Warrior traditions in southern India

Power structures in southern India had begun to fragment by the sixteenth century. Though the nature of the Chola state remains a controversial topic among scholars, there can be no doubt that by the later Vijayanagara period localized power systems were an established fact.Footnote ⁴ The disintegration of Vijayanagara after the Battle of Talikota in 1565 saw the emergence of numerous nayaka (leader) polities which then engaged in constant internecine warfare.Footnote ⁵ Telugu chieftains from the northern fringes of peninsular India had begun to settle in the region as early as the fifteenth century.Footnote ⁶ European maritime powers were able to exert greater influence along the southern coasts than in core areas of Mughal power further north. A constant influx of Portuguese mercenaries helped to bolster the position of local polities. They provided military personnel for field armies and greatly improved the conduct of siege operations.

Nayakas were generally hostile to firearms. Portuguese mercenaries had flooded the region with canons and muskets in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet, warrior elites refused to adopt them en masse as they created too great a distance between opponents. Guns were associated with anonymous death and blotted out the heroic aspects of ritualized warfare.Footnote ⁷ Close combat between warrior champions remained the preferred form of armed engagement during the nayaka wars of the early modern period. This stands in sharp contrast to, for instance, Japan where gunpowder technology was readily embraced by warlords and played a decisive role in the centralization of political power. The sword and lance remained the preferred means of confrontation in South India, although there is evidence that low-caste Maravars and Kallars made extensive use of musketry in ambushes launched from dense forest cover to devastating effect.

Many poligars in the Tamil countryside came from these lower castes. Their ‘little kingdoms’ emerged in the dry plains and upland forest country of peninsular India. It had always been difficult for kingdoms based in fertile and readily accessible areas to exert control over rugged terrain. Recalcitrant groups fled to upland tracts to avoid the demands of overbearing states. These areas were then used as staging points from which to plunder lowland regions.

Yet, clientage characterized relations between fringe and core as much as conflict. Local nayakas dispensed patronage to these predatory chiefs in an effort to expand their armed followings. Many poligars began their ascent up the social order by serving in nayaka armies. Glory in war brought titles and fiscal privileges from above. Successful poligars presented themselves as warrior divinities in order to assemble retinues that launched wars of expansion into the fertile rice-growing regions of present-day Tamil Nadu. As a warrior chief's resource base increased, he engaged the services of sacerdotal groups which contributed to his divinity through religious rites. Nevertheless, Brahmans remained junior partners in the petty kingdoms that were sustained by the successful exercise of violence.Footnote ⁸

These kingdoms could never grow too large as any chief who sought to expand his holdings did so at the expense of rivals. Chieftains on the receiving end of aggression mobilized their retainers in an effort to resist and overcome their opponents. In addition, poligars were prone to turn on nayaka overlords who had originally granted them a legitimate place in local power structures. Revolts by unruly vassals and internecine warfare between petty chiefs prevented the formation of durable states that were able to exercise routinized forms of control over fixed territories. Susan Bayly is quite right to extend Andre Wink's concept of fitna (sedition) to the petty princelings of the southern districts.Footnote ⁹ Sedition by local elites against higher levels of authority perpetuated a highly fragmented political order in which centres could not take the compliance of peripheries for granted.

Aurangzeb's Deccan campaigns failed to incorporate frontier territories into the Mughal empire. Protracted wars against recalcitrant Maratha chieftains gradually eroded the power of the imperial state. Collapse at the centre triggered the outward radiation of Mughal culture, political institutions, and personnel into the southern reaches of the subcontinent. Hyderabad, Arcot, and, later, Mysore were all Persianate states with Muslim ruling dynasties. In addition, the strategic imperatives of the Second Hundred Years War caused Britain and France to expand their presence in southern India as part of a global struggle for oceanic trade networks.

All the new players that entered South India in the eighteenth century remained dependent on local warrior elites for military manpower and material resources. The first nizam of Hyderabad constructed military forces by plugging into pre-existing networks of warrior power. Maratha horsemen and Telugu nayakas made up the core contingents of his armies.Footnote ¹⁰ Regional polities were constructed through associations with, rather than the absorption of, local war bands. The nawabs of Arcot would not have survived long without establishing linkages with poligar chiefs.Footnote ¹¹ British commanders had little choice but to engage in extensive bargaining with free-floating warrior groups if they hoped to sustain adequate concentrations of coercive force. Mobile armed communities in fringe areas received substantial infusions of patronage from regional states until the turn of the nineteenth century.

