When and why did philosophical idealism come about? In an influential article addressing this question, Myles Burnyeat argues that there are no examples of idealism prior to Descartes.Footnote 1 According to Burnyeat, it is only after it became possible to ask the question “Does anything exist other than immaterial minds and their contents?” that Berkeleyan idealism could emerge as a reply.Footnote 2 Burnyeat’s argument is based on a careful analysis of why Berkeley was wrong in making a startling claim about the status of sensible objects in Plato and Aristotle.Footnote 3 Berkeley claimed that Plato and Aristotle never asserted the independent existence of sensible objects apart from their status as objects of perception. Burnyeat argues that Berkeley failed to see that the ancient Greek philosophical perspective was governed by the presumption of realism (of some sort) and that this presumption had survived into the modern period until Descartes’s egocentric re-orientation of epistemology.Footnote 4 As a result of this oversight, Berkeley perceived links between his own idealism and the thought of figures in the past when no such link was possible.Footnote 5
Berkeley’s assertion is odd not only because it flies in the face of much of what both Plato and Aristotle actually said about the status of material bodies, but also because Berkeley often displayed a thorough grasp of the history of ideas. Berkeley located what he believed to be evidence for his position in Plato’s Theaetetus, where Plato discusses a theory that equates knowledge with perception. The theory involves the relationship between the subject and the object of perception such that “it is impossible for a thing to be sweet but sweet to nobody”.Footnote 6 That is, things are such and such only in relation to a perceiver. Berkeley interpreted the theory as holding sensible objects to be dependent upon minds – which is precisely the way Berkeley’s own version of idealism described the relationship between mind and the objects of perception. Burnyeat argues that Berkeley misunderstood both the content and the status of the theory in Plato’s dialogue.Footnote 7 According to Burnyeat, the theory in question does not specify the composition of reality in a Berkeleyan manner. In order to exemplify Berkeleyan idealism, one would have to assent to the spare Berkeleyan ontology which holds that the only things that exist are immaterial minds and ideas. Furthermore, the theory is ultimately rejected by Plato as untenable. Apparently, Berkeley simply missed the fact that the dialogue subjected the theory to a lengthy reductio.Footnote 8 Berkeley also claimed Aristotle as a precursor.Footnote 9 Berkeley argued that Aristotle’s doctrine of potentiality entailed that sensible objects were merely potential entities until they were perceived. However, Burnyeat correctly points out that Aristotle held material entities to be extramental substances, not merely collections of sensible qualities or ideas in one’s mind.Footnote 10
Burnyeat argues that Berkeley’s interpretive errors expose an interesting fact: Berkeley was unaware that his own views were deeply opposed to an entrenched realism in ancient Greek philosophy.Footnote 11 According to Burnyeat, the ancient Greeks were certainly open to the possibility that reality is wildly different from how it appears. However, they were simply unaware of the modern philosophical problem of external world scepticism. That is, the Greeks never considered proving the existence of something other than one’s mind to be a philosophical problem. Why not? Ancient Greek scepticism was similar to Stoicism and Epicureanism in offering a strategy for happiness and well-being. Pyrrhonian sceptics sought serenity through suspension of belief. Since anxiety is caused by uncertainty, the elimination of uncertainty is the cure for anxiety and the prescription for a life of tranquility. The sceptic can achieve this state of mind if he suspends judgment about what is true and what is false about the world. But the scope of this form of scepticism was limited by the practical nature of the ancient sceptic’s enterprise. The question of how one ought to live is a “world-bound” question that is fundamentally distinct from the purely theoretical question of whether one can demonstrate the existence of an extramental world. Thus, if the sceptic’s interest is in how to live, it is not likely that he will push doubt to its theoretical limit. Burnyeat argues that Descartes generalized the arguments of the sceptics. It is Descartes’s thorough methodological scepticism that leads to the possibility of asking the question “Is there anything other than mind?”Footnote 12 This question was not asked by ancient sceptics because of the practical orientation of their scepticism. The ancient sceptics assumed the existence of an external world – although they doubted whether we could be certain about its nature. Descartes’s sceptical arguments were not harnessed to the project of crafting a formula for human flourishing. Thus, Descartes was able to explore radical possibilities which the ancient sceptics would not have imagined. Of central importance is the radical notion that one’s body is part of the external world. Burnyeat argues that at no point in the history of western philosophy had any thinker pushed scepticism to the point where one’s body was considered part of the external world.Footnote 13 If the existence of the extramental material world is in question (including one’s body), it is possible to hold the view that there is no extramental material world. As Burnyeat views the matter, this is the piece of philosophical history that Berkeley missed.Footnote 14 Descartes had introduced a conceptual distinction which was radically distinct from ancient forms of scepticism. From Berkeley’s vantage point, any right-thinking philosopher might come up with a doctrine similar to his own. But Berkeley failed to see the fundamental shift in perspective brought about by Descartes’s rigorous application of sceptical arguments to basic realist assumptions.
