I. A PROBLEMATIC ARGUMENT
In the first two books of De finibus (= Fin.), Cicero deals with the Epicurean view of the final goal of life. This philosophical discussion, which is preceded by a rhetorical proem that stands on itself,Footnote 1 is framed as a dialogue between Torquatus, who defends the Epicurean position, Cicero, who attacks it, and Triarius, who confines himself to a few critical interventions. If philosophy starts in wonder, according to the celebrated passage from Plato's Theaetetus (155d), the company meets this criterion admirably well, for the actual discussion starts with Torquatus’ surprise about Cicero's aversion to the Epicurean view (Fin. 1.13). He even suggests that this aversion has nothing to do with a fundamental disapproval of Epicurus’ doctrines but that it should rather be sought in stylistic concerns.
This challenge is a welcome opportunity for Cicero, as it enables him to briefly expound his general attitude towards Epicureanism from the very outset. He confirms that he has no objections regarding Epicurus’ style (oratio) but rather finds fault with his views (res), adding, though, that he may be wrong (falli possumus) (1.15). This is a fine example of strategical self-presentation. Of course, Cicero is very much concerned about stylistic matters as an orator, but in this context he is willing to let it go, agreeing that for a philosopher such things are of secondary importance at best. Cicero, then, knows and respects the rules of the game. Moreover, he realizes and even emphasizes that he has no monopoly on the truth: quot homines tot sententiae (1.15).Footnote 2 Thus he shows an open-mindedness that perfectly fits in with both his philosophical affiliationsFootnote 3 and his creed as an orator, whose principal concern is with persuasion.Footnote 4 And this self-presentation works, for Torquatus recognizes Cicero at once as a just critic (iudicem aequum, 1.15). This short introductory discussion thus contributes to the philosophical credibility of Cicero and as such helps to build the overall intellectual perspective from which the whole discussion (including the passage discussed below) should be understood.
Furthermore, Torquatus’ challenging opening question also yields an additional advantage, in that it immediately allows Cicero to criticize the Epicurean position. Even before Torquatus can start his exposition of Epicurus’ philosophical view on the end, Cicero can already elaborate a fundamental and quite comprehensive attack on the different domains of Epicurean thinking: natural philosophy (1.17–21), logic (1.22) and ethics (1.23–5).Footnote 5 At the end of this attack, just before the concluding phrase haec Epicuri non probo (1.26), Cicero inserts a strange argument:
et quod quaeritur saepe, cur tam multi sint Epicurei, sunt aliae quoque causae, sed multitudinem haec maxime adlicit quod ita putant dici ab illo, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est uoluptatem. homines optimi non intellegunt totam rationem euerti, si ita res se habeat. nam si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista sua sponte et per se esse iucunda, per se esset et uirtus et cognitio rerum, quod minime ille uult, expetenda. (ed. Reynolds)
Again, as to the question often asked, why so many men are Epicureans, though it is not the only reason, the thing that most attracts the crowd is the belief that Epicurus declares right conduct and moral worth to be intrinsically and of themselves delightful, which means productive of pleasure. These worthy people do not realize that, if this is true, it upsets the theory altogether. If it were admitted that goodness is spontaneously and intrinsically pleasant, even without any reference to bodily feeling, then virtue would be desirable for its own sake, and so also would knowledge; but this Epicurus by no means allows. (transl. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library)
This passage has received little attention in scholarly literature, and this is perhaps not so surprising. It looks like a kind of isolated supplementary comment, added to what is presented as a more systematic and coherent argument, rather than a point of substantial criticism. Apart from that, it is a rather odd argument, that raises at least three problems.
