When it comes to politics, those who have modern thoughts, and are uncorrupt and deal in facts, have come into this war without trauma, and developed their political strength. But those who in normal times have corrupt bureaucratic minds, who specialise in entertaining and socialising, and who carry out their tasks perfunctorily, have already become agitated and panicked, and are at their wits' end. . .But why must we despair? Why must we be pessimistic?. . .The Republic of China will inevitably have her great bright future, but we must go through a very painful course, and must work hard to overcome this pain.Footnote 1
Du Zhongyuan, 1937In Chongqing, there is male/female mixed bathing. In the tearoom of the bathhouse, you can bring in a woman to clean your back. . . Chongqing's bathhouses are very dirty. There's a stench of urine.Footnote 2
Xu Wancheng, 1946On 7 July 1937, a military incident broke out at the village of Wanping near Beijing when soldiers of the Japanese north China garrison clashed with local Chinese troops. The incident ended quickly, but the Japanese nonetheless demanded major concessions from the Chinese authorities, which would have allowed the Imperial Army even greater influence in north China, building on Tokyo's expansion into the region since 1931. However, the Chinese reaction was unexpected. Up to that point, the leader of the ruling Nationalist (Kuomintang or Guomindang) party, Chiang Kaishek, had generally not resisted incursions in north China, knowing that the Chinese army was not yet sufficiently well trained to cope with the technologically superior Japanese armed forces. However, by early 1937, Chiang was more confident of the Chinese army's capabilities, and public opinion was no longer favourable to conciliation of the Japanese.Footnote 3 This time, Chiang refused the demands and escalated the conflict. Within weeks, he had opened up two fronts, one in the north of China near Beijing, and one in central China around Shanghai. The Sino-Japanese War had begun. Before it ended, some 15 million Chinese (a low estimate) would be killed, some 80 million would become refugees and a significant proportion of the country's hard-won modern infrastructure would be destroyed. In the words of Lloyd Eastman, the war was ‘the most momentous event in the history of the Republican era in China’.Footnote 4
In many countries, the events of the Second World War became central to the shaping of the post-1945 social fabric and cultural life, whether it was Britain's attempts to cope with a post-imperial role, the American rise to superpower status or Japan's and Germany's desire to reshape their roles as peaceful post-war democracies. However, in China, there was relatively little such opportunity to reflect on wartime experience and absorb it into nation-building myths. Political imperatives imposed by the Cold War meant that in Mao's China, very few aspects of the wartime experience could be discussed, and that the history of the war became important primarily as a means of explaining the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) rise to power. Only in the past decade or two has it been feasible to explore aspects of China's wider wartime experience, and, in doing so, understand much more fully the significance of that experience in shaping China's path for the six decades and more that have followed the war itself.
This paper takes advantage of the new arena for the discussion of wartime in China to argue for a reinterpretation of that experience as a struggle for a new narrative of Chinese modernity and identity. Using the autobiographical writings of two figures who reflected on the experience of war, I suggest that there was a conscious attempt from the very earliest days of the war to create a positive narrative of progress from the war's events, and to portray it as a force for the renewal of a recently formed but already deeply flawed Chinese modernity. However, that narrative became subverted from within by an increasing realisation that the modernising narrative itself had failed. In particular, it did not capture the non-teleological absurdity of the wartime experience as well as a widespread, almost postmodern, anti-narrative perception of what had happened in wartime China.
The story of the Second World War in China has always been a battle between narratives, and it remains one today. At one level, this is an obvious statement; but it is worth noting that until very recent years, the understandings that we have of the events and significance of wartime in China have been the products of very specific narrative strategies, and ones that have become so ingrained in historical consciousness that historians have tended to frame their debates within their parameters, consciously or otherwise. The following few lines give a thumbnail sketch of a common understanding both in the west and the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Taiwan has its own rather different historiographical trajectory with regard to the war against Japan): that during the Sino-Japanese War, a Nationalist government under Chiang Kaishek failed to offer much resistance to the invasion of China, instead retreating to the interior, and that in contrast the Communists carried the greatest burden of the fighting in resistance to Japan. Each of these understandings is now subject to significant revision by specialists in the field, and was in fact disputed by many knowledgeable figures at the time. However, during the Cold War, the Sino-Japanese War was interpreted in the west and in China itself primarily as a staging-post in a teleological narrative of Communist victory. Immediately after the war ended in 1945, political considerations in the west also reinforced an existing preconception that the China Theatre had been of secondary value in the overall war effort; that it had been under the control of an incompetent and now irrelevant figure (Chiang Kaishek); and that study of its complexities, already difficult because of the closing of China to the west, was not worth a great deal of effort. The restrictions of the Cold War also meant that the PRC was unwilling to open up discussion of a conflict in which the Nationalists had played their part in opposing Japan, and the west was equally unwilling to give much thought to the wartime efforts and suffering of a country which had moved from the allied to the enemy camp after the Communist victory in 1949.Footnote 5
This began to change in the 1980s, as the War of Resistance to Japan (as the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45 is still known in China itself) has begun to emerge in the historiography of modern China as a traumatic event to rival the other, more prominent, catastrophes in recent history: the Civil War of 1946–9, the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward. The reexamination of the narratives that underpinned wartime China depended on a variety of historiographical changes that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. The most important overall change in focus is the move away from concentration on the role of the CCP. From the 1960s to the 1980s, much of the scholarship in the west and the vast majority of scholarship within the People's Republic of China concentrated on the problematique of war as a catalyst to peasant revolution under the CCP.Footnote 6 Yet most of China in 1937–45 was under the control of either the Nationalist government (‘Free China’) or else collaborationist governments dealing with the Japanese. This has led to a more complex historiography which takes account of the differing nature of experience and ideology during the war years across all of China.Footnote 7 For instance, much Cold War historiography was underpinned by an interpretation of the decline of the Nationalists and rise of the Communists that owed something to melodrama: a need for heroes and villains. Examination of archival evidence has suggested that the wartime Nationalist record, while marked by corruption, inefficiency and human rights abuses, needs to be understood in the context of the massive social crisis that was engendered by the arrival of some millions of refugees in the woefully under-equipped region of Sichuan where the government in exile retreated.Footnote 8 These interpretations are not intended to rehabilitate the Nationalists or denigrate the Communists, in a rerun of Cold War-era arguments about ‘who lost China’: rather, they subject China's wartime experience to the same powerful mixture of social and political analysis that has long been standard for societies such as Britain, the USA and even the USSR.Footnote 9 The Nationalists have been partially rehabilitated as sincere, if often ineffective and corrupt, patriots whose contribution was an important part of the wider struggle against Japan.