If Burnyeat’s analysis is correct, then the following two theses are true:
T1: There are no examples of idealism prior to Descartes.
T2: Idealism could not come about prior to Descartes.
If T1 is false, then T2 also is false. If there is an example of idealism prior to Descartes, then obviously idealism could come about prior to Descartes. However, if T1 is true, that does not entail that T2 also is true. That there are no examples of idealism prior to Descartes does not entail that idealism could not have come about during that time. If T2 is true, then T1 also is true. If idealism couldn’t be conceived prior to Descartes, then there couldn’t be any examples of idealism prior to Descartes. However, if T2 is false, that does not entail that T1 also is false. That idealism could have emerged prior to Descartes does not entail that it did. The truth values of T1 and T2 hinge on the meaning of “idealism.” Burnyeat employs the following four definitions of idealism:
D1: The doctrine that everything is in some substantial sense mental or spiritual.Footnote 15
D2: The doctrine that the world is essentially structured by the categories of our thought.Footnote 16
D3: The doctrine that esse est percipi.Footnote 17
D4: The doctrine that mind and the contents of mind are all that exist.Footnote 18
According to Burnyeat, T1 and T2 are true on any of these four meanings of “idealism.” Burnyeat’s position has been challenged on a number of fronts. Some scholars have argued that D2, D3, and D4 versions of idealism emerged prior to Descartes.Footnote 19D2 identifies the general form of idealism associated with Kant. D3 and D4 are signature theses of Berkeleyan idealism. Additionally, Gail Fine has argued that Burnyeat presents a mistaken view about the nature of subjectivity in ancient philosophy. According to Burnyeat, Descartes was the first philosopher to introduce the notion that one could have knowledge of one’s subjective mental states.Footnote 20 Fine claims that the Cyrenaics held a similar view of subjectivity such that beliefs about, and knowledge of, subjective states were possible.Footnote 21 My goal is not to address the question of the possibility of pre-Cartesian idealists of the Berkeleyan or Kantian variety nor whether knowledge of subjective states was possible in ancient authors. My aim is to determine the truth values of T1 and T2 given D1 as the definition of idealism. This amounts to an investigation into the nature of Neoplatonic metaphysical doctrines about the composition of material bodies which might qualify as versions of D1 idealism.
D1 is consistent with more than one account of the content of reality. The Berkeleyan reading of this thesis is rather straightforward: The only things that exist are immaterial minds and their contents. This interpretation of D1 amounts to a rendition of D4. However, there are alternative ways to parse D1 that are not equivalent to D4. D4 specifies a type of monism about the kinds of things that exist, but D1 states only that everything is substantially mental or spiritual. There is a considerable difference between these two doctrines. Consider the following versions of monism:
M1: Material entities are the only things that exist.
M2: Immaterial entities are the only things that exist.
Most metaphysical systems in the western tradition are not monisms of either the M1 or M2 sort. For example, a traditional theist may hold that M1 is true with the exception of God. An atheist may hold that M1 is true with the exception of numbers or some other type of entity existing in logical space. Furthermore, a Platonist may hold that the only real things are immaterial Ideas and also hold that material bodies “exist” in some sense. D4 idealists fit neatly into the M2 category. However, D1 idealism is not necessarily a form of M2 monism. Although Burnyeat argues that idealism is a type of monism,Footnote 22 it is not clear that D1 adequately captures the sort of monism that is required to preserve the truths of T1 and T2. Some versions of Neoplatonism may provide plausible candidates for D1 idealists who would reject M2. For example, Plotinus may reasonably be considered a D1 idealist who would reject M2.