(1) Cicero here ascribes to the crowd much higher thoughts than can reasonably be expected. The more obvious answer to the question of the popularity of Epicureanism would no doubt be that this philosophy, which regards corporeal pleasure as its highest good, is much more attractive for the multitude of ordinary people than high-minded Platonic or Stoic doctrines. This is what Cicero himself suggests more than once in the second book of De finibus. Epicurean philosophy, so he argues, is supported by ‘the least competent but most powerful adherent, the general public’ (2.44), and although Epicurus has many followers, the testimony of the multitude does not carry much weight (non grauissimum est testimonium multitudinis, 2.81). This contempt of both Epicureanism and the crowd is in line with a general tendency in Cicero's philosophical works, where Epicurean philosophy is usually situated at the lowest, ‘plebeian’ level.Footnote 6 But the most interesting passage in this context is no doubt Tusc. 4.6, where Cicero lists three possible reasons for the popularity of Epicurean philosophy: its easiness, its seductiveness and the fact that there was, at an earlier stage, no alternative available, as the Epicureans were the first to publish Latin philosophical works. These are much more credible explanations, at least from Cicero's aristocratic point of view,Footnote 7 and more in line with the limited intellectual and moral capacities which he usually ascribes to the crowd. In our passage from De finibus, the reference to ‘some other reasons’ (sunt aliae quoque causae) should probably be understood in this light. Yet, it does not solve the problem: what Cicero here adduces as the principal reason (haec maxime adlicit) for the popularity of Epicureanism may be credible for a few erudite homines optimi, such as Torquatus, but not for the profanum uulgus.
(2) At first sight, Cicero's counter-argument seems particularly weak and confusing. He wants to demonstrate that virtue is desirable for its own sake (per se) on the basis of the intrinsic connection between virtue and pleasure. Such a claim, however, is by no means evident. As Reid observes:
Cicero's argument trifles. He wants to prove that recta et honesta, apart from pleasure, are expetenda, but he cannot deduce this from the assumption that virtue and pleasure are organically inseparable.Footnote 8
This is not to say that Cicero's objection is completely worthless. If the connection between pleasure and virtue is as tight as Epicurus makes it, it appears increasingly difficult to deny that virtue possesses the sort of worth that pleasure possesses, viz. intrinsic worth. Yet, technically speaking, Reid is correct that Cicero's argument is not logically compelling and that it would definitely not succeed in convincing an Epicurean.
(3) Finally, we may wonder what source—if any—Cicero used for this passage. Cicero's attack against Epicurus’ philosophy at the outset of De finibus has long been traced back to a lost treatise of Antiochus,Footnote 9 and the weakness of this particular argument has occasionally been explained by assuming a defective source.Footnote 10 Recent scholarship has rightly questioned such oversimplified Quellenforschung, pointing out that it often rests on typical unjustified presuppositions about the intellectual limitations of later authors, who are unduly reduced to their sources.Footnote 11 There can be no doubt that, in Cicero's case, such presuppositions are wrong. Cicero did not need to rely on a single source on Epicureanism and slavishly copy it, for he was thoroughly familiar with Epicurus’ philosophy. In his youth, he apparently even frequented the Garden in Athens in order to follow the lessons of Zeno and Phaedrus,Footnote 12 he probably knew the works of Lucretius and Philodemus,Footnote 13 and he was in touch with many Epicureans of his day (including his good friend Atticus). We have no reason, then, to assume that Cicero exaggerates when he repeatedly claims that he has perfectly understood Epicurus’ positionFootnote 14 and that he follows his own judgement (iudicium) in evaluating it (cf. Fin. 1.6 and 1.72).
In this context, however, such a conclusion does not entail a rehabilitation of Cicero as a philosopher but quite the opposite. Whereas several recent studies have demonstrated that Cicero's criticism of Epicurean philosophy was sometimes perceptive and intelligent,Footnote 15 this passage rather seems to corroborate old prejudices. For if we indeed have to ascribe this confused argument to Cicero himself, he once again ends up as a clumsy thinker. And while it is true that this isolated passage would hardly suffice to cast serious doubt on Cicero's general ability as a philosopher and as a historian of Epicureanism, yet it does not seem to add to his credentials either.
