George Stigler reportedly once quipped about a conference paper that it contained much that is good and much that is new: what is good is not new and what is new is not good. One is tempted to pass similar judgement on the present work. It is a temptation to be resisted. Professor Francesco Boldizzoni's provocative and passionate polemic against certain exaggerations in cliometrics raises issues that warrant reflection and debate. Although the arguments are not new, he presents them clearly in spirited prose that leaves no doubt about the distortions he believes have been inflicted on economic history by rigid adherence to methods and questions informed or dictated by neoclassical economics. In this respect, the book is a contribution to the exploding universe of writing critical of the assumptions, analytical procedures, and smugness of large portions of academic economics.
The indictment has two main counts. The first is that cliometrics is a thinly disguised theodicy proposed to justify the ways of the market to mankind. “[T]he (unconfessed) aim of cliometrics is not to increase our knowledge of the past. It is to create narratives of the past compatible with neoliberal economics, and often it is a highly ideological exercise to endorse specific worldviews, theories, and policy recommendations” (p. 5). The second count is that the economics employed by cliometricians does not account for outcomes and institutions in noncapitalist societies. “[M]odern economics arose to describe the modern market economy, and is therefore unsuited for analyzing previous periods. The economic activity of the past needs to be understood with reference to its substantive meaning” (p. 21). The charge echoes the Romantic critique of Enlightenment philosophy (of which classical economics was a representative product), which held that cultures possess an inner meaning that is understandable only on their own terms, and not reducible to general propositions of doubtful ontology. An alternative interpretation is that a premodern economy is not an imperfect version of a market economy. The basic indictment, then, is that cliometricians are economic reductionists.
As a polemicist, Boldizzoni does not pretend to balance assessment, picking the low-lying fruit of scholarly howlers, while ignoring or misconstruing well-crafted constructions that might impair his case. He instances Greif's misinterpretation (and misreferencing) of Genoese notarial documents and Botticini's mismatching Florentine marriage and wealth records to show how the rush to economic argument sometimes takes precedence over critical assessment of sources needed to sustain it. On the other hand, he misrepresents the Industrious Revolution as a remake of proto-industrialization, overlooking De Vries's subtle account of how socially determined “demand clusters” generated discontinuous (and unpredictable) shifts in demand; he misunderstands path dependence as theory of origins rather than a framework for thinking about how historically conditioned indivisibilities and market externalities create branching points supporting multiple pathways from one starting point. He gives space to Fogel and Engerman's Time on the Cross but reserves none to Wright's Slavery and American Economic Development. He ignores the vast literature bearing on the gold standard, the Great Depression, and globalization, where formal theory and statistical inference are sine qua non, or to instance fine cliometric work on the broader canvas that Professor Boldizzoni prefers, Ó'Gráda's economic history of Ireland. The purpose of selective criticism is to sanction shoddy work and sloppy thought, but it does no service to the discipline to ignore the contribution that economic reasoning and statistical inference make to understanding economic change where evidence supports and demands their use. The case is not against economic reasoning, but against its inappropriate deployment: it should be directed at the workman, not his tools.
Although Boldizonni does not pursue the matter, one can nevertheless argue that the training and housing of cliometrics in departments of economics can erode standards of historical workmanship. The reasons are not far to seek. A course of study reserving one or two courses to economic history cannot provide the mastery of historical literature that students in history acquire through deep and extensive reading. Not surprisingly, confronted with the requirement to produce a dissertation, fledgling economist-historians turn to what they know best and apply the theory they have learned to stylized historical facts, producing technically proficient work disconnected from the historiography that gives those facts meaning. Economic historians employed in economics departments confront a different problem: they have to demonstrate why “history matters” to colleagues lacking in historical culture, which all too often means showing an uncritical audience how an economic model “explains” a disembodied fact from the past. Probably the most serious consequence of this institutional setting is to denude inherited narratives in economic history while inhibiting development of new ones. A critical assessment of cliometrics at the level proposed by this book needs to address the issue of competing narratives.
Although Boldizonni praises context-driven accounts like Witold Kukla's Economic Theory of the Feudal System and Chayanov's Theory of the Peasant Economy as laudable examples of economic models tailored to specific times and places, his judgment is essentially typological. They are praiseworthy because they represent economic types. The typological obsession is evident in his hostile commentary on interpretations of classical antiquity as a relatively advanced preindustrial market economy, to which he prefers the sociological model proposed by Max Weber and Moses Finley. In this he commits the same fault he accuses Greif and Botticini of: wilful ignorance of evidence. It is now recognized that the older interpretation is tainted by severe selection bias attributable to total destruction of a voluminous but ephemeral paper trail generated by economic and administrative agents; the proposition that the classical economy was essentially autarkic was an argument from silence. In the last four decades, that silence has been shattered by extensive archaeological excavations which reveal high levels of specialization and correspondingly high levels of exchange. There is just enough documentation to demonstrate that the exchange was organized through markets. The contention that the new interpretations reflect academic opportunism in a neoclassical zeitgeist is untenable. The real question is not whether the economy of classical antiquity was a market economy, but what kind of market economy it was. The fundamental issue raised by Boldizzoni's tract concerns the legitimacy of typologies as an expository device for historical narrative. Be they economic or sociological, typologies are static: they compress long periods of time into a single instant. We do not, for example, have a typological model for the European or American economies of the 1960s and another for the 2000s, but they are surely different in ways not captured by putting them in a box labelled “market economy.” The same is true of economies in the past, which evolved in response to specific opportunities and constraints that were themselves changing in time.
Boldizzoni gives a useful warning against certain tendencies which, if they were to achieve dominance in teaching and controlling academic promotions, could have catastrophic effects on the practice of economic history. Current evidence suggests that the danger is much exaggerated. As a methodological proposition, criticism of cliometrics as inherently ahistorical is off target. The culprit is not economics, but economics dressed up as typology. Like good economics, good economic history exploits the logic of individual (and collective) intentionality as they are conditioned by the particularity of time and place. The difficulty of doing this successfully can hardly be exaggerated. As a recent Nobel Laureate in economics has observed, “One of the great difficulties in economic analysis is the process of going from abstract analysis to thinking about the economy. That is, how does one use what one has learned from abstract analysis. The easy way out is to take the model literally. Sometimes this seems to be what is meant by taking a model seriously. To me, taking a model seriously means putting in the effort to think through what lessons from the model one wants to take along when thinking about the economy” (Peter Diamond, On Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 7). Most of Boldizzoni's examples of bad economic history are also examples of bad economics. There are no shortcuts to good work. The merit of this book is to remind us of that sad truth.
