The Protean Ass, The Ass on Stage, Framing the Ass, and now the Invisible Ass. Perhaps Apuleius scholars should call a moratorium on pre- and post-colon ass titles. Geoffrey Benson's learned monograph thematises invisibility to argue that Apuleius’ Metamorphoses is a ‘daemonic fiction that places its audience in an imaginative space between the sensible world and the realm of the divine’ (240). B.'s conclusion follows from a thorough and lucid investigation of the invisible in the works of Apuleius. Though the Romans may not have had a precise word for it, B. develops compelling and robust definitions of invisibility by drawing on various contemporary sources and the language and motifs of vision in Apuleius’ works. B. is attentive to the philosophical works in his reading of the Met., but in a way that emphasises the ‘fault lines’ between the Met. and Apuleius’ other works, between Apuleius’ works and Plato (228). B. frames invisibility not primarily as optical or social but as phenomenological, to represent the novel's gesture beyond the material world to a higher level of reality. Though the detailed readings of the major episodes of the Met. are not always remarkable for their originality, in sum they present a cogent interpretation that demonstrates in new ways the profound originality of the Met. itself. By regularly but not insistently comparing and contrasting contemporary theories regarding invisibility, B. succeeds in showing how the daemonic reading of the Met. is plausible for its Roman as well as subsequent generations of readers.
The book's chapters treat important sections of the Met. (the Prologue, Cupid and Psyche, Book 11) as well as more general through-lines (human behaviour, fragmented bodies); despite this arrangement, an index locorum would be a useful addition. After an introduction, B. begins with an analysis of the voice of the prologue as ‘acousmatic’. This reading compares the unnamed, hidden speaker of the prologue with indefinite, disembodied voices in On the God of Socrates and the Psyche story. B. stops short of claiming that the prologue's voice is that of a daemon, however. Surveying the scholarship on the connections between the prologue, Lucius, and Apuleius, he pursues Barthes’ influence on recent readings, including his own, but ultimately sets the question of how the author appears in the text to one side, instead focusing on how the Prologue introduces readers to the daemonic realm.
In ch. 2, B. more fully defines his terms, distinguishing optical from phenomenological invisibility, connecting the invisibility afforded by the ring of Gyges with the social invisibility of numerous characters in the Met. B. asks if invisibility provides freedom to act as they please, if surveillance is the only guarantee of ethical behaviour. B. does not answer this question, but instead suggests, through comparison with other ancient texts in which invisibility instructs, that various stories in the Met. invite such a consideration of human behaviour and thus add didactic as well as entertainment value to the work. It would be interesting to know how/if B. would extend his ethical focus to animal behaviour in Apuleius.
In ch. 3, B. tackles Cupid and Psyche, offering not a comprehensive reading of the tale but a close analysis of the motif of vision. Phantasia is key to the critical plot points regarding Psyche's visions of her husband. Perhaps it is too obvious to say that travelling long distances to contemplate and worship human beauty is precisely what a careful reader of Apuleius should not do; B. instead concentrates on the esoteric qualities of the tale and develops the allegorical and mise en abyme readings of others.
In ch. 4, B. responds to what he imagines as a major objection to his elevation of invisibility, namely the novel's insistence on physical (sometimes grossly so), sensate and sensory bodies. Focusing on the depressingly brutal treatments of bodies, B. links bodily disintegration and metamorphosis with metaphysics and the metaphysical aspects of Lucius’ initiations. The argument here is consistent with the previous in that B. argues for a connection between the lessons of the Met. with the Platonic and Neoplatonic interpretations of myths about dismembered bodies to trigger a series of questions of in the mind of readers, pushing them to contemplate a higher level of reality.
After the number of questions and uncertainties raised in the progression of the argument, it is not surprising that B. ultimately aligns himself the aporetic reading of Winkler (1985), who (in a way that may be taken too seriously by some) famously judged the Met. to be a ‘philosophical comedy about religious knowledge’ (124, qtd. 239). (Winkler's is only one of many well-known analyses that B. engages throughout the book.) Of these terms, B. is least interested in the comedy of the Met. and rejects recent readings of the Met. as parodic or seriocomic. He views the novel as fundamentally addressing questions about how human beings can comprehend divinity that is invisible. While some of the theoretical engagements are less instructive than others — in the end, B.'s definition of invisibility is so ‘complex and multifaceted’ (260) that it may be worthwhile to hazard the plural rather than force a connection between Apuleius’ narratives and numerous mythical tricks of invisibility — B.'s argument on the whole is persuasive and provocative.
