Introduction
Among all the country situations examined or investigated by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), Guinea has garnered the least scholarly attention, with publications dedicated to the case only recently reaching double digits – a fact noted by the few scholars who have ventured to explore this understudied case (Chappell et al. Reference Chappell, Grey and Waller2013: 457; Calvet-Martínez & Barry Reference Calvet-Martínez and Barry2024: 139). This persistent neglect is both unfortunate and potentially detrimental to the International Criminal Court (ICC)'s institutional reputation, particularly given the longstanding scepticism surrounding its ability to end impunity and deter future atrocities. Given the scarcity of agreed-upon success stories in academic and policy circles, the question of whether the Guinea preliminary examination represents a success story for the ICC in whole or in part remains both timely and consequential (Caban Reference Caban2011: 215; Bocchese Reference Bocchese2021b: 283–4). Central to this inquiry is the concept of applied complementarity: did ICC scrutiny, through pressure and assistance, contribute to domestic authorities ultimately conducting trials? Former Chief Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo famously tied the principle of complementarity to the broader evaluation of the Rome Statute system, asserting that the absence of ICC trials – provided it results from the effective functioning of national courts – would represent a significant success for the Court (Moreno Ocampo Reference Moreno Ocampo2022: 86–7). Moreover, does the holding of these domestic trials represent a success of ICC's applied complementarity from the perspective of domestic stakeholders who are the primary recipients of its efforts and initiatives? With its access to primary data, this article is uniquely positioned to empirically test these claims while providing theoretical insights into the broader dynamics of complementarity. At its core, the study examines whether ICC involvement in Guinea – notably in response to the 28 September 2009 stadium massacre – had a tangible positive impact on domestic judicial efforts. This analysis employs a within-case approach to explore the interplay between the ICC's efforts and the actions of domestic authorities. The inquiry is divided into two distinct parts: first, it seeks to substantiate claims regarding the ICC's ability to pressure and assist Guinea's government in pursuing accountability at the domestic level. Second, it tests these claims by drawing on original interview data, including 25 in-person interviews conducted in Conakry in late spring 2023. These interviews, conducted with key national stakeholders, provide a nuanced view of the ICC's impact on Guinea's justice efforts.
Conceptually, this study also grapples with a critical question: can ICC scrutiny be examined in isolation from extra-legal factors? In the Guinean context, external pressures from the United Nations (UN), other international organisations, and major powers played significant roles in shaping successive governments' responses to ICC engagement. These pressures intersected with domestic political dynamics, including multiple regime changes over 13 years and state leaders' self-interest, shaped by their potential culpability in the massacre. By exploring these intertwined factors, this article underscores the importance of situating ICC interventions within their broader political and institutional contexts. Furthermore, this article's empirical contribution offers theoretical spillover effects for understanding complementarity. Scholars have often debated whether ‘positive complementarity’ – where the ICC actively encourages states to meet their obligations – is sufficient. Guinea provides an illustrative case where the ICC's efforts went beyond encouragement, reflecting what some scholars term ‘proactive complementarity’. While the ICC's coercive and collaborative strategies effectively compelled Guinea's authorities to act, interviewees largely failed to acknowledge the ICC's supportive role, focusing instead on its coercive power.
The conclusion drawn from this study highlights three major extra-legal factors that shaped Guinea's response to ICC scrutiny: first, external pressures exerted by international organisations and powerful nations; second, the destabilising effects of multiple regime changes, which, despite their challenges, created opportunities to reset and redefine ICC-state relations; and third, the self-interested calculations of state leaders based on their varying degrees of involvement in the 2009 massacre and their likelihood of being indicted by the ICC. Together, these findings emphasise the complex interplay between ICC actions and domestic politics, illustrating both the potential and the limits of applied complementarity. Ultimately, the Guinea preliminary examination offers a nuanced success story for the ICC, albeit one tempered by the significant influence of extra-legal dynamics.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows; The second section surveys the scant literature on ICC involvement in the situation of Guinea. The section following the next provides the necessary political context within which the ICC intervened and was involved for 13 years. The section before the penultimate one outlines the interview structure, presents the list of questions asked during interviews and lays out participant demographics. The penultimate section discusses attitude formation and evolution over time. This section sets out to test claims about what the ICC has been able to achieve in Guinea, which approach to complementarity has proven most effective in securing legal cooperation from state authorities, and whether lasting ICC involvement has had positive spillover effects on democratic politics. The last section speculates about the future. The landmark domestic trial, which culminated on 31 July 2024 with the conviction of former junta members, has set high expectations. Many interviewees described it as witnessing history in the making, given Guinea's enduring culture of impunity for its security forces. This article concludes that the trial of the 28 September massacre would never have occurred without sustained ICC pressure and long-term assistance. Interviewees largely agree that former Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda deserves particular recognition for ‘putting Guinea on the map’ and engaging with domestic authorities and civil society groups in a timely and genuine manner.
