This book sets out to explain the documentary base for understanding the Neo-Babylonian legal system and how this can be interpreted in order to reconstruct the fundamental procedures. After an introduction which gives a brief overview of the study of Mesopotamian legal texts of all periods and the Neo-Babylonian period in detail the work is divided into two principle sections, Part I presenting a functional typology of texts and Part II an analysis of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory procedures. Chapter 1 takes on the decision records, which Holtz sorts into three groups, the Royal Judges style, Eanna style and unstylised. The Royal Judges style is further divided into Royal Judges style A and Royal Judges style B. Both groups are comprised of a standardised format recording the details of the case, the deliberations of the judges and their statements of their verdicts. The difference lies in the details of the first of these sections: in Royal Judges style A the opening clause launches straight into the plaintiff's statement whereas Royal Judges style B begins with the notification that there is a conflict between the two parties. In style B it is also explicitly stated that the parties appeared before the royal judges. Holtz's assessment is that these differences are not merely due to the preference of the scribe (there are indeed scribes who wrote both types) but that they represent a functional difference depending on whether or not this is the first appearance before the judges of the king. The next major category is the judicial texts stemming from the jurisdiction of the temple communities. Holtz calls these the “Eanna style”. Here too there are two separate groups - Eanna style A and style B - but in this case the difference is not so profound, only consisting of whether the list of witnesses is placed at the beginning or the end of the document, and may indeed be due to the style of the scribe. There is however overlap between these two principal categories - members of the Eanna administration are known to have also been royal judges and “cases recorded in the Royal Judges style may be adjudicated by Eanna authorities and cases recorded in the Eanna style may be adjudicated by the royal judges” (p.21). The determining factor appears to have been whether the tablet in question was to be retained by the plaintiff or by the temple.
Chapter 2 deals with other types of texts including the resolution of disputes. These fall into three categories: conclusions recording both the decision and that the parties had complied with its stipulations; memoranda of decisions, characterised by the phrase “tahsistu la mašê ” “reminder, not to be forgotten” and for the use of the scribe himself; and records of (out of court) settlements. Chapter 3 examines the evidence for preliminary protocols and statements in court, the former including summoning witnesses, interrogations, confessions, production of evidence, the taking of sworn statements and establishing that there is a case to be heard. Chapter 4 deals with summonses of defendants to argue (dabābu) or conclude (quttû) a case. A most interesting fact which emerges (p.123) is that these summonses are always to Babylon. Chapter 5 deals with summonses to establish (kunnu) a case, guarantees to produce a witness and verdicts conditional on the emergence of a witness; Chapter 6 marshals the evidences for summonses to present (abāku) witnesses and guarantees for the presence of a witness; and Chapter 7 covers types of documents not falling in any of the previous categories such as promissory notes and injunctions.
In sum then Part I marshals the evidence for the individual components which constitute the basic building blocks of pursuing justice in the Neo-Babylonian period, from initial accusation through to final settlement. In Part II these foundations are re-evaluated to create a formal analysis of Neo-Babylonian juridical procedure. The bulk of the evidence pertains to two very distinct arenas. The first of these is cases conducted through the state and heard by the royal judges. A particularly useful section here is the appendix giving a directory of the judges known from the reign of Nebuchadnezzar through to the reign of Cambyses. One interesting upshot of this is that there appear to have been boards of judges, with different boards for different provinces or regions; another important observation is that there was continuity over the holders of these offices over the change to Persian rule. The other arena for which we have a sizable body of evidence is for the judicial procedures carried out within the sphere of the Eanna temple of Uruk. In both cases Holtz reviews the evidence for the individual steps – hearings, interrogations, taking of oaths, the deliberations (mitluku) and decisions (purussû) of the judge.
Overall this work succeeds well in its aim. It does indeed reconstruct the basics of Neo-Babylonian legal procedures from the “tablet trail” which they have leftFootnote 1. The only significant failing is that the work omits to properly address the administration of justice in the Achaemenid period – which the author specifically includes in his definition of “Neo-Babylonian” – and particularly the body of evidence relating to cases referred to and judged by the Great King himself: court procedure in both meanings of the phrase. This is a pity as it includes some most fascinating material. A recent addition to this corpus is the publication by the reviewer of BM 79541, a text dealing with a dispute over revenues from chariot fiefs belonging to the Persian nobility in the vicinity of Sippar and Cutha (see “A Judgement of Darius the king” (JCS 60 (2008), pp. 87–99). Another, smaller, failing is that Holtz does not always cite the latest edition of a text he is discussing even though it is clear from the bibliography that he does know the publication in question. For example, the large tablet dealing with a theft of cloth from the temple storerooms CT 22 2 is considered by Holtz (pp. 99–100) and it is clear from the bibliography that he knows of Joannès's edition of the text in RA 86 but he does not give this reference to the reader. This is a pity. Non-specialists cannot be expected to know these references and it decreases, even if only slightly, the utility of the book. On the procedural side more could have been made by the part played by the consultation of the entries on waxed wooden writing boards in judicial inquiries, cf “The use of writing boards in the Neo-Babylonian administration at Sippar”, Iraq 64 (2002), pp. 217–236, esp. p. 225. On the subject of juridical activities directed by the temple authorities of Sippar, see now also “Fields of endeavour: leasing and releasing the lands of Šamaš” JEOL 40 (2007), pp. 91–101.
A few individual remarks:
p. 23 The Tapšuhu of TBER No.58 also occurs in BM 61088 (MacGinnis, ‘‘Temple ventures across the river’’, Transeuphratène 27 (2004) p.30 No.1) and has been equated with classical Thapsakos (Graslin & Lémaire NABU 2004/2 No.55).
p. 87 Note the interesting translation of tamīmu, conventionally understood as denoting animals perfect for sacrifice, as “unbranded”.
p. 90 With regard to maš’altu “interrogations” further unpublished texts dealing with maš’altu's are BM 67595, BM 101913, BM 101193, BM 76034, BM 67534, BM 67595, BM 84059, BM 101913 and BM 101913.
p. 105 On Gimillu see also M Jursa “Auftragsmord, Veruntreuung und Falschaussagen: Neues von Gimillu” WZKM 94 (2004), 109–132.
p. 135 BIN I 113.4: for gišBÁN read gišBAN.
p. 223 The claim of Nebuchadnezzar to have rebuilt the courts of Babylonia raises the interesting question of how justice was administered in Babylonia under Assyrian domination
p. 279 & p. 288 n. 48 Note the phrase eli ramānišu kunnu used when an individual implicates himself.
pp. 288–289 Holtz brings our attention to the suggestion first made by San Nicolò that the maš’altu interrogation procedures may have involved torture.
In sum this is a most useful work and students of both Mesopotamian legal systems and near eastern legal systems more widely will be grateful to Holtz for this contribution.
