South Korea's per capita GDP in 1960 was $155 and grew at one of the highest rates in history to reach $26,000 in 2013. During this period, South Korea transitioned from an autocratic state to a full democracy. Scholars and policy makers have studied South Korea's economic success for years, but the miracle growth story is naturally shifting into the realm of economic history. However, Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig have managed to identify a new South Korea success story—its recent rise in the international arena, for example, as a provider of aid and security. They provide a timely analysis of the relationship between economic development and foreign relations with an in-depth focus on South Korea.
The book's main thesis is that economic development enables a country to expand its foreign relations through accumulated resources, democratically elected elites, and a stronger military. South Korea's case applies to this thesis very well. For instance, as its economy developed, South Korea transitioned from an aid-receiving country to a member of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, a group of rich countries that provide official development aid across the world. In some aspects, the idea that economic development can increase foreign influence using its newly acquired wealth seems almost mechanical. Not many would dispute that money can directly buy influence and relationships. Similarly, the book highlights South Korea's increasing trade and inbound and outbound investments with multiple countries as evidence of economic development expanding international relations. But then again such correlation is hardly novel, especially for a trade-reliant country like South Korea. The more interesting points to discuss could have been the indirect channels of how increasing wealth impacts international relations. Heo and Roehrig do allude to a few potential channels. For instance, businesses trying to expand export markets, like the steel company POSCO's investment in India, or the Korean cultural wave, like K-pop's expansion into South America, were initially driven by profit motives but have generated further personal and government exchanges. Also, discussions of why certain countries contribute more in foreign aid compared to countries of similar wealth, and whether South Korea is utilizing its resources above or below its economic weight, could have enriched their point on the relationship between wealth and foreign relations.
As Heo and Roehrig point out, South Korea's participation in UN peacekeeping missions and dispatch to Iraq and Afghanistan may have been due to South Korea's stronger military capacity accompanied by economic growth. However, could the same logic explain South Korea's participation in the Vietnam War when South Korea was still very poor? The commitment to the U.S.-South Korea alliance plays an important role in South Korea's decision to send troops abroad. In other words, existing international relationships were likely as important factors behind the choice to deploy troops as increased military capacity due to economic growth.
Though the book is primarily a detailed case study of South Korea's foreign relations, the book's thesis regarding the relationship between economic development and foreign relations is an intriguing one and a fertile area for future research. Researchers, as they read through the book, will likely ask how foreign relations should be defined and measured. Should we measure it as the amount of aid given out, the volume of trade, the number or diplomatic ties established, the number of foreign military operations, or some combination of these? A statement about expanding foreign relations fundamentally requires some way to measure foreign relations. Heo and Roehrig would have made a more serious contribution if they had tackled this challenge.
In addition to the detailed and up-to-date coverage, one of the book's main contributions is the chapters on South Korea's foreign relations with Russia, the European Union, India, and regions further away from the Korean peninsula. Discussions of South Korea's international relations are often consumed by North Korea, the United States, China, and Japan, and one is often left to wonder whether South Korea has any dedicated and serious relations with other countries. This book does a great job in elucidating the increasing importance of countries beyond South Korea's immediate neighbors.
Readers in search of a comprehensive study of South Korea's foreign policy will have much to like in this book. Accordingly, the book would be suitable for an introductory course that covers South Korea's international relations. Readers looking for a novel general hypothesis with supporting rigorous analysis will not find that here. And to be fair, Heo and Roehrig were not aiming for a new theory with supporting causal evidence. The book's greatest contribution is the breadth and depth of information on a miracle economy's foreign relations, and in stimulating scholars to further research on the economic development and international relations nexus.