Literature Review
This section illustrates how little scholarly attention the preliminary examination of Guinea has drawn so far. We start off with Moreno Ocampo's War and Justice in the 21st Century, noting that only three pages out of 581 (preface and index excluded) are dedicated to the situation of Guinea. Even so, he recognises that the ICC preliminary examination ‘was a piece of a broader intervention’ (Reference Moreno Ocampo2022: 308) wherein ‘regional organisations took the lead to contain violence’ (306). He also stresses how the fear of ICC indictment induced state leaders to take sudden action, launching a national investigation just days before Deputy Prosecutor Bensouda's first visit to Conakry in February 2010 (307). Given the extremely scant literature on the topic, it might be useful – if not necessary – to include publications that explore the situation of Guinea in depth as well as others that incidentally mention it as an example. To begin with, a few scholars focus on the ICC's deterrent – and compellent – impact in the context of recurring political violence in Guinea. On this point, Kikoler draws attention to the timing of deterrence as well as threat credibility. According to her, ‘the deterrent value of the UN Secretary-General's call for accountability was amplified by the rapid speed at which he established the COI’ (Reference Kikoler, Sharma and Welsh2015: 313). In turn, ‘the ICC played a critical role in buttressing the deterrent impact of the COI’ (313). Similarly, Malu looks at the ICC's likely impact on conflict prevention as a deterrent mechanism. Being a permanent court that monitors evolving situations, he argues, ‘the ICC has the advantage and potential to respond in a timely manner to crises in Africa, which could discourage future atrocities by addressing impunity’ (Reference Malu2017: 31). Next, Fong and Day recall how the threat of ICC indictment compelled junta leaders to cooperate – however selectively – with international justice efforts against their self-interest. In particular, they point out that ‘Camara, reportedly concerned at the possibility of future ICC action against him, reluctantly accepted the [UN-mandated COI]’ (Pichler Fong & Day Reference Pichler Fong, Day, Nathan, Day, Brubaker and Honwana2018: 27). Lastly, Labuda observes that in the context of the Guinea preliminary examination, the ICC's leverage ‘peaked during the early phases of intervention but steadily declined over time’ (Labuda Reference Labuda2023: 274).
Another group of scholars is chiefly interested in how complementarity rules applied to the situation of Guinea. In his analysis, Colish first distinguishes between different stances towards complementarity and then introduces a new one, which he labels ‘hybrid complementarity’. For him, the ‘relationship between Guinea and the ICC has developed through a combination of mutual assistance and threatened intervention’ (Reference Colish2013: 35). Hence, hybrid complementarity integrates elements of two distinct approaches, namely complementary deterrence and proactive complementarity, into a consolidated ‘stick and carrot’ prosecutorial policy. On his choice to select Guinea as case study, he argues that the latter exemplifies a scenario wherein a state is ‘not quite able or willing enough to investigate and prosecute.’ Precisely in these scenarios, he claims, the ICC ‘becomes an important institution to nudge those levels of willingness and ability upward and to help build a durable infrastructure for justice to deter future crimes’ (44). Further addressing state (un)willingness, Grace shows how the COI's decision to include names of suspected perpetrators in its final – and public – report lent credibility to the threat of ICC indictment (Grace Reference Grace2015: 55–6). For Stefan, the willingness and ability factors cannot be examined separately. That Guinea lacks an independent and impartial judiciary is no accident; rather, it is the result of prolonged – and intentional – neglect by consecutive governments, one after the other (Reference Stefan2021: 376). Against this backdrop, ‘the ICC has been vital in encouraging and pressing [Condé's] government to keep accountability on its agenda, and in supporting national accountability processes with relevant expertise’ (384). Furthermore, Chappell and her co-authors maintain that ‘unwillingness and inability could arguably also be considered due to the fact that Guinea has no formal witness protection program’ (Reference Chappell, Grey and Waller2013: 472). This dramatic condition, which stems from the fact that most sex crimes have not yet been included in the Guinean penal code, severely affects the impartiality of court proceedings and victim participation therein (472). The third cluster of scholars investigates how cooperation patterns played out between Guinean authorities and international judicial and quasi-judicial institutions. In pointing out the UN's – and ICC's – reliance upon state officials to acquire information, Fromageau describes them as de facto gatekeepers to information gathering and/or evidence collection (Reference Fromageau2010: 405). Legal obligations notwithstanding, he contends, ‘the final decision to cooperate or not will be made by States’ (415). But admitting that ‘the proper functioning of [information] exchanges relies more on diplomatic arrangements than on legal guarantees’ (421) also calls for treating ICC officers as diplomats, and not just legal experts. Similarly, Tillier notes that legal cooperation may not be forthcoming in situations like Guinea, where the government ‘may be partly or wholly responsible for alleged crimes, and therefore be unlikely to genuinely attempt to prosecute those responsible for the alleged crimes’ (Reference Tillier2013: 538). On best diplomatic practices, she highlights the importance of OTP delegations visiting situation countries, for it is during these visits that ‘information sharing between a state under examination and the OTP usually takes place’ (539). Likewise, Bocchese observes a comparable dynamic during the early stages of the preliminary examination of the situation in Guinea (Reference Bocchese2023: 518). After the names of state leaders appeared in the COI's final report, these leaders recognised that selectively cooperating with the ICC's requests served their interests. By providing only evidence that did not directly implicate them in atrocities, they sought to balance compliance with the ICC while safeguarding their own positions (518–19). Lastly, Labuda highlights that during the Guinea preliminary examination, the OTP engaged extensively with donors and civil society groups for over a decade. This unusually high level of involvement aimed to strengthen the state's capacity to prosecute and thereby avoid initiating another ICC investigation into an African nation (Labuda Reference Labuda2023: 195).
