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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 February 2004
In this preliminary analysis, we apply the theory of issue evolution developed by Carmines and Stimson to the politics of gender (1989). Issue evolutions involve issues “capable of altering the political environment … and the party system from which they emerged” (1989, 11). Most relevant for our purposes is the idea that the positions of American political parties on these issues exhibit a distinctive pattern over time. At the beginning of this evolutionary process, the positions of the political parties are indistinct, and a particular issue area does not easily break along partisan lines. A “critical moment” can occur, however, that fosters a period of change, in which the positions of the parties become clearly defined. In other words, in the wake of the critical moment, the parties take a side. Subsequently, the parties' positions become polarized over time. As Carmines and Stimson (1989) demonstrate, this crystallization and polarization between the parties can be seen among various party elites and the mass public.1
Carmines and Stimson (1989) use this theory to explore the issue of race and its impact on American political parties and racial policy. In this paper, we suggest that this theory can also be applied to gender issues by exploring a variety of policies, the integration of women into the political system, and the links between the parties and the mass public. Prior to the 1960s, support for gender issues did not split along easily identifiable party lines. But in the wake of a “critical moment” in the early 1970s, the positions of the parties on issues of gender polarized, and clear ideological divisions developed among party elites, party activists, and the mass public.
In general, prior to the 1960s, issues of gender were not clearly partisan issues (see Wolbrecht 2000). The history of the Equal Rights Amendment, for example, is a good example of this and how even women's rights groups were split over the issue.2 In 1921, Alice Paul, the head of the National Woman's Party, drafted a version of an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which was introduced in Congress in 1923. It was, however, immediately opposed by labor unions and other progressive organizations, including Florence Kelly's National Consumer League (NCL). Kelly opposed the ERA because it would threaten the maximum hour and minimum wage laws for women for which the NCL had fought hard (see Mansbridge 1986; O'Connor 1980). By 1940, however, the Republican Party adopted the ERA as a plank in its platform. The Democrats followed suit in 1944 (Mansbridge 1986, 9). Although women's rights were not a priority for President Kennedy, in 1961, he did create the Commission on the Status of Women (see Davis 1991; Harrison 1988).
We argue that the critical moment in the issue evolution of gender in American politics was from 1970 to 1973. In 1970, new women's rights organizations were being created faster than anyone could count (Freeman 1975, 147–48). Membership in NOW exploded from 3,000 in 1970 to 50,000 in 1974 (Davis 1991, 108). The “smallscale disruptive actions” of the 1960s were being replaced by mass marches, such as the 10,000 demonstrators who paraded down New York's Fifth Avenue to mark the 50th Anniversary of the passage of the 19th Amendment (Costain 1992, 2). January of 1970 also marked the beginning of “the grand press blitz.” For the next three months, almost every major media outlet in the American press featured stories on the women's movement (Costain 1992). In addition, during the 93rd Congress (1973–1974), Congress passed the largest number of women's issue bills in its history (Costain 1992, 10). “Women's liberation became the latest fad” (Freeman 1975, 148).
During this three-year period, the Equal Rights Amendment also attracted widespread publicity and was given serious attention in Congress. As Boles (1979, 38) explains, 1970 was a “pivotal year in the ERA's legislative history.” By this time, a consensus had been reached on the ERA, even among labor groups (Mansbridge 1986). After a series of set backs and procedural maneuvers, Congress finally passed the ERA in 1972 with bipartisan majorities and sent it to the states for ratification (see Mansbridge 1986; Boles 1979). By the end of 1973, 28 states had ratified with lopsided bipartisan votes in favor (Boles 1979, Table 1.2).
As with civil rights, issues of gender became increasingly partisan and polarized in the wake of this critical moment. Congress cleared the ERA in 1972 with a ratification deadline of seven years. After the initial rush of states, however, ratification all but stalled, and serious grassroots opposition was mobilized. Over the next four years, only five more states would ratify, and all of these votes were much closer (Boles 1979, Table 1.1). As the ratification deadline approached, 35 states had ratified, but approval by the three additional states needed for the 3/4 majority was looking bleak. A number of states also asserted the prerogative of rescinding their vote for ratification. Proponents of the ERA then introduced a resolution to extend the deadline for ratification to June 30, 1982. In contrast to the initial passage in the early 1970s, the congressional effort to extend the ratification was far from bipartisan. Majorities of Democrats voted against majorities of Republicans. In the states, Democratic party leaders were now putting pressure on state legislators to vote in favor (Mansbridge 1986, 154). In 1980, the Republican Party removed the ERA from its party platform. In spite of the extension, no additional states ratified the ERA, and it died in 1982. Beginning in the mid 1970s, the politics associated with a number of gender-based issues became increasingly partisan and ideological (see Wolbrecht 2000).
Based on data drawn from the National Election Studies from 1952 to 2000, we find that party identification among the mass public with regards to gender follows the pattern of issue evolution. Between 1952 and 1964, women were more likely to call themselves Republicans. The period from 1966–1978 is one of fluctuation. In 1980, “separation” occurs, with women more likely to call themselves Democrats. This trend continues through the late 1980s and early 1990s. By the mid-1990s, there is a 10-point gender gap for the Democratic Party.
There are similar patterns evident among party activists. The pattern here, also based on NES data, is similar to the changes among the mass public. 3 Again, three periods are evident. Prior to 1968, Republicans have a greater proportion of female activists than Democrats. The second period, from 1968–1978, is one of fluctuation. Finally, there is a separation in 1980– 1982 that persists through the end of the time series. From 1982 forward, women comprised at least half of the Democrat activists and marks the last time that women comprised at least half of the Republican activists.
The same pattern can also be seen in the partisan distribution of women elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from 1956–2000. There are relatively equal numbers of Republican and Democratic female House members in the elections from 1956 until 1968. In the early 1970s, there is more fluctuation, especially among the Democrats. Separation occurs in 1988 and increases through the elections of the 1990s and 2000. In 1968, the last election prior to the “critical moment,” eight women were elected to the House of Representatives, five Democrats and three Republicans. After the election of 2002, there were 59 women, 38 Democrats and 21 Republicans. Of the 14 women in the Senate today, nine are Democrats. Similar patterns can also be seen among women in state Houses of Representatives and state Senates (Simon and Palmer 2003).
While very preliminary, all of this suggests that gender triggered an issue evolution that fundamentally changed the electoral landscape in the United States. A deeper historical and more rigorous statistical analysis is needed to determine whether the dynamics of change conform to the top-down, elitetomass evolution found in the issue evolution of race. Ultimately, we hope to contribute to our understanding of the slow integration of women into the political system. One of the theories that attempts to explain why, 82 years after women were granted the right to vote, only 15% of Congress is female is the “pipeline theory.” The basic premise underlying this theory is a “bottom-up” approach, in that there is a sequential lag structure in the American political hierarchy. We argue, however, that parties, political elites, and policy goals play a fundamental role in this process. Although there has been a slow, relatively steady, increase in the number of women in public office, women are no longer evenly distributed across the two parties. Thus, we may have to account for more of a “top-down” explanation, in which political elites at the national level foster changes in lower levels of the political system and eventually in the mass public.