Mysore as a fiscal-military state, 1762–1799

Mysore had not been a major power in southern India for much of its existence.Footnote ¹² Although the Hindu Wodeyars had ruled the area since the late sixteenth century, they had never surmounted severe structural deficiencies in their fiscal-military apparatus. Revenue officials lacked the means to conduct regular collections across such a vast territory. Mysore had a huge advantage in terms of superior access to draught animals but it was unable to construct a reliable cohort of military personnel. Wars of expansion were predicated on the formation of alliances with Maratha or Mughal contingents that often fell apart. Poligar chieftains proved highly unreliable and refused to serve in protracted campaigns that drained their resources. Portuguese mercenaries bolstered field armies but proved ruinously expensive and prone to desertion if they were not promptly paid. Elite cavalry units were led by an assortment of Pathans, Turks, and Telugus. These overmighty subjects were difficult to control and frequently developed their own followings. It is in this context that Haidar Ali rose to prominence.Footnote ¹³

Haidar Ali's gradual seizure of power was premised on various forms of alliance-building and the incorporation of strategic service groups. He began to assert his status as an effective leader during his military service with the Hindu maharajas of Mysore. During a campaign against upland poligars in 1755, Haidar dispatched a force of 3,000 foot soldiers, 1,500 horses, and four field pieces. Punitive expeditions such as these appear to have been more demonstrative than militarily decisive. The appearance of large armies at the gates of a disloyal fort usually induced a refractory chieftain to come to terms.Footnote ¹⁴ Yet, certain poligars were capable of mounting an effective defence which could result in protracted sieges and heavy casualties.Footnote ¹⁵ Haidar had not yet openly overthrown the Wodeyar maharajas and appears to have been pursuing a policy of conciliating local warrior elites.

Pragmatism rather than any deep-seated commitment to rigid objectives determined Mysore's policies. The Hindu maharajas openly allied themselves with Muslim rulers to curb the ambitions of rival states. In 1749, 5,000 cavalry and 10,000 militiamen were sent to Hyderabad to join an attack on the nawab of Arcot. Haidar himself was mainly concerned with formal declarations of loyalty that secured the regular payment of revenue from localities outside central control. Revenue collections were sporadic at best. The voluntary nature of financial contributions apparently promoted greater social peace among Mysore's inhabitants. Haidar used military campaigns to reap substantial personal profits. On one punitive expedition against recalcitrant poligars he swept up the cattle they had confiscated from local inhabitants and resold them to their former owners at exorbitant prices.Footnote ¹⁶

The sultanate managed to field formidable armies against the British when it was able, and willing, to subsidize free-floating units of military labour. According to Company estimates from 1780, Mysore infantry totalled anywhere between 70,000 to 100,000 men. Added to this were 100 canons operated by European mercenaries and 30,000 cavalry, 2,000 of whom were made up of Ethiopian mercenaries who acted as Haidar's personal bodyguards. A number of indigenous groups serving in his ordinance department had initially been trained by the British or were employed by the nawab of Arcot.Footnote ¹⁷ Mysore drew them into the fold by offering more favourable conditions of service. Almost 10,000 of Haidar's horsemen had apparently been contracted from the Carnatic military labour market. Arcot had recently made substantial reductions in mounted contingents for reasons of economy. This flooded the region with unemployed warriors who were easily inducted by Haidar's commanders.

Upon his accession, Tipu Sultan pushed much harder in asserting direct control over the southern districts. He engaged in coercive population transfers to increase his own productive capacity while diminishing the resources of his opponents. Hardly a year went by without active campaigning. Independent warrior power was severely curtailed in certain frontier regions adjoining rival states.Footnote ¹⁸ Such aggressive actions eventually drove regional polities and petty princelings into an alliance with the British. Local elites could only be pushed so far before they sought protection from a different patron. As a result, Tipu had to backtrack on harsh policies against warrior elites. On occasion, he offered rewards to certain poligars who were willing to contribute armed contingents to expeditions against more recalcitrant colleagues. But, punitive policies alienated large numbers of armed servitors. Total control of the southern military economy was a goal beyond Mysore's means and did not serve its ultimate interests.

The sultanate eventually had to fall back on domestic resources to supply its field armies. After extensive territorial losses in 1792, Tipu further tightened the screws on his truncated domains. Although evidence is hard to come by, this appears to have alienated further sectors of the local elite and made them more amenable to Company rule.

Outside powers proved to be of little direct value after the second Anglo-Mysore war of 1780–1784. The brief resurgence of French global power during the American Revolutionary War was snuffed out by an acute fiscal crisis at home. Tipu primarily utilized France as a source of arms and military tactics. It is also possible that French moves towards state centralization after 1789 inspired Tipu to press on with his own efforts at administrative integration. Yet, relations were more symbolic than substantial. By the mid-1780s, France no longer possessed the capacity to act as a meaningful military counterweight to the growth of British power on the subcontinent. In 1786, Tipu sent khilat (robes of honour) and various gifts to Louis XVI but voiced his disappointment at France's decision to enter into a separate peace with Britain in 1783 without first consulting Mysore.Footnote ¹⁹ Tipu only rarely deigned to refer to Louis as a true king, or badshah, preferring instead to call him a mere raja in official correspondence. Such evidence strongly contradicts British attempts to link the Anglo-Mysore wars to larger global conflicts with France.Footnote ²⁰

Richard Wellesley, governor-general from 1798–1805, justified the invasion of Mysore in 1799 as a countermove to French imperial ambitions. He claimed he was unaware of Nelson's victory at Aboukir Bay the preceding year and uncertain of the state of the French army in Egypt.Footnote ²¹ Delaying the attack on Mysore would only provide a resurgent France with an opportunity to link up with an old ally on the subcontinent. Presenting an act of aggression as pre-emption won Wellesley many accolades from London but had little to do with the war on the ground. Company policymakers were attempting to topple a rival regime that threatened their bid for political hegemony in southern India. After the early 1780s, the French threat was a justification rather than a genuine cause for prosecuting wars against the sultanate.

