Taking seriously the value of cultural competence in healthcare requires at least three general commitments.1
Although I do not specifically address cultural competence in international biomedical research, I believe much of my following analysis is applicable to this other context.
The answer to this question is largely context dependent. Proponents of cultural competence are likely to have different and additional commitments depending on which level of the healthcare system they occupy. At the organizational level, for instance, recognizing the importance of cultural competence might translate into efforts to produce greater minority representation among the healthcare leadership and workforce. At the structural level, a practical commitment to cultural competence may require better access to interpreter services, more culturally sensitive intake processes, and the development of culturally and linguistically appropriate health education materials and signage. At the clinical level, proponents of cultural competence might channel their energies toward improving healthcare providers' interactions with culturally diverse patients and their families. In short, different players in the healthcare system may realize the value of cultural competence in different ways, depending on their range of professional activities. Thus, in asking what further commitments stem from accepting the value of cultural competence, one must start by making explicit the context in which this question is being posed.
My aim in this article is to explore the ethical commitments that are implied in accepting cultural competence at the clinical level. More specifically, I want to examine whether clinicians must be committed to a version of ethical relativism as a consequence of their valuing cultural competence more generally. In other words, must clinicians become ethical relativists to provide culturally competent care?
This question is not motivated by philosophical interest alone. It relates to an issue of practical importance for clinicians, and it is prompted by a shift in the way cultural competence education is now conceived.
Early training programs in cultural competence tended to rely on categorical constructs that lumped patients together by their “typical” cultural values, customs, and beliefs. In learning how to care for Korean patients, for example, clinicians were usually offered a list of common health beliefs and behaviors for Koreans, along with a litany of various dos and don'ts.2
For an example of the categorical approach, see Paniagua FA. Assessing and Treating Culturally Diverse Clients: A Practical Guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; 1994.
Partly in response to the practical limitations of this first approach, newer approaches to cultural competence education have tended to focus on developing important skills and attitudes in clinicians. Now the didactic emphasis has tilted toward a more dynamic ideal of improving clinicians' interactions with their culturally diverse patients. To this end, much of the recent cultural competence curricula have centered on building key clinical aptitudes, such as negotiating different communication and decisionmaking styles, eliciting patients' own conceptions of health and disease, and being attuned to areas of potential cross-cultural misunderstanding.3
Kleinman A, Eisenberg L, Good B. Culture, illness, and care: Clinical lessons from anthropologic and cross-cultural research. Annals of Internal Medicine 1978;88:251–8; Carrillo JE, Green AR, Betancourt JR. Cross-cultural primary care: A patient-based approach. Annals of Internal Medicine 1999;130:829–34; Like RC, Steiner P, Rubel AJ. Recommended core curriculum guidelines on culturally sensitive and competent health care. Family Medicine 1996;28:291–7; Culhane-Pera KA, Reif C, Egli E, Baker NJ, Kasserkert R. A curriculum for multicultural education in family medicine. Family Medicine 1997;29:719–23; Berlin EA, Fowkes WC. A teaching framework for cross-cultural health care. The Western Journal of Medicine 1983;139:934–8.
But although the practical skills necessary for culturally competent care have been specified and discussed at length in the prevailing literature, the sorts of governing attitudes clinicians ought to develop in conjunction with these skills have received far less attention. Little has been offered beyond a few stock recommendations that clinicians ought to have a respectful attitude toward the different behaviors and values of patients and their families, and that clinicians should tolerate cultural diversity in a pluralistic society.4
See note 3, Like et al. 1996; see note 3, Culhane-Pera et al. 1997.
This last point underscores a serious issue facing clinicians who are committed to the value of cultural competence but who remain uncertain about how permissive they ought to be of practices they would not hesitate to speak out against were they not performed by persons from a different culture. Uncertainty in this regard can be especially pronounced when it comes to cross-cultural ethical disagreements on hot button issues like the importance of medical truth telling, the significance of patient autonomy, and the moral worth of decisionmaking styles that preserve patriarchal family dynamics. As commentators have noted in the bioethics literature, it is not unusual for culturally diverse patients and/or their families to differ considerably from clinicians in their beliefs about the ethical dimensions of patient care.5
See, for example, Macklin R. Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine. New York: Oxford University Press; 1999; Blackhall L, Murphy ST, Frank G, Michel V, Azen S. Ethnicity and attitudes toward patient autonomy. JAMA 1995;274:820–5; Tanida N. Bioethics is subordinate to morality in Japan. Bioethics 1996;10:202–1; Fan R. Self-determination vs. family-determination: Two incommensurable principles of autonomy. Bioethics 1997;11:309–22; Surbone A. Truth-telling to the patient. JAMA 1992;268:1661–2; Hyun I. Waiver of informed consent, cultural sensitivity, and the problem of unjust families and traditions. Hastings Center Report 2002;32:14–22.
