International organizations and treaties are critically important for “maintaining international order and enhancing international prosperity and global security” (p. 252). They do so by assisting “the integration and socialization of nonliberal states in the international community” (p. 252). In Beyond Compliance, Ann Kent argues that earlier pessimistic predictions about Beijing's participation in international organizations are unwarranted. Since 1971 when China regained its seat in the United Nations, it has generally played a constructive role in multilateral diplomacy. As the book's title suggests, China's behavior has often extended beyond formal compliance with international agreements to a “deeper” cooperation involving changing attitudes and domestic reform.

China's support for, and implementation of, international norms and principles have, however, been uneven. Beijing's participation in security regimes like the Conference on Disarmament has been the most remarkable, altering its basic attitudes and policies on such matters as nuclear nonproliferation and verification procedures. It has also worked productively with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, introducing tangible domestic policy and institutional adjustments. It has, moreover, participated actively in the United Nations Environmental Program, albeit with more constructive steps on ozone protection than the on amelioration of climate change. It has been the least “compliant” on human rights, such as those protecting the freedom of association and physical integrity (espoused respectively by the International Labor Organization and the UN Committee Against Torture).

The book chronicles China's evolving participation in these leading international organizations and global conventions. Its case studies offer illuminating narratives on China's transformation from a strident critic and resentful outsider in the 1950s and 1960s to its current role as a contributing member and important stakeholder in multilateral diplomacy. It is hard to disagree with the author's conclusion that “China has made enormous progress” and that “its acceptance of, and integration into, the international system have been nothing short of extraordinary” (pp. 222–23).

Explanation of this phenomenon, however, engages the selection question. Do states with a predisposition to support multilateral diplomacy choose to become members of international organizations in the first place? If so, their cooperation is already explained by their initial decision to join international organizations, rather than by their subsequent experience of being members. Similarly, there is a debate about whether international treaties simply give states that have already made the necessary compliance adjustments a means to signal their separation from others that have not yet made this investment, or whether these accords actually constrain states to behave differently than they would have in the absence of their treaty commitment.

The author makes the causal claim that socialization and internalization (rather than, say, China's leadership turnover or evolving domestic and foreign environment) have been responsible for Beijing's changing attitudes and behavior. Arguing that because China represents a “least likely” case, its experience should support the proposition that international organizations can transform “rogue states” into responsible members of the international community. Yet one faces the apparent paradox that some “most likely” cases (e.g., the United States, Australia) have sometimes joined China, for example, when they objected to the Optional Protocol on the Convention Against Torture, the fundamental principles and rights declared by the International Labor Organization, and the Kyoto Protocol. If the most likely and least likely states respond similarly to global accords, socialization and internalization have evidently been trumped by some other variable(s). Moreover, the attitudes and behavior of the most likely states point occasionally in the direction of decreasing support for international organizations and conventions (besides the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Land Mines Convention, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Law of the Sea Convention come to mind), and therefore tend to contradict the hypothesized influence of socialization and internalization processes over time. Just as this review was being written, an overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to protect the rights of indigenous peoples over the objections of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

One is thus reminded that whether a state is in or out of step with the international community and the extent to which its behavior is compliant (or cooperative) depends on the issue selected for study. Cross-national and cross-issue variations provide a basis for causal inferences and empirical generalizations. Naturally, compliance and cooperation are relative matters, and should be evaluated in light of the adjustment and opportunity costs that a state is willing and able to bear, given its capacity and starting point. In undertaking disarmament, environmental conservation, or political and economic reforms, these costs and the efforts required for conforming to international norms and principles also vary significantly across countries.

The “dependent variable” in this book seems overdetermined. Multiple causal influences are operating, and the observed phenomenon is compatible with several alternative explanations (for example, “process-based theories—managerialism, transnational legal process, constructivism, and … related IR theory of persuasion” [p. 246], in addition to a desire for “legitimization,” “rational choice,” and the pursuit of “sovereignty” and “self-interest” [p. 222]). Multiple plausible motivations imply that China is an unexceptional rather than least likely state. There have been other recalcitrant or reluctant states that were “outsiders” to international organizations (e.g., the Concert of Europe for post-Napoleon France, and the League of Nations for Bolshevik Russia, fascist Italy, imperial Japan, and isolationist America). If one expands the list of “rogue” or “revolutionary” states, the explanations offered for China may have limited generalizability or require further clarification.

Beyond Compliance provides a balanced account of China's increasing engagement with international organizations and its support for global accords. The single-country case-study approach presents a useful corrective to statistical analyses that rely on large samples of countries with superficial data coding. At the same time, there also ought to be a place for careful analysis that compares China's record with its peers, such as the other members of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, and India) or the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. Such comparisons can help to clarify the extent to which China is different from or similar to other states in its conduct on the world stage.