1.1 Introduction
Ironically, the United States fought its first war as an independent country against France. Yet France was the first genuine ally of the United States, and French forces were instrumental in the American victory in the Revolutionary War.Footnote 1 Just two decades after the American Revolution, the United States, a weak upstart, a newly independent colony, and France, one of the most powerful nations in the world, were embroiled in a “quasi-war” over the right to freedom of navigation on the high seas. From October 1796 to June 1797, French raiders captured 316 American ships.Footnote 2 This number amounted to 6 percent of the nation’s merchant vessels. The Federalist Northeast was especially hard hit. From 1797 to 1799, for example, Newburyport, Massachusetts, lost seventy-seven ships.Footnote 3 Philadelphia merchants claimed to have lost 2 million dollars to French raiders.Footnote 4 Between December 1796 and February 1797, marine insurance rates skyrocketed from 6 to 30 percent of the value of the cargo. Insurance to cover ships on voyages to Europe doubled, and for vessels bound for the West Indies, insurance premiums rose 200–600 percent.Footnote 5
The United States resisted France to vindicate the principles of freedom of the seas, shaped by a strong sense of egalitarianism and liberty. These values colored the governing philosophy of American leaders in both domestic and international affairs. The political parties disagreed over whether France or Great Britain posed the greatest threat to American sovereignty and freedom of the seas. The Federalists favored closer relations with Great Britain and, at times throughout the 1790s, called for a declaration of war against France. These were business-oriented men; their ranks included Alexander Hamilton, George Washington, John Jay, John Adams, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. The Republican Democrats, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (and later, Henry Clay and Andrew Jackson), viewed Revolutionary France as a natural ally to be cultivated. They saw Great Britain as the larger threat to freedom of the seas – a sentiment that would lead Madison and the Republican Democrats to declare war in 1812. On the other hand, they considered France a catalyst for the demise of monarchies in Europe and the spread of universal liberalism.Footnote 6 Both the Federalists and Republican Democrats valued freedom of the seas for commercial and ideological reasons. Republican Democrats thought negotiations were the key to defending navigational rights against French encroachment while avoiding war.
Even Thomas Jefferson, who devalued international banking and commercial links with Europe, realized that his ideal of an agrarian society based on liberty would have to rely on maritime trade to sell agricultural products abroad.Footnote 7 Hence, later presidents would invoke the Jeffersonian idea of the United States as a self-contained “Empire of Liberty” and a beacon of hope for the world, raising these issues from the Spanish–American War to the Cold War. In each case, freedom of navigation in the oceans served to spread American values. Distinguished American historian Samuel Flagg Bemis called the doctrine of freedom of the seas one of the fundamentals of American foreign policy.Footnote 8 The Quasi-War was the first conflict in which the United States vindicated its birthright to use the oceans freely.
1.2 The American Revolutionary War Era
As a colony, the United States operated a large commercial fleet but only a small coastal navy, the functions of which it outsourced to privateers. The Americans promoted a liberal wartime trading system, one that protected freedom of trade for all states during times of peace and for neutral states during periods of armed conflict.
During the American War of Independence, American leaders had adopted a maximalist view of the doctrine of “free ships make free goods,” using law as a weapon in place of naval power. Even before they declared independence on July 4, 1776, the American colonies opened all their ports to foreign commerce, except for British ships. This Act was the first irrevocable step toward independence, as it directly repudiated the American Prohibitory Act, passed by the British Parliament in December 1775.Footnote 9 The principle of “free ships make free goods” later became a component of the American alliance with France and then later treaties with Holland, Sweden, Prussia, and Morocco.
French support for the United States was tied to France’s geopolitical relationships in the New World and Europe. France sought recompense for its defeat in the Seven Years’ War (French and Indian War), 1754–63 and hoped that an independent United States would reduce British economic and military power. The defeat of the British army at the second battle of Saratoga on October 7, 1777, was the turning point in the conflict.Footnote 10 British general John Burgoyne’s ignominious defeat presaged American independence. The battle of Saratoga immediately reset the chessboard; after the American victory, Spain and France went all-in to help the United States. Sir Edward Creasy later observed:
Nor can any military event be said to have exercised more important influence on the future fortunes of mankind than the complete defeat of Burgoyne’s expedition in 1777; a defeat which rescued the revolted colonists from certain subjection, and which, by inducing the courts of France and Spain to attack England in their behalf, insured the independence of the United States, and the formation of that transatlantic power, which not only America, but both Europe and Asia, now see and feel.Footnote 11
The colonies declared their independence on July 4, 1776. The Articles of Confederation followed on November 15, 1777, only after the battle of Saratoga. Serving in Paris at the time, Benjamin Franklin and his fellow commissioners saw their difficulties with the French government disappear.Footnote 12 France rushed to offer the United States a military alliance to prevent the colonies from being enticed by England with an accommodation, such as some form of limited self-government, like that enjoyed by Canada. The United States, however, was emboldened by its own success.
1.2.1 The US “Model Treaty” (1776)
A more open and competitive trading system benefited the United States, which sought to protect and even expand its neutral rights amid conflicts engulfing its trading partners in Europe. Toward this end, the Continental Congress proposed and developed a “Plan of Treaties,” which came to be known as the American Plan or the “Model Treaty.” The “Model Treaty” was a draft agreement comprising some thirty articles designed to liberalize trade between the United States and France.Footnote 13 The draft served as the basis for all but one US trade treaty before 1800.Footnote 14
On September 17, 1776, the Continental Congress adopted the “Model Treaty” as a framework for reciprocal commercial terms with France and Spain. As these powers were frequently engaged in wars on the continent, the “Model Treaty” called for the right of neutral states to trade at any belligerent port not under blockade.Footnote 15 Neutral ships would be entitled to carry any goods except contraband – and contraband was defined narrowly as armaments and ammunition. The Americans did not regard even food, naval stores, or other goods owned by a belligerent government as contraband if they were carried in neutral hulls. France accepted these principles in 1778, and they were memorialized in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States. However, the text was later revised to include “most-favored-nation” trading privileges.Footnote 16 The two nations concurrently signed the Treaty of Alliance.Footnote 17 The “Model Treaty,” successful as a point of departure for trade negotiations, also served as the basis for the US–France Convention of 1800, which ultimately ended the Quasi-War.
1.2.2 Treaties with France (1778)
The United States signed two treaties with France on February 6, 1778 – a treaty of amity and commerce and one of alliance.Footnote 18 For the time being, the alliance was the more important of the two agreements, although the terms of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce would prove most enduring. Article II of the Treaty of Alliance described the US–French relationship as a “defensive alliance,” designed to maintain the “liberty, sovereignty, and independence” of the United States. In return, the United States was obligated in Article XII to observe a reciprocal guarantee to France “the moment … war shall break out” between France and England. Article VIII held that “neither of the two parties shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain” without the consent of the other.
Both agreements recognized the independent United States of America. To sweeten the deal further, France renounced any claim to territories held by Britain or the United States in mainland North America. (At the time, Spain held Louisiana.) For its part, Spain sought to weaken British power to retake Gibraltar and had invaded and occupied West Florida, which Great Britain occupied after the Seven Years’ War. The United States and Spain were not bound by treaty, although the Spanish design was to provide sufficient aid to the colonialists to “keep the pot boiling.”Footnote 19 Nonetheless, the terms of the Franco–Spanish treaty affected the US–French relationship. Just as Spain and France assisted the United States in challenging Britain, they also allied with each other. France and Spain agreed not to reach a separate peace settlement with Britain until Gibraltar was restored to Spain. Similarly, whereas the French–American alliance stipulated that neither party could sign a separate peace with Britain without the other’s concurrence, France could also not do so without Spain’s assent. Thus, the interests of the United States, France, and Spain were intertwined as each sought to balance Britain.
