Christian Tradition and the Practice of Justice, by Nicholas Sagovsky, Canon Theologian of Westminster Abbey, is the sequel to his earlier Ecumenism, Christian Origins and the Practice of Communion. This volume extends the previous work's central concept of koinonia from the specific fellowship of shared sacrament to the more general fellowship of shared witness. Or, put in the standard terms of the modern ecumenical movement, Sagovsky shifts the emphasis of communion from ‘faith and order’ to ‘life and work’, nevertheless insisting that the two are inseparable. The communion of shared witness is crucial for him, not only because it constitutes a wider ecumenical engagement than shared sacrament, but also because it constitutes an inter-religious engagement with the wider world. Indeed, it is the Christian tradition's engagement with the wider world that is the theme of his text. Sagovsky's thesis is that there is a conception of justice which not only unifies the church where sacrament divides it, but that this same conception of justice unites church and world. On Sagovsky's view, the Christian tradition's conception of ‘righteousness’ is in continuity with the Western tradition's conception of ‘rightness’, especially as the latter is epitomised in John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. From start to finish, Sagovsky's meditation on justice is an apology for a revised Rawlsian liberalism ‘thickened’ by the capacities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.

Sagovsky begins and ends with what he calls the four strands ‘to be found in all worthwhile accounts of justice’ (p. xiii): liberty, rule of law, welfare and responsible action. These strands are defined through scripture and developed through three ‘grand theorists’ of justice: Augustine, Aquinas and Rawls. The opening chapters (1–3) outline the historical and scriptural background of Sagovsky's conception of justice. On the one hand are the Graeco-Roman dramatic and philosophical traditions. On the other are the Judaeo-Christian prophetic and apostolic traditions. In the following chapters (4–6) Sagovsky develops this conception into the practice of justice, first through an engagement with Augustine and Aquinas, and then with Rawls himself. The Augustinian tradition demonstrates the Christian's obligation to serve the temporal peace and justice of the earthly city, thus emphasising rule of law and responsible action. The Thomistic tradition demonstrates the Christian's further obligation to secure the freedom and flourishing of their neighbours, thus emphasising freedom and welfare. The Rawlsian tradition demonstrates that political liberalism and democratic contractualism best instantiate the four strands of justice. The original position and veil of ignorance maximise equality and minimise inequality by outlining a procedure of legality and responsibility governed by public reason. Nevertheless, like Rawls himself, Sagovsky concedes that justice as fairness offers no substantive account of the good. He thus turns to the capacities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum to fill out a contentful account of the minimal welfare necessary for maximal liberty.

While there is much to be said for Sagovsky's theological approach to the practice of justice, several significant weaknesses emerge in his account. These all have to do with the revised Rawlsian position he adopts. First, while Sagovsky mentions public reason, he says nothing about Rawls’ initial prohibition of religious reasons in public deliberation or his later proviso requiring that claims made on the basis of religious reasons later be redeemed by non-religious justifications. That is, Sagovsky is silent on Rawlsianism's fundamental allergy to religion. Second, and relatedly, he offers no discussion of the past three decades of debate on religion and public reason between figures such as Richard Rorty, Stanley Hauerwas and Jeffrey Stout. This is, perhaps, due to differences between the American and British contexts. Still, for the broader English-speaking audience, this debate has significantly moved beyond Rawlsianism. Third, while Sagovsky discusses critics of political liberalism, he fails to take them at all seriously. Feminists, Marxists and Communitarians are introduced as minor voices only to be quickly dismissed. On these three counts, as well as on its overall account, Christian Tradition and the Practice of Justice will confirm the convictions of Rawlsian liberals, but it will not convince anyone not already so committed.