Yet in some respects, the nature of the discourse within China has not altered greatly. Previously, the War of Resistance made up part of a narrative of heroic struggle against Japanese imperialism, led by the CCP. Since the 1980s, it has instead been the story of Chinese nationalism, with CCP and Nationalists both in prominent roles, in opposition to Japan as part of a world anti-fascist war. However, the war remains trapped in a different sort of teleological narrative in which the end-point, now located in the victory over Japan in 1945 rather than the CCP's victory in 1949, leads to an ultimately beneficial result, the establishment of an independent China (the unfortunate fratricide of the Civil War is now swiftly passed over in this account). However, this new teleology fails to capture the way in which, for many Chinese, the War of Resistance was not experienced at the time as part of a series of linear developments within the trajectory of Chinese nationalism, but rather was responsible for a culture of disorientation shaped by fear of the unknown. The most characteristic events of everyday experience for Chinese all across the country were bombings and refugee flight: in other words, events that shattered the stability of everyday life, and particularly of the sense of place which underpinned Chinese society. It was a very non-teleological event. The fact that at the time, and for the generations that followed, it has been possible to trace the changing but clear narratives that have defined the war's meaning in China is a tribute to the resilience of the narrative strategies that quickly arose to underpin the wartime experience.
War in the first person
In 2000, the collector Fan Jianchuan published his book One Person's War of Resistance (Yi ge ren de kangzhan). Despite the title, it is not a memoir but rather an intriguing set of reflections by a collector of memorabilia from the wartime years, who discusses his understanding of contemporary Chinese identity in the context of rediscovering wartime history.Footnote 10 The interpretation of first-person accounts of wartime in China is still at an early stage, and the field has not yet thoroughly developed the type of complex reading of traumatic experience that marks the interpretation of western warfare, and in particular, the Holocaust.Footnote 11 Arguments have begun to circulate about the Chinese twentieth-century experience as shaped by ‘survivor guilt’, but this interpretation is still in a preliminary phase, and much of this discussion is primarily concerned with the Cultural Revolution or Great Leap Forward, and is often the province of anthropologists and literary critics rather than historians.Footnote 12 Of course, it is important to stress that the War of Resistance is not equivalent to the Holocaust: most of the arguments that are made about the comparability of one set of atrocities to another are emotional and political, not historical, in their concerns.Footnote 13 However, Andrea Reiter has usefully reflected on the variety of interpretative techniques that have been used in analysing the Holocaust, particularly creative use of autobiography:
Which linguistic devices, which genres, do the survivors rely upon to communicate their experiences? How does literature in the broadest sense, and language and genre more narrowly, become a means of coming to terms with life?. . .From its mystical antecedents onwards, the autobiographical genre has changed time and time again to take account of the most recent experience of life.Footnote 14
Autobiography is particularly valuable in that it allows analysis of self-presentation and subjectivity, and in twentieth-century China, allows us to assess the ways in which modernity, and its sudden disruption by war, was experienced and expressed. There is a lively debate about the point of origin of the modern self in China. Nonetheless, the impact of a western-derived, imperialist modernity in China from the late nineteenth century onward demanded a profound rethinking of how the individual should be defined in relation to the wider society.Footnote 15
Du and Xu were both clearly shaped by that modernity and the way in which it forced a new assessment of the role of the individual in society. However, each of them expressed that reshaping in a very distinct sort of autobiographical writing. Du Zhongyuan (1895–1944) wrote reportage from the battle front and from cities that were major targets for the Japanese in 1937–8. Xu Wancheng (1905– ?) wrote an account of Chongqing's wartime experience in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender in 1945; yet he himself had not been in Chongqing, but in occupied Shanghai, during the war. Who were these two writers, and what makes their writing relevant for a wider understanding of the times they lived through?