According to British officials, Tipu's open disregard for French royal honour was a result of religious prejudice. It would be degrading to Muslim sensibilities to refer to any ruler outside of the Islamic faith as a badshah. Europeans, like the Hindu rulers of the subcontinent, were idolaters who could not be dignified with a title held in such high esteem.Footnote ²² The British noted that while the title ‘raja’ had once been reserved for powerful kings who ruled over vast dominions, it had been debased over the centuries as more and more petty princes laid claim to it. By equating Europeans with a domestic political order in decline, the Mysore sultanate was attempting to assert its supremacy over all challengers, both foreign and domestic.

None of this heated ideological rhetoric prevented the French colonial enclave at Pondicherry from turning a handsome profit by selling thousands of small arms to the sultanate. In addition, Pondicherry provided a ready market for valuables plundered from Company territory by Tipu's troops. When the British protested, French authorities stated that they lacked the capacity to control roving war bands crossing porous colonial boundaries. While French commanders provided asylum for refugees fleeing the ravages of war, they maintained a policy of official neutrality during the 1790–1792 conflict.Footnote ²³ At this time of great political and economic uncertainty in France, their own resources were stretched quite thin. Caution rather than subterfuge was the guiding principle of a remote French colony surrounded by more powerful actors.

Tipu went to greater lengths to assert his place in the wider Islamic world. In 1784 and 1785 he sent envoys to Constantinople. Mysore's emissaries also paid their respects at the holy Shi'a cities of Najaf and Karbala.Footnote ²⁴ These actions did not result in any extensive military aid from the Ottoman empire. They were more symbolic demonstrations of the sultanate's global significance than attempts to form concrete alliances with outside powers.

For all the Company's efforts to portray Mysore as a formidable foe with vast resources at its disposal, Tipu's armies frequently found themselves in desperate circumstances. His commanders offered gifts to local poligars in exchange for provisions that commissariat services had failed to provide.Footnote ²⁵ When the British besieged Seringapatam in 1791, Mysore bullocks had little fodder and Tipu was forced to tear off the thatched roofs of local dwellings in an effort to maintain his herds. Even units of Tipu's much vaunted cavalry came over to the British when their master's prospects seemed bleak.Footnote ²⁶

The Mysore sultanate partially broke with prior modes of interaction between states and local strongmen. Haidar Ali began a process of redirecting revenue and resource flows towards a central authority. These resources were then deployed to buy up large swathes of free-floating military labour. His son Tipu expanded upon these processes and further curbed the power of petty princelings. Fiscal resources were extracted with greater effectiveness and resistance to the state's military requirements elicited ruthless reprisals. These policies were a substantial departure from events that were taking place elsewhere. The ‘thrusting centralization’ of post-Mughal states was by no means a general phenomenon.Footnote ²⁷ Outside the military sphere, attempts at despotism were tempered by utilizing the cultural symbols of kingship that were rooted in southern society. The sultanate cannot be seen as an attempt to impose an alien Islamic idiom on a fundamentally Hindu region.Footnote ²⁸ As a ‘just and moral king’, Tipu respected the rights of local communities engaged in production. He protected producers from intermediary groups that arbitrarily siphoned off surpluses in order to increase the overall quantity of goods available to meet state needs.Footnote ²⁹ However, warrior groups obtained better deals from British colonial officials eager to contract out the burdens of conquest.

Tipu came to embrace a programme of wholesale military fiscalism within his domains. There had been signs of this hardening position in the closing years of his father's reign, but Tipu pushed it much further. The reasons for this have to do with both a widening and a narrowing of options. The diffusion of Western military drill and tactics into southern India after 1760 was more or less complete by the time Tipu came to power. Improved means of state coercion increased the squeeze on recalcitrant local chieftains. Poligars were subjected to even greater exactions as the consolidation of British naval supremacy after 1790 sharply curtailed resources from maritime commerce. Increasing exploitation generated counter-mobilizations of local elites which British commanders were on hand to support. Coercive subordination of independent armed formations was undermined by a rival imperial state in need of military personnel.

Mercenaries and disease: the deficiencies of conventional colonial armies

White British soldiers in Company service were generally viewed with derision by their commanders. Many in the ranks were foreigners, sailors, or invalids desperate for steady pay. Lord Cornwallis, who served as governor-general and commander-in-chief from 1786 to 1793, stated that the ‘contemptible trash of which the Company's European force is composed makes me shudder’.Footnote ³⁰ Some men enlisted merely to obtain passage to the subcontinent. Upon being discharged for incompetence, they usually could not find any alternative means of subsistence and joined the pool of idle European poor. Cornwallis feared this would only lower the British in the eyes of the indigenous population.