Suppose a newly immigrated Vietnamese woman with chronic pelvic pain is accompanied by her husband who adamantly forbids anyone on the medical staff from performing a pelvic exam. Through an interpreter he explains that it is customary in their region of Vietnam for husbands to make medical decisions for their wives and that no respectable husband would allow nonemergency procedures as immodest as a gynecological exam. Although the woman remains anxious about her health, she declares her acceptance of her husband's decisions. What moral attitudes should guide clinicians as they try to negotiate this woman's medical care?
I believe it is safe to say that most observers would be deeply troubled by the sexual politics suggested in this scenario, regardless of the cultural heritage of the couple in question. Nevertheless, many clinicians may question whether the apparent cross-cultural character of ethical differences like the one above provides them with a reason not to interfere with—much less gently challenge—the choices made by culturally diverse patients and their families. Would it be correct for clinicians to adopt a more permissive attitude toward such cross-cultural ethical differences? Aside from legal and practical limitations, where might the boundaries of cross-cultural ethical tolerance lie?
These questions are of practical relevance for clinicians striving to provide culturally competent care, because people's culturally embedded ethical beliefs can vector into medical decisionmaking as much as their cultural beliefs about illness and effective medicine. Indeed, these philosophical questions are as important for clinicians to ponder as questions concerning how best to negotiate different explanatory models of disease. In the next few paragraphs, I offer my own philosophical analysis of what cultural competence may require of clinicians as moral agents and moral evaluators.6
Like most philosophers, I use the terms ethics and morality interchangeably—likewise with the adjectives ethical and moral.
In asking where the limits of cross-cultural ethical tolerance lie, one must begin with the normative reasons supporting the value of cross-cultural tolerance itself. Notably, it is at this antecedent level that the threat of ethical relativism first emerges, for many observers might suppose that ethical relativism provides the most obvious and direct justification for the kind of tolerance we are now exploring.
It is easy to see why some might be tempted to draw this conclusion. Ethical relativism is the doctrine that the moral rightness of actions is determined solely by the accepted norms of the individual actor or evaluator's social group.7
To be more precise, this is a version of relativism philosophers sometimes refer to as group ethical relativism. There is another version of relativism called individual ethical relativism, which is the position that the moral rightness of actions varies according to the personal norms of the individual actor, regardless of whether these norms are shared by members of his own group. For the purposes of this article, I focus on group ethical relativism, not individual ethical relativism.
- Ethical relativism makes it possible for an action to be morally right for the members of one group but not morally right for others, provided the groups in question accept different norms. That is, the moral worth of an action is wholly dependent on whom the actors or evaluators happen to be; it does not rest on a standard existing independently of what is actually accepted by any particular group.
- Because the moral worth of actions is always relative to the norms of one's social milieu, it would be a mistake for one to judge actions of another group's members by the standards of one's own group. To judge others in this way would be to misunderstand the nature of morality itself, or so ethical relativists would have us believe.
Given these two claims, some may find the doctrine of ethical relativism instructive for considering how to respond to cross-cultural ethical disagreements. Together, these claims suggest that neither party in a cross-cultural disagreement is wrong in affirming its own ethical position, for there is no neutral perspective from which any of the disputants can claim a moral upper hand. From the standpoint of ethical relativism, then, it appears that clinicians would be justified in permitting culturally diverse patients and their families to act on their different ethical beliefs. Furthermore, clinicians would be justified in doing so regardless of whether they find these beliefs personally disagreeable.8
Astute readers may notice some philosophical flaws hidden in this relativistic position. I unpack these problems below.
Obviously, much hinges on whether one is persuaded by the doctrine of ethical relativism. Clinicians who are convinced of ethical relativism may believe it sensible to allow a considerably large range of behaviors for their culturally diverse patients and/or their families.9
It is crucial to note that the ethical relativist's position here must not be confused with the position that clinicians ought to respect the autonomy of their culturally diverse patients. I elaborate on this distinction below.
Answering these questions is complicated because there are different varieties of ethical relativism. Therefore, I next identify those varieties potentially relevant for clinical cultural competence and explain some of their philosophical challenges. I start with a type of ethical relativism that is strongly suggested by a commitment to clinical cultural competence—what philosophers call descriptive ethical relativism.