Du Zhongyuan was born in the Chinese north-east (then widely known as Manchuria). He studied in Japan, and in the 1920s, became a prominent entrepreneur in Shenyang (Mukden), first running a brick factory, then moving on to his real love, the manufacture of porcelain. He also became an adviser to Zhang Xueliang (‘The Young Marshal’) (1901–2001), the militarist ruler of the region from 1928 to 1931. Zhang was the son of a classic warlord, the regional ruler Zhang Zuolin, who was primarily concerned with conquest, and was eventually assassinated by the Japanese in 1928. His son was no less interested in power, but, unlike his father, was convinced that nationalism was the best ideological solution for China, and allied Manchuria with Chiang's Nationalist government in 1928 on the understanding that Chiang would have little practical influence within the north-east. Zhang also sponsored spending on education and infrastructure in the region, earning a reputation as one of the more progressive militarist leaders within the precarious Chinese republican structure. As a prominent local business leader, Du became close to Zhang because the latter was interested in commercial development as a means of strengthening the region against foreign influence, particularly Japanese and Soviet. At the same time, Du also became friendly with Zou Taofen, the editor of Life (Shenghuo), the single most successful weekly publication in Republican China, which may have had up to 2 million readers at its peak. The sudden invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese on 18 September 1931 saw prominent political figures including Du Zhongyuan forced to flee the region. Over the next few years, a substantial Manchurian Chinese exile community kept up pressure on Chiang Kaishek, trying to persuade him to recapture Manchuria. Chiang did not fall in with their wishes; he felt, with some justification, that China's forces were simply too weak and until 1937, opted instead for a policy of diplomatic protest rather than military resistance to Japan, while at the same time using a German adviser to revitalise the Chinese army and also encouraging secret economic planning for a war against Japan via the government's National Resources Commission.Footnote 16
Du wrote regular columns in Life supporting the recapture of Manchuria, and when Zou Taofen was forced to leave the country in 1933, under Nationalist government pressure, Du took over and wrote weekly columns in a successor journal, New Life (Xinsheng). Eventually, the Japanese threatened to create a diplomatic incident because of a column in Du's journal that insulted the emperor of Japan, and Du was imprisoned for fourteen months in 1935–6. During the 1930s, his frustration with Chiang's policies meant that he began to sympathise with the CCP, although he never joined the party. The outbreak of war with Japan meant that his anti-Japanese sentiments were no longer politically problematic, and he became a frontline reporter for the journal Resistance (Dikang) in 1937–8, from which many of the writings considered here are taken. Shortly afterward, he accepted a position as head of the Xinjiang Academy, the major higher education institute in China's most westerly province, but in 1941, the local militarist ruler, Sheng Shicai, turned against Du and other CCP fellow-travellers, and he was arrested and imprisoned. He died in still-mysterious circumstances in prison in Urumqi in 1944.Footnote 17
Xu Wancheng followed a profession which owed something to the old Confucian tradition of ‘rectification of names’ (zhengming) and a great deal to the emergence of social sciences in China. He was a ‘social investigator’, a compiler of information which he then published and sold on a commercial basis. His major work in this area was a listing of Shanghai's major schools, which he divided up into 38 colleges, 199 middle schools and 1,275 primary schools. The success of this work enabled him to give up his own job as a teacher and set up his own bookshop and publishing enterprise. In 1935, he and a team of colleagues produced a guide to libraries throughout China, with detailed information about their classification systems and visitor numbers. However, his interests were not just quantitative. He also investigated social change by sponsoring questionnaires that asked newspaper readers about a variety of social issues including marriage, education, employment and love. His motivation was shaped by an assumption that individual problems (‘atoms’, in the social scientific phrasing of the time) were reflected in wider crises within society.Footnote 18
The politics of style
In some respects, Du Zhongyuan and Xu Wancheng would appear to be similar in their political positions. Both were Chinese patriots opposed to the Japanese invasion, and both condemned collaboration with the enemy, even though they expressed nuanced views on this question, understanding if not excusing acts of collaboration under desperate circumstances. They were also both products of the May Fourth era, the period of relative freethinking in the 1910s and 1920s, when the idea of ‘science and democracy’ as the recipe for ‘saving China’ had great currency: ‘science’, with the wider implication of empirical rationality or Wissenschaft, and ‘democracy’ suggesting popular participation rather than specifically the mechanics of elections. Xu's interests in social scientific method and Du's in widening political participation clearly speak to both sets of concerns and mark them out as exponents of a modernity that defined itself in terms of a rational, dynamic forward progression for both the individual and society. Crucially, both were also public figures who had commercial success. Du was a ‘brand-name’ weekly columnist who was read by hundreds of thousands (perhaps more), and Xu had also been successful enough to live off his publications. The two of them, therefore, were not simply writing for themselves, but had a recognisable public: for that reason, their attitudes toward the war are significant in that they relate to self-presentation to an identifiable readership, primarily the emergent urban lower middle class (xiao shimin) that had been torn apart by the impact of war in 1937.Footnote 19 Despite these similarities, however, the contrasts between the two were greater.
Both Du and Xu write about wartime experience in the first person and use the baihua (‘plain language’) vernacular style to do so. However, the contrast in the style in which they write, and the genre within which they express themselves, not only shows the different possibilities that existed as part of the first-person narrative, but also the way in which the choice of style and genre could in themselves express attitudes toward the war. Reiter addresses the question of how choice of genre was used by Holocaust survivors to tell their stories: the contrasting genres of the Hasidic folktale and the travel report were adapted as frameworks to narrate events which corresponded to nothing in the experience or collective memory of those who lived through them.Footnote 20
Stylistically, Du revealed himself as influenced by the new, reportage style of journalism that had emerged in the 1920s. This type of writing reflected an American-influenced interest in objectivity and clear reporting, with events set down in a modern, unadorned style.Footnote 21 Du was a friend of Fan Changjiang, one of the most prominent members of the New Journalism school, although by the late 1930s, Du had his own, very distinct, journalistic reputation. His war reportage was written in plain, colloquial language, with numerous conversations set on the page as if taken down in the heat of the moment, and plenty of reflection on events with the reader as confidant. Conversational asides within the reports such as ‘We were meant to set off from Shanghai at 6 p.m., but we Chinese don't stick to agreed times, so when we set off it was already getting toward 7 p.m.’ are common and reflect the intimacy created with the reader (who as a regular magazine purchaser was likely to have known of Du's writings for some seven years or so).Footnote 22 To western readers, Du's style reads very naturally, but the very fact of this seeming naturalism shows how skilful the construct was, since the use of the vernacular in an explicitly first-person pronoun (wo) was a relatively new literary device, a product of the baihua movement that sought to make written Chinese more similar to the language as it was spoken, superseding the classical forms that still dominated ‘respectable’ writings such as newspapers or textbooks.Footnote 23 Du's seeming spontaneity was the product of very careful construction. He wrote in a first person that stressed the individuated self and its activities, and embraced a narrative of the war as a positive, modern force that had the potential to change China for good into a country that was centralised, industrialised and technologically empowered. Between his asides and homely anecdotes, he promoted a political agenda that was quite clear, encouraging the incorporation of north-west China (Xinjiang province) within a much stronger centralised economic and political framework, and setting up agencies to make it easier to transmit news around the country; in other words, the sinews of the Andersonian ‘imagined community’ of the nation, a political formation that was still highly contested in the China of the 1930s.Footnote 24
Xu Wancheng's self-presentation was significantly different from Du's. His 1946 work Chongqing huaxu (‘Chongqing gossip’) was in stark contrast to Du's war reportage, both in his self-portrayal and his depiction of the war. This is not just a matter of chronology, although Xu was of course able to see the troubled aftermath of the war in a way that Du was not; nonetheless, even though by 1946 Xu could see the destruction that the war had wrought on the Nationalist state, the reality that surrounded Du in 1937 was highly destructive and chaotic. Rather, the genre in which Xu presents his thoughts on the war is in itself important in understanding his attitude toward it. Instead of the modern reportage style which Du favoured, Xu consciously styled his work as a biji. The term was used in the late imperial era to refer to the private writings of literati, often in a scholarly jotter or notebook in which short comments would follow on one from another, often in seemingly random order. The biji was not one of the canonical forms in traditional Chinese literature, but it was a recognised form, and in its heyday, used for a variety of strategies: it could be an exploration into the Confucian self, it could be a means of showing the cultural level or power of the writer and it could be used to record the pleasures of everyday random living. Yet while the use of the genre was not unknown in the twentieth century, to adopt it in 1946 suggests a rather conscious archaism and a desire to contrast oneself from the now-common modernity of linear narrative.Footnote 25
Xu's use of the biji form suggests his own ambiguity about China's wartime experience. Crucially, Xu chose not to write about his own wartime experience, but instead to reconstruct the experience of a part of China where he had not been during the war. During the war, Xu had lived in Shanghai under Japanese occupation. His trip to Sichuan to visit the wartime capital took place over several months from December 1945 to September 1946, and his impressions and anecdotes were gathered during that time. While Du wrote in a continuous first-person narrative, a story developing in real time, Xu, as in the traditional biji, moves from topic to topic without any necessary link.