Next, Gürler and Philipps focus on institution building and, more specifically, on the adoption and implementation of judicial reforms following Condé's election in late 2010. They recall that, when his government ‘formally requested the UN's assistance in January 2011, bilateral donors and policy makers considered its political will and broad-based support for democratic change to be high’ (Reference Gürler and Philipps2019: 26). According to them, a few obstacles still remain towards establishing the rule of law in Guinea. These range from low trust in national courts to the resilience of informal justice mechanisms, from a shortage of qualified personnel to widespread corruption (29). Similarly focused on strengthening the rule of law in Guinea, Calvet-Martínez and Barry examine the influence of exogenous factors – specifically, the international sanctions imposed in response to gross human rights violations – on the country's democratic progress (Calvet-Martínez & Barry Reference Calvet-Martínez and Barry2024: 140). Notably, they highlight temporal variations in the impact of these sanctions. While the sanctions initially succeeded in pressuring domestic authorities to hold Guinea's first democratic elections in 2010, they later failed to ‘prevent the progressive concentration of power by President Condé, who amended the constitution in 2020 to extend his mandate for a third term’ (140). Shifting focus, Balde and Wemmers explore what justice entails for both past and recent victims of crimes against humanity in Guinea. Drawing on thirty-one interviews, they demonstrate that victims' conceptions of justice transcend mere punishment of perpetrators. These perspectives encompass reparations ‘based on the victims' suffering’ and aim to dismantle the entrenched cycle of impunity in the country, ultimately seeking to prevent the recurrence of such crimes (Balde & Wemmers Reference Balde and Wemmers2021: 155–6). Given the findings of the literature review, this study emerges as the first contribution to conduct a comprehensive within-case analysis of the preliminary examination of Guinea from start to finish, critically testing both scholarly and institutional claims about the ICC's achievements in the country through original interviews with domestic elites and other key stakeholders.
ICC–State Relations in Historical Perspective
This section conducts a within-case analysis of the situation in Guinea over time, organised around successive temporal phases, each marked by a distinct approach to complementarity. Structuring the discussion in this way helps to highlight the variation in ICC involvement over time, while facilitating an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach in achieving the ultimate goal of fostering genuine domestic investigations and prosecutions of crimes within the ICC's subject-matter jurisdiction. Theoretically, this section unpacks concepts such as Colish's ‘hybrid complementarity’ by distinguishing between periods when the OTP employed threats versus those when it relied on incentives (Colish Reference Colish2013: 34–5). To set the stage for this analysis, it is essential to outline the domestic political landscape into which the Hague-based court inserted itself – providing a kind of prelude to the ICC's engagement in Guinea.
As a prelude to ICC involvement, Guinea signed the Rome Statute on 8 September 2000 and ratified it on 14 July 2003. Following the death of dictator Lansana Conté on 22 December 2008, a military junta, led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, seized power, suspended the Constitution, and promised elections by December 2010. The African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded swiftly, suspending Guinea's membership on 29 December and 10 January, respectively, and isolating the new regime diplomatically.Footnote 1 Domestically, the junta's rule fuelled political instability, as it promised to address social grievances and settle scores with former elites, including Conté's son. Opposition to Camara intensified in mid-August 2009, when he reconsidered running for president, heightening tensions with regional organisations. On 18 September, the AU imposed targeted sanctions on Camara in an attempt to deter his presidential bid. Despite this, the junta continued its crackdown on dissent, banning political discussions in the media. The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) later revealed that security forces had prepared for a large opposition protest in the capital on 28 September, Guinea's Independence Day. When tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered at a stadium, the presidential guard, aided by militiamen and mercenaries, opened fire, killing at least 157 people and injuring over 1,200. The massacre prompted immediate international response. The UN sent two exploratory missions in October and November 2009, while ECOWAS imposed an arms embargo on 17 October. France, the US, the EU, and the AU followed with sanctions, and NGOs like Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported on the junta's crimes. While ICC involvement is central to this article, other international actors played a crucial role in addressing Guinea's crisis.
Phase 1
In response to international sanctions and diplomatic isolation following the 28 September massacre, the OTP announced the opening of a preliminary examination on 14 October 2009. The Guinean government responded swiftly; on 20 October, the foreign minister visited The Hague to assure Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda of Guinea's willingness and capacity to investigate the crimes. The OTP, employing a ‘trust but verify’ attitude, requested detailed information on the mechanisms established for domestic prosecutions. Despite these reassurances, Guinea's internal situation deteriorated, with cabinet resignations and violent crackdowns on protests. President Camara sought to retain control over justice initiatives to influence outcomes while pledging cooperation with international investigations. Complicating matters, the COI's final report submitted to the UN Security Council on 18 December directly implicated five junta members, including Camara, in criminal liability for the massacre and its aftermath (Grace Reference Grace2015: 56). While seemingly counterproductive, the junta's cooperation reflected strategic behaviour: by demonstrating action at the domestic level, they aimed to reduce the risk of ICC intervention.
This dynamic aligns with the concept of ‘complementary deterrence’, coined by James Alexander, which suggests domestic authorities comply with ICC demands due to implicit coercion (Alexander Reference Alexander2009: 19–22). The OTP signalled it could assert jurisdiction under complementarity rules if Guinea's efforts proved inadequate, creating credible pressure for compliance. As then Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo noted, the OTP's swift response and preliminary examination announcement convinced junta members that ICC action was a serious threat. In an effort to avoid prosecution at The Hague, the junta chose to cooperate with the OTP rather than hiding behind state sovereignty (Moreno Ocampo Reference Moreno Ocampo2022: 306–7).
