Not even Léon Walras, the first economist who seriously tried to model an economy guided by an invisible hand, believed that it describes our actual world (see Elements of Pure Economics [1874] 1954, trans. William Jaffé, pp. 256–57). In the imaginary best of all possible worlds, individuals maximize utility as they conceive it, all characteristics of goods are transparent, contracts covering any future contingency are honored, no one has power to distort market prices, and everyone is paid his or her true productive value. But the Walrasian ideal anchors the powerful neoclassical paradigm. The paradigm treats our world as a series of “imperfect” departures from that ideal, as monopolistic firms raise prices or lenders cannot discern borrowers' real intentions, as coalitions organize to grab subsidies or politicians spend to buy support.
A vast range of investigators—institutionalists, Marxists, some Keynesians, and the list goes on—hold that the Walrasian perfect-market model provides a fundamentally invalid framework for understanding market and society. Kaushik Basu and Daniel B. Klein jump into this fray from opposite sides. In Knowledge and Coordination, Klein charges economists with reducing Adam Smith's moral and pragmatic vision of the invisible hand to barren techniques. He would reinvigorate an eighteenth-century liberalism. In Beyond the Invisible Hand, Basu embraces the neoclassical paradigm but charges that what he calls the “Invisible Hand Theorem” (p. 19) is applied far too literally. Considering how often modeling actual situations requires dropping perfect-market assumptions, he argues that the invisible hand fails in a far broader set of circumstances than is generally recognized.
The failures of the invisible hand that Basu evokes usually involve the norms of a group, a race, or a society. He uses game theory, which departs from the perfect-market model in considering a limited number of actors who individually influence results. He shows how small differences among them can lead to radically different group outcomes. For example, in Chapter 6, he shows how a group can develop cooperative norms, such as respecting contracts—so crucial for economic development—or uncooperative norms, such as habitually ignoring contracts. The difference may lie not in the typical individual's characteristics but in whether the “game” the group plays gravitates toward a good or bad result. He also shows how just a few aggressive individuals can tip a race toward acting aggressively against another race, when it would otherwise act cooperatively.
Another example: Basu takes on Milton Friedman's claim (Capitalism and Freedom, 1962) that the operation of markets inherently erodes ancient ills such as racial discrimination. Friedman argues that firms that turn down qualified employees because of race will have a less skilled or costlier workforce and thus fail to compete with firms that do not discriminate. Basu counters that mere belief that a caste of entrepreneurs is more productive allows them to more easily sign contracts with lenders and customers. Since serving customers requires investors, and securing investors requires customers, that belief itself makes the caste more productive.
Basu takes a particular view of utility. Nineteenth-century economists such as W. Stanley Jevons saw utility as narrowly economistic, leaving questions about “moral right and wrong” to philosophers (The Theory of Political Economy, 3rd ed., 1888, 27). By the early twentieth century, after psychologists had demolished the notion that people are utilitarian, economists decided that preferences should capture all desires or aversions, “whether material or spiritual, personal or communal, present or future, actual or ideal” (Michael Mandler, Dilemmas in Economic Theory, 1999, 116). Now economists just asked—and this remains the official view—that we know if we prefer bundle of goods A or B (based on material, cultural, moral, or any other criteria), and if we chose A over B and B over C, we must chose A over C.
Basu reverts toward the nineteenth-century concept, but with a twist. His agents distinguish economistic “utility” from “social” goals such as altruism (pp. 101–4). Since he claims to base his argument on contemporary theory, some clear defense of his method seems in order. There is not much of one. Still, his models provide an illuminating “allegory,” as he puts it (p. 177), highlighting real-world possibilities.
In discussing globalization, inequality, and democracy, Basu treads on thinner ground. First, he concedes too much to claims for globalization: “The potential benefits caused by the easier flow of goods, services, software producers, and labor are enormous” (p. 167). Neoclassical theory says no such thing. For example, Arnold Harberger calculated that if Chile eliminated 50% tariffs across the board, it would secure a mere one-time GDP boost of 2.5% (“The Fundamentals of Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries: Using the Resources at Hand More Effectively,” Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Review 49 [no. 2, 1959]: 134–46.)
Basu next uses oversimplified game models to argue that globalization “erodes each national government's power to have an equity-conscious policy” (p. 175). Maybe so; maybe not. As gauged by the standard Gini index, Brazilian income inequality worsened from the late 1960s through the late 1980s under military rule but subsequently improved 10% under civilian rule, when globalization was more advanced. (Calculated from the average of relevant Gini indices in World Institute for Development Economics Research, World Income Inequality Database, 2.0c.)
Finally, the author argues that norms can change globalization for the better. Just as practices such as apartheid, once accepted, are now deemed grossly wrong, so, too, “vastly better systems of society than what prevail today are, in principle, possible” (pp. 201–11). One hopes he is right, but his economic apparatus contributes little to the argument.
Klein attacks “flat-talking” economists, whether they often support market regulation, like Kenneth Arrow, or not, like George Stigler (p. 148). They all assume that the agents in their models “interpret things in a definite and final way” that all the agents share and never change (p. 10). Flattening knowledge into information bits trivializes the value of free markets (p. 11): “[A]ll that freedom accomplishes is individual optimization within given conditions…. Agents act like machines; they ‘optimize.’”