The impression given is of a disjointed narrative without a clear teleology. Yet this impression has its own significance, since it becomes increasingly clear that Xu sees the post-war settlement as suffering from the same problem of how the state that had won the war could now progress politically. Du Zhongyuan's genre is teleological and narrative. Xu Wancheng's is non-linear and non-teleological; Du invites metanarrative, Xu defies it.
Xu engages directly with the legendary status of Chongqing as a key site of resistance during the war, noting that
Chongqing was China's heart during wartime, the base area that led the whole country in the war of resistance, the place where the government and leadership were. Military, political, and legal edicts came from there, and it was the political centre. This was the base for economic construction in the Interior (da houfang).Footnote 26
This narrative of Chongqing as ‘China's heart’ was not a purely Chinese construction: the journalist Theodore White, sent by Time-Life Publications to wartime Chongqing, described the defence of the city in Thunder out of China as ‘an episode shared by hundreds of thousands of people who had gathered in the shadow of its walls out of a faith in China's greatness and an overwhelming passion to hold the land against the Japanese’.Footnote 27 Du Zhongyuan visited the city in his role as a director of the Sichuan Minsheng company shortly after it had taken up its role as wartime capital, in April 1938, and reflected on how it had changed since even the early 1930s:
I had been to Chongqing seven years before. It was an utterly feudal place full of opium and gambling. This time, it was not the same as before. The roads had been newly repaired, the face of the city had changed, and government agencies filled up the whole city. There were lots of new advances on the cultural and industrial fronts. . .These new features made me harbour limitless hope about the future of the resistance war.Footnote 28
Xu acknowledges the legend of Chongqing but also undermines it swiftly. Shanghai, where he himself spent the war, offered few legends, either heroic or horrific. After the initial, brutal bombings of the city in 1937–8, life became calm if hardly normal until the war ended.Footnote 29 Nor was Shanghai subjected to mass killings like those in Nanjing in 1937–8 (the notorious ‘Rape of Nanking’). In contrast, Chongqing had been one of the most heavily bombed cities on earth from 1938 to 1943. Chongqing's suffering became part of a new, immediately post-war metanarrative. One example of this is a pictorial history of the war produced in Shanghai in 1947, which portrays the great raids on Chongqing of 3–4 May 1939 as a crucial event: yet this new reading of the war's meaning was to be superseded within a few years with Mao's victory in 1949.Footnote 30 And even during the period 1945–9 itself, an alternative to the grand narrative would emerge which portrayed wartime life as lived in the interstices rather than the grand sweep of history. Paul Pickowicz has skilfully analysed the disillusionment that characterised the immediate post-war period by examining the highly ambiguous films about the wartime experience that were produced and attracted large audiences in China in the years 1945–9. He cites the director Shi Dongtian, who in 1946 declared that for him, the task of filmmaking was to help himself and his friends ‘understand why, in the months after victory, we felt defeated’.Footnote 31
Xu's Chongqing biji is both premodern and postmodern in its form: a succession of matters great and small with little discrimination between them, and little desire to draw a larger lesson or framework in the way that had underpinned Du's seeming naturalism and conversational tone. Xu had, of course, had a role as an important and commercially successful compiler of social information in the years before 1937; this makes his abandonment of taxonomy and social scientific method in his biji particularly poignant, suggesting that the experience of war had disillusioned him with the promise of modernity to build a rational and ordered society.
The modern and the Confucian self
Both Du and Xu employed a self-presentation that combined elements of the premodern Confucian public persona with a very modern subjectivity. One sign of this is the apologia that both authors make for their intrusion in the public world of letters, the implication being that a truly public-minded figure keeps himself discreetly at a distance from any form of self-publicity. Du Zhongyuan did not make such an apologia in his war reporting. But he had had the opportunity to do so some three years earlier, at the start of one of the many troublemaking episodes in his life. In 1934, his journalistic colleague and mentor, Zou Taofen, had hastily left China after the Nationalist government had shut down his bestselling Life weekly magazine because of its strong pro-resistance line on the Japanese occupation of the north-east. Du took up the baton, launching a successor title waggishly named New Life (Xinsheng), subtitled on the masthead in English as ‘The Renaissance Weekly’. He published a long opening letter in its first issue, showing both premodern and modern conventions of self-presentation:
I am not a cultured man (wenxuejia), and I am not a news reporter, nor am I a famous or great character. Formerly, I was an entrepreneur in Shenyang. I set up a ceramics works with over 1,000 workers. Although the factory is still running, because I was not willing to fall in with Japanese imperialism, I became what I am now, a man with no home to return to, and with no trade to turn to.
