Matthew Stratton's The Politics of Irony in American Modernism takes a term we thought we understood and defamiliarizes it. In the twentieth century, of course, irony typically has come to literary studies either as a New Critical value or as postmodern irony. Stratton proposes a different set of contours. His form of irony is not a transhistorical term. Rather he proposes to examine its presence in the first half of the twentieth century, in order to examine the uses to which it is put and to show how disagreements about irony are central to understanding the range of its functions. As he writes, “the question at hand is not whether irony exists but what possibilities competing discourses about irony disclose and foreclose for literary studies and cultural politics” (2). Much of the book examines forms of irony that existed before New Criticism began to control our understandings of the term and its social possibilities. Irony, for the authors covered in this study, works “as a disposition to both analysis and pleasure” (100), a disposition with political consequences. Stratton argues that the writers he examines “figure irony as an aesthetic politics that actively democratizes the unsayable … as a means of encouraging the transvaluation of values that have become habitual and thus invisible” (192).
The Politics of Irony covers the first half of the twentieth century, when the use of irony as a term rapidly increased, as a way “to describe features not only of life and art but of the possibilities for aesthetics to orient the lives of social individuals toward political goals” (5). Understood as a political force, irony stands apart from New Critical irony. Although the latter occasionally presented itself as an ethical stance, it typically offered itself not as a route to effective political action, but rather as a way of removing oneself from action. After an introduction which examines the contemporary trope of “the death of irony,” The Politics of Irony is divided into four chapters. The first chapter contrasts two now largely forgotten intellectual figures who in different ways saw irony as a political stance: Randolph Bourne, who saw irony as “a critical attitude towards life” that moves toward action rather than away from it (27), and the enigmatic Benjamin De Casseres, whose use of irony is much more destabilizing.
The second chapter provides a lengthy analysis of Ellen Glasgow's The Romantic Comedians (1926) to consider the vexed historical relationship between irony and gender in modernism. Much of the chapter's analysis proceeds through the frame of Hegel, and argues that Glasgow presents “a feminist, comic, and emphatically public irony that is openly opposed to literary sentimentalism and philosophical idealism” (75). Glasgow's project, focussed on overturning habits of mind, “expands the possibilities of imaginative self-production and expands the definition of ‘political action’ to include such production” (89). Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of satire as a way of approaching John Dos Passos's work. Working with a strategy similar to that he employed in his introduction, Stratton examines the “cultural logic” that proclaims the death of satire, eventually to argue that in Dos Passos satire is used “as a mode of activist irony to educate readers' aesthetic sense of print, image, and text in the age of public relations and hopelessly corrupt information” (110). The “novelist's task” is “to employ the distortions of irony in order to capture a distorted world and to introduce such distortion into readers' perceptive capacities” (135). The fourth chapter reads Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man (1952) through the lens of Kenneth Burke, arguing that Ellison's irony is “an agonistic intervention in and repurposing of” New Critical understandings of irony (148). This is not to say that Stratton argues that Ellison's irony proposes specific political actions; rather, it “inculcates habits of awareness” (158), and “emphasizes the central role of hermeneutic and aesthetic practice within and as political practice” (187).
Stratton's reading of Invisible Man is the book's strongest and most polemical chapter, and reveals, clearly, that The Politics of Irony does not just describe irony's affect, but champions certain types of understanding of what irony can do. Its polemic is inseparable from the basic strategy of this book – to think of irony not as some transhistorical phenomenon but as a contested concept, concerning not just its value, but also its meaning. Stratton's supple use of a cultural concept is precisely right, but this attention to the variability of meaning requires irony's contrasting terms to be stable, even if those terms may have the same sliding register that irony has. (It may be that even in modernism, sentiment, for example, has the same kinds of changing and multiple social function as irony.) In addition, a more nuanced analysis of New Critical irony – which was, after all, the dominant understanding of irony in the twentieth century – would have been welcome. But my caveats here point to the strengths of this excellent book – a wish to see its procedures and inquiry expanded, a move which would probably require a second book.