II. TOWARDS A SOLUTION
While it would indeed be rash to question Cicero's philosophical talents on the basis of this single passage, the problems it entails are nevertheless real. And yet, there is a solution to these three problems, and it can be found in Cicero's correspondence with Cassius. During the winter of the year 45 b.c., Cicero sent three letters to Cassius. In the second letter (Fam. 15.16.3), he tells Cassius that Pansa has just left Rome in uniform (paludatus)Footnote 16 and regards the latter's conduct as an argument in support of the doctrine that the noble is to be chosen for its own sake (τὸ καλὸν δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν esse). Cassius’ reply to Cicero's point is particularly interesting (Fam. 15.19.2–3):
Pansam nostrum secunda uoluntate hominum paludatum ex urbe exisse cum ipsius causa gaudeo tum mehercule etiam omnium nostrorum. spero enim homines intellecturos quanto sit omnibus odio crudelitas et quanto amori probitas et clementia, atque ea quae maxime mali petant et concupiscant, ad bonos peruenire. difficile est enim persuadere hominibus τὸ καλὸν δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν esse; ἡδονὴν uero et ἀτ<αρ>αξίαν uirtute, iustitia, τῷ καλῷ parari et uerum et probabile est. ipse enim Epicurus, a quo omnes Catii et Amafinii, mali uerborum interpretes, proficiscuntur, dicit ‘οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ἄνευ τοῦ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ζῆν.’ itaque et Pansa, qui ἡδονὴν sequitur, uirtutem retinet et ii qui a uobis φιλήδονοι uocantur sunt φιλόκαλοι et φιλοδίκαιοι omnisque uirtutes et colunt et retinent.
I am glad that our friend Pansa was sped on his way by universal goodwill when he left the city in military uniform, and that not only for his own sake but also, most assuredly, for the sake of all our friends. For I hope that men generally will come to understand how much all the world hates cruelty, and how much it loves integrity and clemency, and that the blessings most eagerly sought and coveted by the bad ultimately find their way to the good. For it is hard to convince men that ‘the noble is to be chosen for its own sake’; but that ‘pleasure’ and ‘tranquillity of mind’ are acquired by virtue, justice and ‘the noble’ is both true and demonstrable. Why, Epicurus himself, from whom all the Catiuses and Amafiniuses in the world, incompetent translators of terms as they are, derive their origin, lays it down that ‘to live a life of pleasure is impossible without living a noble and just life’. Consequently, Pansa, who follows ‘pleasure’, keeps his hold on virtue, and those also whom you call ‘pleasure-lovers’ are ‘lovers of what is noble’ and ‘lovers of justice’, and cultivate and keep all the virtues. (transl. G. Williams, Loeb Classical Library, modified)
This is the ingenious reply of a Roman politician who endorses Epicurean philosophy.Footnote 17 Cassius no doubt knew very well that a combination of Epicureanism and politics was not evident as such, since Epicurus did not recommend engagement in politics, but he also knew that Epicurus allowed exceptions and made room for personal assessment on the basis of a careful calculus of pleasure and pain.Footnote 18 He here even shows that political commitment can also be justified from an Epicurean perspective. This is not the place to develop this issue in more detail, although the topic would no doubt repay further study. Here, I prefer to focus on the striking correspondences between Cassius’ letter and our passage from Fin. 1.25. I contend that the latter passage should indeed be understood in the light of Cassius’ reply to Cicero and that we can in this way solve the three problems listed above.
Regarding problem (1): It now becomes clear that it is the view of the learned Cassius that is concealed behind the supposed convictions of the multitudo in Fin. 1.25. And Cassius is indeed a homo optimus Footnote 19 who presumably had higher motivations to embrace Epicureanism than the ones mentioned in Tusc. 4.6. Cassius was erudite enough to despise popularizing Epicurean authors such as Amafinius and Catius,Footnote 20 and he showed all the energetic virtue and dignity to surpass the vulgar hedonism of the crowd.Footnote 21 This also explains the tension between Tusc. 4.6 and Fin. 1.25: the two passages take into account different perspectives, respectively that of the ignorant multitude and that of more learned Epicureans.