Plotinus’s cosmology is structured around three fundamental principles: the One, Intellect, and Soul.Footnote 23 These three principles, or hypostases, are related in terms of ontological primacy or dependency. The One holds the position of first cause or the ontological foundation for each successive level of reality. The nature of the One is ineffable, since it lacks determinate qualities.Footnote 24 Intellect is second in the order and is the locus of the Ideas or Archetypes of all things. The Intellect thinks and the object of the Intellect’s thought is itself, which is the plurality of Ideas.Footnote 25 Soul, in turn, generates the spatio-temporal world which is the physical realization of the intelligible world of Ideas identified with the Intellect.Footnote 26 Matter represents the point at which being, originating from the One, peters out. According to Plotinus, matter is an indeterminate receptacle for the Forms. Matter in-itself lacks positive existence and is therefore the privation of form, intelligibility, and being.Footnote 27 Moreover, everything that comes after Intellect in the order of things is an ontological extension of its intelligible archetype in the intelligible realm. Thus, matter, which is the final stage of emanation from the One, also has an intelligible archetype and is in some way a projection of its intelligible Form.Footnote 28 Plotinian emanationism is not a description of numerically distinct realms that are somehow causally connected. Emanation in the sense described here is a type of monism, but it should not be understood as a temporal process leading to a multiplicity of independent, discrete beings. Plotinian metaphysics is not a simple form of monism like M1 or M2, but rather a complex system that attempts to explain the material realm as the sensible extension of intelligible entities. But in what sense is Plotinus a D1 idealist?
According to a plausible interpretation of Plotinus, the only substantial beings are the immaterial Ideas which constitute the self-reflective thoughts of Intelligence. If one were to analyze material bodies along these lines, the substance of matter is the Idea of matter in the Intellect. This would also be true of any qualities that make up a material body – the substance of each particular quality is an Idea in (or identical with) the Intellect. Although material entities are counted as part of the inventory of the universe, qua material they are not, strictly speaking, substantial beings.Footnote 29 Hence, if the Ideas are identified with the self-reflexive thoughts of Intellect, then the only substantial things are mental. If this interpretation is correct, Plotinus is not an M2 monist. An M2 monist would reject the existence of anything that is not immaterial. But Plotinus acknowledges the existence, if not the substantial reality, of material beings.
Burnyeat argues that Neoplatonism of the Plotinian sort is not a form of idealism. According to Burnyeat, the conception of matter in Plotinus is not ultimately spiritual, even if everything else that is real in the Plotinian universe is in some sense spiritual.Footnote 30 Plotinus, like his predecessors, adopted a basic metaphysical framework which analyzed the natural world as a combination of matter and form. Even if something spiritual is responsible for creating matter and imposing form upon it, it remains that matter is distinct in some sense from Intellect and Idea. Thus, Burnyeat appeals to the lack of a genuine spiritual/mental monism in Plotinus as proof that Plotinus was not an idealist. This amounts to the claim that Plotinus was not an M2 monist. I agree with Burnyeat that Plotinus’s system is most likely not an instance of M2 monism. However, the D1 definition of idealism allows too much latitude to preserve the parsimonious ontology of M2 monism. To assert that everything is substantially mental or spiritual does not entail that the only things that exist are immaterial entities. If this is true, then T1, and therefore T2, appear to be false given D1 as the definition of idealism.