Phase 2
Guinea's political situation shifted dramatically on 3 December 2009, when President Camara was shot by his aide-de-camp, Commander Aboubacar Chérif ‘Toumba’ Diakité. Camara was flown to Morocco for medical treatment, and his absence transformed the country's political landscape. Diakité later admitted to the shooting, citing fears of being scapegoated for the 28 September massacre, where he had personally led the brutal crackdown at the stadium. Camara, by contrast, coordinated the attack remotely, but his attempts to shift blame onto Diakité ultimately backfired. The failed assassination sidelined Camara, paving the way for Sékouba Konaté to assume the role of acting president. The international community quickly recognised the opportunity for political change. On 13 December, diplomats from the AU, ECOWAS, EU, and the US met in Burkina Faso to discuss Guinea's transition to civilian rule. Under international pressure, Konaté formed a government of national unity on 15 January 2010, appointing opposition spokesman Jean-Marie Doré as prime minister. Presidential elections were scheduled for June, with Konaté retaining the interim presidency.
Konaté's leadership marked a turning point in ICC–Guinea relations. Unlike Camara, Konaté was not among those identified by the COI as bearing primary responsibility for the 28 September massacre. While the COI categorised Konaté as someone warranting further investigation, his cooperative stance on justice initiatives set a different tone. On 8 February 2010, the General Prosecutor appointed a panel of investigative judges to lead a formal inquiry into the massacre – Guinea's first formal assertion of primary jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Despite these steps, concerns persisted. The national commission of inquiry, hastily formed by the junta in October 2009 and knows by its French acronym CNEI, downplayed the death toll, avoided terms like ‘massacre’, and absolved Camara of criminal responsibility.Footnote 2 Furthermore, Konaté retained two main suspects, Commander Moussa Thégboro Camara and Captain Claude Pivi, in cabinet positions, raising doubts about his commitment to genuine accountability. These actions prompted scepticism from Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda during her visit to Conakry on 16–19 February.
Guinea's return to civilian rule unfolded as planned, with presidential elections held on 27 June 2010. A runoff election followed on 7 November after no candidate secured a majority. Escalating violence delayed the process, with the military declaring a state of emergency on 17 November. The OTP issued multiple warnings about electoral violence, emphasising its preventive mandate. The crisis ended on 2 December, when the Supreme Court validated Alpha Condé's victory. Konaté was subsequently appointed to a leadership role within the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to ensure stability. Guinea's democratic transition formally concluded on 10 December, when the new administration lifted the state of emergency, and the AU lifted sanctions. Following Camara's removal, the OTP adopted a more cautious stance, described as ‘classical complementarity’ (Colish Reference Colish2013: 31–2). This second phase saw the OTP defer to Guinea's domestic justice initiatives, displaying a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude while monitoring progress under Konaté's transitional government. While Guinea's judiciary lacked the capacity to prosecute high-level perpetrators, the OTP refrained from launching a formal investigation, instead accepting the government's promises to deliver justice. This approach allowed the ICC to avoid direct intervention while maintaining pressure on Guinea to fulfil its obligations under the Rome Statute.
Phase 3
Guinea's transition to electoral democracy ushered in a new, initially productive phase in its relationship with the ICC. The OTP maintained close ties with local authorities and stakeholders, visiting Guinea twice in 2011, in March and October. However, democratic practices faced challenges in a country without a history of electoral turnover. The military posed a significant threat to the elected government, exemplified by incidents such as the arrest of Colonel Moussa Keita on 2 July and an assassination attempt on President Alpha Condé by armed forces on 19 July. Under these circumstances, criminal investigations of high-ranking military officers were daunting, and indictments lagged. A breakthrough occurred on 1 February 2012, with the indictment of Commander Moussa Thégboro Camara for murder and personal injury related to the 28 September massacre. Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda commended this progress during her visit to Guinea on 5 April 2012. Later that year, on 13 September, Colonel Abdulaye Chérif Diaby, former Minister of Health, was also indicted. These developments prompted the government to undertake reforms, including a cabinet reshuffle on 1 October, which saw the creation of a human rights post and the dismissal of military officials in government. The OTP's 2012 report expressed cautious optimism, acknowledging progress despite delays caused by financial and logistical challenges, security concerns, and political tensions.
In 2013, while the panel of judges continued their work and expanded investigations, public unrest escalated, with anti-government demonstrations leading to violent clashes with security forces. Judicial authorities began addressing sex crimes, indicting a gendarme for rape on 8 May. On 27 June, Captain Claude Pivi, Minister for Presidential Security and former junta member, was charged for his alleged role in the massacre. However, the OTP criticised the retention of government posts by two indictees, viewing it as a frustration for victims and a hindrance to justice. President Condé faced no personal threat from investigations, but his ministers, particularly those overseeing security, were implicated. The OTP's proactive engagement continued in 2014, with its ninth mission to Guinea in February. Despite the Ebola outbreak later that year, which limited field missions, the OTP remained vigilant. On 26 September, Bensouda commemorated the fifth anniversary of the massacre, urging attention to gender-based crimes. In October, the OTP also met with UN judicial experts and Guinean officials to discuss the investigation.
