I think Machery is entirely right, in Doing without Concepts (2009), to draw attention to the phenomenon that he refers to as the heterogeneity of concepts (as the term “concept” is used in cognitive psychology). I also agree that this stands in the way of any unified account of concepts as exemplars, prototypes, or constituents of theories. Nevertheless, I take issue with Machery's eliminativist conclusion. The logical heart of my worry is that heterogeneity across exemplars, prototypes, theories, and so on, precludes a unified theory of concepts only insofar as one assumes that such a theory needs to be built out of the kinds of structures and processes described by advocates of these approaches. I think this assumption is worth questioning, and I want to suggest an alternative approach that rejects it.
The alternative begins with the idea that concepts are individuated by considerations more abstract than their role in cognitive structures and processes. The specific version of this idea that I favor individuates concept types in terms of the individuals, kinds, or properties they represent or refer to (see Edwards Reference Edwards2009; Reference Edwards2010). Before saying more about this approach, I want to mention another issue that might partially explain why Machery is relatively blind to – or perhaps it is more charitable to say, disinterested in – this kind of alternative.
When it comes down to how to construe the starting point for a theory of concepts, Machery (Reference Machery2009, pp. 32–51) is quick to side with psychologists as opposed to philosophers. Machery chooses sides in part to undermine various philosophical concerns on the grounds that philosophers are engaged in a fundamentally different research project. I think Machery may be overlooking some potentially relevant issues here. Just to be clear, I agree that philosophers typically begin from a different starting point than psychologists and tend to emphasize different considerations. However, this is always the case with topics located at the intersection of academic disciplines. Admittedly, this realization does not show that philosophers and psychologists are converging on the same theoretical entity in this particular case. Nevertheless, I think one ought to be very cautious in concluding that different apparent starting points amount to a fundamental difference in subject matter. Given space constraints, I can't properly address Machery's claims on this subject; but I'll briefly mention several issues regarding which philosophers may be able to contribute to how psychologists think about concepts.
One topic to highlight – not surprisingly – is the notion of representation. It seems to me this is a place where philosophers and psychologists tend to take recognizably different approaches. Psychologists, even those who clearly are working within the framework of a Representational Theory of Mind, often appear to presume something in the vicinity of representational content without making this explicit. Consider, for example, how natural it is to talk about exemplars or prototypes being of or about a category. In contrast, philosophers, in particular philosophers of mind, have been something close to obsessed with either explaining such talk in naturalistically respectable terms or explaining how to do without it. Examples of the former include Dretske (Reference Dretske1981), Fodor (Reference Fodor1987; Reference Fodor1992), Millikan (Reference Millikan1984; Reference Millikan1993); examples of the latter include Field (Reference Field2001), Horwich (Reference Horwich1998a; Reference Horwich1998b). I think Machery's neglect of these discussions partially explains why a representation-based view of concepts isn't on his radar. I should note that I am here echoing concerns raised by Rey (Reference Rey2009b).
Another topic much discussed in recent philosophy can be used to shed light on the potential relationship between representation and more blatantly psychological considerations: I have in mind the debate between so-called reductionists and non-reductionists, especially insofar as this has involved questions about multiple-realization (see, in particular, the debate between Fodor (Reference Fodor1974; Reference Fodor1997) and Kim (Reference Kim1992; Reference Kim1998). Speaking very roughly, the upshot of this debate has been that both anti-reductionists and their opponents have confronted the fact that reality exists (or is properly describable/conceptualized) at different levels of abstraction. At a minimum, this forces one to be careful about the level at which a particular theoretical entity is construed. The cost of picking too low a level of analysis is that one wrongly identifies the target entity with a disjunction of lower-level entities each of which is better described as a realization (or instance) of the target. To repeat a now hackneyed example, it is a mistake to identify doorstops with the arrangements of physical stuff (slices of wood, hinged pieces of metal, bricks, old printers, etc.) out of which particular doorstops are made. The now standard functionalist line is that something is a doorstop by virtue of playing a characteristic role in a larger system; for example, a system involving doors, people, and so on. Someone who holds a representational view of concepts can make a similar suggestion. Type-individuating concepts in terms of their representational properties frees up the possibility for different instances or realizations of a concept type to show up in substantially different cognitive structures and processes.
The alternative approach to which I have gestured brings many questions in its wake. I have not, for example, supplied arguments for the conclusion that a representationalist view of concepts should supplant rather than supplement accounts that appeal to mental structures and processes. Similarly, I have not said anything about whether embracing a representationalist alternative forces a substantive (rather than merely terminological) shift in work done by advocates of exemplar, prototype, and theory-based approaches. Moreover, there are familiar reasons to worry about a representation-based approach. The goal of the present commentary is to make two relatively modest points: (1) There is an admittedly radical approach to concepts that needs to be undermined before one opts for eliminativism. (2) Various issues that have featured prominently in recent philosophy have the potential to impinge upon discussions of concepts in psychology, and to do so in potentially important ways.