Regarding problem (2): The correspondence between Cicero and Cassius also enables us to place the argument from Fin. 1.25 in a broader context and thus to understand better its precise meaning and scope. The starting point of the whole discussion is Cicero's letter that contains his interpretation of the Pansa episode (Fam. 15.17.3). There, as we saw, he considers Pansa's departure as an argument in support of the philosophical tenet that what is noble should be chosen for its own sake (τὸ καλὸν δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν esse). At this moment, it is no more than innocent teasing of Cassius,Footnote 22 who no longer shares this doctrine because he has become an Epicurean.
The core of Cicero's argument is that Pansa does not engage himself out of concern for his own pleasure but because he wants to contribute to the public interest. This basic view returns in the second book of De finibus as well. Cicero there underlines that political engagement is simply irreconcilable with the Epicurean point of view. For the whole political discourse in the Senate and the law-courts is about concepts such as ‘duty (officium), fair-dealing (aequitatem), moral worth (dignitatem), fidelity (fidem), uprightness (recta), honour (honesta)’, and so on (2.76), and such terms fit in better with the Peripatetic or Stoic position than with the Epicurean pursuit of corporeal pleasure. It is this fundamental conviction—which, we may add, is in line with a Platonic point of view as well—that also informs Cicero's position in his letter to Cassius.
But Cicero adds a further comment. He also points out that Pansa has thus gained the goodwill of the good (Fam. 15.17.3, mirabilis eum uirorum bonorum beneuolentia prosecuta est). This makes perfect sense from Cicero's general point of view, which presupposes an intrinsic connection between virtuous action and the praise of the good men. This connection, however, does not imply that the former is also chosen because of the latter. The term prosecuta is particularly well chosen in this respect. In this context, it does not merely denote the action of ‘escorting’ Pansa, but also suggests that this benevolence ‘follows upon’ virtuous behaviour, as a kind of ἐπιγέννημα. In other words, the relationship between virtue and the pleasure of praise is not one of means and end.
Nevertheless, by making this comment, Cicero made a strategic mistake. For by pointing to the factor of beneuolentia, he introduces an external advantage which risks undermining his philosophical view that virtue is to be chosen for its own sake (per se). And thus he himself gave Cassius all he needed to reply.
And Cassius indeed accepted this present with gratitude. In his letter, he interprets the Pansa episode differently, presenting it as evidence for his own Epicurean view. He is able to do this on the basis of Epicurus’ Kyria doxa 5, which clearly states that pleasure presupposes virtuous conduct. This is to say: if Pansa wants to live pleasantly, he cannot but live virtuously, and therefore is not only φιλήδονος but necessarily at the same time φιλόκαλος and φιλοδίκαιοςFootnote 23 as well. And this suffices for Cassius to refute Cicero's claim: virtue is not to be chosen per se.
But just like Cicero, Cassius does something more with his argument. As a matter of fact, he broadens the perspective from Pansa to the people in general (homines), and argues that his Epicurean view will more easily persuade men to choose what is noble. Pansa's popularity (secunda uoluntate hominum) is thus transformed into an (Epicurean) argument for virtue. His example indeed shows that virtue entails a good reputation, which in turn brings pleasure, and this is a much stronger incentiveFootnote 24 than Cicero's belief that virtue is to be pursued per se. At the same time, Cassius thus shows that his philosophical doctrines are valid not only for the aristocratic moral upper class (Cicero's uiri boni) but for the great multitude as well. And in this too, Cassius may well show himself a genuine follower of Epicurus, who was likewise concerned with everyone's well-being and addressed his message to everybody, learned and uncultivated alike.Footnote 25
Cassius thus did not merely reply to Cicero but actually challenged him, and his claim that his own Epicurean philosophy was more able to persuade men to choose a virtuous life than that of Cicero no doubt touched a tender spot in the orator. In that sense, Cicero indeed ‘met his match’.Footnote 26 Yet, to a certain extent, Cassius’ answer is also surprising. We have seen that the question raised by Cicero is whether virtue is to be chosen per se. The answer that should be expected from an Epicurean is a negative one: virtue is not to be chosen for its own sake, but is only a means towards the actual goal of pleasure.Footnote 27 What we expect, in other words, is a reply that underlines the instrumental character of virtue. Epicurus himself provocatively stated that he ‘spits on the good and the people who admire it to no purpose if it produces no pleasure’ (Ath. Deipn. 12.547a = fr. 512 Us.). This is the kind of answer we should expect from an orthodox Epicurean and, in that sense, Cassius’ reference to Kyria doxa 5, which strongly underscores the intrinsic connection between virtue and pleasure,Footnote 28 indeed comes as a surprise. And this, I believe, explains Cicero's reaction in Fin. 1.25.