Descriptive ethical relativism is the position that, as a matter of fact, people from different societies often accept different ethical norms and thus disagree about many moral issues. The cosmopolitan shadings of descriptive ethical relativism should be familiar to many observers, especially because the chief exponents of this view have been well-traveled authors such as the ancient Greek historian Herodotus and early 20th century anthropologists like William Graham Sumner and Ruth Benedict. Although the boundaries between cultures are much more porous in our modern global era than for these seminal authors, the worldview of descriptive ethical relativism still rings true. One need only consult one's own experiences abroad to produce a few exemplary observations of how people in different cultures sometimes seem to follow different ethical norms. Thus the basic claim behind descriptive ethical relativism is not new, nor is it very controversial.10
For some doubts about the truth of descriptive ethical relativism (also called descriptive cultural relativism), see Moody-Adams M. The empirical underdetermination of descriptive cultural relativism. In: Moody-Adams M. Fieldwork in Familiar Places. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1997:28–43.
Indeed, descriptive ethical relativism helps provide the very starting point for this article. That is, descriptive ethical relativism is presupposed whenever clinicians wonder whether a commitment to clinical cultural competence requires that they be especially tolerant of cross-cultural ethical differences. Because a call for greater clinical cultural competence is premised on the belief that people's ethical values can be profoundly shaped by their particular cultural traditions and upbringings, those responding to this call implicitly accept descriptive ethical relativism to some degree or another.11
There may be good reasons to accept this premise, for linguistic and psychological studies have suggested that people in different societies tend to organize their everyday experiences using the conceptual lens provided by their own cultural backgrounds. See Edel M, Edel A. Anthropology and Ethics. Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas; 1959:117–9.
It is important, however, that descriptive ethical relativism should not be confused with the more radical claim that the moral worth of people's actions is wholly determined by the accepted norms of their respective social groups. The latter is a distinctly different form of ethical relativism that philosophers call normative ethical relativism. Unlike descriptive ethical relativism, which is essentially an observational account of peoples' different ethical beliefs, normative ethical relativism is a theoretical account of the ethical validity of people's actions and judgments. This bolder version of ethical relativism holds that an action is right if and only if it accords with the norms of the agent's group.
At first glance, normative ethical relativism appears to support a high degree of cross-cultural ethical tolerance. Normative ethical relativism, if accepted, makes it possible for actions to be right for members of one group but not for members of another. Also, if accepted, it makes a person's moral evaluations and judgments valid only in relation to the norms of that person's own group. Drawing on these suppositions, some commentators might argue that clinicians should adopt a nonjudgmental moral attitude toward the behaviors of culturally diverse patients and their families. Furthermore, some might argue that clinicians should resist interfering with actions that are approved by these individuals' cultural norms. In summary, it may appear to many that normative ethical relativism justifies a very high degree of cross-cultural ethical tolerance on the part of clinicians (or anyone else for that matter).
On closer inspection, however, I believe the justificatory approach outlined above falls short for two key reasons. The first problem is that, according to normative ethical relativism, the rightness of actions and the validity of moral evaluations rest crucially on there being clearly demarcated sets of group norms to act as points of moral reference. Unfortunately, there is no compelling reason to assume from the outset that the only group norms that matter for this purpose are those that cluster people into different cultural groups. The complicating issue here of course is that people can (and often do) belong or self-identify with other social groups that exist alongside or within their own culture. Within any given cultural group, for instance, there are different social classes, peer groups, families, and the like that are not uniquely captured under the general cultural group classification.
Additionally, the group norms that help define people's various extra- and intracultural associations can often stand in conflict with one another. Normative ethical relativism does not provide a way to prioritize which among a person's possible array of accepted group norms should serve as his or her point of moral reference. Due to this indeterminacy, it would be quite arbitrary to pick any single one of these clusters of group norms (including people's cultural norms) to set the ethical value of people's actions and evaluations.12
I would argue, furthermore, that unless this indeterminacy problem is resolved, normative ethical relativism faces a potential conceptual incoherence. A strange result occurs in the case that a person belongs to different groups that have conflicting sets of social norms. For such a person, it may be possible for some of his actions and judgments to be simultaneously both right and wrong, and this does not make any sense. This is surely different than saying that a particular action or judgment can be at the same time right for one person and wrong for another, which is what normative ethical relativists want to conclude. David Lyons also discusses this conceptual problem; see Lyons D. Ethical relativism and the problem of incoherence. Ethics 1976;86:107–21.
So, normative ethical relativism does not support cross-cultural ethical tolerance quite as unequivocally as many might suppose. This is because additional arguments are needed to establish that a person's cultural norms—above all of his other possible group norms—should determine the moral worth of his behavior and judgments.
