The Cuban economy is being transformed, under reconstruction so to say, or – more politically correct in Havana – the Cuban economic model is being ‘updated’ (actualizado). But what does the current transformation mean? Is it actually a transition to market economy ‘with Cuban characteristics’ (paraphrasing the Chinese description of its transition to market economy), or is it an attempt to create something new, a new model unheard of elsewhere?
In any event, there can be no doubt that a key to success in this transformation, or transition, is the role that an emergent private sector (or non-state sector) will be allowed (or hopefully encouraged) to play in a future mixed-market economy. President Raúl Castro has been quite clear about his commitment to change, embracing a role for the non-state sector (in contrast to his brother Fidel).
Two recently published books give us lots of insights into this interesting development and about the economic transformation going on in Cuba in general, but with a focus on the emerging non-state sector, its status, problems, promises and future challenges. The book by Archibald Ritter and Ted Henken, Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape is well documented and one of the best volumes published on the potential of the non-state sector. It gives a thorough and necessary background to the many ups and downs in the attitudes and policy towards the private sector in Revolutionary Cuba since 1959. The chronological narrative is followed by a detailed discussion of the policy changes under Raúl Castro and the prospects for a vigorous non-state (cooperative and private) sector.
The Revolutionary Government had already begun to nationalise major industries (starting with the US-owned sugar refineries) during 1959–63 period. Small businesses (mainly in the retail sector) were untouched. But with growing pressure on resources and economic problems growing in the 1960s, Fidel Castro in March 1968 launched the ‘Revolutionary Offensive’, whereby over 55,000 small firms were nationalised practically overnight. These included over 17,000 food retailers, 11,000 drink sellers and barber shops plus 14,000 other service enterprises, and 9,600 small-scale industries.
The result was that 86 per cent of the national economy was state-owned by 1970, with only a small private sector remaining, consisting primarily of private farmers (11 per cent of the labour force), and an even smaller group of self-employed (street vendors etc.). It is clear that Castro used small businesses as a scapegoat for economic failures. He condemned the private sector for its low levels of support for the Revolution, and claimed that the nationalisations were needed so that the growth of egoistic attitudes common in the private sector could be checked. It is interesting to note that Fidel's intransigent position was, in retrospect, not shared by everybody in government or in the 26 July Movement. In a discussion I had in 1985 with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, at that time Cuban Vice-President, he said – to my surprise – that he personally had been against these draconian measures taken by ‘the leadership’ in 1968 to suppress the remnants of the private business sector. Rodríguez told me he was against it that time, that this was still his opinion, and that it would be so for the rest of his life (he died in 1997).
However, Fidel Castro was obsessed with the ‘petty bourgeoisie’, which he said would – if allowed to continue expanding their businesses – end up threatening the very essence of the Revolution, a socialist economy based on the public ownership of the means of the production. This is a position he maintained until his death in November 2016.
Some private activities were again allowed after 1978 – together with the gradual opening of private farmers’ markets. But then again, in 1986 when small self-employment businesses began blossoming, the Communist Party began a new campaign against the small business sector, a campaign disguised as a ‘rectification process’, and there was yet another policy reversal in the treatment of small enterprises.
Economic stagnation at the end of the 1980s was followed by a deep depression after the demise of the Soviet Union (1990–1). The impact on Cuba was disastrous, with GDP declining by 35 per cent between 1990 and 1993. During the ‘Special Period’, cautious economic reforms were introduced, and a limited number of self-employment activities was again permitted, mostly family eateries (paladares) and house renting (casas particulares), that rapidly became a window of opportunity with an increasing inflow of foreign tourists. Then in 2004, restrictions were again imposed on the relatively small number of private businesses (cuentapropistas).
It was only in 2010, when Raúl Castro had taken over the Presidency from his brother, that government policy really started to move in the direction of serious reforms. The reason was that the government became painfully aware that it was an inefficient, oversized state sector that was becoming the most serious obstacle to change and reform. More than 1.5 million state employees were redundant, said the President, and would be encouraged (rather than forced?) to seek employment in the non-state sector. The immediate target was to ‘transfer’ 500,000 of these state employees (disponibles) to activities in the non-state sector by April 2011, when the 6th Party Congress would be held.