You have
Access
I think Machery is entirely right, in Doing without Concepts (2009), to draw attention to the phenomenon that he refers to as the heterogeneity of concepts (as the term “concept” is used in cognitive psychology). I also agree that this stands in the way of any unified account of concepts as exemplars, prototypes, or constituents of theories. Nevertheless, I take issue with Machery's eliminativist conclusion. The logical heart of my worry is that heterogeneity across exemplars, prototypes, theories, and so on, precludes a unified theory of concepts only insofar as one assumes that such a theory needs to be built out of the kinds of structures and processes described by advocates of these approaches. I think this assumption is worth questioning, and I want to suggest an alternative approach that rejects it.
The alternative begins with the idea that concepts are individuated by considerations more abstract than their role in cognitive structures and processes. The specific version of this idea that I favor individuates concept types in terms of the individuals, kinds, or properties they represent or refer to (see Edwards Reference Edwards2009; Reference Edwards2010). Before saying more about this approach, I want to mention another issue that might partially explain why Machery is relatively blind to – or perhaps it is more charitable to say, disinterested in – this kind of alternative.
When it comes down to how to construe the starting point for a theory of concepts, Machery (Reference Machery2009, pp. 32–51) is quick to side with psychologists as opposed to philosophers. Machery chooses sides in part to undermine various philosophical concerns on the grounds that philosophers are engaged in a fundamentally different research project. I think Machery may be overlooking some potentially relevant issues here. Just to be clear, I agree that philosophers typically begin from a different starting point than psychologists and tend to emphasize different considerations. However, this is always the case with topics located at the intersection of academic disciplines. Admittedly, this realization does not show that philosophers and psychologists are converging on the same theoretical entity in this particular case. Nevertheless, I think one ought to be very cautious in concluding that different apparent starting points amount to a fundamental difference in subject matter. Given space constraints, I can't properly address Machery's claims on this subject; but I'll briefly mention several issues regarding which philosophers may be able to contribute to how psychologists think about concepts.
One topic to highlight – not surprisingly – is the notion of representation. It seems to me this is a place where philosophers and psychologists tend to take recognizably different approaches. Psychologists, even those who clearly are working within the framework of a Representational Theory of Mind, often appear to presume something in the vicinity of representational content without making this explicit. Consider, for example, how natural it is to talk about exemplars or prototypes being of or about a category. In contrast, philosophers, in particular philosophers of mind, have been something close to obsessed with either explaining such talk in naturalistically respectable terms or explaining how to do without it. Examples of the former include Dretske (Reference Dretske1981), Fodor (Reference Fodor1987; Reference Fodor1992), Millikan (Reference Millikan1984; Reference Millikan1993); examples of the latter include Field (Reference Field2001), Horwich (Reference Horwich1998a; Reference Horwich1998b). I think Machery's neglect of these discussions partially explains why a representation-based view of concepts isn't on his radar. I should note that I am here echoing concerns raised by Rey (Reference Rey2009b).
Another topic much discussed in recent philosophy can be used to shed light on the potential relationship between representation and more blatantly psychological considerations: I have in mind the debate between so-called reductionists and non-reductionists, especially insofar as this has involved questions about multiple-realization (see, in particular, the debate between Fodor (Reference Fodor1974; Reference Fodor1997) and Kim (Reference Kim1992; Reference Kim1998). Speaking very roughly, the upshot of this debate has been that both anti-reductionists and their opponents have confronted the fact that reality exists (or is properly describable/conceptualized) at different levels of abstraction. At a minimum, this forces one to be careful about the level at which a particular theoretical entity is construed. The cost of picking too low a level of analysis is that one wrongly identifies the target entity with a disjunction of lower-level entities each of which is better described as a realization (or instance) of the target. To repeat a now hackneyed example, it is a mistake to identify doorstops with the arrangements of physical stuff (slices of wood, hinged pieces of metal, bricks, old printers, etc.) out of which particular doorstops are made. The now standard functionalist line is that something is a doorstop by virtue of playing a characteristic role in a larger system; for example, a system involving doors, people, and so on. Someone who holds a representational view of concepts can make a similar suggestion. Type-individuating concepts in terms of their representational properties frees up the possibility for different instances or realizations of a concept type to show up in substantially different cognitive structures and processes.
The alternative approach to which I have gestured brings many questions in its wake. I have not, for example, supplied arguments for the conclusion that a representationalist view of concepts should supplant rather than supplement accounts that appeal to mental structures and processes. Similarly, I have not said anything about whether embracing a representationalist alternative forces a substantive (rather than merely terminological) shift in work done by advocates of exemplar, prototype, and theory-based approaches. Moreover, there are familiar reasons to worry about a representation-based approach. The goal of the present commentary is to make two relatively modest points: (1) There is an admittedly radical approach to concepts that needs to be undermined before one opts for eliminativism. (2) Various issues that have featured prominently in recent philosophy have the potential to impinge upon discussions of concepts in psychology, and to do so in potentially important ways.