I don't know what country I am from. Can I say I am Chinese? My home village clearly is no longer part of China's territory. Can I say I'm not Chinese? But I was nurtured and raised in the same environment with 450 million compatriots; only because it is the cause of the Chinese people do I feel the pain and shame. . .There are people who are stray curs, like the slaves of a lost country, and now I have become a stray cur.
. . .But as I have experienced the pain of a lost country (wangguo), I therefore have the authority and the necessity to call out a war-cry to the masses of the whole country.Footnote 32
While much of Du's language and political analysis is modern in origin, informed in particular by nationalism and Marxism, it is also implicitly, and on occasion, explicitly informed by a desire to adapt Confucian norms within a modern context. Du's self-declared modesty was part of that strategy. ‘I am not a cultured man [or] a news reporter’, Du had started by declaring, and a little further in the initial issue, another contributor started his open letter by declaring: ‘Why don't I write essays [i.e. more formal literary prose] but instead write “letters”?. . .I could never write essays. Even when I was little and at school, I couldn't write essays well.’Footnote 33
The moral imperatives of national salvation are also embedded everywhere in Du's writings, along with his exhortations to his readership to turn away from their own apathy and resist Japan. Yet the ‘new’ modern self is clearly visible in Du and his associates' self-presentation as well. The conventions of premodern autobiography mean that
the disinclination to use the first person, perhaps a virtue in a historian, has rendered many an autobiography indistinguishable from biography; they share the same impersonality of tone, the same suppression of an individual voice with its own whims and quirks, the same opacity as to the yearnings of a heart or the inward workings of a mind.Footnote 34
This is not true of Du Zhongyuan. For the traditional autobiographer, credibility rested on distance from subjectivity: for Du's purposes, credibility rested rather in exactly that subjectivity and a very strong personal voice.
Xu Wancheng starts Chongqing huaxu by noting:
This book reports the secret story of the political stage of Chongqing. . .so that even people who had not fled to the Interior also should know the things that happened in the Interior during the War. I will only record facts, and will not add empty talk (relating the facts is the basis of human happiness).Footnote 35
He elaborated:
(1) I won't record anything that is not factual or is not pretty close to being factual. . .
(2) Reading this book is like eating [snacks] – the flavours are not all the same! They are all varied.
(3) . . . I have no party, and no prejudice. . .just recording the facts.Footnote 36
Much of Xu's self-presentation is Confucian in tone: it is self-deprecating and sceptical of much of the nature of modern politics. A true Confucian gentleman would be reluctant to join a party or a faction, and Xu's book ends with a round condemnation of all of China's major political parties as corrupt, brutal or irrelevant. Neither Du nor Xu were crude enough writers to demand that readers made a specific inference from their writings. Yet it is clear that there is a clear divide, in that Du's narrative strategy is one of creating a linear, teleological ‘meaning’ to the war, and Xu's is, if not hostile to meaning, at least indifferent toward it, or, at least, toward imposing a linear narrative on the recently concluded war. Reiter analyses this tension in the context of the Holocaust, in which experience that is beyond words in its destructiveness has to be placed somehow within the context of language and narrative.Footnote 37 At a time of clashing grand narratives (the Civil War breaking out around Xu as he wrote was such a narrative no less than the War of Resistance), he chose a consciously non-modern and diffuse genre in which to record the meaning of the war. Xu's take on the war is dry and unexplicit. He records Chiang Kaishek's defiant statements of resistance against the Japanese, but also discusses the corruption which marked the wartime capital. In doing so, he casts doubt on Du's ‘limitless hope about the future of the resistance war’ and suggests that it has been dissipated.
The war writings of Du Zhongyuan: modernity from chaos
It is not that Du was naïve and Xu was worldly-wise or cynical. Instead, they both used the experience of war to interrogate a newly formed and highly protean grand narrative: modernity and its Chinese inflection. Du's vision, perhaps precisely because of the desperation of his country's position at the time he was writing, was a very positive one about the potential for China to use the war as a vehicle for modernity. Xu's more elliptical observations suggest a more cautious view of the war's effects. Take, for instance, an observation from the streets of the capital just after the war's end:
At the headquarters of the Dazhong steamer company in Baixiang street in Chongqing, there are two advertisements. One says: This company's boat XX [sic – this indicates a generic name] is safe and swift from Nanjing to Shanghai. The second says: Travelling by boat is pretty dangerous, be quick to get insurance from this company.Footnote 38
In this short anecdote, Xu shows the disruption of an only recently created modernity, with its fragility and contradictions. The juxtaposed pair of posters that Xu noted indicated the absurdity that could arise from the contradictory messages of two modern phenomena: one, the arrival of high-technology transport, and the other, an abandonment of Confucian ideas of ‘fate’ for the security of life insurance.
Much recent writing on Chinese modernity has concentrated on the performative aspects of a model that derives from Enlightenment assumptions about rationality, the shaping of an epistemology that stressed progress and the creation of a new, non-hierarchical mass identity.Footnote 39 Other work has also contributed to the idea that aspects of modernity, such as the creation of a ‘public’, were encouraged through the growth of mass-produced narrative prose.Footnote 40 Du Zhongyuan's old mentor Zou Taofen also contributed strongly to this tendency, using his widely read magazine to tell the life-stories of figures such as Curie, Edison and Pasteur, who seemed to him to embody the spirit of the age, the ‘science and democracy’ of the May Fourth era that were supposed to build a modern China.Footnote 41 Du's war reporting had to follow in this tradition by reconciling a difficult combination of factors: taking the reality of disorientation and disruption, finding points of continuity with the pre-war narrative of progress, and concluding that, counterintuitively, the chaos of war could in fact be the crucible of modernity.