The 2015 election year was marked by violence, with politically motivated unrest preceding and following the October elections. In July, during a visit to Conakry, Bensouda called for peaceful elections and warned against violence. Just a few days later, former junta leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara was indicted for his role in the massacre. From exile in Burkina Faso, Camara accused Condé of blocking his return to Guinea and declared his willingness to stand trial to prove his innocence. Despite this indictment, violence persisted throughout the election period. In its year-end report, the OTP recommended finalising investigations and setting the stage for a trial in 2016. Sadly, no trial occurred in 2016. The year's only notable judicial development was the arrest of Diakité, a red berets commander and conspirator, by Senegalese authorities in December. Diakité was extradited to Guinea and appeared before the panel of judges in March 2017. By June, the national investigation neared completion, prompting the OTP to adopt a more proactive approach. It engaged with NGOs to gauge views on prosecutions and invited the territorially competent prosecutor to attend a seminar on judicial cooperation in The Hague. Bensouda also met with the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to explore cooperative efforts in October. On 29 December, after seven years, the panel of judges concluded the investigation and referred the case to trial.
In 2018, the focus shifted to capacity building for organising a credible trial. A 13-member steering committee, chaired by Justice Minister Cheick Sako, was established to oversee logistics, including venue selection, security, budgeting, and victim compensation. However, the committee met only three times over nine months, and progress stalled. Sako's repeated efforts to persuade President Condé to initiate the trial phase failed, leading to his resignation in May 2019. Interim Justice Minister Mohamed Lamine Fofana restructured the committee in August to expedite decision making. Despite reforms, no further meetings occurred. During an OTP visit to Conakry in October, Fofana announced the trial would begin by June 2020. The OTP's subsequent statement acknowledged the announcement but expressed concerns about limited progress. It also highlighted violent state repression of protests against a potential constitutional amendment to extend Condé's presidency.
In conclusion, the third phase of bilateral relations between the ICC and Condé's government was initially marked by a significant convergence of interests. This alignment was facilitated by both parties' shared – albeit temporary – preference for conducting domestic criminal proceedings (Colish Reference Colish2013: 25). This period exemplifies what Burke-White termed ‘proactive complementarity’, a framework in which the ICC actively supports state authorities in meeting their obligations to ensure accountability (Burke-White Reference Burke-White2008: 54–8). In theory, proactive complementarity broadens the Court's capacity to fulfil its mandate, envisioning a role that includes material support to national governments in their efforts to investigate and prosecute international crimes domestically (Burke-White Reference Burke-White2008: 56; Colish Reference Colish2013: 35). In practice, the ICC collaborated extensively with major NGOs, UN agencies, and foreign donors to strengthen Guinean judicial institutions, enabling them to undertake complex criminal proceedings (Colish Reference Colish2013: 38). The assistance provided by the Court was conceived in broad terms, encompassing technical, logistical, and even material support. This level of intervention was made possible largely due to the Guinean government's willingness – at least initially – to tolerate otherwise intrusive involvement in its internal affairs. However, as time passed, it became increasingly clear that President Condé had little genuine interest in delivering justice for the victims of the 28 September massacre. His administration frequently stalled progress, selectively complying with ICC cooperation requests while perpetuating a ‘willing but unable’ narrative. This strategy, which seemed designed to extract technical and material assistance from the OTP, ultimately weakened the prospects for meaningful judicial cooperation with the Court. Instead of fostering genuine accountability, Condé's approach led to a more lenient stance from the ICC and diverted its focus towards capacity-building rather than substantive justice.
Phase 4
Guinea's political landscape shifted again on 5 September 2021, when a new junta ousted Condé in a coup. Initially pledging to restore civilian rule within three years, the junta later agreed – under international pressure – to expedite the transition by late 2023 or early 2024. Central to its legitimacy was the long-delayed trial of former junta members involved in the 2009 stadium massacre, a promise Condé had made but failed to deliver. While sceptical of the junta's motives, the ICC's OTP worked with state authorities to address capacity challenges, as political will was no longer the primary barrier. This final phase of ICC engagement culminated on 28 September 2022, the massacre's 13th anniversary, with the trial's opening in Conakry. ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan attended the ceremony and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on complementarity with junta leader Colonel Mamady Doumbouya. The next day, Khan announced the closure of the ICC's preliminary examination into Guinea's situation.
The trial progressed despite setbacks, including a jailbreak that briefly freed former president Camara and other high-profile accused, one of whom remained a fugitive until September 2023. A significant procedural milestone occurred on 4 March 2024, when the local prosecutor's representative requested reclassification of charges from common crimes to crimes against humanity, invoking Guinea's 2016 criminal code. The trial's ‘confrontations’ phase concluded on 23 April, during which judges reconciled testimony discrepancies from victims, witnesses, and defendants, including Camara. On 31 July 2024, the Dixinn Court of First Instance convicted Camara and seven senior officials of crimes against humanity, awarding reparations ranging from $23,000 to $172,500 to victim groups for physical and psychological trauma. Amid these developments, the OTP issued a new policy on complementarity and cooperation on 4 April, introducing ‘dynamic complementarity’. As René Urueña (Reference Urueña2024) explains, this approach formalises the OTP's dual strategy of fostering partnerships with national authorities while remaining vigilant to intervene if they fail to prosecute international crimes. Highlighted in the policy as a key example, Guinea illustrates how the ICC balances recognition of genuine national efforts with the readiness to renew scrutiny if necessary, signalling a pragmatic evolution of prosecutorial practice.
Research Design, Interview Structure, and Sample Demographics
This section introduces the questions asked during interviews and explains the academic payoffs of seeking compelling answers therefrom. Next, it lays out interview structure details and the criteria for selecting interviewees. In-person structured interviews make it possible to aggregate and compare answers between sample subgroups. Specifically, this method enables the corroboration of state agents' declarations by juxtaposing them with other interviews. This project benefits from the diverse insights provided by government officials employed with the Ministry of Justice, domestic judges and prosecutors, political leaders, NGO officers and civil society representatives, defence and victims' lawyers, members of the media, and victims of state violence.
