Soon after the first democratic elections in South Africa in April 1994, the new government began negotiations with the European Union (EU). These eventually culminated in a Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) that entered into effect on 1 January 2000. The TDCA is currently undergoing a process of review, and discussions have also begun between the two parties to establish a Strategic Partnership, which will enhance the level of political dialogue between South Africa and the EU.

This book provides a rather limited account of South Africa's relations with the EU. Whilst it might be useful to readers with very little background knowledge of the external relations of the EU, especially those with the developing world, there is little added-value in terms of a contribution to the existing literature on EU–South Africa relations. Partly this is because only three of the nine chapters are actually devoted specifically to this relationship. Other chapters focus on the history of Europe's relations with South Africa, both before and during apartheid, the history of EU development policy, and the EU's response to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Curiously, the longest chapter is a comparison of the regional integration efforts of the EU and the African Union, which comes to the rather obvious conclusion that ‘these two organisations differ in most respects and it is doubtful that the world will ever see the EU model of integration replicated in Africa’ (p. 138).

Olivier's central argument is that the South African government should devote more resources towards its relations with the EU than it currently does. He is critical of the new government's prioritisation of its relations with other developing countries especially within Africa. However, beyond this there is limited critical analysis of the significance and impact of South Africa's post-apartheid relations with the EU. For example, we might want to consider the links between the TDCA and South Africa's domestic political economy, and in particular the developmental needs of its poor black majority. Olivier refers to South Africa's ‘national interest’ throughout his discussion, without considering who the winners and losers might be within South Africa.

For historical and domestic political reasons, the new South African government has often claimed to give regional relations a high priority in its foreign policy. However, the reality of South Africa's foreign economic relations, as Olivier accepts, is that Europe remains both a highly significant trading partner and investor in the new South Africa. Moreover, if South Africa's approach has become more Afrocentric, then why did the new government fail to consult the other member states of the Southern African Customs Union during the TDCA negotiations with the EU? Contrary to the claims made by Olivier, it appears that South Africa's relationship with the EU, demonstrates just how committed the South African government is to a development strategy based on neo-liberalism and further trade liberalisation within the global economy. Recent statements by both the European Commission and the Department of Foreign Affairs in South Africa, espousing their shared values and common interests, merely serve to reinforce this point.