Senior British officers had greater respect for army units from continental Europe. Hanoverian troops were dispatched by the Crown while Swiss mercenaries were contracted directly by Company agents.Footnote ³¹ Given the high price the Company paid for these men, they were very particular about the type of soldiers they wanted. A hundred men contracted from Rheinau were to be no shorter than five feet three inches in height. Recruits had to be younger than 35 and adhere to the Protestant faith. Swiss officers were allowed to administer military discipline to their own men according to a separate set of regulations. However, on arriving to the subcontinent the much-vaunted foreign mercenaries were soon stricken with disease and so appalled by the conditions of service that they were prone to mutiny.Footnote ³² Commissariat services were simply unable to sustain them in the field.

In 1787, two regiments of Hanoverian troops were contracted to serve on the subcontinent for seven years. King George III was to be notified two years before the expiration of their terms in case the Company wanted to retain them. As troops from the Electorate of Hanover, any alterations to their contractual status had to be approved by the monarch.Footnote ³³ It is telling that George III was willing to mobilize Hanoverian manpower to reinforce British imperial ventures. In doing so, he provided his troops with patronage from a source under loose parliamentary oversight. British commanders paid greater attention to the needs of Hanoverians in the field, perhaps as a means of obtaining royal favour for themselves. Cornwallis intervened personally to make sure that they were given adequate advances in pay. Hanoverian officers led a relatively pampered existence compared to most Company forces.Footnote ³⁴

These privileges did not improve combat effectiveness. Electoral regiments were expensive and never amounted to more than a token force in a sea of indigenous military labour. Poor systems of provisioning and disease made these troops far less effective than their contractors had hoped. French armies operating on the subcontinent also faced execrable conditions. French soldiers frequently deserted to British lines during the Seven Years War after abandoning all hope of receiving their pay. At one point, French naval units in southern India were so desperate for cash that they resorted to capturing neutral Dutch vessels.Footnote ³⁵ European infantrymen serving in ramshackle armies perennially starved of funds were generally ill-attended-to and hence of little use.

Company policymakers felt that it was crucial to maintain a social distance from indigenous communities. Though their officials were seldom men from the highest ranks of metropolitan society, there was a strong push to maintain a dignified existence and thereby keep locals in awe. In 1786, Cornwallis decreed that all men would be compelled to serve out the terms of service they had contracted for. If they were discharged before their term expired, they would have to find a replacement and return to Europe at their own expense on the next available ship. Troops in Britain were subjected to proper inspections to ensure they were up to standard. Several years on the subcontinent proved to be a debilitating experience for most. Those who survived their service often returned to the British isles wracked with disease and fell into a life of beggary. Though there were some competent officers, promotion by seniority and the distribution of lucrative commands to well-connected arrivals did not encourage many junior officers to take risks.

In addition, different levels of field allowance for units from the different presidencies caused considerable tension. Madras Army officers were particularly galled by the fact that they had to face the same dangers and hardships as their colleagues in the Bengal establishment during the second Anglo-Mysore war but were compensated at much lower rates. King's regiments sent to India were outside the Company's authority altogether. Each army had an officer corps largely preoccupied with their own particular privileges. Solidarities did not extend much beyond institutional boundaries.

Cornwallis found ‘native black troops’ in the Bengal Army to be fine men who ‘would not in size disgrace the Prussian ranks’.Footnote ³⁶ Such regiments were the exception rather than the rule, however. Sepoys from other parts of the subcontinent were typically poor rural cultivators who joined the army under duress or for bare subsistence. Native regiments were often so undermanned that British officers resorted to abducting able-bodied men from villages; local headmen were made responsible for their remaining in the army.Footnote ³⁷ Modest origins were masked by imposing appearances. Clothing made the Company soldier a figure deemed worthy of respect. Shoddy troops could not induce indigenous compliance to state directives. In 1791, officers fretted that they had been unable to provide revenue troops with standard uniforms. The British felt that the mere sign of a Company coat would overawe agrarian cultivators. Even when collecting revenues, sepoys had to look the part.

Bengal sepoys fought bravely but were prone to mutiny due to pay arrears or any infringement on their caste privileges. They were also highly averse to leaving their home areas. Troops sent south to combat the Mysore sultanate crossed the Kistna River only with great reluctance. British commanders proved remarkably understanding in this instance, taking the necessary precautions to ensure that the sepoys did not have cause for complaint.Footnote ³⁸ British commanders felt that pushing the troops too hard would only exacerbate their natural inclination to desert. Yet, if they crossed the line with acts of open defiance, the Company showed little tolerance. The retainers of local chiefs were commissioned to hunt down deserters and mutinies were readily suppressed with violence.Footnote ³⁹ Bengal Army sepoys were more of a liability than an asset when they were posted to regions beyond Hindustan. In the end, the Company would always need a body of European troops on hand to check any potential revolt by indigenous units.