On March 6, 1778, France formally announced the two agreements with the United States. Nearly simultaneously, France and Britain recalled their ambassadors from London and Paris; a state of undeclared war now existed between them. The following week, King Louis XVI received the American representatives. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778 pledged a “firm, inviolable and universal peace” and “sincere friendship” between the two states.Footnote 20 The treaty also provided most-favored-nation trading status to each party.Footnote 21 France was obligated to protect American vessels under its jurisdiction and to restore them to their owners if they were captured and brought into French ports, and the United States was required to do the same.Footnote 22 The parties agreed to respect each other’s fisheries, and France was entitled to fish on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland.Footnote 23
Article XVII of the treaty provided that ships of war and privateers of either party might carry their prizes into the ports of the other state and that prizes would not be searched or arrested by port authorities or examined as to their “lawfulness.” France intended that this provision would cover its privateers operating in the western Atlantic and Caribbean against English shipping. (The United States, however, objected when French privateers were licensed in the United States on board American vessels, often with American crews.) Furthermore, no “shelter or refuge” would be given by either party to vessels that had been seized as prize by a third-party belligerent, except in case of force majeure, in which case prize vessels would have to leave port as soon as possible. Citizens of neither party were permitted to accept letters of marque (authorizing them to act as privateers) from any state with which the other was at war.Footnote 24 Neither party would permit foreign privateers to fit out in its ports, to sell their prizes, or even purchase provisions, except as necessary for the voyage to the next port.Footnote 25
The agreement stipulated “free ships make free goods,” except for certain contraband items.Footnote 26 Except for soldiers, nationals of a belligerent state who traveled on board a neutral ship were also protected from capture. Contraband was defined to include war-making materials and such implements as weapons, bombs, mortars, armor, and horses outfitted for battle.Footnote 27 France viewed “free ships, free goods” as a concession to the Americans and respected it as applied to US-flagged ships until abandoning it in protest when the Jay Treaty was signed in 1794.Footnote 28 If either the United States or France went to war, the other party was to supply its ships with “sea letters,” or passports, stating the name, property, and cargo of the ship, the name and residency of the master or commander, and the owner of the vessel.Footnote 29 The United States consistently emphasized Article XXIII of the Treaty of Amity of 1794, which stated that either party was free to trade with a nation at war with the other. This provision was the basis for American refusal to restrict its burgeoning trade with Britain after the Treaty of Paris, even when France and Britain became embroiled in the 1793–1802 Anglo–French War, an outgrowth of the French Revolutionary Wars.
1.2.3 Great Britain and US Maritime Neutrality
Meanwhile, in Britain, Prime Minister Frederick, Lord North, attempted to convince Parliament to wean the Americans away from France. However, King George III still refused to concede independence to the colonists. The American Revolution dragged on. The Royal Navy outgunned all other naval powers combined. The British used this power with impunity to control trade flows. British warships conducted unlimited searches and arrests of neutral ships and cargoes under the pretense that the affected trade only strengthened its adversaries. To counter the Royal Navy’s supremacy, Americans and other states leveraged the long-standing legal doctrine, “free ships make free goods,” one of the earliest tangible expressions of freedom of the seas.
“Free ships make free goods” was the cornerstone of a legal understanding of the sanctity of neutral rights that emerged between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries within the Mediterranean trade system. Under this doctrine, ships and goods from states that were not at war were inviolable, within certain limitations. The Consolato del Mar maritime code, prepared by either Pisa or Barcelona, spread to Venice, Genoa, and beyond.Footnote 30 In 1691, the states of the Baltic Sea region produced a treaty to protect such neutral rights.Footnote 31 Their code contained rules to guarantee neutral (or “free”) ships and neutral (“free”) goods on enemy ships from seizure by belligerents. A free ship carrying enemy cargo was not subject to seizure by a belligerent during war unless it was bound for a belligerent port.
English and continental admiralty courts upheld neutral rights, which were also recognized by the leading scholars of the period. Dutch jurist Cornelius Van Bynkershoek (1673–1743), for example, recognized that neutral states have a right to normal trade relations even with nations at war, so long as they abstain from supplying contraband.Footnote 32 By the early sixteenth century, the doctrine of free ships and free goods had become a feature of international law. The 1713 Commercial Treaty of Utrecht, part of the Peace of Utrecht, ended the War of Spanish Succession. The treaty incorporated the concept of neutral rights: “free ships shall also give a freedom to goods,” except for “arms … and warlike instruments,” which were contraband.Footnote 33
1.2.4 League of Armed Neutrality 1780
Russia also unilaterally promoted neutral rights. On February 28, 1780, after talks with Denmark, Catherine II issued a proclamation seeking to overturn the Rule of 1756 (trade closed to foreigners in peacetime could not be opened to neutrals in wartime).Footnote 34 The Russian empress asserted the right of her subjects to peaceably enjoy the fruits of their industry and the advantages of belonging to a neutral nation.Footnote 35 These “hindrances to liberty of trade” with Russia violated the “law of nations.” The proclamation stated that neutral vessels have a right to navigate freely, even along the coasts of belligerent states. The goods and effects of neutral subjects were inviolable on neutral hulls, except for contraband. France, Spain, and the Dutch United Provinces immediately concurred in the proclamation.Footnote 36
On July 9, 1780, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia formed the first League of Armed Neutrality. The first “Armed Neutrality” was based on four principles: (1) neutral ships may freely trade in any port and along any coast and with nations at war; (2) property of the citizens or subjects of belligerent powers is free from capture while on board neutral ships, except contraband; (3) contraband is narrowly defined; and (4) blockades must be effective to be considered lawful. These states agreed that all states had a right during the time of war to navigate between the ports and along the coasts of belligerents and that goods on board neutral ships, except contraband, should not be subject to seizure.Footnote 37 Article 3 embodied the doctrine of “free goods” in a vaguely worded pronouncement that “all other commerce shall be and remain free.” The following year, Spain, France, Holland, Denmark, the United States, Prussia, and Austria acceded to the agreement, as did Portugal in 1782 and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Sicily and Naples) in 1783.Footnote 38 As a progressive measure to defend neutral maritime rights, the League of Armed Neutrality was the first major multilateral maritime law treaty and left Great Britain virtually isolated.Footnote 39
The first Armed Neutrality began to erode with the Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783, which ended the American Revolutionary War. Britain peeled off France and Spain by signing separate peace deals – the Treaties of Versailles – with both on the same day, while denying the Americans and the Dutch similar terms. Meanwhile, the United States and France continued to honor their bilateral agreements, which served as the foundation for postwar relations. Disagreements over the terms of the treaties would contribute to the outbreak of the Quasi-War fifteen years later.
