It is hardest to mount a major effort when a problem still seems minor. Once the danger has fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier—but by then it may be too late.
The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 350
The Commission viewed American incapacity as a failure of imagination, but Coll makes it clear that the problem was much larger than that. At the heart of the matter lay the conflicts among the agendas of three of the principal outside actors in Afghanistan—the governments of the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—and the conflicted nature of each of those agendas. All three agreed that peace should be restored in Afghanistan and were prepared for a measure of cooperation among themselves in pursuing this objective. Beyond this, however, the three differed sharply in their view of the Taliban, on how to approach al-Qa

ida and Osama bin Laden, and on the nature and extent of the threat posed by Islamic extremism. In each capital, there were divisions of opinion, and differing, often hidden, agendas in play. Policymaking was further complicated by dissembling in interstate communication and by the withholding of access to essential information among and within the governments involved.
Coll's meticulous research and 200 interviews put ample flesh on the bare bones of the foregoing generalizations. He highlights the ambiguous position of Saudi Arabia, particularly that both Prince Turki al-Faisal, the kingdom's former intelligence chief and principal Saudi liaison with Pakistan, and the United States in supporting the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation. Prince Turki and his deputy, Ahmed Badeeb, had later financed the Taliban, and for this reason, the sincerity of the Prince's 1998 effort to get Taliban leader Mullah Omar to surrender Bin Laden has been questioned. The Prince nonetheless managed to maintain close working relations with the CIA while other elements of the Saudi establishment, notably Turki's uncle, Interior Minister Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz, were suspicious of the United States and rebuffed American requests for intelligence cooperation. Like everyone else involved in Afghanistan, the Saudis seemed to speak with more than one voice.
The Pakistani dimension of the problem was also complex. Whereas Saudi-American relations rested on the bedrock of American interest in Saudi oil, the central facts of Pakistan's relationship with the United States once the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan were the Pakistani nuclear program and the sanctions imposed by Washington on Pakistan as a result. Many in the Pakistani military, particularly in the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), were deeply committed to the Taliban, and in the hostile climate of U.S.–Pakistan relations in the 1990s, it was easy and natural for those officers to maintain an arms-length relationship with the United States and their erstwhile CIA collaborators and to continue supporting the Taliban. The country's political leadership, by contrast, feared the rise of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan and sought to mend fences with the United States. This effort continued even after the military gained ascendancy over the civilians by having Benazir Bhutto replaced as Prime Minister, but the Pakistan government did not pursue the American interest in the capture of Bin Laden as vigorously as Washington thought it could and should.
However, it is the American foreign policy process in all its complexity that is the main focus of Ghost Wars, with the CIA and its in-house and interagency battles receiving the most attention. The agency's Counterterrrorist Center advocated using the intelligence network and forces of the Afghan Tajik resistance leader and post-Soviet Defense Minister Ahmed Shah Massoud in an effort to capture or kill Bin Laden, and supported a small group of Massoud's agents assigned to the task. Within the agency, the center's activism was countered by the Directorate of Operations, which was more sensitive to the concerns of its erstwhile ISI partners. The ISI had supported Massoud's ethnic and political rival Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during and immediately after the Soviet occupation and later backed the Taliban in their successful campaign to oust Massoud and his forces from Kabul. At the interagency level, the CIA fought against State Department proposals for broadening the Afghan government beyond the resistance leaders who had fought the Soviets. Later, as Massoud became the most viable opponent of the Taliban and Bin Laden, the State Department argued that the United States should not take sides in the Afghan civil war. Meanwhile, the Defense Department opposed engagement in South Asia, and the Clinton White House, with the Iran-Contra debacle and its own controversial air strikes on Afghanistan and the Sudan in mind, tended to view most of the covert actions proposed with a jaundiced eye.
Coll's fluent account of these bureaucratic wars leads inexorably to the conclusion that before 9/11, the United States government was not capable of devoting the amount of effort and resources needed to counter the threat posed by Bin Laden and Islamic radicalism. The al-Qa

ida attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Tanzania, and Yemen were not enough to overcome American reluctance in the post-Cold War era to reengage seriously in South Asia and the Middle East. President Clinton's national security advisor believed that terrorism and al-Qa

ida should be the number one issue on President Bush's agenda. However, while in George Tenet's words, “the system was blinking red” in the summer of 2001, with intelligence pointing to an impending al-Qa

ida attack, that system was unable to marshal the evidence it was receiving into a case for pursuing any of the unattractive courses of action available. That case would be “evident to all” only after 9/11.
Coll's book is thus a “must-read” for scholars, diplomats, and others with a professional interest in the Middle East and South Asia, for students of U.S. foreign policy, and for anyone seeking to understand a remarkably important bit of world history. For those seeking to understand the region and the American interest, the book provides a wealth of historical material and insights into the personalities involved in the events leading to 11 September 2001. Equally important, it is the mother of all case studies of American foreign policy, showing both how difficult it is for those directly charged with making policy to decide on the best course of action and how the temper of the times and the concerns of other actors in and on the policy process can prevent such action from being taken until, to quote the 9/11 Commission, “the danger has fully materialized.” That happened on 11 September 2001, and by then, it was too late.