During the desperate summer of 1780, Company armies nearly collapsed. Morale plunged as news spread of the annihilation of Colonel Baillie's detachment at the hands of Haidar's horse. Sepoys fought over the few supplies that made it to the front lines. Cavalry units refused to march before they were paid their arrears, and officers were so preoccupied with trying to arrange regular shipments of rice for the army that they had little time to focus on field operations. At one point, sepoy units were forced to march up to ten miles a day to collect sufficient supplies of fresh water.Footnote ⁴⁰ Officers were not beneath using warrior chieftains to intimidate the European rank-and-file. When a dozen white troops deserted one garrison over a period of two months in 1791, poligars in the vicinity were hired to bring them back dead or alive.Footnote ⁴¹

Even Company commanders found it difficult to make ends meet. Charles Fredrick, a colonel in the Bombay Army, could barely live up to the standards expected of a British officer on an income of 700 rupees a month. Conspicuous consumption among senior officers significantly raised their cost of living. Charles Farran claimed the 15 servants he employed were barely enough to ensure a decent life. And he became quite distraught when some of his servants stole his money, dining table, and clothing trunks; a fellow officer lent him another table so he would not have to suffer the indignity of taking his meals on the floor.Footnote ⁴²

Britons employed a variety of methods to fill the gap between means and expectations. Due to short-staffing in the Madras church establishment, junior officer Robert Bell performed marriages, christenings, and burials for a fee.Footnote ⁴³ A British captain supplemented his income by charging war refugees one rupee per head for permission to enter his fort. In a letter to his mother, Lieutenant Goldsworthy wrote that he expected to be handsomely compensated with prize money after several months of arduous campaigning. Officers were constantly looking for precedents established in other regiments that might entitle them to similar privileges. Cornwallis was always being pestered by officers seeking his patronage.Footnote ⁴⁴ Reductions in troop numbers among the King's regiments created pools of redundant officers. Senior commanders organized the formation of new regiments to provide them with further employment.Footnote ⁴⁵ Other officers displayed remarkable persistence in laying claim to a share of the loot. Keith Macalister sent a petition to the governor of Madras declaring he was still owed a portion of the prize money from booty captured by Company forces more than a decade earlier. Plundered enemy property was often the most valuable form of reward for troops in the field. It was also a source of friction as different units squabbled over its allocation. War booty was a far more certain prospect than the timely payment of wages. Resources to maintain and guard prisoners were so scarce that captives were frequently released in large numbers. It was a fact that troops would rather eat than see their meagre rations diminished further by having to maintain prisoners of war.Footnote ⁴⁶

Those who persisted long enough in broadcasting their distinguished military careers could obtain pensions adequate enough to sustain them in their old age. Shaik Brawn claimed he had served in Company armies for 60 years; at age 75 he requested a pension equal to his full active service pay.Footnote ⁴⁷ As he was responsible for a very large family, British officials granted his request. With sufficient prodding, the Company took care of its own. Pensions were also a means of punishment and pacification. Two gun lascars were pensioned off when they were suspected of looting their stocks to sell them on the open market. Placing them on the pension list substantially cut their income but also prevented them from spreading discord among their associates.Footnote ⁴⁸

While imperial ventures did provide various forms of outdoor relief, none of this was taken for granted. Individuals had a better chance of obtaining benefits if they belonged to influential families or military networks connected to senior Company officials. Only determined lobbying and powerful patrons provided access to the plums of service.

Conventional fiscal-military methods could not function in a southern context for much of the eighteenth century. The direct challenge posed by the Mysore sultanate, coupled with the coastal nature of British power, made the subordination of warrior groups untenable. The same coercive methods that the British used in their attempts to exert control over southern weaver communities could not be applied to free-floating aggregations of military labour.Footnote ⁴⁹ However much colonial authorities would have liked to construct a military apparatus based on regular infantry, this was initially not an option in the Carnatic. Fiscal resources extracted locally or disbursed southwards from Bengal were frequently redistributed to concentrations of military force that stood outside the colonial state's institutional framework. Hence, the Company's initial incursions into the southern districts increased the resource base of free-floating elements that serviced its conventional coercive capacities.

Mobilizing military labour: war bands and the Company state

Colonial administrators in southern India faced great difficulties in putting together standing regiments. Demographic and geographic constraints made manpower far less accessible. Imposing conscription on cultivators would only have triggered the mass flight of labour to other states where there was a scarcity. It was generally beyond the capacity of the Company's ramshackle administration to successfully pursue and capture vagrants during the early colonial period. As the British were hardly the best option in the region during the early 1780s, they enticed far fewer elites into their service than was the case further north. The lower castes who made up a large proportion of the Madras regiments attracted scathing contempt during recruitment, but ultimately they too could only be kept in place by the regular distribution of benefits.

Authorities on the ground did manage to construct viable armed coalitions that effectively applied coercion in pursuit of colonial objectives. The establishment of Company rule on the subcontinent was ultimately premised on the successful exercise of violence. However, violence was initially organized and deployed in such a manner as to attach a variety of mobile warrior elements to the nascent colonial state.