This article explores three sets of questions. The first one (questions 1–3) concerns the timing of ICC intervention and domestic reactions thereto. Furthermore, it asks respondents about the ICC's potential to pacify Guinea in the wake of state-sponsored violence and throughout the democratisation process that ensued from regime change. The second set (questions 4–7) investigates the inner dynamics of state cooperation with the Hague-based Court. To this end, it asks interviewees to evaluate the ICC's performance since its intervention in mid-October 2009, assess whether state authorities have cooperated in full, identify domestic supporters and opponents of its continuing involvement in Guinea, and pinpoint the events that affected ICC–state relations over time. The aim is to study the formation, short-term variation, and long-term trajectory in state attitudes towards the Court's involvement in the country. Finally, the third set (questions 8–10) is interested in the ‘what next’ question. To this end, it interrogates interviewees about their preferences between domestic and international justice, their trust in the fairness and impartiality of ongoing criminal proceedings against former junta leaders, and the verdict's expected spillover effects on Guinean politics and social peace. These ex-ante expectations can then be juxtaposed with developments in Guinea following the landmark conviction on 31 July 2024, when a court of first instance in Conakry found former president Camara and seven others guilty of crimes against humanity for the rapes and killings of protesters in 2009.
Next, this section outlines and explains interview structure details, participant selection criteria, and participant demographics. Twenty-five professionals agreed to participate in an interview during the author's research trip to Conakry in late spring 2023 (see Table I). These in-person (largely) structured interviews allow for high-quality data collection, as well as the opportunity for interviewees to clarify their answers. This interview method also permits a more balanced representation among categories of participants, as shown below. Finally, interviewees were able to provide contact information of peers, which enabled word of mouth to play an important role in accessing a number of public officials and members of the judiciary who were otherwise unwilling to participate in this study. In conclusion, the present article benefits tremendously from the insider knowledge shared by public officials working with government agencies, high courts and other judicial bodies as well as politicians, party leaders, former cabinet members and election commissioners, NGO officers, members of civil society and academia, and victims of state violence.
Participant demographics (N = 25).
Concerning the logistics of interviews, the author took all possible steps to ensure the identity of all interviewees remained completely anonymous. To this end, the interviews were not electronically recorded. Notes were handwritten in a notebook and later typed into a Word file. Interviews took between forty to sixty minutes – sufficient time to address in detail a total of ten questions. Given the sensitive topics addressed during interviews, questions were circulated in advance to those offices and departments whose acceptance of the author's interview request hinged upon a preliminary assessment of the questions' content. A few important remarks on the demographics of the interviewees are now timely. First, all participants are Guinean nationals (see Table I). This element stands in sharp contrast to similar studies conducted in the recent past, when foreigners proved willing – if not eager – to contribute their time and knowledge. Second, thirteen participants (52%) have either a law degree or significant professional experience in matters related to criminal justice. Given the subject matter and institutional actors involved therein, it is not surprising that legal experts were more likely to consider participating in an interview. Third, only one woman agreed to take part in this study. Women's contribution is particularly salient in light of the disproportionate impact that prolonged political violence has had on them in most situations that have come under ICC scrutiny, and even more so in Guinea given the sex crimes perpetrated during and in the wake of the 28 September massacre. Despite the author's best efforts, however, identifying and contacting female respondents proved harder than expected.
Finally, the criteria for selecting participants revolved around the opportunity of collecting diverse views and opinions on the subject matter. Thus, public officials working for different government branches and agencies as well as experts external to the state were invited to participate in this study. Only one interviewee works for the executive branch, although it bears noting that several politicians and NGO officers held positions in previous administrations. Additionally, nine interviewees are party leaders and former legislators or electoral commissioners (36%), representing a total of seven opposition parties and political movements, which creates variation within this subgroup. Their feedback is a valuable yardstick against which to compare the answers of their peers and members of the executive power. Similarly, the views shared by five members of the judiciary (20%) further contribute to the infra-governmental cross-verification of information (see Table I). Lastly, an overview of ICC–state relations would be incomplete without the input of non-state actors. Interestingly, domestic NGOs, interest groups, and civil society organisations have converging views on key aspects of how the OTP conducted its preliminary examination in Guinea. For instance, many of them complained about the meagre financial assistance provided by the Hague-based Court over its 13-year engagement with domestic authorities, thus displaying a – somewhat – flawed understanding of how ICC operates on the ground. Also, these interviewees were among those who stressed the agency and ingenuity of state leaders in liaising with the OTP, deploring both Condé's repeated attempts to postpone domestic proceedings indefinitely and Bensouda's failure to call out his delay techniques.
