As evinced by their titles, these books share a concern with the trajectory of contemporary liberal (or progressive) politics; however, the respective focus, methods, and approach of each book are quite different. Reaching for a New Deal, edited by Theda Skocpol and Lawrence Jacobs, recruits an array of prominent political scientists to investigate—and ultimately explain—the wayward course of progressive policymaking at the federal level during President Barack Obama's first three years in office. Amy Dean and David Reynolds's A New New Deal searches for evidence of, and seeks a blueprint for, progressive initiatives led by organized labor and its allies at the local and regional levels. In the end, these books raise shared, provocative questions about the meaning and prospects of progressive reforms today.
As the editors explain in their far-reaching and insightful introduction, Reaching for a New Deal seeks to apply political science theories and methods to “make sense of the Obama presidency so far” (p. 5)—in particular, to explain both the striking successes and the notable limits of Obama's first three years in office. Additionally, the contributors to the volume attempt to shed light on one of the most curious features of his presidency, namely, that Obama's remarkable programmatic successes—which have exceeded those of every Democratic president since Lyndon Johnson (if not Franklin Roosevelt himself)—have not garnered his administration greater accolades from the public.
The volume's focus is on national policy, with each chapter written by a well-known scholar about a different programmatic area. An attractive feature of this volume—and, especially, of its policy-centric organization—is that it permits analysis of both policy “successes” and “failures.” In the realm of policy “successes,” Skocpol and Jacobs tackle the epic battle over health-care reform, Suzanne Mettler explains the transformation of the student-loan sector, Daniel Carpenter assesses financial regulation reform, and Lorraine McDonnell analyzes Obama's innovative education initiative, Race to the Top. In the area of policy “failures,” Dorian Warren dissects Obama's inability to secure major labor reform legislation, John Skrentny discusses the administration's failure to achieve immigration reform, and Judith Layzer analyzes the stalled progress of clean-energy reform. The pivotal conflicts over taxes and the budget also assessed in an important chapter by Andrea Campbell.
Although each author has his or her unique perspective on the politics of programmatic reform during the Obama administration, the chapters share the view, characteristic of historical-institutional and American political development scholarship, that a configurative approach that takes account of numerous causal factors is necessary in order to make sense of Obama's policy achievements and disappointments. As Skocpol and Jacobs (p. 8, emphasis added) note: “Our challenge is to develop a real-time holistic approach that looks at all of the maneuvering actors, and the opportunities and constraints they have faced within evolving institutional and political contexts.” Several common themes come to the fore.
First, the chapters reveal the powerful active role played by government policies (created by both Democrats and Republicans) or, alternatively, by government inaction in empowering relatively narrow interests, from health insurers to student lenders to energy producers to the financial services industry, thereby creating substantial obstacles to the president's progressive ambitions. Even in areas where Obama and the Democratic Congress achieved historic reforms, they were almost always forced to offer substantial concessions to entrenched interests as the price of victory. As a result, landmark reforms, such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, fell far short of progressive expectations.
Second, the chapters highlight the programmatic implications of the sharp political polarization that characterizes contemporary American politics at the national level. Unlike Roosevelt or Johnson, who enjoyed overwhelming partisan support in Congress as well as the acquiescence of many Republicans in the first few years of their respective administrations, Barack Obama had a much smaller partisan margin, and he faced much more vigorous opposition from a very conservative Republican caucus from the start. As a result—especially given the de facto requirement to achieve a supermajority in the Senate—Obama's prospects for policy success were virtually guaranteed to disappoint the high expectations among his Democratic supporters that accompanied his election. The president was dealt some important defeats and his successes were invariably partisan (rather than consensual) achievements, sometimes accomplished through unorthodox maneuvers, such as the budget reconciliation process or administrative rulemaking.
Third, and related to the previous two points, the chapters underscore the centrality of comparatively undemocratic policy processes—from lawmaking through administrative rulemaking to the close connections among high-ranking administrative officials, congressional committees, and representatives of major industries—that characterize policymaking in the modern administrative state. Even as Obama's election ostensibly marked a major break from the Bush administration, with its close ties to business groups and its imperious invocation of the “unitary executive,” the chapters in this volume strongly suggest the continuation of tight government-interest group relations and administrative aggrandizement during the Obama administration. Indeed, in areas where Obama accomplished important reforms, such as health care, student loans, and financial regulation, many of the most important policy details remain to be worked out over time through closed-door negotiations, administrative rulemaking, and court decisions, all of which privilege a relatively insular crowd of interest groups, regulators, lawyers, and judges. Moreover, in areas where progressive proposals met with limited legislative success, such as in labor law, education, and energy policy, the Obama administration has used unilateral administrative maneuvers to achieve the president's objectives. Even as Obama accomplished important programmatic “Changes We Can Believe In,” his presidency has not altered the broader institutional and structural environment in which these policy changes have occurred.