Poligars were initially reluctant to openly commit themselves to any one state. An uneasy peace between the Company and sultanate was the most favourable situation they could hope for. Many chiefs were clearly eager to spare their territories from further devastation. The destruction wrought by contending armies rapidly dissipated the material resources needed to sustain their followings. Maintaining the political status quo in the Carnatic would also allow warrior elites to extract patronage or political concessions by playing both sides off against each other. Some poligars reacted to open confrontation by maintaining a policy of strict neutrality.

Colonial officials had to engage in protracted negotiations before local war leaders could be brought on board. In Dindigul district, the Company dispatched ministers from the Wodeyar family as intermediaries. After receiving assurances of protection, the poligars assembled a force of some 6,000 men to occupy strategic points throughout the area.Footnote ⁵⁰ This freed up army units for deployment elsewhere. Wodeyar ministers called on poligars to engage in open rebellion once the Company's regiments entered Mysore's territories. Given that the Wodeyars had a vested interest in toppling the sultanate, they constantly browbeat the British to push forward with offensive actions lest poligars lose their faith in the Company and make a separate peace with Tipu. Regardless of the Wodeyars’ agenda, the failure to sustain links with warrior groups resulted in a double loss for the British. Not only would they lose access to critical reserves of manpower and materiel, warrior elites might also channel these scarce resources to Mysore. This would bolster the coercive capacities of a dangerous rival while draining those of the Company state.

British commanders made direct appeals to local patriotism. In a general proclamation to the zamindars, poligars, and village headmen of southern India, General Harris stated that Tipu had responded to the Company's appeals for peace by forming a military alliance with France. Once Mysore linked up with French forces, they were determined to ravage and occupy warrior lands.Footnote ⁵¹ The Company, by contrast, cast itself in the light of a protector that would prevent this oncoming savagery. It stood with indigenous elites against a despotic sultanate and its foreign ally.

Such eloquent, and highly dubious, pronouncements would have fallen on deaf ears had the British not matched them with the distribution of material rewards. In a seller's market, the British had no choice but to tolerate fluid loyalties. Officers on the verge of concluding arrangements with one war band saw their agreements rendered null and void as Mysore launched a successful offensive.Footnote ⁵² Poligars who shunned British services were constantly enticed to come into the fold. They were offered better conditions, greater rewards, and more extensive privileges. At times, the Company could not follow through with its promises to provide loyal poligars with protection as they did not have sufficient forces available to dispatch to their pollams (landholdings). The families of poligars were given refuge during hostilities in princely states allied with the Company.Footnote ⁵³ On other occasions, the British took full advantage of Tipu's efforts to curb poligar power. The pollams of poligars expelled by Tipu were scoured for supplies by Company armies in 1799. If a chief proved particularly uncooperative, the British temporarily occupied his land and handed over its administration to a more reliable client. But these replacements were often other chieftains who had to be provided with patronage if their loyalties were to be sustained.Footnote ⁵⁴ While certain poligars were deposed by both sides, many others found protection in the territories of one while being harried by the other.

Inducing disparate poligar bands to act in unison proved extremely difficult. Lieutenant-general Eyre Coote stressed that if war bands remained fragmented they would not be able to rally sufficient manpower to meet British military requirements. In spite of their reservations, field commanders never pushed the amalgamation of poligar forces too far.Footnote ⁵⁵ There are two possible reasons for this. From one angle, moves toward centralization only raised complex questions of precedent, remuneration, and the distribution of plunder among various war bands. Warrior elites jealously guarded their sense of prerogative and status. Conflicts within coalition ranks had to be avoided at all costs. While separate warrior contingents were less effective in the field, their linkages to the Company were easier to maintain. From another perspective, bilateral agreements with different chiefs precluded the possibility that all of them could unite to put pressure on the Company at once. Scattered bands seeking patronage were preferable to mass formations that could demand substantial concessions.

British officials threw caution to the winds as far as poligars within Mysore were concerned. They did all they could to encourage the ‘fractious’ and ‘rebellious’ spirit of poligars in enemy territory. Chieftains in Coimbatore seldom paid heed to the sultanate's nominal suzerainty and openly sought assistance from Madras to resist fiscal exactions. When poligars provoked Haidar's ire they readily found refuge in Company territory.Footnote ⁵⁶

In return, poligars provided essential services such as guarding supply convoys and providing foodstuffs. Without large bodies of armed poligar escorts, Company convoys easily fell prey to bands of marauders or Mysore cavalry. During the campaigns of 1781, Coote confessed that he would not have been able to provide his men with rations if food shipments from local poligars had not been forthcoming. Poligars offered to transport provisions to Company Collectors themselves. Warrior supply trains must have been substantial undertakings as they were often subjected to raids by Tipu's forces.Footnote ⁵⁷ Warrior elites were also utilized to obtain or retrieve forced labour. In the winter of 1799, local rajas were called upon to deliver all those who had taken refuge in their dominions to escape transport duties.Footnote ⁵⁸ Loyal poligars garrisoned forts which had surrendered to the Company, thus freeing up sepoy contingents for service at the front. Poligar militiamen were dispatched to reinforce British units in return for remissions of peshkash (tribute payments). Militias guarded strategic passes in rugged terrain essential to the movement of armies. Territorial chokepoints were kept safe for the Company and defended from its opponents.Footnote ⁵⁹