1.2.5 Anglo–French Wars
France and Great Britain were at war almost continuously during the French Revolutionary Wars, 1792–1802, and Napoleonic Wars, 1803–15, after already having fought the Seven Years’ War, 1756–63, and again during the American Revolutionary War, 1778–83. Throughout these conflicts, the Americans were adherents of Adam Smith, believers in free trade. They regarded monopolizing the trade of one’s colonies in time of peace and infringing neutral rights in time of war as inimical to prosperity for all. Benjamin Franklin captured the American ideal: “Commerce, consisting in a mutual Exchange of the Necessaries and Conveniences of Life, the more free and unrestrained it is, the more it flourishes; and the happier are all the Nations concerned in it.”Footnote 40
The US Constitution was signed on September 17, 1787, replacing the Articles of Confederation, adopted in 1777. The first session of Congress convened on March 4, 1789, sitting until September 29, as the United States began operating under the Constitution. That same year, France was cast into the cataclysmic social and political upheaval of the French Revolution. The revolution overthrew the monarchy and sparked a host of conflicts that morphed into the Napoleonic Wars, which lasted until 1815. From 1793 to 1815, France was engaged in almost continuous war with Great Britain and other states on a battlefield that extended from Western and Central Europe and the Italian Peninsula to the Caribbean colonies and the Middle East.
Because France aided the United States in the Revolutionary War, Americans remained largely pro-French, although most wanted to stay out of European politics. The British, however, continued to aggravate the embryonic republic by failing to fulfill all their commitments under the Treaty of Paris. George Washington transmitted that agreement to the Senate on June 11, 1789. The Senate rendered unanimous advice and consent to a statute implementing the treaty on April 14, 1792. Britain stubbornly refused to close garrisons that lingered at Detroit, Lernoult, Michilimackinac (present-day Mackinac), Niagara, Ontario, Oswegatchie, and Presque Isle, despite treaty provisions that required it to relinquish them “with all convenient speed.”Footnote 41 Five years later, John Jay led US negotiations to resolve these disputes, but some of these posts would resurface as scenes of fighting in the northwest during the War of 1812.
Neutrality was the first foundation of American foreign policy, backed up by the doctrine of freedom of the seas. The Continental Congress resolved that the genuine interest of the United States “requires that they should be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations.”Footnote 42 This approach diverged from the quest of European states for control of the oceans, discussed by John Adams in a 1783 letter to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Robert R. Livingston:
The United States of America have propagated far & wide in Europe the Ideas of the Liberty of Navigation and Commerce. The Powers of Europe, however, cannot agree as yet in adopting them in their full extent. Each one desires to maintain the exclusive dominion of some particular Sea, or River, and yet to enjoy the liberty of navigating all others…. For my own part, I think Nature wiser than all the Courts and States in the World, & therefore I wish all her Seas & Rivers upon the whole Globe free.Footnote 43
In peace, as it had in war, the United States found its ideal of free commerce on the seas at the mercy of the Royal Navy. Jay’s only leverage with respect to Great Britain was the implicit threat that the United States would once again join Russia, Sweden, and Denmark to defend neutral rights. When Russia proposed the first Armed Neutrality in 1780, Denmark declared the Baltic Sea a neutral area on May 8, and the Russo–Danish Convention on Armed Neutrality was concluded on July 9. Both documents called the Baltic a closed sea, lying outside of the zone of war, “where all nations … may navigate in peace and enjoy all the advantages of perfect tranquility.”Footnote 44
1.3 Tension with France
No longer a cobelligerent with the United States, France now posed challenges to American neutrality. France and Britain ramped up their war at sea, and the United States was caught in the middle. As 1790 drew to a close, the United States was engaged in a dispute with France over maritime commerce, a dispute that would culminate eight years later in the undeclared Quasi-War. Despite France’s assistance in bringing the American Revolution to a close and the waivers of duties granted by royal decrees in 1787–88, American trade began to revert to its former channels: trade with England increased, while commerce with France languished.Footnote 45 France complained that US trade restrictions violated Article V of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778. In retaliation, the French National Assembly imposed trade measures against the United States. In 1792, Secretary of State Jefferson directed Gouverneur Morris, American minister plenipotentiary to France, to negotiate a new treaty of commerce. Morris duly proposed it on July 9, 1792.Footnote 46 The French Revolution intervened, however.
The First Republic, an outgrowth of the French Revolution, fought a series of wars on the continent against European monarchies. On August 27, 1791, the Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold II, and King Frederick William II of Prussia, in collaboration with emigrant French nobles, issued the Declaration of Pillnitz, proclaiming support for King Louis XVI against the revolutionaries. They threatened intervention if the monarch were deposed. Revolutionary leaders regarded the Pillnitz Declaration as an affront and an interference in France’s internal affairs.Footnote 47
The European powers, disturbed at the radicalization emerging in France, considered intervention to prevent the spread of revolutionary fervor. Austria positioned troops along the border; France demanded their withdrawal.Footnote 48 The Austrian reply was evasive, and the National Assembly declared war on April 20, 1792.Footnote 49 On August 10, 1792, King Louis XVI was overthrown, and the First French Republic was proclaimed. The king was tried and beheaded by guillotine on January 21, 1793, ending 1,000 years of French monarchy. Nervously watching, London expelled the French ambassador. France responded on February 1, 1793, with a declaration of war on England and the Dutch Republic.Footnote 50
As France slid into war in the fall of 1792, its government appointed M. Edmond C. Genêt as ambassador to the United States. Genêt arrived carrying some 250–300 blank commissions authorizing US ships to serve as privateers and prey on British commerce.Footnote 51 He landed on April 8, 1793, in Charleston, South Carolina, rather than Philadelphia, the capital, and set about issuing the commissions to ships outfitted and manned by mixed crews of American and French sailors.Footnote 52 Genêt traveled by land to Philadelphia, greeted along the route by cheers from pro-French Americans. Genêt’s privateers began seizing British prizes and bringing them into US ports for condemnation, some taken while inside the territorial waters of the United States. The British ship Grange was captured in Delaware Bay (though it was surrendered after the British minister protested).Footnote 53 President Washington was alarmed that Genêt was violating American territorial sovereignty and acting in ways counter to the obligations of neutral states.Footnote 54
The appointment of Genêt raised three issues within the US government that would define the relationship between the United States and France. First, should the United States receive a French ambassador, and if so, should Genêt be received absolutely or with qualifications? Second, should the United States issue a proclamation of neutrality? Third, was the United States absolved from bilateral treaties with France concluded with King Louis XVI for the American Revolution, especially the 1778 US–French alliance?Footnote 55
The United States received Genêt without qualification, one month after, President Washington issued a US proclamation of neutrality.Footnote 56 American seafarers, however, continued to accept offers to serve as privateers for France, undermining Washington’s position. French consuls in the United States sat as admiralty courts in prize cases, a practice Genêt defended as consistent with the US–French treaties. Article XVII of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Genêt claimed, precluded the United States from interference with prize cases brought into US ports. The United States objected that its commitment to neutrality toward France did not obligate it to violate its duty of neutrality toward third states.
Furthermore, US officials protested that the conduct of prize cases by French officials in American ports violated American sovereignty and that the United States had not ceded the right of consular officials to try such cases in the consular treaty.Footnote 57 To maintain its neutrality, the United States halted the fitting-out and arming of privateers and forbade those already operating from reentering the United States. The announcement created an impasse. The United States requested that France recall Genêt; in retaliation, France requested and obtained the recall of Gouverneur Morris from Paris.