Klein quotes from a W. Somerset Maugham story about a verger (p. 14). Fired for being illiterate, the verger seeks a cigarette to comfort himself but notices that no shops on the street sell cigarettes. It occurs to him that a tobacco shop might do well. “That's an idea,” he says, with a sudden start. “Strange 'ow things come to you when you least expect it.” The verger opens a tobacco shop, builds a chain, and earns a fortune. It was an entrepreneurial moment. The verger did not choose from some existing set of options. Rather, a perception leapt from the back of his mind into his consciousness, reinterpreting the world that had been there all along.
Klein would hardly be surprised that Harberger found small benefits for tearing down trade barriers because, he maintains, mechanical models trivialize the real gains from a liberal economy: the incentives it gives individuals to envision the world anew and the possibilities to realize their visions. If the verger had lived in a planned economy—or a mixed economy that declared the zoning off-limits for a tobacco shop—he might never have conceived or realized his idea.
Further, Klein argues, automaton agents fool economists into thinking that they know everything about economies, providing false confidence about regulating or planning them. It is the error Friedrich Hayek famously branded “pretense of knowledge.”
Klein distinguishes “mutual” from “concatenate” coordination. The terms are not easy to pin down; he spends two chapters on their nuances. But, in mutual coordination, participants consciously cooperate to adopt a convention. For example, it might be to drive on the right or the left—but not willy-nilly on either side.
In concatenate coordination, an external actor coordinates participants performing a constellation of activities. The coordination could be centralized, as when a factory owner manages operations, or spontaneous, as when skaters weave in and out, creating order on a rink. The skaters take conscious actions (avoiding collisions if possible) but do not consciously create the overall order. It just emerges as if orchestrated by, yes, an invisible hand. Whether the coordination concerns a skating rink or a liberal economy, there must be—or we must imagine—some “beholder and judge” whose invisible hand oversees it on moral as well as pragmatic grounds (p. 45).
The author cites a passage from Smith's earlier Theory of Moral Sentiments that eerily foreshadows his famous invisible hand quotation from the Wealth of Nations (p. 34): “‘[B]y acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence.’” The case for a liberal economy rests on our belief that some allegorical judge and beholder approves it.
Klein uses the distinction between concatenate and mutual coordination to counter some objections to the invisible hand. With the rise of game theory, economists usually think of coordination as mutual and fail to find it in a market economy. For example, Joseph Stiglitz cannot find mutual coordination among steel producers, so rejects the invisible hand (pp. 75–76). But the invisible hand, Klein reminds us, rests on concatenate coordination, coordinating conflict as well as cooperation from above, and does not depend on participants' mutual coordination.
Admitting a role for moral judgment does not absolve Klein from substantiating the case for free markets. He provides examples, but few seem convincing. For example, he argues for “free competition” in urban transit—not only among bus, taxi, and limo services but train lines as well. Who decides where the tracks are laid? And, since urban planners “can well argue” that partial privatization could yield “disjointed pieces, destructive competition and interloping” (p. 166), the author goes all out for privatizing streets, sidewalks, even local governance (p. 170). Pragmatic regulation might be necessary, he concedes, such as blocking whoever owns the street in front of Bill Gates's house from extorting “outrageous payments” from him (pp. 173–74). What about the owners of streets in front of others' houses? All urban streets are monopolies. How is this whole fantastic concatenation to work concretely?
Klein could analyze experiences. Governments have privatized everything from highways to airport security (not a notable success on 9/11). What went right; what went wrong? He coauthored an article discussing the “great concatenations of turnpike infrastructures” that private builders laid in the nineteenth century. How well did they succeed? Why did governments take them over?
Like colleagues such as George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz, Basu deploys the neoclassical paradigm to tell allegories about how the invisible hand fails. Contrary to the subtitle's claim, his is not a “new economics.” More important, if a paradigm is so easily contorted—if assuming a few imperfect deviations from its underlying framework will yield opposite results—why rely on it at all?
Klein's case for the invisible hand, resting ultimately on moral grounds, is uncontorted and direct. But since, like Smith, he concedes that pragmatic exceptions to the free-market ideal will always apply, what rationale underlies these exceptions? And why should we believe that the invisible hand works when they do not apply? It is hard to conceive an argument that would persuade skeptics or dissuade believers.
Knowledge and Coordination can be rough going because Klein often fails to define subtle terms clearly enough and then keeps circling back to remedy what he left muddy. These obstacles aside, the book should give serious pause to economists and political scientists who too readily posit a theoretical optimal world and then too credulously think that they can model the actual world by elaborating “imperfect” twists on it. Basu's more readable book uses some of the tools Klein dislikes but, in the stronger arguments, makes intuitive sense. Beyond the Invisible Hand will be useful to political economists who want to see how game theory can shed light on the ways that groups and races of rational actors may assume surprising dynamics. It could also be useful to policymakers who must justify arguments about group policies in standard economic terms. Both authors' contributions to political economy deserve to be taken seriously.