Even if the necessary missing arguments above could be adequately supplied, there remain other damaging reasons why normative ethical relativism fails to deliver support for cross-cultural ethical tolerance. According to normative ethical relativism, persons would be right to permit the different ethical beliefs of others if and only if their own group norms support such tolerance. Notice, however, that there lies in this claim the danger that some people's group norms may not endorse cross-cultural tolerance whatsoever and may, in fact, demand the suppression of other cultural groups. In other words, the question of whether normative ethical relativism actually supports cross-cultural tolerance depends entirely on the actual group norms of the agent in question. Similarly, having a tolerant attitude toward the behaviors of persons from different cultural groups would be right if and only if the appraiser's own group accepts cross-cultural ethical tolerance as a guiding norm. There is no guarantee, of course, that this would be the case.
Neither is there any guarantee that group members will share all the same norms, let alone agree about their relative weights. Recall that it was the reality of intragroup differences that effectively sank the categorical approach to cultural competence. This same fact also encumbers the relativists' doctrine that the ethical value actions and judgments can be simply determined by reference to people's clearly shared group norms. That group members can disagree about their ethical norms undermines the supposition that any particular member's ethical judgments or actions will necessarily carry the normative force that ethical relativism promises.13
I thank Erika Blacksher for encouraging me to make this point more explicit.
So, what reasons support cross-cultural ethical tolerance if not normative ethical relativism? And where might the limits of such tolerance be drawn?
Cultural competence is an important issue for both medical and nonmedical reasons. From a medical point of view, one can argue that cultural competence is necessary for effective healthcare in a multicultural society. Cultural differences between the provider and patient, if left unattended, can threaten the quality of provider–patient communication. This threat carries worrisome implications, for studies have linked effective provider–patient communication to greater patient satisfaction, improved patient adherence to recommendations, and better health outcomes.14
Stewart M, Brown JB, Boon H, Galajda J, Meredith L, Sangster M. Evidence on patient-doctor communication. Cancer Prevention Control 1999;3:25–30; Novak D. Therapeutic aspects of the clinical encounter. In: Lipkin Jr M, Putnam SM, Lazare A, eds. The Medical Interview: Clinical Care, Education, and Research. New York: Springer-Verlag; 1995:32–49.
Committee on Quality Health Care in America. Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2001; Smedly BD, Stith AY, Nelson AR, eds. Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2003.
This rationale accounts for only part of the story. There is also a deep-seated moral commitment underlying the aforementioned medical, instrumental value of cultural competence. Accepting the value of cultural competence in healthcare involves (along with other beliefs) a fundamental normative belief in the equal moral worth of all persons. This fundamental regulative ideal entails that, from the point of view of healthcare professionals who ascribe to this belief, the health and well-being of each patient is believed to be of equal importance, regardless of cultural differences. To provide culturally competent care is to provide as much as possible patient-specific care across a culturally diverse patient population—an approach to care that, in turn, is grounded in an equal and substantial moral concern for the well-being of all patients. Typically, these deep-seated moral commitments are unstated assumptions in people's accepting the value of cultural competence. Nevertheless, it is important to be reminded of their essential role in motivating the call for greater cultural competence in healthcare, for it is on the basis of the equal moral worth of persons and patient-specific care that cross-cultural ethical tolerance can best be justified and delimited.
To elaborate this last point, believing in the equal moral worth of persons and their well-being entails that we treat persons with equal respect. One way we show equal respect is by allowing others to be different from us, especially when they disagree with us, even if we think they are wrong. This is just what it means to be tolerant. In other words, tolerance is, at heart, simply a manner of treating others as one's moral equals. Equal respect leads us to allow personal differences because each person has an interest in living his or her life as he or she sees fit. To be tolerant means to be willing to live peacefully with those who see the world differently (assuming their views do not include our dominance or elimination). Notice that there is nothing in the concept of tolerance itself that requires us to believe that everybody's beliefs and ethical norms are equally valid. If we did not think that some beliefs and norms were better than others, then there would be nothing left for us to tolerate.
I believe the analysis I have just sketched can support cross-cultural ethical tolerance much more adequately than the line of justification offered by normative ethical relativism. Much of the appeal of normative ethical relativism seems to come from the perception that different cultural groups can have different moral norms and can get along at least as well with their norms as we do with ours. This perception is often followed by the idea that it is wrong for us to be intolerant of other people's cultures and to impose our own ways on them. Unfortunately, this last claim does not at all follow from the perception above. This is because normative ethical relativism eliminates our need to be tolerant in the first place by denying that we could ever legitimately evaluate other groups' beliefs and practices as wrong. If other group members could never be wrong in affirming their own norms, then tolerance would be an empty virtue.