In Du's writings, the most obvious indicator of disrupted modernity is the delayed train. The train had been a powerful symbol of modernity in China since the late Qing, albeit not always an entirely positive one: Zhang Henshui's popular novel Pinghu tongche (1930) portrayed the characters who rode the eponymous train as glamorous, but also potentially sinister, and out to rook the naïve and foolish.Footnote 42 Nonetheless, the train was crucial in providing cheap transport that could move very large numbers of people over long distances. Railways had just a few decades of existence in China by the time war broke out in 1937, and they had hardly had enough time to settle in the popular imagination as a symbol of technological progress before the war brought them under attack.
Trains (and his problems travelling on them) are central to Du's writing from the battlefront, and he uses them to illustrate two wider themes, both of which had changed significantly with the Sino-Japanese conflict: time and distance. These two concepts were useful to Du in that they linked literal and metaphorical disorientation, and enabled him to give a new interpretation to disasters which had been understood for centuries. Refugee flows, after all, had been known for years, with Jurchen and Xiongnu invasions from the north regularly causing Chinese imperial capitals to be emptied so that people could flee to safety. However, the refugee flight that took place during the War of Resistance was on a scale that simply could not have been imagined before new technology enabled the conflict to become ‘total’. While the civil wars that had convulsed China in the 1910s and 1920s were large scale and had also been highly disruptive, they were still not on the scale of the post-1937 conflict.Footnote 43 Du's reporting was therefore able to take advantage of the unprecedented nature of the war to express the disruption of modernity.
One sign of that disruption appears in Du's obsession with time, and, in particular, time counted according to the western calendar. Naturally, timetelling had also been a longstanding Chinese institution, not least since China invented the water clock, but the late Qing and Republic meant that new methods of timing were necessary along with technological innovation: it would not have been easy, for instance, to run a railway without a timetable. Yet it is the disruption of this still-new temporal modernity that one sees in Du's writing overall:
Our train ought to have got to Xuzhou at 1 a.m., and we would then have connected with the Longhai train, but because of the delays, we didn't get there till 5 a.m., and we had no choice but to get off the train and stay at the Huayuan hotel. At 6.30 p.m., the train starting moving west again. Although Xuzhou used to be a tourist spot, everyone was now tearing around in a hurry, and not looking properly at anything.Footnote 44
Du repeatedly recounts train times and delays to his readers; on a journey to Taiyuan in September, he notes: ‘I talked with Shao till 6, then got on the train to go west. When we got to Zhengzhou, it was 2 a.m., and I changed to the Ping-Han train, to go north, and when we got to Shijiazhuang, it was already 6 p.m.’Footnote 45 Or else, on the way to Fengzhen,
Fengzhen isn't more than a couple of hundred li from Datong, and I would get there in normal times in an hour or two, but this time, because the stations had all been raided by enemy planes, they were repairing them at the same time as running the trains. I got on the train at Taiyuan at 10 p.m., and we didn't arrive until 5 a.m.Footnote 46
As Du had become one of the most prominent travel writers in the mid-1930s, with his weekly column from round the country published in Life, this type of reporting also drew on the world he had previously created for his readers: having written in a way that was supposed to let those readers associate a wider idea of China with new cultural and geographical insights and pleasures, the same journey was now being undertaken in circumstances of necessity and fear; Du makes the link between the China of pre- and post-1937 explicit in his frequent references to his earlier visits in his reportage.
Du's conversational style does not prevent him using highly literary images in his writing; for instance, descriptions of bad weather become a defining environmental determinant as Du's battlefront is caked in mud; when he and his companions get out of the car driving from Datong back to Taiyuan, they have to wade through the mud, and having climbed back into the vehicle, they are delayed by fog so that they get into the city at 1 a.m.Footnote 47 Then there are floods: in October, he ‘went on to Ci county, and then I heard that the Zhang river had risen and submerged the bridge, and we had no choice but to return with the car to Shijiazhuang’.Footnote 48 Descriptions in detail now totally displace the old, formulaic tropes that Du had used to describe war in Manchuria (‘suffering beneath the iron hooves of the Japanese’): a real change in the language of explaining war.
Casual language also helped to shape Du's style: in a piece about a businessman who thinks he knows it all, but predicts the war's progress in highly pessimistic terms, Du reports his conversation as:
According to him, Chiang absolutely couldn't fight a war of resistance, the reason being that Japan's imperial army was so blah blah [zenyang zenyang] powerful, and China's troops were blah blah no good, and Japan's aircraft were blah blah just terrific, and China's aircraft were blah blah backward.Footnote 49
One other linguistic trope, which would have previously been avoided in this sort of writing intended to inspire and elevate, was swearing. In the 1930s, Du's weekly column was notable for its earthy language, and he used this authentic-seeming form of speech to flavour his war reporting, as in a report on the breakdown of a car (again, the trope of dysfunction is important here):
At 3 p.m., there was a car from the Sixth cavalry division returning to Taiyuan, and via the introduction of friends, I got a seat in it. There was a lot of rain for days on end, and the highway got even muddier; the car went 60 li, and suddenly there was a breakdown. The driver got down and spent ages doing repairs, and then we got on our way again. When it got dark, it broke down again. The driver angrily said: ‘Today we're getting shitty [ma de] stuff we never usually get.’ (Two cars breaking down at the same time, that's pretty rare.)Footnote 50
This kind of writing in effect sets down conversations on the page. While the conversation itself may well have been constructed, the style is still innovative, because, however well disguised, Du's purpose is not literary experimentation, but political education. However, his approach to political education is very different from either the traditional exhortations from government during the Qing, or indeed from the parallel types of political writings, many supposedly aimed at the masses, which emerged in the early twentieth century. The writings of the Nationalist government, for example, via its exhortatory New Life campaign, were hardly designed to engender complicity with their readers. Nor, indeed, was much of Mao's writing, which is punchy enough, but generally wears its ideology very openly; it educates, to be sure, but is not intended to place the reader at the same level as the author. In the writings of political leaders and the ideological apparatus that they maintained, terms such as ‘imperialism’ and ‘nation’ come up frequently, but they are usually isolated within a rarefied, somewhat theoretical discussion, and rarely embedded in an account of lived experience.