There, Cicero takes the new perspective that Cassius introduced into the discussion as his point of departure: his original focus on the uiri boni is now replaced by Cassius’ interest in the multitude (multitudinem in Fin. 1.25). The conclusion of the argument is the starting point of the whole discussion, viz. Cicero's own conviction that virtue is to be chosen for its own sake. Cicero thus reaffirms his initial position and, in that sense, it is he, not Cassius, who has the last word.Footnote 29 And his principal argument rests on the intrinsic connection between pleasure and virtue. This argument, which Reid deemed so problematic, reflects precisely the position that Cassius defends on the basis of Kyria doxa 5. In Cicero's view, Cassius has defended his position in the wrong way. Such an emphasis on the connection between virtue and pleasure fits in better with Cicero's own position (where pleasure necessarily ‘follows upon’ virtue) than with Cassius’ Epicurean outlook (where virtue is a mere means for pleasure and is to be rejected if it does not contribute to pleasure). Cicero's point, then, should be regarded as an indirect reply to Cassius, and its full significance and meaning can only be understood against the background of his discussion with Cassius.
Regarding problem (3): Finally, this parallel yields a modern and methodologically sound alternative to traditional Quellenforschung, in that it does justice to Cicero's uoluntas auctoris. We have indeed found the source of our passage—though not in Antiochus or in whatever lost polemical treatise. It can be traced back to the intellectual discussions that Cicero had in the circle of his erudite friends.
We may add at this point that the date of both the letters and De finibus is particularly revealing. Cicero probably received Cassius’ letter in mid January 45 b.c.Footnote 30 And we know that he wrote De finibus slightly after that period. The first mention of the dialogue is in a letter to Atticus that is dated 16 March 45 b.c. (Att. 12.12.2). It is not certain whether Cicero had already begun writing at that moment,Footnote 31 but a couple of weeks later he probably had, given that the first book was ready and sent to Rome by the end of May.Footnote 32 This means that Cassius’ letter was in all likelihood still fresh in Cicero's mind, which makes it even more reasonable to presume that this passage from Fin. 1.25 was indeed directly influenced by Cassius’ view. Thus the dating of both documents yields an additional argument in favour of our hypothesis.
Moreover, there are more general implications for the question of Cicero's sources. There can be no doubt that Cicero knew both the relevant literature and the ongoing discussions in the philosophical schools of his day, and that he used all this as sources for his own dialogues. But all too often scholars ignore the importance of the lively intellectual discussions among learned aristocratic friends. The passage from Fin. 1.25 shows that such discussions should not only be regarded as the edifying pastime of the cultivated upper class or as a general intellectual framework but that they also left tangible traces in written works.
III. EPILOGUE
As far as we know, this discussion between Cicero and Cassius was not continued. As Cicero stuck to his point of view in De finibus and thus indirectly challenged Cassius, it was again Cassius’ turn to reply. We have little reason to presume that Cassius will have changed his mind on the basis of what he could read in De finibus, but this theoretical debate, however interesting it was, had to wait. Cassius had other things to do at that moment—a crucial period indeed when he was about to take his place definitively in world history.