Whereas the edited volume focuses on national policymaking, Dean and Reynolds's A New New Deal views regional and local policymaking as deserving of greater consideration than is often granted. According to the authors, the economic region—comprised of a city, the suburbs, and surrounding nonmetropolitan areas—is the core building block of the economy, providing integrated labor, customer and supply markets, and symbiotic firm networks. Consequently, they contend, organized labor and its progressive allies should look to regional policymaking to accomplish their objectives; indeed, the avowed purpose of the book is to present “a strategy for building power for working people in America's metropolitan regions—and ultimately in the country as a whole” (p. 1). Much of the book is concerned with developing and illustrating—though not systematically testing—a tripartite “regional power building” model that, they argue, will help progressive, labor-led coalitions achieve important regional economic and social goals, such as higher wages, better health and pensions benefits, more affordable housing, and so forth.
According to Dean and Reynolds, the first “leg” of a successful regional power-building strategy is the development of a coherent regional policy agenda. They argue that local and regional labor organizations should invest in “think and act” tanks that challenge the conventional economic growth frames posited by businesses and their political allies, and they highlight the submerged costs of traditional regional growth strategies focused on low-wage, temporary work and/or special tax subsidies for employers. Think-and-act tanks should also develop policy agendas that go beyond traditional workplace issues and appeal to broader progressive constituencies, emphasizing themes such as health care, education, and affordable housing. Indeed, the second leg of Dean and Reynolds' strategy is that regional and local labor organizations should attempt to build durable, and institutionalized, alliances with other progressive groups in pursuit of long-term objectives (rather than merely short-term, “one-off” coalitions that disband after accomplishing their immediate goal). The third leg of their strategy is “building aggressive political action,” by which they mean both establishing capacity to mobilize grassroots supporters during and between elections, and generating the ability to recruit, groom, and run sympathetic candidates for office.
This book offers an insightful analysis of the “regional-ness” of contemporary economic development, as well as of the challenges and opportunities presented by this form of economic organization. The tripartite model of regional power building is also nicely illustrated through vignettes based on Dean's personal experience as an AFL-CIO leader in the Silicon Valley and Reynolds' research in California, Michigan, and elsewhere, though a rigorous empirical test of the model is not provided and remains to be undertaken. Additionally, Dean and Reynolds' book is astute in emphasizing the importance of broader coalition building and grassroots mobilization in organized labor's efforts to match conservatives' impressive grassroots strength and achieve progressive objectives.
Each of these books offers important—albeit quite different—contributions to our understanding of the past development and future prospects of liberal (or progressive) reforms in the United States. Considered together, however, they also raise provocative questions for scholars and advocates generally sympathetic to progressive policymaking. I found it striking that each book contained the phrase “New Deal” in its title and could not help but wonder what the significance of this was. Is the phrase invoked as a specific programmatic agenda, a blueprint for future policymaking, or is it a simply a handy phrase, a kind of shorthand for a broadly liberal, pro-government perspective? After all, not only was the original New Deal comprised of numerous, and conflicting, programmatic impulses, it was also marred by racial and gender inequities, which were only gradually, and incompletely, remediated and it was wedded to a powerful administrative presidency that was effectively redeployed by conservatives to accomplish objectives inimical to progressives' interests. I think that both of these excellent books could have wrestled more with the ambiguities of the New Deal and perhaps provided a better sense of what the “Next Deal” (for lack of a better term) should look like.
An equally important question raised—though not fully answered—by both books is whether lasting progressive policy change is possible without broader structural transformations of economic and governing institutions. Can durable progressive changes be secured when international economic trends (globalization, the primacy of finance and banking, high returns to education, etc.) and domestic governing trends (especially the growing role of money in politics and the tight linkages between interest groups and elected officials in both parties) seem to favor more conservative outcomes? Or are progressives tinkering around the edges of a fundamentally conservative order?