Du's writings create a world whose flavour is clear and pungent even when read today. In the early 1930s, Du had written about the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese, but he was hobbled in his ability to bring over the reality of occupation to his readers for two reasons: first, they were not themselves living under Japanese rule and had little way to understand that experience personally, and, second, Du himself was in exile and therefore writing at second hand about the situation in Manchuria. But in 1937, Du's readership were experiencing exactly the same disorientation that he was describing. What Du did was to reinterpret the chaos of wartime in terms that had some meaning. His writing is among the few places that ordinary readers could have related their everyday experience to a wider narrative that accounted for the sudden disruption in their lives. At the end of the homely anecdote in which the travellers had been forced to abandon their car after it broke down (hence the swearing), Du and his companions ended up walking to a village and breaking into the local bathhouse to sleep, being surprised by early morning bathers the next day. But Du follows up the bathhouse anecdote by asking: ‘The country hasn't yet been defeated, and already people are suffering disaster – and who does everybody think gave us this distress?’Footnote 51 The relationship of everyday disaster to a wider narrative of anti-Japanese nationalism was crucial to Du's strategy. Furthermore, Du led his readers into an understanding of why war has changed. In another piece, he recalls a story well known to his readers about the single-handed defence of a Chinese city by the ancient Chinese general Zhuge Liang, but then subverts the connection he has made to premodern Chinese culture by noting: ‘I often think about [what Zhuge Liang did], but in reality it wouldn't be possible. . .today's communications and today's weaponry cannot be compared with those of ancient times.’Footnote 52
The ideological agenda is never hidden in Du's writing, and, after all, he had had years of previous experience as a propagandist that had made his public reputation in the first place. However, Du's talent was to present his propaganda to his readers in the guise of being the counsel of a friend. The style is not always attractive to the contemporary reader; one tends to see similarities with the sorts of kitschy false bonhomie identified by Paul Fussell in his analysis of the sort of sentimental writings in unofficial but popular writings about US involvement in the Second World War. Du Zhongyuan, having met the prominent general Li Zongren, came away from the meeting feeling that Li was ‘not only worthy of respect, but also very lovable’.Footnote 53 Fussell, too, noted that patriotic writers in the wartime USA would use sentimentality to appeal to their readers, as in the piece by Carl Sandburg describing a modest tailgunner whose quiet demeanour apparently led an officer present to ask: ‘Didn't you just want to reach out your arms and put them around him?’Footnote 54 But one should not ignore the power of this type of writing: Du knew what he was doing.
Xu Wancheng: chaos from victory
Xu Wancheng, in contrast, uses an elliptical and astringent style for his observations, relying on the readers to make inferences rather than presenting them with a direct statement. Early on, he observes that people came to Sichuan province (where Chongqing is situated) for a variety of different reasons.
During this last seven or eight years, people from other provinces have been coming to Sichuan. Some people say that they ‘came to Sichuan for resistance and reconstruction’. Others say they ‘fled to Sichuan’. I praise the sentence that we ‘fled to Sichuan’ as honest talk (laoshihua).Footnote 55
This deflating of the official narrative line sets the tone for much of the rest of Xu's reflections on the recently ended war. It is intriguing to think (though impossible to prove) that this opening statement may well be a deliberate dig against Du Zhongyuan, whose weekly column in New Life was called ‘Honest Talk’ (Laoshihua), as Xu's Shanghai readers would have known. Du had died two years earlier, but it was still only a decade or so since Du's column had been a talking-point among Shanghai's readers, and his progressive and modernising certainties of the 1930s would have seemed hollow to many in the months after the Japanese defeat. Ironically, by 1946, one of Du's most important anti-imperialist aims had been achieved; as a result of the Second World War, the old international concessions within Shanghai (and elsewhere in China) had been abolished permanently, and Shanghai was at last a unified city in an independent China. Yet the city did not seem a place of celebration for many living there at the time that Xu was writing.
Repeatedly, Xu uses short, seemingly pointless observations to hint at something wider about the war's effects on Chongqing and China more widely:
Chongqing doesn't have any newsstands. It has a lot of tobacco kiosks, teahouses, and snack shops.Footnote 56
Or:
There are a lot of mice in Sichuan. There are a lot of sparrows too. If somebody could invent a trap for mice and sparrows, then they would be on sale everywhere. But Sichuan people couldn't catch sparrows. They didn't find out whether the flavour of sparrow was good enough to eat.Footnote 57
The tone is not merely nihilistic. Xu does respect the role of Chiang Kaishek in resisting the Japanese:
When Dushan was lost, Chongqing was in crisis. The heads of departments and ministries variously asked the Zongcai [Chiang Kaishek] where the government would move to. The Zongcai. . .replied, ‘Even if the National Government has been bombed so that there is only one stone left, I'm still going to set up office on that one stone.’Footnote 58
However, much more of the document makes it clear that the heroic myth of Chongqing resisting even if ‘there is only stone left’ has given way to a much harsher reality:
The big officials curse the middle officials, the middle officials curse the lower officials, the lower officials curse the Jiwubing, the Jiwubing go home and curse their wives, the wives curse the kids, the kids beat the little dogs and cats, and the little dogs and cats cry out tearfully.Footnote 59
Another anecdote suggests a creeping cynicism that has infected the whole bureaucracy:
Some bureaucrat developed a technique. . .When his superior swore at him strongly, he just stood to attention, and with a smile on his face, said: ‘Yes. Yes. You're cursing me correctly.’ After he went home, his wife would ask him why he didn't want face [i.e. personal dignity]. He replied: ‘You really don't understand. The Head curses me. I then go and curse my subordinates. I've made no business loss. What need to get angry?’Footnote 60
Furthermore, Du's vision of disrupted modernity, which was used in 1937 to project the idea that progress might come out of chaos, is made much less hopeful in Xu's vision, expressed in a little jingle that rhymes in Chinese:
In Chongqing, the phone doesn't connect.