Washington’s declaration of neutrality stated that “it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and France on the other.” The United States would act with “sincerity and good faith” to “pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers.”Footnote 58 The proclamation also announced that Americans who participated in the conflict would be liable to punishment and forfeiture. France and the pro-French Democratic-Republicans criticized the declaration as a repudiation of US treaty commitments with France; men like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were deeply concerned, holding that the President, who had no authority to declare war, lacked the power to declare neutrality as well. Writing under the pseudonym “Pacificus,” Alexander Hamilton defended the neutrality proclamation in a series of newspaper editorials; they were answered by Madison, writing as “Helvidius.” The Pacificus–Helvidius debate offered still resonate as contending visions of presidential power and the separation of powers in foreign relations.
On June 29, 1793, the privateer Citizen Genêt captured the sloop Betsey and brought it into Baltimore, Maryland, as a prize. Swedish subjects owned the ship, and American and Swedish traders owned its cargo. There, the American and Swedish owners brought suit on the grounds that nationals of neutral states owned the vessel and were therefore subject to US courts rather than an empaneled French prize court. The captors argued that an American court lacked jurisdiction because the United States was not at war. Prize courts generally were established at the beginning of hostilities and disbanded once hostilities ceased, the privateers argued. Therefore, the United States lacked a standing prize court to adjudicate the case. The US trial court and appellate court found for the captors, and the owners appealed to the Supreme Court.Footnote 59 The owners of the Betsey claimed that the Constitution conferred on federal courts jurisdiction over “civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court unanimously agreed. Rejecting the idea that a foreign tribunal in the United States could exercise admiralty jurisdiction “for taking cognizance of prizes captured on the high seas,” the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the owners. The Court held that “no foreign power can of right institute or erect any court of judicature of any kind” on US territory.Footnote 60
1.3.1 The Jay Treaty 1794
During this period, the Royal Navy began the impressment (forcible recruitment, in this case at sea) of American sailors, and this aggravation would become one of the causes of the War of 1812. Britain also seized American ships in the West Indies that were trading with France. The United States protested Britain’s violation of its neutrality. In February 1794, Joseph Fauchet succeeded Genêt as France’s representative in the United States. At the end of his tour of duty, Fauchet sailed by the American packet Peggy, a sloop, to Newport, Rhode Island, to meet another ship for the homeward voyage. On August 1, 1795, en route to Newport, he was intercepted in American waters about two and a half miles offshore by the Africa, a British warship. The English searched Fauchet’s baggage and, both ships proceeding to Newport, sent an insulting letter via Thomas Moore, British vice consul in that city, to the governor of Rhode Island. In retaliation, the president revoked Moore’s authority to act as consul, ordered the Africa to leave Newport, and demanded reparations from Britain.Footnote 61
The continued British occupation of frontier forts in the Ohio Valley also rankled the Americans. The Jay Treaty of November 1794 compelled the British army to withdraw from these last remaining redoubts on American territory – garrisons in western Pennsylvania and north of the Ohio River and along the shores of the Great Lakes. The US–Canada boundary was submitted to arbitration, and American ships were officially granted the right to trade with British colonies in India and the Caribbean. The treaty also protected neutral American shipping trading with French colonies in the West Indies from capture as prizes. The Jay Treaty benefited the United States, which wanted to normalize relations with England and eject British troops from the United States. The main benefit for Britain was to draw the United States away from France.
The treaty was based on the principle of “free ships make free goods.” That principle had been a significant element of the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, as well as US bilateral treaties with the Netherlands (1782), Sweden (1783), Prussia (1785), Morocco (1787), Tripoli (1796), and Tunis (1797). The Jay Treaty did not precisely recognize the principle of “free ships, free goods”: it provided that enemy property on neutral ships could be seized but that neutral property on enemy ships was safe. These terms were a departure from American aspirations and the prevalent law of nations, which held, under the rubric of “free ships make free goods,” that neutral ships always were exempt from capture unless carrying contraband to a belligerent. If the Jay Treaty thus accommodated both British and American interests, it spurred France to take even more extreme measures against American shipping.Footnote 62
American leaders were divided on the Jay Treaty. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison opposed the agreement, favoring a foreign policy tilt toward France. Even after the excesses of the French Revolution became apparent – the Reign of Terror (1793–94), the Thermidorian Reaction (1794), the ascendancy of the five-man Directory (1795–99), and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte – Thomas Jefferson’s faction still believed in the original ideals of the French Revolution as an antidote to the monarchies in Europe.Footnote 63
The Federalists, including George Washington and Hamilton, supported the treaty and tilted toward Britain. The Jay Treaty passed the Senate by a vote of twenty to ten – exactly two-thirds – and entered into force on February 29, 1796. The agreement immediately caused problems between the United States and France.Footnote 64 France bitterly complained that the Jay Treaty violated international law, as well as the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and betrayed the special bilateral relationship. Just days later, on March 2, 1797, the executive Directory of France contravened parts of the 1778 agreement, putting the two states on a collision course.
As fighting between Britain and France erupted on the continent, American ships were subjected to both British and French interference. The two European powers sought to cut each other off from trade with the United States. Britain issued orders in council that made the rights of neutral trade secondary to those of belligerents. France disavowed the principle of “free ships make free goods,” which had been codified in Article XXIII of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, under the rationale that the United States was unwilling to compel England to observe the same rule. When the United States began resisting Britain’s seizure of American vessels, France relented – for a time. The ruling French Committee of Public Safety adopted a decree on January 4, 1795, that permitted American vessels to transport enemy merchandise, reestablishing “free ships, free goods.”Footnote 65
1.3.2 French Objections to US Neutrality
France objected to the “insidious” 1793 neutrality proclamation by President Washington.Footnote 66 The Americans argued that their balanced, impartial neutrality was necessary and even in France’s interest. France, however, bristled at US efforts to punish American privateers who aided the French.Footnote 67 France also asserted that British warships were being admitted into American ports after having taken French prize vessels, in violation of Article XVII of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. The United States countered that the article did not forbid enemy warships that had ever taken a French prize from entering US ports, or even enemy warships with prizes in tow, from entering American ports. Still, it only required such warships to “depart as soon as possible.” But by terms of the Jay Treaty, France was no longer permitted to sell captured British prizes in US ports as it had done. The United States said that practice had been a temporary privilege, not a right under the Treaty of Amity and Commerce.
One storied case arising from the neutrality proclamation involved Gideon Henfield, who was indicted in federal court for serving as a prize master on board the French privateer Citizen Genêt. In May 1793, Henfield’s ship captured the British merchant ship The William and brought it into Philadelphia as a prize.Footnote 68 The Republicans claimed Henfield had not violated any law, but he was charged with taking part in hostilities against a country with which the United States was at peace, in violation of the law of nations. Henfield was acquitted at trial. It is unclear whether the jury was pro-French or simply accepted his argument that there could be no punishment in the absence of a statute, since Congress alone had the power to “define and punish offenses against the law of nations.”Footnote 69 In any event, the Henfield case was a grave embarrassment to the American administration, which had assured Britain that it would win. The loss dealt a blow to US neutrality policy. As a result, President Washington requested that Congress enact legislation granting federal courts jurisdiction over prize cases.
The United States found itself in a dilemma: permitting French privateers and warships to use American ports as part of their war effort violated neutrality. At the same time, the 1778 Treaty of Alliance required that American ports be open to French (as well as English) ships. The United States could not close its ports to French warships. Still, it hoped that closing French consular prize courts and preventing the licensing and arming of American merchant vessels as privateers would placate Britain without alienating France.