An obvious objection to my analysis is that the One’s nature is indeterminate and therefore not substantially mental or spiritual. Hence, Plotinus is not an example of D1 idealism and T1, at least, successfully resists the Plotinian counter-example. There are three replies to this criticism. The first is that Plotinus may have attributed a mind-like quality to the One. J. M. Rist has argued that the Plotinian One possesses a type of self-knowledge.Footnote 31 The precise nature of this form of self-knowledge is obscure. Unfortunately, much of what Plotinus says on the topic is difficult to grasp in a way that would clarify the issue at hand.Footnote 32 Accordingly, the first reply may raise some doubt about whether T1 is true, but it doesn’t demonstrate that T1 is false. Burnyeat also rejects this reply. According to Burnyeat, even if the One possesses some form of self knowledge, this does not entail a monism of mind.Footnote 33
The second reply is that the objection may not be that important after all. Burnyeat argues that
the monism which comes most naturally to a Greek philosopher is materialism. … Whereas, I suggest, a monism leaning in the other direction, from reality to mind, would be repellent to Greek thought, for it would deprive mind of the objects it must necessarily have.Footnote 34
However, Plotinus does explain the physical, spatio-temporal world as a visible manifestation of an intelligible world of substantial Forms which are identified with the Intellect. Given this analysis, the mental is the substantial ground of the material. Even if we suppose that the One isn’t mind-like, but is something prior to thought and being, the highest level of reality that can be conceptually grasped is the Intellect which thinks itself. Although the reduction to mind may not be complete, the “lean” appears to be in that direction.
A third reply is that Neoplatonic metaphysics may have inspired others besides Plotinus to reach more definitive conclusions about the primacy of mind. Richard Sorabji has argued that Christianized versions of Neoplatonism are more explicit about the role of mental activity in the first principle.Footnote 35 According to Sorabji, St. Gregory of Nyssa maintained that material bodies are created by an immaterial God out of thoughts or concepts.Footnote 36 Gregory’s doctrine was developed in response to the problem of explaining how material bodies can be caused by something immaterial. That is, in order for two entities to be causally related, they must share some properties in common to accommodate the transaction. Since God created material bodies, there must be some property shared by creator and creation. Gregory’s solution was to eliminate the radical difference between the two by equating the qualities that comprise bodies with thoughts or concepts. According to Gregory, material bodies are created by an immaterial God by bringing together immaterial qualities that are in themselves intelligible concepts. Since there is nothing more to material bodies than the qualities that comprise them, the material world is nothing more than a collection of concepts. Gregory’s explanation of this theory is as follows:
You can hear people saying things like this: if God is matterless, where does matter come from? How can quantity come from non-quantity, the visible from the invisible, something with limited bulk and size from what lacks magnitude and limits? And so also for the other characteristics seen in matter: how or whence were they produced by one who had nothing of the kind in his own nature? … By his wise and powerful will, being capable of everything, he established for the creation of things all things through which matter is constituted: light, heavy, dense, rare, soft, resistant, fluid, dry, cold, hot, color, shape, outline, extension. All of these are in themselves thoughts and bare concepts; none is matter on its own. But when they combine, they turn into matter.Footnote 37
But we can say this much on the subject: none of the things we connect with body is on its own a body – not shape, not color, not weight, not extension, not size, nor any other of the things classed with qualities. Each of these is an idea, but their combination and union with each other turns into a body. So, since the qualities which fill out the body are grasped by the mind and not by sense perception, and the divine is intelligent, what trouble is it for the intelligible being to create the concepts whose combination with each other produces corporeal nature for us?Footnote 38
For a thing is not a body if it lacks color, shape, resistance, extension, weight and the other properties, and each of these properties is not body, but is found to be something else when taken separately. Conversely, then, when these properties combine they produce material reality. Now if the conception of these properties is intelligible, and the divine is intelligible in its nature, it is not strange that these intellectual origins for the creation of bodies should arise from an incorporeal nature, with the intelligible nature establishing the intelligible properties, whose combination brings material nature to birth.Footnote 39
Sorabji argues that Gregory’s theory is similar to Berkeleyan immaterialism.Footnote 40 Whether or not Sorabji is correct about that comparison, it is plausible to count Gregory’s doctrine as a specimen of D1 idealism. D1 idealists claim that everything is in some sense mental or spiritual. Gregory appears to endorse such a view in the quotes above. Gregory does not deny the existence of corporeal objects, but he does argue that corporeal bodies are derived from incorporeal elements which are intelligible ideas or concepts. Matter is therefore a product of the commingling of immaterial entities. What accounts for the commingling? Gregory claims that material bodies are brought into existence by an act of divine creation. It is important to note that the intelligible concepts constitute corporeal bodies rather than simply cause them to exist. Gregory was not the only ancient philosopher to produce an immaterialist account of the composition of material bodies. A similar doctrine was also considered by Plotinus (as presented by an imaginary interlocutor) and rejected.Footnote 41 According to the proposed theory, matter is a useless concept since material bodies can be adequately explained as collections of Forms. Once each quality of a material body is abstracted from the object, nothing is left over. Plotinus argued that a substratum, even if purely negative in determination, must be posited to provide a receptacle for the Forms. Plotinus, unlike Gregory, does not describe the coming together of Ideas to form material bodies as a creative act in the mind of a divine agent. However, this example shows that D1 idealism was conceivable, even if it is unclear whether such a view was ever defended.