The light doesn't light up.
The roads are not flat. (Chongqing dianhua bu ling, diandeng bu ming, malu bu ping.)
These are the three ‘Nots’
A big headache.Footnote 61
Xu's biji is notable for its concentration on Chongqing, the location from which he was absent during the war years, and he makes only an occasional reference to his own experience in occupied Shanghai. When he does make the comparison, it is in the context of naming, something with which his pre-1937 role as a ‘social investigator’ gave him a great familiarity. He also makes a link between conditions in Chongqing and Japanese-occupied Shanghai that is politically daring by hinting at the ambiguous zone between resistance and collaboration during wartime:
During the period of enemy occupation of Shanghai, names of roads changed a great deal. . .Changing the road name is the most silly and confused thing to do. If you only change the road name, and don't mend the road, then this is confused.
Chongqing's road names also changed a lot.
In Chongqing, it was difficult being unfamiliar with the street and having to go and ask the way. It wasn't that people were unwilling to tell you. The streets had old and new names, and they kept changing so it was no longer clear. When I returned to Shanghai, the names had changed yet again a lot. The names that had been changed during the enemy puppet period had changed again, but there were still some that had not been changed. Alas! China is a nation that changes names and yells out slogans!Footnote 62
But perhaps most pointed is one short anecdote that carries no explicit commentary at all:
In the winter of 1944, near the crossroads at Zhangjia gardens, two people were carrying a jar. They stopped for a rest. Suddenly you couldn't see the two people any more. You could see the inside of the jar: there were a human head, and human hands and feet, and various pieces of human flesh. The blood and the flesh were all mixed up.Footnote 63
Conclusion
The experience of Chongqing and the surrounding areas forced the emergence of a narrative of war that was tinged with uncertainty. For this was not the war as seen in the Rape of Nanking, with a clear and obvious enemy; nor did it have the sullen certainty of life under occupation, nor even the ideological underpinnings of the base areas controlled by the Communists. Rather, it was the unease and uncertainty of a ‘Free China’ which was always under threat from the air, and the end point of whose narrative remained uncertain up to, and in many ways, even beyond 1945.
Yet it is also worth noting that attitudes toward the wartime experience under the Nationalists were not wholly negative; or, rather, that the negativity was nonetheless informed by realisation that the myth of resistance had been fuelled by something more than mere propaganda. Du and Xu each drew his authority to speak from a very different source. Du used his presence on the front to give himself authenticity as a reporter, whereas Xu used his absence from wartime Chongqing to give himself objectivity as a later observer. For Du, it was important to say ‘I was there’; for Xu, it became a source of strength rather than weakness to say ‘I was not there.’ Yet Xu's writing is also tinged by a melancholy at having been absent and having lived through less heroic times. The young Israeli novelist Ron Leshem caused controversy with his 2005 novel Beaufort, which describes a group of soldiers involved in the final Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The novel makes it clear that the fictional protagonist, who stays in Lebanon until the last moment of withdrawal, thinks that ‘it was all for nothing’. Yet the author, in an afterword, is at pains to point out that as a young Israeli, he felt compelled to write about Lebanon as a traumatic moment in his country's history precisely because he himself had not been there: ‘the deep, personal feeling of having missed something by not having been there and experienced it. . .are what brought me to write this book’.Footnote 64
Xu's work is not partisan, and his biji ends with a despairing account of the inadequacy of all political actors in the China of 1946. Some of its complaints, for instance about corruption within the Nationalist government, echo those of the CCP, and the western observers who became increasingly disillusioned at the degeneration of the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. He observes of the Nationalists:
Once the revolution had succeeded, the Revolutionary Party (the Nationalists). . .took national power, but then a lot of politicos and grafters flooded in. . .who depended on the party to eat, and had no idea what the Three People's Principles [of Sun Yatsen] were, or the National Revolution. Everywhere appeared the so-called ‘Party old gents’ or ‘Party thugs’.
But the solution is not, for Xu, the CCP:
But the Chinese, when we talk about communism, are talking about a tiger's face and skin! Why? Because the CCP sets fires and kills people, and in everything its talents are for destruction. When they get to a place, ‘they reach the place and take the resources’. They carry out the Three Alls policy. [‘Burn all, kill all, destroy all’: a reference to the Japanese Army policy of the same name.] Whoever in a place has money or power. . .they kill them all, not asking the right or wrongs of it.
Xu's linking of the CCP's tactics to those of the marauding Japanese (the ‘Three Alls’) is just as inflammatory as his earlier comparison of street name changes under the Nationalists and the occupation government in Shanghai, and just as dismissive of pious myths of resistance. He concludes bleakly: ‘As the blood flows between Guomindang and CCP, the ordinary people are suffering!’Footnote 65 For Xu, the final legacy of an ambiguous war was a political aporia, a tragedy with no catharsis.
Du Zhongyuan was lucky, albeit only in a very limited sense. He died in 1944 before it became clear that the narrative of modernisation through war that he had helped to propagate was deeply flawed. Of course, just five years later, the arrival of the Chinese Communist Party in power substituted a new modernising ideology upon the people of the country, this time penetrating and moulding society in a way that none of its predecessors – the late imperial governments, the militarists of the early Republic, and the Nationalists – had managed to do. But this was done at the price of huge distortion of the narratives of wartime experience. The ambiguities and disappointments felt by millions, and articulated by Xu Wancheng, were simply swept away by a new party-state that had no time or interest in recalling any aspects of the war against Japan except those that helped to cement a new narrative of Communist victory. In this version of history, there would be no positive contributions of any sort by the Nationalists toward victory, and collaboration with the Japanese would be condemned simply as anomalous treachery. It would be nearly half a century before Chongqing would be allowed to remember the full scale of its wartime experience; and even now, the space to remember and to grieve is constrained by the demands of contemporary ideology, looser than in the days of Mao, but still visibly present.