Nevertheless, France, incensed by the Jay Treaty and a sense of abandonment by the United States, issued a series of decrees aimed at coercing greater cooperation from Washington. The first decree, of January 4, 1795, reiterated the terms of the 1778 Treaty of Commerce respecting contraband and the carriage of enemy goods. Disappointed that Jefferson was not elected president, the Directory issued a second decree on March 2, 1797, that clarified the authority of French warships under the first decree:Footnote 70 all enemy property and all property “not sufficiently ascertained to be neutral” conveyed under an American flag could be confiscated. American privateers operating on behalf of England were to be regarded as pirates. Two days later, on March 4, 1797, President John Adams, a Federalist, took the oath of office.
The most significant impact of the 1797 decrees related to the documentation of vessels. The sea letters, or passports, required under the Treaty of Amity and Commerce during wartime certified the ship’s name, the names of the crew, and the type and origin of the cargo. Merchant ships visited by naval personnel of the other party were to offer such passports for inspection, after which they could continue safely on their voyages.Footnote 71 The system of documentation in place under US law was deemed insufficient, and vessels were seized as prizes for minor irregularities in bills of lading, crew lists, or other papers.Footnote 72 The new decree changed these rules: it was tantamount to a “general and summary confiscation” of American vessels.Footnote 73 Captured American merchant ships were now taken to prize courts in the French West Indies, where they often were condemned without trial or opportunity for their owners to offer a defense.Footnote 74
The second decree modified the terms of the 1778 treaty to make US vessels and their cargoes subject to capture for any cause that was lawful in Jay’s treaty. Americans found serving on board British warships were treated as pirates if captured and hanged, even if they had been impressed against their will. President Adams sought to lower tensions with Paris through diplomacy. He hoped private claims by shipowners against France for the capture of US merchant ships might address the problem without antagonizing Paris.
The United States sought regular communications with France and, in November 1796, sent Federalist stalwart Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to Paris as ambassador. Pinckney’s credentials were refused, however. The Directory insisted that the issues raised by the Jay Treaty had to be resolved first. After weeks of discourteous treatment, Pinckney was forced to retire to the Netherlands. After this insult, President Adams delivered, on May 16, 1797, a special message to Congress in which he pledged to continue to treat with France. At the same time, however, he asked Congress to “adopt such measures … as exigencies shall be found to require.”Footnote 75 “We shall convince France and the world,” the president declared, “that we are not a degraded people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear and a sense of inferiority, fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign influence, regardless of national honor, character, and interest.”Footnote 76
The Senate on May 23 issued a reply to the president that offered support and urged fortitude, arguing that the rights of the US government were “inseparably connected with the dignity, interest, and independence” of the country.Footnote 77 Thomas Jefferson, as the vice president and president of the Senate, signed the message, despite his French sympathies. Jefferson was uneasy that talk of war while negotiations were being opened would send a mixed message to Paris or even be viewed as provocative. Just days later, the US House of Representatives also offered its support to President Adams.Footnote 78
1.3.3 “XYZ” Affair
The United States enacted laws to ensure neutrality in the war between England and France. On June 14, 1797, the Fifth Congress passed a law that made acts of privateering against nations at peace with the United States a crime subject to a fine of $10,000 and imprisonment for ten years.Footnote 79 Simultaneously, another law was passed that made it unlawful for Americans to export weapons to any country under penalty of forfeiture of the ship on which the armaments were carried.Footnote 80 Ports and harbors were fortified, for which $115,000 was appropriated, although the coastline was so long that the amount was trivial in comparison to the need.Footnote 81 An Act Providing a Naval Armament was signed into law on July 1, 1797, authorizing the president to “man and employ” the frigates United States, Constellation, and Constitution.Footnote 82 The Constitution and United States were rated at forty-four guns and the Constellation at thirty-six, but all three ships often sailed with even more.
Despite the Pinckney rebuff, on May 31, 1797, President Adams nominated to the Senate three envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to the French Republic.Footnote 83 In mid-July, the three emissaries – Elbridge Gerry, Pinckney, and John Marshall – were approved, and soon after, they left for France. Marshall and Gerry sailed to the Netherlands, where they joined Pinckney, and the three men arrived in Paris on October 4. The Americans carried diplomatic credentials to negotiate with the Foreign Minister, the Marquis de Talleyrand, and the Directory to resolve the brewing disputes between the two states.Footnote 84
During a series of visits, four professed representatives of Talleyrand informally welcomed the American delegation, but the Directory refused to grant them official recognition. In their correspondence back to the United States, the envoys code-named Talleyrand’s representatives: Nicholas Hubbard (later “W”), Jean Hottinguer (“X”), Pierre Bellamy (“Y”), and Lucien Hauteval (“Z”). Messrs. X, Y, and Z pressed the American envoys for payment of a douceur, or conciliatory bribe, of £50,000 as a precondition to meeting Talleyrand. The French government insisted on a low-interest loan of 32 million florins and that the United States pay off claims filed by American shipowners against France. The terms of the ultimatum were reduced to writing and delivered to the Americans, who objected that the demand was degrading. The American negotiators firmly walked away from requests for payment of a bribe, stating in correspondence home that they had replied, “No, no, no; not a six-pence.”Footnote 85 In any case, the American intermediaries were skeptical that French policy would change even if the conditions were met.
On January 17, 1798, the Directory issued yet another decree, this one declaring that every vessel at sea loaded in whole or in part with goods from Britain or from English territories would be seized as a prize, regardless of its flag.Footnote 86 Any merchant ship with English goods on board was considered fair game. The decree also forbade entry into French ports of any vessels that had on any previous voyage entered a British port or any English possession. The Directory was casting a broader net to raise funds sorely needed for its war in Europe.
In a message to Congress on February 5, 1798, President Adams recounted a letter of October 22 from Pinckney, now governor of South Carolina, that described French attacks against English shipping within US territorial waters. For example, in October 1797, the Oracabissa, carrying sugar and rum loaded in Jamaica, was damaged in a storm and approached Charleston, South Carolina.Footnote 87 On the sixteenth, the ship had taken on a pilot when it encountered a French privateer, the Veritude, under Captain Jourdain. The crew of the Veritude boarded and set fire to the Oracabissa in retaliation for a British frigate’s having burned a privateer previously commanded by Jourdain.
Three weeks later, Timothy Pickering, the third American secretary of state, detailed international “delicts,” or wrongful acts, inflicted by France. The offenses included a campaign of “spoliation and maltreatment” of US vessels by French warships and privateers; an eleven-year embargo on US ships entering the port of Bordeaux; the failure by French colonial administrations in the West Indies to pay bills and debts lawfully due to American citizens; seizure of private cargoes and their appropriation to public use; and the capture, detention, and condemnation of American ships as prizes in violation of bilateral treaties.Footnote 88
By March 2, the three American diplomats in Paris had still not been accredited. The trio was preparing to leave the city when they were offered a meeting. Talleyrand repeated the terms provided by X, Y, and Z; the American envoys refused. Talleyrand dropped most of his demands but still refused to halt the seizure of American ships. President Adams, receiving dispatches from Paris on March 4, was outraged at the insulting French behavior. On March 19, the president delivered a report to Congress declaring that the United States had to prepare for the worst.Footnote 89
Seeing no ground for compromise and not being authorized to pay bribes or extend loans, the American representatives in Paris broke off negotiations on April 3, 1798. Talleyrand, who had become most partial to Gerry, suggested that he remain to continue talks. Pinckney and Marshall returned to the United States, while Gerry remained to avert war. Gerry stayed until July 1798 without achieving any breakthrough. In any event, he was directed by the US government to consider himself uncredentialed and recalled.Footnote 90 Upon the arrival in the United States of the latest dispatches from Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, along with Pinckney and Marshall themselves, President Adams declared, “I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation.”Footnote 91 President Adams and the Federalists were in favor of war, but the pro-French Democratic-Republicans were suspicious of the president’s motives. House Republicans, in fact, suggested that Adams was manufacturing a crisis with France – a country that should be a natural ally.