State Attitudes: Formation and Evolution over Time
Historical contextualisation and attitude formation
The first three questions for interviewees concern the timeliness and opportunity of ICC intervention as well as its potential to pacify Guinea in the aftermath of state-sponsored violence and during the early phases of its subsequent democratisation process. To better comprehend interview data, one must bear in mind the time lag between the OTP's opening of a PE, dated 14 October 2009, and its closing on 29 September 2022, almost thirteen years later. Another preliminary remark concerns individual agency. All three ICC chief prosecutors oversaw the preliminary examination of Guinea at some point in time; none decided to launch a full investigation thereinto.Footnote 3 That said, the vast majority of interviewees agree on both the timeliness (23 out of 25, or 92%) and opportunity (18 out of 25, or 72%) of Moreno Ocampo's decision to open a preliminary examination. The initial question about the timeliness of ICC intervention (Q1) proved to be an easy one, with no respondent unable or unwilling to provide a clear answer. The remaining two interviewees, both political leaders, answered in the negative for different reasons: one did not believe the OTP was sincerely interested in Guinea; for him, its announcement was tantamount to cheap talk – a timely, but somewhat deceitful statement.Footnote 4 For the other, who held a high-level position in the 2010 transitional government, it is rather a matter of principle. As a fervent believer in Pan-Africanism, he opposes external interference in any shape of form and fears the ICC's (alleged) double standards apply when scrutinising African countries.Footnote 5 Regarding the interviewees' initial reactions to ICC intervention (Q2), eighteen participants responded either somewhat or very positively to the OTP's decision to examine the situation of Guinea. Four participants (16%) had neither a positive nor a negative reaction to Moreno Ocampo's determination.Footnote 6 Of the three people who answered in the negative (12%), two are the same politicians who lamented the insincerity or inappropriateness of ICC intervention, whereas the remaining one is a victim of the 28 September massacre.Footnote 7 She claims she initially had high hopes for the ICC, but the lack of tangible judicial outcomes, paired with the threats to personal safety she received for giving public testimony of what she suffered, left her demoralised and helpless.Footnote 8 All in all, the respondent pool reacted positively to the news that the situation of Guinea was under examination; only one objected to ICC intervention on normative grounds. Still, numerous interviewees voiced their concerns regarding the OTP's choice to focus exclusively on one episode of mass violence, thus disregarding others occurred before or after 28 September 2009.
Q3 addresses the ‘peace v. justice’ debate and asks interviewees which role, if any, they envisage for the ICC in pacifying Guinea. The stated purpose here is to delineate the contours of what interviewees conceive as permissible and legitimate state behaviour throughout the democratisation process as well as what the ICC can contribute towards improving Guinea's democratic performance and establishing the rule of law. Unlike in other case studies, the overwhelming majority of interviewees (22, or 88%) agree that the Court has in fact played a big role in deterring further atrocities, pushing domestic authorities into action, strengthening domestic judicial institutions, and de-escalating violence at critical moments, especially before and after elections. Two participants welcomed ICC intervention but failed to notice any spillover effects on Guinean politics,Footnote 9 whereas the last one accused the Court of targeting Africa inappropriately, neglecting in turn other situations worthy of scrutiny.Footnote 10 All in all, a surprisingly large majority of respondents recognise the deterrent effects exerted by the ICC on potential peace spoilers, that is high-profile individuals or violent groups who believe that promoting democracy and the rule of law in Guinea could threaten their power and interests, therefore they will try to sabotage it.
Attitude evolution over time and critical junctures
This subsection explores questions regarding attitude evolution over time and state compliance with cooperation requests. Q4 addresses individual assessments of the ICC's performance from mid-October 2009 to September 2022, when Khan announced the preliminary examination of Guinea had been terminated. Next, Q5 asks participants whether or not they believe national authorities have fully cooperated with ICC operations as prescribed by the Rome Statute. Two additional – yet related – aspects of ICC–state relations are worthy of scholarly attention and rich in policy implications. First, Q6 unpacks the Guinean state to single out the Court's domestic supporters and opponents. Second, the development of ICC–state relations over time hinges on decisions made by actors that are both internal and external to the relationship itself. To this end, Q7 aims to pinpoint events that affected working relations between the military juntas and civilian governments in Conakry and the ICC, either for better or worse.
Prior to discussing responses to Q4, it bears recalling that all interviews were conducted between late May and mid-June 2023, that is eight months after the 2009 Massacre trial's inaugural hearing and Khan's concomitant decision to wind up the preliminary examination into the situation of Guinea. That being said, eleven participants (44%) express a very or somewhat positive evaluation of what the ICC has accomplished since its preliminary examination opened in mid-October 2009. For a victim, ICC intervention proved especially effective in that it spurred domestic authorities into action. Central to his assessment was the OTP's ability to leverage complementarity rules so as to pressure state leaders into undertaking seemingly genuine justice efforts.Footnote 11 Similarly, a district court judge contends the (then) ongoing trial would have never taken place were it not for the pressure exerted over time by the OTP on state leaders.Footnote 12 A public prosecutor emphasises a different aspect of the ICC's deterrent impact. For him, OTP warnings issued at critical times worked to disincentivise the recourse to violence and instil the fear of criminal sanctions in wanna-be perpetrators.Footnote 13 For a government official, ICC intervention had positive spillover effects on the modernisation and digitalisation of the national justice system, thanks in part to the technical assistance and training programmes delivered by the ICC.Footnote 14 Moving forward, ten participants (40%) appraised the ICC's performance in neither positive nor negative terms. As for the remaining four (16%), their negative opinions on ICC performance in Guinea pivot on two shared considerations. First, ICC intervention set high expectations initially but failed to take timely action afterwards. Put otherwise, the ICC accomplished too little, too late.Footnote 15 Secondly, state leaders deceived OTP officers into believing they were sincerely committed to do justice, whereas they just sought to buy time and postpone domestic proceedings indefinitely.
