part because defending such rules, outside this case, is a massive task, perhaps the central task of philosophy of science. It is far beyond the scope of this 5,000-word-limit paper. Consequently, the paper relies on the prima facie plausibility of these rules of thumb as a first step in a longer, more sophisticated argument. This first step makes two points. First, if there are noncomparative criteria of theory assessment, this case suggests that they might be formulated as rules of thumb. Second, if these rules of thumb seem useful in the panther case, they might also be useful elsewhere.

Comparativists also might claim that foul play can infect any account of scientific theorizing, not just theirs—that the panther case shows only that scientists did not really cognitively compare alternative theories but, instead, were swayed by conflicts of interest. While partially correct, these responses miss the point. Because LCPS require cognitive criticism, but only relative to other theories, such criticisms are more easily manipulated than those based on rules of thumb, like “use error statistics.” Comparativists like Schaffner thus have other resources open to them to challenge flawed theories and conflicts of interest. Their evidentiary standards are not dependent purely on a competitor, limited to whatever the alternative theory can provide. For them, theory choice is not acceptable merely because alternative theories have not been adequately investigated—as it seems to be for LCPS.

A third objection is that Laudan's comparativism does not always require one either to accept or reject a theory; rather, he distinguishes many different cognitive attitudes of scientists, including pursuing a theory. However, while in theory Laudan does distinguish different cognitive attitudes, as already mentioned, in practice he limits the scope of theory pursuit because he says that a problem is not a problem for a theory until some other theory has solved it. This means that LCPS cannot claim to be “pursuing” an unsolved problem or one that only it faces. LCPS also undercuts work on unsolved problems because it defines rationality only in terms of comparative problem solving. That means one cannot rationally pursue some theory's problem unless there is a competitor theory. In the panther case, no theory had solved the problem of nighttime telemetry, and thus for LCPS it was not a problem. But the precise point of the panther case was to show that, even when no theory can solve such a problem, it remains a problem.

7. Conclusions

If preceding arguments are correct, what might be done to improve LCPS? Instead of IC, one might recognize that truth and probability are as important as problem solving. This would not limit LCPS rationality to comparative problem solving. Second, instead of NC, one could explicitly require theoretical pluralism and developing alternative theories—regardless of whether they were able to solve problems that other theories could not. Instead of NC, LCPS comparativists might follow Mayo (Reference Mayo1996) in admitting that there are rules of thumb, such as “use error statistics,” relevant to theory choice. Even without an alternative theory, LCPS could avoid confusing not accepting a theory with rejecting it.