This failure by the American emissaries to resolve differences with France sparked a crisis. The United States had viewed French attacks on US merchant ships with growing alarm and was now dismayed by France’s refusal to negotiate amicably. Between 1796 and 1798, France captured over 300 American merchant ships, and the indignity of the attacks and their collective economic impact were becoming unbearable. The “X, Y, Z affair” was the last straw.
The rumors of the mistreatment of American envoys in Paris slowly leaked to the Congress and newspapers over the spring of 1798. On June 2, 1798, the House voted to request the president to release decoded transcripts of the diplomatic mission to Paris; President Adams transmitted a complete set the following day, changing only the names of the three French interlocutors to “X,” “Y,” and “Z.” The contents were already widely known, but the revelations awed even the Jeffersonian Republicans, who nonetheless feared the Federalist program would lead to war.Footnote 92
1.4 Congress Builds a Navy
Concern over not French privateers but Barbary corsairs spurred Congress to create a naval force. On March 27, 1794, Congress authorized $688,888 for the construction of four ships of forty-four guns and two ships of thirty-six guns.Footnote 93 These original six frigates of the US Navy were the Constitution, President, United States, Congress, Constellation, and Chesapeake. Built to a hybrid design, American frigates had enough firepower to engage most enemies but were fast enough to outpace the massive English and French ships of the line. Congress authorized the completion of the six frigates and their outfitting, but the funds were disbursed in two tranches. Keels for all six ships were laid, but just three – the United States, Constellation, and Constitution – were finished before the end of the war with Algiers in 1796, undercutting their justification. Only after the start of the Quasi-War were the remaining vessels completed and outfitted: the Congress and the Chesapeake were launched in late 1799 and the President in April 1800.
Between April and June 1798, in fact, the Federalists and the president enacted a package of legislation to prepare the country for war. The United States had no navy, but the three frigates still under construction would be ready for action, and the Department of the Treasury had some fifteen revenue cutters available. Construction of twelve ships with twenty-two guns each was authorized on April 27, 1798, for $950,000.Footnote 94 On April 30, President Adams signed a law that created the Navy Department. The close, forty-seven to forty-one, vote in favor of establishing the Department of the Navy underscored a lingering ambivalence in Congress about expenditures for national defense. Adams appointed Georgetown, Maryland, merchant Benjamin Stoddert as the first Secretary of the Navy;Footnote 95 Stoddert was sworn into office on June 19. Another $250,000 was appropriated to strengthen the defenses of ports and harbors.Footnote 96 Eighty thousand dollars was spent to acquire ten galleys for coastal defense (these ships would prove woefully few and, in any event, inadequate).Footnote 97 The president also signed into law, on May 28, 1798, an Act to authorize US warships to seize any armed vessel hovering off the coast of the United States that had committed “depredations” on American commerce.Footnote 98
In June 1798, a host of such laws were adopted. On June 13, President Adams signed an Act suspending commercial trade with France and its dependencies.Footnote 99 The Act forbade American ships from entering any port of France or its dependencies. Ships undertaking voyages to foreign ports were required to post bonds equal to the value of the ship and its cargo, to be forfeited if the vessel entered into French jurisdiction for the purpose of trade. French vessels were barred from American ports.
Secretary Stoddert quickly began acquiring merchant ships and converting them into warships while completing the authorized frigates. By the end of 1798, the US Navy had twenty-one warships in service; one year later, thirty-three warships; and by the end of 1800, fifty-four warships.Footnote 100 Revenue cutters were authorized to carry up to seventy Marines.Footnote 101 The masters and crews of American merchant ships were permitted to defend their vessels against attempts at search or seizure by French warships and privateers and to retake their ships if captured.Footnote 102 At a banquet reception for John Marshall on June 18, 1798, Robert Goodloe Harper, a South Carolina Federalist and chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, proclaimed a toast that became a famous refrain: “Millions for defense; not one cent for tribute!”Footnote 103 The call would become a national rallying cry; Jeffersonian opposition to a stronger approach toward France evaporated.
On June 22, Congress passed statutes to increase the size of the Navy and to raise an army.Footnote 104 George Washington was appointed commanding general of the Army on July 13, 1798, and served in that position until his death on December 14, 1799. A statute was passed on June 25 to permit the arrest and expulsion of aliens and to authorize the defense of merchant ships against attacks by French warships and privateers.Footnote 105 Captured French privateers could be brought into US admiralty courts and condemned as prizes; American vessels being used as French privateers and captured were to be restored to their rightful owners upon payment of salvage.Footnote 106 To deter American ships from sailing under French letters of marque, armed merchantmen had to post bonds equal to double the value of the vessels at sailing.Footnote 107 The president was authorized to issue rules for the use of force by armed merchant vessels to “prevent any outrage, cruelty or injury which they may be disposed to commit” in actions against French privateers or in recovery of US ships.Footnote 108 Should French warships begin to comply with the laws of war and respect American neutral rights, however, US ships would submit to France’s belligerent right of visit and search to determine the character of their cargoes.Footnote 109
On July 7, 1798, President Adams signed an Act that annulled the treaty of alliance with France because of repeated attacks on American merchant ships. Henceforth, the two treaties with France were not to be legally binding on the United States.Footnote 110 Two days later, Congress authorized the president to deploy US warships on the high seas with orders to “subdue, seize or take” any armed French vessel as a prize.Footnote 111 The law also authorized the president to commission armed merchant ships as privateers to capture any armed French vessel.Footnote 112 American privateers were required to post bonds or sureties of between $7,000 and $14,000 and to observe the laws of the United States, treaties to which the United States was a party, and the orders and regulations issued by the president.Footnote 113 Captured vessels were to be brought into American ports and adjudicated by admiralty courts; prisoners were to be delivered to a US marshal. Condemned prizes and their cargoes would be forfeited and the sums realized from them distributed to the captors (except, as noted, for recaptured American vessels).
Congress established the US Marine Corps on July 11, 1798;Footnote 114 five days later, funds were appropriated for the three long-deferred frigates – Chesapeake, Congress, and President – that had been authorized on March 27, 1794.Footnote 115 On August 21, 1798, the attorney general, Charles Lee, advised the secretary of state that a legally authorized “state of maritime war” existed between the two nations.Footnote 116 “France is our enemy,” Lee said, and “any American citizen who renders aid or assistance to her commits treason.”Footnote 117
1.5 Negotiating with France
Legislation was also passed to ensure that pro-French citizens did not interfere with US foreign relations by freelance negotiations with Paris. Aside from Gerry, still in France without credentials or authority, there was an enterprising state legislator and pacifist Quaker from Pennsylvania, Dr. George Logan, who made his own attempt at resolving differences with France. Armed with a certificate of private citizenship signed by Vice President Thomas Jefferson, Logan did not officially represent the United States. Convinced he could negotiate a settlement, however, he left for France on June 12, 1798, where he was hailed as an envoy of peace. The Directory, smarting from the backlash of the X, Y, and Z affair, realized it had pushed the Americans too far. The embargo on American merchant ships was lifted, and detained American vessels and sailors were freed.Footnote 118
The Federalists did not welcome Logan’s trip to Paris, however. President Adams complained that he saw “no real change” in the disposition of France toward the United States. He recommended to the Senate on December 12, 1798, legislation to control unaccountable citizen diplomats such as Logan to prevent “officious interference” by individuals with the “temerity and impertinence … to interfere in public affairs between France and the United States.”Footnote 119 The resulting Logan Act of January 30, 1799, forbade unauthorized American citizens from negotiating with foreign governments.Footnote 120
1.5.1 US Trade Restrictions with France
One week later, Congress passed a law further restricting trade with France.Footnote 121 The statute provided that no ship owned by a resident of the United States was allowed to “proceed directly, or from any intermediate port or place, to any port or place within the territory of the French Republic.”Footnote 122 Vessels in violation of the law could be forfeited, along with their cargoes. The statute was tested in the Supreme Court case of the Flying Fish.
