Cultural histories of thermodynamics tend to contradict each other and even themselves. Was the modern science of heat allied to mid-nineteenth-century liberal optimism – a vision of progress akin to evolutionary biology in its insertion of a temporal direction into the natural world? Or was it a spectre of decline in keeping with the cultural pessimism of the Victorian fin de siècle, with its visions of biological degeneration and cultural decay? It is the great service of these two books to contribute to unravelling this confusion. From the pair there begins to emerge a nuanced view of the manifold, often conflicting, implications attributed to thermodynamics between the 1850s and the First World War.
According to both Elizabeth Neswald and Helge Kragh, there was no consensus in this period on the meaning or range of application of the principle of entropy increase. Neswald stresses that this underdetermination allowed entropy to become a magnet for cultural debates ranging from religion to political economy. She thus sets out to write entropy's ‘history of fascination’ – a history of thermodynamics as a ‘battleground’ for competing world views. The pessimistic reading of thermodynamics became dominant only in the early twentieth century, she argues. To buttress this view, she recovers several strands of thermodynamic thinking of a surprisingly rosy hue. These include familiar trends such as vitalism, in which the second law served to highlight the uniqueness of entropy-lowering organic processes, and also monistic energetics, according to which technological progress promised man an escape from entropic decay through the achievement of ever greater efficiency. But her case studies also include a strain of thought that will be unfamiliar even to historians of thermodynamics: entropic creationism.
It is in their attention to this esoteric but intriguing idea that the two books overlap explicitly. According to entropic arguments for creation, given that the present world is highly organized, and assuming that entropy increase applies to the universe as a whole, the universe must not have existed eternally; thus it must have had a beginning, and therefore, it would seem, a creator. Only a handful of thinkers, all German-speaking Catholics and non-scientists, took that last step, but the argument captured a strain of thermodynamic cosmology that had little to do with doom and destruction. More prominent among physicists and engineers of the 1860s than speculations about a thermodynamic ‘heat death’ – a universal and inevitable degradation of useful energy – were the implications of the second law for the universe's beginnings. At the same time, the link thus forged between the second law and divine creation spurred a countertrend: the rise of atheistic or pantheistic cyclical cosmologies. These theories insisted that the universe was an open system and thus not subject to the law of entropy increase; instead of a linear cosmic history they posited a cyclical or spiral temporality, with infinitely many instants of creation. Advocates of such cyclical world views tended to be non-scientists, philosophical system-builders and political progressives. Kragh argues that these broad alternatives, dissipative and cyclical, along with their attendant cultural connotations, structured cosmological debates throughout the period under study. Despite the religious differences between the two sides, however, both struggled creatively to circumvent the second law's devastating implication that the universe would meet an ultimate death.
As these cosmological alternatives amply demonstrate, it was by no means inevitable that thermodynamics would acquire its association with fin de siècle cultural pessimism. Neswald's account of the origins of that association is the most original and stimulating part of her book. Crucial for this turn, she argues, was the insight, due to William Stanley Jevons in 1865, that limits to the supply of coal set strict bounds on economic progress, such that the faster industrialization proceeded, the sooner it would meet its collapse. In this recognition of the ‘inseparable simultaneity of progress and decay’ (p. 422), Neswald spies the logic behind entropy's status as a central metaphor of the fin de siècle discourse of cultural pessimism.
According to Kragh, these two books diverge significantly in ‘approach and coverage’ (p. 2). Indeed, the virtue of Neswald's book is its broad scope, covering entropy's role in discussions not only of cosmology and metaphysics but also of engineering, political economy and biology. Neswald brings all this to life by mining unfamiliar primary sources for highly evocative quotations. There is a real need for such a survey, which ranges well beyond classics by historians such as Anson Rabinbach, Crosbie Smith, Norton Wise and Stephen Brush. Given Neswald's lucid explanations of technical issues, her book would be suitable for undergraduate courses in history of science. One can only hope for an English translation and the addition of an index.
Kragh's book, on the other hand, takes a broader chronological view. In introductory and concluding chapters, he highlights continuities in cosmological ideas of heat and decay from ancient times to the present. His is an exemplary history of ideas, which taxonomizes and critiques a spectrum of arguments about thermodynamics and cosmology, clearly demarcating newer from older ways of thinking. Particularly fascinating is his account of the staying power of the conservative and theological connotations of thermodynamic cosmology into the Cold War, when it became part of Soviet orthodoxy that laboratory physics could not be applied to the infinite universe. The book will interest scholars of science and religion as well as historians of physics. Still, some readers may be left wondering about the historical significance of the entropic creation argument. Where Neswald insists on the centrality of thermodynamic discourse to Victorian cultural debates, Kragh insists, somewhat perversely, on the marginality of these discussions to professional science and complains of their saturation with ‘ideology’ and ‘wishful thinking’ (p. 220).
Neswald explicitly rejects the notion of pure science implicit in such statements, citing SSK (sociology of scientific knowledge) as an influence. However, in practice, pace Kragh, these books are surprisingly similar in approach. The scene of Neswald's story is a Kampfplatz in name only; the ideas she discusses are disembodied and shorn of context, and her actors rarely engage each other directly, much less do battle. Like Kragh's, Neswald's book is essentially a traditional history of ideas.
Kragh makes clear that there was no logical necessity behind the association of a thermodynamically closed universe with religious faith, nor of an infinite universe with atheistic materialism. These alignments, he argues, were ‘historically contingent’. Yet finer-grained contingencies may slip through these authors' nets. Kragh and Neswald both tend to assume that thinkers who do not fit into their schematic alignment of ideological positions with scientific ideas ‘misunderstood’ the ‘ideological connotations’ of thermodynamics (Kragh, p. 214) or constituted ‘ironic’ exceptions, as Neswald writes (p. 261) of Nietzsche's theory of eternal recurrence. By the same token, Kragh's reference (p. 214, my emphasis) to ‘the cultural struggle of the late nineteenth century’ prompts the question of whose late nineteenth century he has in mind. This, however, is a semantic shortcoming, a failure to acknowledge the varied local contexts that these syntheses necessarily overlook. In revealing the weighty stakes of late nineteenth-century debates over the meaning of entropy, both Neswald and Kragh have illuminated a vital episode in the cultural history of modern physical science.