Colonial commissariat services were heavily dependent on native chiefs for maintaining food supplies. But poligars seldom fulfilled the promises they made regarding procurements when Company forces were found wanting in the field. A victorious army marching through pollams was usually met by poligar delegations proclaiming their submission to British authority in exchange for protection and the confirmation of existing privileges. Coote did not care to know the details of a particular poligar’s past allegiances.Footnote ⁶⁰ His primary concern was to associate them with the Company war effort for the duration of hostilities and thus augment military forces at his disposal. Lord Macartney, governor of Madras from 1781–1785, fully backed Coote on this issue.Footnote ⁶¹ As Macartney flatly stated ‘Every thing seems at stake, and it is not the time to dispute upon the rights of the Polygars.’Footnote ⁶² Fort St George was fully convinced that the best way to dispatch supplies and protect minor posts was through a system of hiring out certain functions to warrior groups outside the ranks of conventional forces. Confirming the rights and privileges of petty chiefs was the surest way to obtain essential services. In Macartney's view, poligars were either drawn to the sultanate through coercion or dissatisfaction with conditions of service while in the Company's employ. Promises of protection were crucial for keeping warrior-entrepreneurs out of Mysore's grasp and in British hands.

Military dependence curtailed any hostile action the British considered taking against ‘fractious’ chiefs. The poligars of Tinnevelly proved a constant source of irritation. They seized the livestock of local inhabitants only to restore them in return for ransom. The absence of Company units during campaigns was an ideal opportunity to increase raids on agrarian communities. When the levels of Company forces were reduced after the peace treaty of 1792, a number of unemployed troops even entered the ranks of the poligars. However, Company Collectors still managed to procure transport bullocks from this volatile area by offering its warlords the right price.Footnote ⁶³ Overt confrontation would merely imperil a source of provisions that could not easily be made up from other sources. Consistent promises of fair payments, peppered with occasional threats in the event of non-compliance, proved an effective strategy, given the regional dynamic of multiple states engaged in constant wars. Squeezing local chiefs too hard only alienated an essential service group, while too delicate an approach made the Company appear irrelevant. As armed warriors with claims to local sovereignty, poligars not only exercised their highly marketable skill sets to serve states intent on contracting out the means of violence, they also used violence to exact tribute from rural cultivators. Selling off extorted grain and livestock to ill-provisioned armies provided poligars with an additional and more secure form of income. It was always easier to extract surpluses from poorly defended peasants than engage in the perils of military service.

Local war bands were also deployed to support regional allies. Cornwallis reinforced armed contingents from Hyderabad with poligar militia. Loyalist chiefs were dispatched to the nizam's forces and told to take their orders from his commanders. Guns and ammunition were dispatched from Bangalore fort to supplement the nizam's heavy ordinance. Cornwallis wanted their two governments ‘to be so closely connected, as to think it immaterial whose troops may occupy the conquered country. Indeed it appears to me that our sole object should at present be to reduce the power of an ambitious and an encroaching Enemy.’Footnote ⁶⁴

The rights and privileges of the poligars were protected in exchange for military service throughout the wars of the late eighteenth century.Footnote ⁶⁵ Alexander Read was dispatched as Cornwallis's personal envoy in the Baramahal to hammer out the details of particular arrangements. Gifts such as shawls, pistols, and cloth were offered to prominent chieftains as a sign of respect. In one instance, Read turned over the weapons and grain stocks found in a captured fort to a local poligar who had induced its surrender. He also granted the chieftain concerned temporary exemption from all financial contributions to Madras. In exchange, the poligar agreed to garrison the fort jointly with Company sepoys and provide the British with a consignment of livestock.

Quid pro quo negotiations were protracted but often yielded the best results, given the limitations and constraints placed on the Company's coercive capacities. Grateful warriors wrote obsequious letters of appreciation to the governor-general for the protection he afforded to their families and property. Cornwallis granted poligars parcels of sultanate land in return for services rendered, and they turned to him for protection if Tipu attempted to retake them. When certain poligars were singled out for attack by Tipu, the British encouraged others to rebel in an attempt to distract Mysore from its immediate intentions. When certain warriors incurred the Company's displeasure, other chieftains vouched for their good conduct. Such assurances frequently resulted in a poligar’s return to favour.Footnote ⁶⁶ British commanders actively attempted to shore up and sustain independent armed formations. They seldom had the means at their disposal to dismantle them and it simply would not have served military objectives to have done so. Inducements were offered time and again in an effort to co-opt autonomous war leaders.

