Scholars of Rousseau have long labored to make sense of his copious paradoxes. Recently political theorists such as Laurence Cooper, Ruth Grant, Jonathan Marks, John T. Scott, Elizabeth Wingrove, and others have shifted their attention away from “resolving” these paradoxes in favor of one ideal extreme over the other, instead interpreting his opposites as necessarily partial pieces of the human condition requiring ongoing negotiation, however imperfect. Denise Schaeffer makes an invaluable contribution to this growing body of “middle way” scholarship on Rousseau by reading many of the oppositional juxtapositions in Rousseau's works—nature versus civilization, passion versus rationality, illusion versus truth—as occasions for the development and exercise of judgment rather than as mutually exclusive choices to be alternated between. The category of judgment, which for Schaeffer's Rousseau combines “rational detachment with passionate attachment” and requires both “naked truths” and “salutary chimeras” (6), has been almost completely overlooked in Rousseau's work, and Schaeffer's book fills this gap admirably. At the same time, Schaeffer situates the argument within the rich recent conversation among democratic theorists on judgment (as well as within recent Rousseau scholarship); while familiarity with Rousseau's corpus will be helpful for engaging with the argument, anyone interested in the concept of judgment will find its treatment here quite valuable.
Schaeffer's Rousseau is first and foremost a pedagogue, and the bulk of the analysis comprises a careful reconstruction of the latent conceptual category of judgment in the Emile. For Schaeffer's Rousseau, an education in judgment “cultivates [the] ability to be simultaneously seduced by and critically detached from the chimeras that are necessary to sustain human happiness and freedom” (136). To simplify, Schaeffer argues that yes, for Rousseau illusions are necessary for directing the passions and fostering attachment, but it is best if people can be made to understand that they are illusions yet no less necessary for being so. In this way judgment is a skill or capacity employed in “perpetually negotiating [the] fragile tension” (ibid.) between such mutually necessary pairs as dependence and freedom, faith and doubt, integrity and change. Good judgment thus contributes to a healthy form of self-consciousness necessary to both individual and collective (or democratic) self-rule. Conversely, while blindly following rules leaves one better off than being without rules at all, and good judgment requires good rules, poor judgment comprises the inability to discern the principles motivating them, principles which by nature can never be fully contained by rules but can be grasped only through reflection on examples over time.
Interestingly, to make this case, Schaeffer must become a pedagogue as well, instructing the reader in how to have one's judgment instructed by Rousseau. That is, Schaeffer shows how Emile is meant to develop the reader's capacity for judgment by showing us how to read the work differently, following her example. Schaeffer demonstrates again and again how Rousseau's rules are invariably followed by exceptions, and how his solutions implicitly give rise to new problems, inviting the reader to develop his or her own judgment in making sense of the gaps between what Rousseau says and what he shows. The sense that Rousseau's work deliberately opens up space for judgment is enhanced by one's being made aware of the many mediating layers in the relationship between Rousseau and the reader. For example, Schaeffer devotes considerable attention to the role played by the book Robinson Crusoe in Rousseau's Emile, the one book given to Emile by the tutor after Rousseau declares books hateful but necessary. What lesson is the reader to draw from the example of Crusoe, to which the reader is at least six times removed? From Defoe; to the narrator and character Crusoe, who tells the story in the past tense, using written language; to the character Emile, who we know only by description; to Jean-Jacques the tutor and Rousseau the narrator (who is not identical with Rousseau the author); and finally to Schaeffer, interpreter and guide—at each point of mediation, the reader is positioned to compare and evaluate what the characters think, say, and do, just as the characters are so positioned in relation to each other. Experiencing Emile in this way serves as strong evidence that for Rousseau, to be whole, natural, and self-sufficient requires going outside oneself, engaging with society, and selectively incorporating the wisdom of others: in short, the development of good judgment.
One question left unresolved for me is just who, exactly, Rousseau would entrust with the crucial task of judging politically. Schaeffer implies that ideally, everyone's capacity for judgment should be developed (women included, about which I will say more in a moment). In this way Schaeffer depicts Rousseau as more like Socrates the egalitarian interlocutor than like Plato, who divided the populace between myth propagators and myth followers. But even as Schaeffer makes a compelling case for the widespread exercise of judgment in the early chapters focusing on education and private life, the idea that Rousseau would have us all exercise political judgment is not as thoroughly argued. Moreover, it seems to me one thing to learn to see behind the curtain put up by one's tutor, and another for a people to see behind its founding myths. Does Rousseau think most people are capable of doing so without threatening the stability of that foundation, and if so, what exactly would it take to develop such a capacity for judgment in citizens of a democracy?
For many readers the most controversial part of the argument will be Schaeffer's interpretation of the role played by Sophie, Emile's love interest, in Rousseau's thinking about education and judgment. Feminist scholars have consistently interpreted Rousseau as providing Sophie an education designed to develop only those capacities necessary to performing her (natural) role as auxiliary to Emile, fitting her to be a wife and mother though not a full human being in her own right. Although Schaeffer does not wholly disagree with this interpretation—“Sophie is not separable from the whole that she governs” (141)—in comparing Sophie's capacity for judgment with that of Emile, Schaeffer makes the case that by Rousseau's own standards Sophie is the superior judge, that she is “more genuinely free in her exercise of judgment” (136, emphasis in original). If we accept that for Rousseau “to be a truly self-sufficient whole is to be a divided whole” (145, emphasis in original), or that wholeness is not actually Rousseau's standard, then Schaeffer's case here is compelling. Nonetheless, it is difficult to accept the idea that Sophie is in any way “free” given her status as a social and legal dependent. If Sophie's capacity for judgment is more highly developed than that of Rousseau's ideal pupil, why is citizenship reserved for men?
These last points, it should be noted, are not meant as criticisms but aim to identify some of the important questions raised by this nuanced, carefully constructed, ultimately convincing argument. That Schaeffer's reconstruction of judgment in Rousseau's work provides a fresh lens of analysis for engaging with some of the most contentious debates among Rousseau scholars, and simultaneously adds a new and important voice to the ongoing conversation about the role of judgment in democracy, speaks to the significance of this work to the field of political theory broadly speaking.