The non-state sector has indeed increased since then, although not at the speed originally desired. Non-state sector employment increased from 806,000 (16.2 per cent of the labour force) in 2010 to 1,401,000 (28.8 per cent) in 2015. The main explanation for this expansion is the growth of self-employment from 147,000 to almost 500,000. The increase is significant and would be promising if it were not for a serious limitation. Self-employment licences are limited to a list of 201 occupations (as of January 2017), of which the majority are low skill, which can seem irrational in a country where the incentives for high-level professionals (such as computer scientists) to work in the public sector are low. Restrictions on self-employment are thus a major problem for the growth of the sector in the future. ‘Professionals’ are not allowed to exercise their professions as self-employed people. This goes also for university graduates (such as computer scientists).
The future of the non-state sector in Cuba is also the focus of an important study by the renowned Cuban American scholar Carmelo Mesa-Lago, who has, together with four Cuban colleagues – Roberto Veiga, Lenier González, Sofía Vera Rojas and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán – produced a book with the title Voces de cambio en el sector no estatal cubano. This study is an excellent companion to the Ritter–Henken book. While Ritter and Henken give a thorough background to, and documentation of, the gradual rebirth of the non-state sector in Cuba, Mesa-Lago et al. make a courageous attempt to explore in depth what the non-state sector looks like, a kind of ‘Inside the Non-State Sector Report’. What does the sector look like some five years after Raúl Castro gave a green light to initiating the process of its expansion?
The study is based on 80 interviews with people working in four types of non-state activities: (1) self-employed (cuentapropistas), (2) usufruct farmers (usufructuarios), (3) members of the new type of (non-agricultural) cooperatives, and (4) real estate brokers.
The first group – cuentapropistas – is, as mentioned, by far the biggest private sector in Cuba with an estimated half a million employed by 2015, accounting for 35.8 per cent of total non-state employment in 2015.
Usufructuarios are a relatively new sector. These are farmers who have been granted land – usufruct (with tenancy rights) for up to 20 years; specifically, this is idle state-owned land, previously used for sugar production. The transfer of land started in 2008; the number of usufructuarios totalled 312,300 in 2014, and is increasing. Usufructuarios would – if these figures are correct – account for about 23 per cent of current non-state sector employment, and 6.2 per cent of the total labour force.
The third sector is of even more recent origin. It is an attempt by the government to expand the cooperative movement into urban areas, with so-called non-agricultural cooperatives. It is so far a quite small sector (7,700 in 2015) but is expected to increase rapidly in the coming years since many see the cooperatives as the backbone of a reformed – still socialist – Cuba. The final group – real estate brokers – is part of the cuentapropista sector, and was added to the ‘list of 201’ as late as September 2013. The total number in this group has not been made public.
Originally 100 interviews were planned (with 25 in each group), but because of bureaucratic problems getting permissions to interview cooperative members (many coming from former state-owned firms) only five interviews were possible in that group.
In addition to basic questions such as about age, gender, level of education etc., the interviewees were asked about success factors, such as satisfaction with income, length in business, but also – and perhaps more importantly – what they see as the most serious problems for running the business. The answers of course vary somewhat between the four groups. But there are many problems that they share: shortages of inputs, and access to wholesale markets (32 per cent of those interviewed), and red tape from a ubiquitous bureaucracy (27 per cent of those interviewed). Only 3 per cent answered that they had no problems.
An important statistic is that 41 per cent (!) of those interviewed had university education of some kind (this is higher than the figure in the average labour force, 22 per cent). Given that university graduates are not allowed to set up their own businesses in their field of study (profession), this suggests an enormous internal brain drain and waste of resources.
The data and the data analysis are very interesting. But the interpretation is not unproblematic. The interviewees have not been chosen in a statistical random selection process, so there is no confidence that the data are representative. This is of course a problem that the authors share with other analysts in Cuba. There have been several similar studies carried out in Cuba since 2011, with similarly limited samples. The reason is that it is difficult to get the necessary government permits to carry out surveys. This is absurd, of course, since different government agencies frequently carry out similar surveys (presumably with larger representative samples). These surveys are, however, for some reason classified information – until now.
Both the Mesa-Lago et al. study and the Ritter–Henken book discuss the future of the non-state sector, and they find that the internal brain drain, bureaucratic inertia and resistance by the political classes are among the most serious obstacles to its expansion. It will only be when the government begins encouraging non-state activities (whether self-employment, cooperatives, or other private enterprises, including joint ventures), levelling the playing field with equal opportunities for all stakeholders, that a healthy mixed market economy can thrive in Cuba.