Cornwallis took the side of local chiefs when revenue officials pressed them too hard. When certain poligars in Tinnevelly resisted the exactions of Collectors, Cornwallis called for an inquiry into the conduct of Company officials. He claimed that he had never known poligars to resort to violent resistance unless they had just cause. The very officials that provoked the discontent erroneously saw the dispatch of sepoys as the only solution to their problems. Even if the poligars were found guilty of shirking their obligations, Cornwallis stated, ‘I would still recommend the most lenient measures that can possibly be adopted without betraying too much weakness on the part of the Government.’Footnote ⁶⁷

As part of the 1792 treaty with Mysore, the Company made a general commitment to defend all poligars and zamindars who allied themselves with the British war effort against outside intimidation.Footnote ⁶⁸ Zamindars appealed to the British directly, stating they would preserve order in a certain district in exchange for a monthly stipend. Landowners dispossessed during the hostilities were contracted to maintain order in turbulent locales.Footnote ⁶⁹ The British had little choice but to put disgruntled warriors on the Company payroll. Stipends essentially functioned as a form of protection money. Refusal to pay an armed chieftain resulted in depredations against the local populace. If a chief could not maintain himself and his retinue through regular subventions, he did so through plunder. This led to the flight of cultivators and a consequent drop in revenues collected from the countryside. The cost of refusing to accept minor extortion by local warriors was far greater than allowing it to continue.

Resentment towards the nawab of Arcot was one of the few issues that united nearly all poligars in the Carnatic. Lacking an efficient army and bureaucracy, the nawab resorted to demanding arbitrary financial contributions from local chiefs. Warrior elites protested by contending that they owed him no allegiance. A weak state demanding tribute from local strongmen who jealously guarded their prerogatives resulted in perennial disorder. Chieftains were particularly prone to revolt in time of war as Company regiments streamed out of the province to shore up the frontlines. Poligars openly expropriated land, stole crops, and extorted protection money from cultivators.Footnote ⁷⁰ Arcot did not have the military means to bring the poligars to heel, nor did it possess a bureaucratic structure that could regulate a routinized system of taxation. Arcot's own sepoys refused to protect the nawab unless he paid their wages on a regular basis.

Resentments occasionally boiled over. In 1790, mutinous sepoys assembled outside the nawab's residence demanding their arrears. The British were forced to dispatch troops to defuse the situation. After tense negotiations, those who agreed to lay down their arms were offered employment in the Company's service. Several months later another mutiny occurred, with 400 troops surrounding the nawab's palace. Lieutenant-colonel George Campbell, commander of nawabi forces, attempted to disperse the mutineers. In the course of a heated exchange, he drew his sword and provoked the sepoys into attacking the palace. In the ensuing scuffle, the nawab's own son was wounded in the arm. The mutineers later dispersed of their own accord and the British promised to make up their arrears in pay.Footnote ⁷¹ The rapid removal of mutinous troops from their immediate locale prevented other units from following their example. But this could only be done by promising them a place in the Company's ranks. Those not transferred to British service were promptly pensioned off. The shortcomings of allied states increased the pool of indigenous military labour that was directly linked to British patronage.

Poligars were allowed to extract resources from rural society by any means at their disposal. Colonial authorities implicitly recognized that violence was unavoidable and essential if these collections were to yield a sufficient surplus. Eyre Coote protected poligar property from expropriation by nawabi officials. Any attempts by Arcot to intimidate chieftains in the service of the Company resulted in sharp rebukes from British headquarters. Strongmen later turned to the Company for protection when the nizam of Hyderabad began encroaching on their landholdings. One of the nizam's commanders ordered his men to refrain from plundering the pollams of local poligars as he considered them to be ‘English subjects’ that Hyderabad could not afford to antagonize.Footnote ⁷² Securing the person and property of a warrior chief was an essential component of the colonial state's patronage system. Protecting established allies attracted more allies.

British officials encouraged the nawab of Arcot to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards his poligars. When this had little effect, the poligars and tributaries of the Carnatic were placed under the Company's protection throughout 1791–1792. Similar provisions were written into the Treaty of 1792 regarding poligars in Mysore. Tipu was obliged to desist from retaliatory measures against all warrior chiefs who had allied themselves with the British.Footnote ⁷³ These declarations formalized a policy of de facto protection for pro-British war bands that had been in place for over a decade.

Company policymakers promised to avoid the forced fiscal contributions associated with Arcot's rule. Local privileges were confirmed in exchange for regular payments of peshkash. The consolidation of a broad consensus regarding the poligars made these policies difficult to reverse in the current context. Clinching an alliance with the Company consolidated a safe haven for chieftains who found Tipu's exactions too onerous. Whenever Company requests for contributions seemed unreasonable, poligars would plead poverty.Footnote ⁷⁴ The destructive nature of the Anglo-Mysore wars provided local warrior elites with excuses to avoid monetary contributions they did not wish to pay and opportunities to plunder the cash flows that kept the wars going. While Company policies managed to conciliate some poligars, others remained a law onto themselves.