Magnus Hörnqvist's Risk, Power and the State is a provocative intervention into the often elided problematic of the state in, as Hörnqvist puts it in the book (often disparagingly), ‘the [Foucaultian] tradition’. Whilst ‘risk’ and, of course, ‘power’, are well-worn objects of inquiry for those of us writing in this ‘tradition’, the state is not. This lack of theoretical attention – a function both of Foucault's problematisation of what he critically labelled an ‘ontology of the state’ and the consequent insistence within ‘governmentality’ scholarship of studying government ‘beyond’, or irreducible to, the state – has led to some fecund studies of a range of forms of power in a range of different social fora, but a rather attenuated consideration of just what it means for the state to exercise power and what happens when it does. It is to precisely these questions that Hörnqvist's valuable book is directed. Risk, Power and the State is composed of both empirical and conceptual insights and is a very useful corrective to much scholarship which, ‘after Foucault’, de-emphasises the role of state power. (I agree with Hörnqvist that this attempt to get ‘beyond’ the apparatuses of the state – what he calls an ‘axiom of governmentality studies’ (p. 21) – has led to a ‘blind spot’ (p. 21) as concerns the theorisation of state power.) I shall first briefly discuss Hörnqvist's empirical studies of various state agencies, the richness of which I think constitutes the chief merit of this book, and then discuss some of the conceptual presuppositions that animate these empirical studies (with which I disagree in part).
Hörnqvist describes Risk, Power and the State in the opening pages as ‘an empirical study of power in some contemporary organizations’ (p. 1). These contemporary organisations are all organs of the state. In Chapter 1, Hörnqvist analyses the practices adopted by the Swedish public employment service to ‘activate’ the long-term unemployed – a mixture of particularly unsubtle disciplinary interventions and self-directed motivatory tools – in order to reinsert them into the labour market. This chapter concerns not only the exercise of state power but also – thus raising another, perhaps more salutary, corrective to ‘the tradition’ – the functional orientation of state power towards the reproduction of capitalist relations. ‘One cannot’, Hörnqvist observes tellingly of this system of state reproduction of wage labour, ‘be socially included unless one is performing wage labour’ (p. 33). Chapter 2 concerns the use of cognitive behavioural techniques by the Swedish prison system in order to reintegrate offenders into society (read here, again, often into the lower tiers of the wage labour hierarchy). Chapter 3 also concerns the Swedish prison service, only this time from the perspective of internal disciplinary control and the maintenance of order within the confines of the prison, whilst Chapter 4 describes the approach of the Swedish border control agencies towards searching ‘suspect’ incoming passengers. The discussions contained in all of these chapters are distinguished by a depth and richness of description and analysis. Hörnqvist's analyses of these different disciplinary, or governmental, scenes, are all based on a three-stage model in which the relevant organisation first ‘sets the target’ (whether that be the reintegration of the long-term unemployed or criminal offenders back into the wage labour market, or the identification of particular performance targets, or the isolation of certain problems to be managed), then ‘targets’ this problem through administrative techniques and interventions, and then finally attempts to ‘stay on target’ through calculated reflection on the success (or otherwise) of particular measures. This last element of the organisational procedure frequently imports a disciplining and control of the members of the organisation itself (as opposed to the target group of offenders or the long-term unemployed), and Hörnqvist's discussion of this stage is often very informative (see for example, on p. 91, his diagram of ‘Teacher surveillance in the classroom’ in which the video camera at the rear of the class is directed solely at the course instructor).
As I mentioned above, these different discussions of the way in which state organisations deploy power are rich and well-observed, sometimes confirming Foucault's insights (as with, above, the tendency of disciplinary apparatuses to work upon those who deploy them), sometimes complicating, extending and updating them. Often Hörnqvist identifies in these different theatres of state power a mixture of repressive and productive interventions on behalf of the state, which brings me to the question of Hörnqvist's conceptual premises. These premises structure his empirical observations in Chapters 1 to 4, and are set out explicitly in the Introduction. This introductory chapter is a dense analysis of power in Foucault which articulates a number of, for Hörnqvist, key distinctions crucial for understanding Foucault's achievement – power as a relation versus power as an activity, power studied historically versus power studied conceptually, power as repressive versus power as productive, and so forth.
I cannot in the space available here do justice to Hörnqvist's discussion in full, but I do want to disagree with several aspects of it. Hörnqvist writes that:
‘Foucault's primary contribution lies on the conceptual level, in the distinction between productive and repressive power. No doubt it was developed through genealogical studies, but once formulated it cuts across all transformations of government. The distinction … is not … subject to constant change … [and] should be defined in categorical rather than historical terms.’ (pp. 8–9)
This is quite an extrapolation from Foucault's method, which Hörnqvist admits and then downplays here (‘[n]o doubt it was developed from genealogical studies’). This is a heterodox reading of Foucault (as Hörnqvist writes, ‘this study represents a critique of the current Foucaultian mainstream’ (p. 153)) and, I think, more would be needed than is provided by way of assertion here to make Foucault out as some kind of categorical thinker who advanced conceptual distinctions in the study of power which were supposedly true for all historical ages (rather than one who remained resolutely historical, or, better, who problematised the very distinction between concept and history).
But it is not so much in the methodological reading of Foucault as a conceptual thinker but rather in the distinction between productive and repressive power itself that Hörnqvist's book fails to do justice to the possibilities of Foucault's thought. Briefly, again, Hörnqvist argues that Foucault establishes a clear-cut conceptual distinction between repressive power and productive power (and that this distinction is Foucault's most important intellectual contribution). There are, of course, moments, especially in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, where Foucault advances this distinction (and others) in categorical terms. But then the texture of his work itself undoes such an easy distinction. Discussing the supposed distinction between empowerment and subjection, Hörnqvist calls for a ‘more complex notion … which takes into account that … interventions rely on constraints to participate as well as the choice to do so … [and that t]he corresponding conceptualization must allow for a combination of contradictions’ (p. 155). But what if this combination of contradictions was extended to the distinction between repressive and productive power itself? What if instead of a more nuanced understanding of their interrelation we arrived at the idea that repressive power was itself always ‘already productive power, forming the very object that will be suitable for control and then, in an act that effectively disavows that production, claiming to discover that [object] outside of power’ (Butler, Reference Butler, Caputo and Yount1993, pp. 86–87; emphasis in original). What of the productivity of the repressive sanction in Foucault? What are the ways that law or sovereign power dissimulates this productivity, and what are the ways in which this productivity rebounds upon the law? These are some of the critical questions opened up by Judith Butler's reading (herself a heterodox ‘Foucaultian’) of philosophical figures such as Nietzsche and Freud, a reading which emphasises the productivity of the sanction and the way in which it cannot simply repress but must also at the same time produce (and, crucially, that it is not always in control of its productivity). This is not at all to argue that Hörnqvist's conclusions are invalidated here by flawed conceptual premises – on the contrary, Risk, Power and the State makes a significant contribution to the understanding of state power in a Foucaultian idiom – but rather to ask whether, after Foucault (in both senses), we might productively begin to question some of the distinctions taken to be cardinal to his thought and to see what levels of analysis such a questioning opens up.
