Stephan Lindner's book on the I.G. Farben trial in the aftermath of World War II addresses a fundamental issue in contemporary history: The question of how far individuals who do not hold governmental positions can be held responsible for war crimes. This was precisely the problem the Allies faced after 1945, when the question of who was responsible for the crimes of the Nazi regime arose.
Already during the Second World War, the Allies of the anti-Hitler coalition had decided to bring the principal Nazi leaders to trial. Following Germany's surrender in May 1945, the victorious powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France—decided at the London Conference in August 1945 to establish an International Military Tribunal (IMT) that would, for the first time in history, punish violations of international law. The Nuremberg Trials against the principal war criminals—all of them German politicians, military officers, or Nazi officials—took place in Nuremberg from November 1945 to October 1946. Gustav von Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was designated as a representative of the private sector, though charges against him were ultimately dropped due to his age and illness. However, from the Allies’ perspective, more than just a small clique around Adolf Hitler were responsible for the crimes of the Nazis. Consequently, twelve additional trials were held before American military tribunals under the legal authority of Control Council Law No. 10—now also targeting doctors, lawyers, diplomats, and business leaders. These included, in addition to the two trials against Krupp and Flick, the trial of twenty-four high-level managers at I.G. Farben.
While the IMT and its significance for the development of international law have been abundantly examined, no detailed study of the I.G. Farben trial has been conducted until now, a gap that Lindner convincingly fills with his book. The chemical conglomerate, formed in 1925 through a merger, quickly adapted to the realities of the Nazi regime in 1933, entered the arms industry, and employed numerous forced laborers. For Telford Taylor, the American chief prosecutor of the subsequent trials, the I.G. Farben trial was therefore of extraordinary significance. The indictment comprised five counts: The managers were accused of planning a war of aggression (I); they were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity through plunder and spoliation (II), as well as through the enslavement of the civilian population and the use of forced laborers (III). Three managers were accused of membership in a criminal organization, and finally, all were charged with having taken part in a conspiracy to commit crimes against peace (V). The trial against only twenty-three defendants began in late August 1947, as one was seriously ill.
In four chapters, based on material from more than twenty archives, Lindner examines the background, the preparations, the course of the trial, and its aftermath, providing a detailed overview of the people involved in the proceedings. In the first chapter, he examines the background to the trial and its legal foundations. Here, he refers, on the one hand, to the—largely unsuccessful—inter-Allied prosecution of German war crimes following World War I, and, on the other hand, to the legal foundations and debates that took place between 1942 and 1945. He concludes that the Nuremberg Tribunal granted the defendants a fair trial, and they were convicted in accordance with their responsibility. Lindner describes the balancing act between the desire for fair trials in accordance with the rule of law, and the desire to punish the heinous crimes of the Nazis.
Chapter 2 focuses on the indictment and the composition of the court. The author introduces the various participants in the trial: the prosecutors, the defendants, the defense attorneys, and the judges. Lindner paints a detailed picture of the working and living conditions in Nuremberg, where both prosecutors and defendants were often separated from their families. He discusses Taylor's difficulties in assembling a qualified prosecution team and explains how Josiah DuBois ultimately rose to become chief prosecutor in the I.G. Farben trial, even though, as an aide to the Secretary of the Treasury, he had worked on the Morgenthau Plan and initially opposed legal proceedings against German war criminals. Overall, working conditions for the prosecutors were not particularly good, but the defense also faced difficulties. I.G. manager Fritz ter Meer attempted to develop a unified line among the defendants by means of a memorandum, in which, even before the trial began, the central argumentation of the defense became evident: The development of the chemical industry was not specifically German, but could also be found in other countries; that the innovations served the good of humanity above all, and that during the war, I.G. Farben had been subject to strict constraints and restrictions. It was a victimizing narrative of patriotic researchers and businessmen.
In the fourth chapter, Lindner then discusses the trial—that is, the prosecution's presentation of evidence, the defense strategy, the closing arguments, and the verdict along with its reasoning, including both the majority opinion and the minority opinion. Time and again, the court admonished the prosecution for its excessive presentation of evidence, which was intended to highlight the special status of I.G. Farben and its managers, and frequently provoked lengthy rebuttals from the defense. After the hearing of evidence was concluded in mid-May 1948, the verdict was announced at the end of July 1948: All managers were acquitted on counts I and V; the three managers charged under count IV were also acquitted. On counts II and III, 13 managers were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 18 months to 8 years. The harshest sentences were imposed on the managers directly involved in the construction of the I.G. plant in Auschwitz.
Finally, in Chapter 5, Lindner addresses the aftermath of the trial—that is, how the verdict was interpreted. While the prosecution criticized the acquittals and the relatively mild sentences—compared to other Nuremberg trials—the defense attorneys and the defendants criticized what they saw as the Americans’ “victor's justice.” This highlights an aspect that runs throughout the entire book: namely, the question of whether it was a political trial (victor's justice) or a legally fair trial. Closely linked to this were (legal) questions that were repeatedly debated: Can individuals be judged retroactively according to different legal principles; do universal human rights apply regardless of the era; or must the principle of nulla poena sine lege be observed? To what extent did the Nuremberg Trials serve to restore the authority of international law or to save capitalism? Were businesspeople without a political mandate even liable for the crimes of the Nazi state, or could they invoke the defense of acting under duress in a dictatorship? What justified the selection of these three companies (Flick, Krupp, I.G. Farben) and specific managers, given that other German firms had also participated in rearmament and forced labor, and at what point does participation in rearmament become a criminal offense? And finally, could individual guilt be proven within a conglomerate like I.G. Farben? Lindner addresses all these questions—which could equally be applied to other historical periods or the present—in his highly readable study and concludes: “The I.G. Farben managers were ultimately convicted for being what they had become in the Third Reich: criminals.” (266) It could not have been better said.