The Danish-flagged brigantine Flying Fish left the French port of Jérémie, Haiti, bound for Saint Thomas. On December 2, 1799, the ship was captured by the frigate Boston, under Capt. George Little, near the island of Hispaniola.Footnote 123 The Flying Fish was carrying Danish neutral cargo owned by Samuel Goodman, an inhabitant of Saint Thomas, a Danish territory. It was seized pursuant to an Act of Congress of February 9, 1799, that authorized the seizure of vessels sailing to French ports. The merchant ship was taken as a prize into Boston, where the case went to trial. The court directed the restoration of the vessel to its owner, finding it neutral property, but declined to award damages because the Navy had probable cause to seize it. The appellate court reversed the decision because the Flying Fish had been on a voyage from, not to, a French port and had carried neutral (free) cargo; accordingly, the ship had been immune. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of Massachusetts.Footnote 124
In two other cases in 1800, the Supreme Court addressed whether the country was even in an armed conflict with France, as there had been no congressional declaration of war. First, in Bas v. Tingy, the Court held that France was “the enemy” and that, therefore, payment of salvage was due to Captain Tingy, who had recovered an American ship taken by a French privateer.Footnote 125 The case began on March 31, 1799, when a French privateer seized the US-flagged Eliza, owned by John Bas, and its cargo as a war prize. Just three weeks later, Tingy, captain of the twenty-six-gun Ganges, recaptured the Eliza.
Seizure of the ship entitled him to recovery, under a 1798 law that authorized payment by the owners of one-eighth of the value of any US vessel that was retaken after having been captured as a prize by France.Footnote 126 The fee was an incentive for “public armed vessels of the United States” to take back ships seized by France. The following year, Congress increased the payment to half of the value.Footnote 127 Tingy accordingly demanded that Bas pay half the value of the Eliza, and the lower courts concurred. John Bas appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that he was required to pay only one-eighth of the value of the ship.
The decision turned on the distinction between the two statutes: the first dealt with ships recaptured from “any nation in amity with the United States,” whereas the second law addressed ships recaptured from “the enemy.” The question was whether France was “in amity” with the United States or “the enemy,” a belligerent with which the United States was at war. The Quasi-War, as the conflict became known, was not fought based on a congressional declaration of war. But Congress had authorized specific actions in preparation for and furtherance of hostilities: for example, it had raised an army, funded a naval force, and authorized privateers, suspended commercial ties, and repudiated treaty arrangements. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded, a state of war existed between France and the United States, albeit a “legally imperfect” one.Footnote 128 Justice Samuel Chase wrote in a concurring opinion that during a (legally) “perfect” war, naval operations are regulated by the law of nations. Still, during an imperfect war, US national (municipal) law prevailed. Since Congress had authorized hostilities against France, the war was imperfect yet lawful.Footnote 129 Mr. Bas owed Tingy half the value of his ship and cargo.
The Supreme Court also ruled, in Talbot v. the Ship Amelia, that the officers and crew of a warship were entitled to salvage payments from the owners of a recaptured armed neutral ship that a foreign belligerent had used.Footnote 130 In 1799, the Amelia, registered in Hamburg and carrying eight guns, was sailing from Calcutta when it was captured on September 6 by the French naval corvette La Diligente. The master and crew were removed and replaced by a French navy prize crew, and the vessel was redirected to Santo Domingo for adjudication under the laws of war. Capt. Silas Talbot, of the forty-four-gun frigate the Constitution, recaptured the Amelia on September 15, 1799. The Constitution put an American prize crew on board the ship and brought it into New York. Captain Talbot demanded payment under the 1799 law, which authorized prize money of half the value of the vessel and cargo.Footnote 131 After the Constitution claimed payment for Amelia, however, its owner, Hans Frederick Seeman, filed his own claim for the vessel. He insisted that the ship’s legal status had not been materially changed by its misadventures.
The US Circuit Court of New York ruled that because France was at peace with the city of Hamburg, the French capture of the Amelia had not been consistent with the laws of war. Therefore, its recapture by the Constitution did not warrant payment to Captain Talbot, as his action may be considered as a hostile Act. The Supreme Court overruled this decision, however, holding that although the Amelia and its cargo should be restored to their owner, Captain Talbot acted meritoriously and was entitled to a smaller salvage payment of one-sixth the net value.
Chief Justice John Marshall conceded that the language of the US statute could support Talbot’s claim to half-salvage but held that in international law, neutral ships were not subject to capture as prizes. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that American law was consistent with international law. It ruled that “the laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable … be construed as to infract the common principles and usages of nations.”Footnote 132 Since the law of nations permitted the capture and condemnation as prizes of ships that were belligerent-flagged, not neutral-flagged, the Court found itself compelled to ensure that the 1799 Act was consistent with international law.Footnote 133 This holding was significant for the United States because it recognized that the Supreme Court would uphold international law and interpret US statutes in a manner consistent with it. Four years later, a similar outcome was reached in the Charming Betsy case.
In Alexander Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Supreme Court reviewed the seizure of the schooner Charming Betsy on the high seas. The thirty-eight-gun frigate Constellation had captured the ship during the Quasi-War because it was trading with the French dependency of Guadeloupe.Footnote 134 The Nonintercourse Act of February 27, 1800, prohibited trade intercourse between the United States and France.Footnote 135 American warships were authorized to enforce the embargo against French goods and could seize American ships carrying such goods and bring them to the nearest convenient port for legal disposition.
The US-flagged merchant ship Jane had set sail from Baltimore on April 10, 1800, with a cargo of flour bound for the Swedish port of St. Bartholomew. Afterward, it was sold to Jared Shattuck, who renamed the vessel the Charming Betsy. Shattuck was born in Connecticut before the American Revolution and moved to the Danish possession of Saint Thomas. In 1796, he became a Danish citizen. On July 3, 1800, the Constellation sent a party on board the Charming Betsy to take possession of the ship. Shattuck argued that because he was a citizen of a neutral country, the seizure of his ship violated the international law of neutrality. The Supreme Court agreed with Shattuck and stated that US law ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations “if any other possible construction remains.”Footnote 136 The Talbot v. the Ship Amelia and Charming Betsy cases have been canonical in American foreign-relations law to this day: American courts are directed to “construe ambiguous statutes to avoid conflicts with international law.”Footnote 137
1.6 Battles on the Water
The US Navy fought the French in the Caribbean Sea and offered to support the revolution led by Toussaint L’Ouverture in the fight for Haitian independence.Footnote 138 By the summer of 1798, French privateers and warships were struggling, worn down by the Royal Navy. The large US frigates Constitution, United States, and Constellation put to sea that summer and performed admirably. Few French warships escaped the British blockade, so even the relatively small US Navy outmatched them.Footnote 139 The US Navy quickly swept the eastern seaboard of French warships and privateers.