In a multicultural society such as ours, tolerating others' differences can be a challenge. Sometimes we are not sure what to do when faced with the different practices of another culture, especially when they offend our moral sensibilities and run counter to our own moral norms. Many of us may attempt to explain away cross-cultural ethical differences by pointing to people's unreflective superstitions or false assumptions. Unfortunately such an approach is not always possible or effective. For example, how would healthcare providers convince the Vietnamese husband that a pelvic exam for his wife is not really “immodest”? Worse yet, by taking a “factual correction” approach to solving cross-cultural ethical disputes, we run the risk of glossing over the possibility that certain behaviors in other cultures can have different ethical meanings and that we may simply lack the ability at present to understand and evaluate these practices. I believe this is the grain of truth to be salvaged from the doctrine of ethical relativism, a lesson that should be taken away by clinicians striving to become culturally competent. For a clinician to ignore the need to understand patients' culturally embedded ethical beliefs related to health and healthcare would be at least as bad as his or her ignoring the need to elicit and understand patients' explanatory models of health and disease.
Of course, acknowledging the need to understand better the ethical practices of other cultural groups is not the same as accepting normative ethical relativism. On the contrary, being aware of the meanings different behaviors can have in other cultures is a necessary step toward one's preventing individuals from accepting and acting on brutally unjust cultural norms and distributions of power. For example, it may be the case that the Vietnamese husband mentioned above is accurately representing his wife's actual preferences by refusing the pelvic exam on her behalf. Or it could be the case that he believes his wife's body is his property to decide what will happen to it as he pleases. It is crucial to know which of these two possible norms is motivating the husband's behavior. The moral commitments underlying clinical cultural competence would justify the healthcare team's permitting the first scenario but not the second. Indeed, with respect to the latter case, clinicians would be committed to preventing the husband from acting on such a sexist norm.
Although the claim above is sure to strike some observers as bold and surprising, it follows from the same basic ethical commitment that underlies the call for clinical cultural competence and cross-cultural ethical toleration—namely, the fundamental ethical belief in the equal moral worth of persons. Indeed, the thrust of this last claim is demanded by one's commitment to moral equality and the ethical beliefs that support the need for cultural competence in healthcare. The limits of tolerance lie at injustice and unequal moral treatment.
So what, based on people's equal moral worth, does a commitment to cultural competence require of clinicians as moral agents and evaluators? First, it requires that clinicians be open-minded and tolerant of their patients' culturally diverse ethical beliefs and behaviors, but only to the extent that these ethical beliefs and behaviors are not premised on or entail a denial of the equal moral worth of persons. It is important to notice that this last qualification is a crucial addition to the cultural competence education recommendations outlined above that concern clinicians' attitudes toward cultural differences.
Second, in cases where there are cross-cultural disputes over the ethical course of patient care, such as disagreements about medical truth telling or the patient's decisionmaking authority, clinicians should gently yet firmly challenge the ethical beliefs of their patients and their patients' families, especially when these beliefs renounce the equal moral importance of the patient's health and well-being.
And third, clinicians should call upon their hospital ethics service to invite other moral deliberators and effective intermediaries, such as community members and other nonhospital personnel, to converse openly with the patient and his or her family. Unlike the hands-off approach to cross-cultural ethical differences suggested by normative ethical relativism, the approach I am sketching here does not shy away from encouraging a substantive ethical dialogue between the disagreeing parties.
In summary, the goals of this latter approach are mutual understanding and cross-cultural ethical tolerance within limits. Clinicians are not morally obligated to allow patients and/or their families to act on fundamentally unjust ethical norms, and clinicians may even have a positive moral duty to prevent this kind of behavior when they can.
Undoubtedly, clinicians may find it difficult and uncomfortable to initiate a deep and meaningful cross-cultural ethical dialogue with their patients. Details of this complex process should be explored on another occasion. Rather, the point of this article was to shed philosophical light on the ethical norms and governing attitudes clinicians must adopt when they take the value of cultural competence seriously. Other commentators who are interested in the value of cultural competence in healthcare and cultural competence education should consider much more thoroughly than I have in this article how a fundamental belief in moral equality ought to translate into clinical practice. What it means practically to honor another's equal moral worth is a complicated matter. Additional important work would be to clarify what steps clinicians should take to help resolve deep and persistent cross-cultural ethical conflicts. Also, the extent to which moral equality is itself a culturally embedded ideal needs to be explored, along with the effect such a determination may have on my preceding arguments. These last suggestions indicate that necessary analyses of the normative issues surrounding clinical cultural competence are barely in their infancy.