If Gregory’s theory is an example of D1 idealism, then both T1 and T2 are false on the D1 reading of idealism. If we suppose that Gregory’s theory is not what we have taken it to be, T1 may be rescued, but not T2. Although Plotinus rejects the possibility that material bodies are nothing but collections of Ideas, that he conceived of such a position shows that it was on the menu of conceptual possibilities. However, this assumes that T2 is understood as a strong claim about conceivability. T2 may be understood as a weaker claim about philosophical motivations. The weak and strong senses of T2 are as follows:
Weak T2: Although it was possible to conceive of D1 idealism prior to Descartes, there was no philosophical motivation to adopt such a position.
Strong T2: It was not possible to conceive of D1 idealism prior to Descartes.
Burnyeat argues for the strong version of T2.Footnote 42 The defence of the strong version is what makes Burnyeat’s argument significant for our understanding of the history of philosophy and the thesis is interesting in its own right. It entails that there are radically distinct possibilities for generating world views given the deep differences between modern and pre-modern metaphysical concepts. The impetus for Burnyeat’s analysis of the origins of idealism was to flesh out the following observation by Bernard Williams:Footnote 43
… [P]hilosophy since the Renaissance has also found room for another kind of monism, idealism, the monism of mind, which holds that nothing ultimately exists except minds and their experiences. It is this kind of view, with its numerous variations, descendants, and modifications, which we do not find in the ancient world.Footnote 44
Burnyeat’s achievement was to lay bare the preconditions for Berkeleyan idealism that emerged in Descartes. However, the variation of idealist thought which is exemplified in Berkeley requires adherence to very specific ontological theses. The central features of Berkeleyan idealism are as follows:
(1) To exist is to be perceivedFootnote 45 or to be a thing which thinks, wills, and perceives.Footnote 46
(2) Immaterial ideas are the only objects of perception.Footnote 47
(3) Immaterial spirits are the only things that perceive.Footnote 48
What distinguishes Berkeleyan idealism from the vague claim that “everything is in some sense mental or spiritual” is Berkeley’s empiricist account of material bodies. That is, Berkeley eliminates material substances via an empiricist account of the phenomenal content of experience. Material bodies are collections of qualities, qualities are ideas, ideas are immaterial, and ideas exist in minds only. Versions of idealism that were inspired by Neoplatonism provide what may be called an intellectualist account of material bodies. That is, material bodies are collections of qualities that are in themselves concepts and concepts are accessed by the intellect rather than by the senses. Thus, the components of material bodies are immaterial. This view is shared by both Berkeleyan and Neoplatonic idealists. However, the latter view can accommodate the existence of extramental material bodies (although they are not genuinely substances), whereas Berkeley rejects the existence of extramental material bodies outright. Thus, the debate is about more than the proper definition of idealism; it is also about the possibility of converging metaphysical theses originating from radically distinct concerns.
I have argued that the D1 version of idealism does not require a connection to sceptical worries about demonstrating the existence of an external world, subjectivist accounts of knowledge, or an endorsement of M2 monism. A purely metaphysical analysis of material bodies led some philosophers to reject the substantial reality of matter. That it was possible for the Greeks to conceive of reality as composed entirely of Forms (if only to reject that view) implies that both T1 and T2 are false on the D1 definition of idealism. Burnyeat is correct when he argues that Berkeleyan idealism is the eventual product of distinctively innovative doctrines in Descartes, but D1 does not restrict the ontological inventory of reality in the frugal manner of Berkeleyan idealism. On a more general level, the analysis above suggests that there is no single motive for the development of idealism in the western philosophical tradition — at least if one’s definition of idealism has the latitude required to capture the diversity of the idealist tradition.