The Americans lost only a single warship during the conflict – the fourteen-gun schooner Retaliation. The Retaliation had been the French vessel La Croyable, taken as a prize by the Delaware under Capt. Stephen Decatur. La Croyable, the first American capture of the Quasi-War, had been condemned in a US court, purchased by the US Navy, and pressed into service as Retaliation. Sailing in the West Indies under Lt. William Bainbridge, Retaliation was accompanied by the twenty-gun converted merchant ship Montezuma and the eighteen-gun Norfolk. On November 20, 1798, the Montezuma and the Norfolk peeled off for a chase, leaving the Retaliation isolated. The thirty-two-gun frigate L’Insurgente and the forty-gun frigate Volontaire overtook it, and, badly outgunned, the US warship struck its colors. (The following June, however, the twenty-eight-gun Merrimack recaptured the Retaliation.)
Another US warship, the Enterprise, captured eight French privateers and warships and liberated eleven American merchant vessels. The twelve-gun schooner Experiment was also successful, capturing French prizes on several cruises to the Caribbean Sea. In the most storied engagement of the Quasi-War and the first American naval battle since the Revolutionary War, the Constellation encountered the French frigate L’Insurgente northeast of the island of Nevis on February 9, 1799. Under the command of Thomas Truxtun, the Constellation maneuvered to rake the French warship with intense firing of its thirty-eight guns with relative impunity for more than an hour. Captain Barreaut surrendered L’Insurgente to the Constellation. The two warships put into St. Kitts for repairs, to the applause of the British onlookers who greeted them.Footnote 140 Not quite one year later, the Constellation hammered the fifty-two-gun frigate La Vengeance in a nighttime battle. The French warship was heavily damaged but managed to escape in the dark.
Truxtun’s two engagements were the only major naval battles of the war. Still, they demonstrated American naval skill that presaged the US Navy’s performance in the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812. For most of the Quasi-War, France had only two or three frigates operating in the West Indies, and Truxtun defeated two of them.Footnote 141 By the end of 1798, nearly the entire American fleet was preying on French ships in the West Indies.Footnote 142
1.7 Peace: The Treaty of Mortefontaine 1800
On November 9, 1799, the young Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Directory, and on December 14, George Washington died – events that marked the passing of an era. The campaign for the 1800 presidential election between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson unfolded simultaneously with negotiations with France to end the war. On September 30, 1800, American and French negotiators signed the Treaty of Mortefontaine, a peace agreement.Footnote 143 The treaty terminated the 1778 Treaty of Alliance. The decision to cancel it reflected George Washington’s 1796 admonition to avoid entangling alliances, except as temporary measures in case of emergency, and also the preference of John Adams to maintain an independent foreign policy. Washington stated, “Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course…. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?”Footnote 144 The United States would not ally with another country until it became part of the “Big Four” during World War II and signed the 1942 Declaration by the United Nations at the First Washington Conference.
The Treaty of Mortefontaine also normalized bilateral trade, granting each party “most favored nation” status (Articles VI, X, and XI) and requiring the return of captured prizes (Article III). Word of the breakthrough did not reach Washington, DC, until the first week of November 1800, however, which was too late to help John Adams in his bid for reelection.Footnote 145 The treaty called for the restoration of warships and private vessels that had been taken and created a new form of passport that rendered safe conduct and passage to commercial ships. The Senate, to deal with questions of order arising during its consideration of the treaty, adopted its first set of rules of procedure for treaties transmitted to it by the president. The Senate gave the president authority to exchange or repatriate captured French citizens during conflict.Footnote 146
The president ratified the treaty on February 18, 1801, with the advice and consent of the Senate, excepting provisions on compensation for captured prizes in Article II. The parties exchanged instruments of ratification on July 31, 1801, with a reservation on the stipulation in Article II of no “indemnities” or compensation for captured US merchant ships. The president returned the treaty and reservation for further advice and consent; it was returned once again and fully ratified. The president promulgated the treaty by proclamation on December 21, 1801. Even before the ink was dry, the treaty was pivotal in litigation over prize captures during the war and how they would be addressed in the era of peace.
The 1801 case United States v. Schooner Peggy addressed whether the Treaty of Mortefontaine was retroactive and required the release of ships captured and condemned before the treaty was signed, even if the case was still pending on appeal.Footnote 147 On April 24, 1800, the eighteen-gun sloop of war Trumbull had captured the schooner Peggy after running it ashore on the coast of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The Peggy had been armed with four four-pounder carriage guns and numerous small firearms, and it had carried about 100 tons of coffee, sugar, and other merchandise. The United States was on friendly terms with General Toussaint, the “governor for life” of the autonomous French colony. The Peggy had sailed under the authority of General Toussaint and carried diplomatic dispatches to the French government. The Supreme Court held that the vessel had been capable of inflicting harm on American merchant ships and therefore was an “armed” ship within the meaning of US law. Furthermore, the Peggy had been captured on the high seas. Consequently, the captain and crew of the Trumbull were entitled to half of the value of the ship in prize money; the other half inured to the benefit of the United States. The US circuit court condemned the vessel on September 23, 1800.
The case raised two significant issues when it was appealed to the Supreme Court. First, was the capture of the Peggy made on the high seas? Second, did the ship fall within an exception in the treaty that required its release? Article IV of the treaty addressed prize captures after the signature of the agreement but before it entered into force:
Property captured, and not yet definitively condemned, or which may be captured before the exchange of ratifications (contraband goods destined to an enemy’s port excepted), shall be mutually restored. And if, from the date of the said signature, any property shall be condemned, contrary to the intent of the said convention, before the knowledge of this stipulation shall be obtained, the property so condemned shall, without delay, be restored or paid for.Footnote 148
The Supreme Court ruled that the ship was not to be considered as “definitely condemned” by the circuit court within the meaning of Article IV of the treaty. That is, the decree of the prize court was final but was subject to review by superior or appellate courts. In other words, “an interlocutory order for a sale is not a condemnation.” The judgment of condemnation is in abeyance until final action by the appellate court. In this case, a new law intervened – the treaty – that “positively change[d] the rule” governing the case. Whereas a “treaty is the law of the land” and materially affects the rights of parties in litigation, in court, such agreements were to be regarded as subsequent acts of Congress.
The United States filed at least 6,479 claims involving more than 2,300 vessels lost to enemy action during the war – most of them taken as prizes.Footnote 149 Tactically, however, the Quasi-War was an American victory. The United States captured some eighty-five French privateers, losing only the Retaliation. The US Navy also trained a generation of officers who later would fight in the wars against Tripoli: Stephen Decatur, Oliver Hazard Perry, William Bainbridge, Charles Stewart, and David Porter.Footnote 150 Strategically, the war also redounded to the benefit of the United States, as France, absorbed in the Napoleonic Wars, would later cede the Louisiana Territory.
After the Quasi-War, the United States moved quickly to reduce its armed forces. Just before leaving office, President Adams signed a statute that reduced the Navy to thirteen frigates, with only six remaining on active service; the remainder were laid up “in ordinary.”Footnote 151 The United States would not establish a standing peacetime navy until 1824.Footnote 152