Q5 turns the tables and asks whether respondents believe that Guinean authorities have fully cooperated with the ICC since it first intervened over fifteen years ago. A narrow majority (13 out of 25 respondents, or 52%) answered in the affirmative, although seven of them felt the need to qualify their answer. For instance, two party leaders maintain that the current military junta, in power since September 2021, has fully complied with the ICC while abstaining to comment on previous governments.Footnote 16 Others distinguished between the executive and judicial branch of government, blaming the former while praising or excusing the latter.Footnote 17 Lastly, two lawyers argue that we must rather look at the quality and/or sincerity of state compliance with ICC treaty obligations.Footnote 18 Put differently, they allege Guinean governments kept to the letter of the law but never interacted with the ICC in good faith. Two participants (8%) avoided answering the question, attributing occasional non-compliance to weak judicial institutions or questioning the OTP's decision to focus on a single episode of mass violence.Footnote 19 The remaining ten interviewees (40%) acknowledge that domestic authorities failed to cooperate in full and are not afraid to name those who bear the responsibility of said failure. Interestingly, they largely blame Guinea's non-cooperation on former president Condé, who is not personally implicated in the 28 September massacre. Within this subgroup, there are also those who highlight variation in state cooperation over time, praising the current junta for doing what Condé had delayed sine die.Footnote 20
The aforesaid remark paves the way for the next question. Q6 adds to the present analysis by identifying the ICC's supporters and adversaries within the Guinean domestic landscape. For comparative purposes, domestic resistance to ICC scrutiny in the situation of Colombia came from the military, particularly from high-ranking officers (Bocchese Reference Bocchese2021a: 169–70). Q6 proved particularly difficult to answer, with only thirteen interviewees (52%) managing to identify domestic actors who either backed or opposed ICC scrutiny in the situation of Guinea. Among the ICC's alleged adversaries, interviewees list – somewhat expectedly – former junta leader Camara and two of his closest associates (and fellow defendants), namely Moussa Tiégboro Camara and Claude Pivi, both of whom were somehow appointed to cabinet positions in the 2010 interim government and then again in Condé's first executive.Footnote 21 Others generically mention state elites or perpetrators;Footnote 22 while too broad and vague, their remarks nonetheless point to the causal relationship between individual perceptions of criminal indictment and attitudes towards accountability efforts, including ICC scrutiny. Lastly, it is important to comment on former president Condé, whom numerous respondents view as the real villain of the story. Up to sixteen participants blame him for engaging with ICC officers in bad faith and for not holding – or postponing indefinitely – domestic prosecutions. Four made his name when answering Q6,Footnote 23 whereas twelve more held him liable at different points during interviews.Footnote 24 This finding might appear puzzling, for Condé was not personally implicated in the 28 September massacre. Yet, participants disagree as to why he hindered international and domestic prosecutions alike. Among the different explanations they put forth, one emphasises the importance of Pan-African beliefs in fending off foreign interference in otherwise internal affairs; another warns about political rivals strategically calling for ICC scrutiny as a means to shame current state leaders. For others, Condé aimed to shield key members of the former military junta from prosecution for the ultimate purpose of strengthening his grip on power – a coup-proofing strategy undertaken by the former president to reassure, rather than antagonise, the armed forces. Lastly, three interviewees concur that Condé had reason to fear ICC intervention, for he could be held responsible for massacres and systematic human rights abuses perpetrated during his presidency and, possibly, at his behest.Footnote 25
As for the ICC's allies, six interviewees (24%) point to a constellation of non-state actors, which includes the legal community, NGOs, civil society groups, opposition parties, and victims' organisations.Footnote 26 Four more (16%) indicate former Justice Minister Cheick Sako, credited for having – unsuccessfully – tried to persuade Condé to hold domestic trials against the perpetrators of the 28 September massacre.Footnote 27 Described as a norm entrepreneur, he pushed for undertaking accountability measures in a country long characterised by a culture of impunity for the rich and powerful. When he resigned in late May 2019, reportedly because he opposed the revision of the constitution urged by Condé himself, victims' organisations feared the trial of alleged perpetrators of the aforesaid massacre would be further delayed or not take place at all. That being said, the remaining fifteen participants are split between those who are unable or unwilling to answer Q6 (52%) and those who answer in the negative (8%), arguing that no domestic actor can be properly characterised as a local friend or adversary of the Court. Drawing on interview data, the author is led to conclude that, throughout the years, the ICC faced constant institutional and political resistance from state leaders, albeit short of open defiance. Because of the cabinet position he held for over five years, Sako is the only individual acting in the interests of justice that interviewees could recall by name.
Lastly, Q7 asks interviewees about critical junctures, that is, turning points that may have altered, either for the worse or for the better, the relations between the ICC and domestic authorities. Only thirteen (52%) could pinpoint one or more events that had the potential to affect state cooperation with ICC operations in Guinea. Furthermore, that figure could be adjusted downward considering that four interviewees listed the 28 September massacre as the sole critical juncture.Footnote 28 Rather than a critical juncture, however, the aforesaid massacre is better conceived as the catalyst for ICC scrutiny. In the aggregate, participants pin down five episodes, the most cited being the successful coup d’état that ushered in regime change in early September 2021.Footnote 29 This finding lends support to the observation that, ‘while not a legal concept per se, regime change has historically had positive spillover effects on judicial assistance’ (Bocchese Reference Bocchese2023: 523). Another participant points out two consequential moments, namely Condé's contentious decision to run for a third term (1 September 2020) and the trial's inaugural hearing (28 September 2022).Footnote 30 One more claims that Condé's promise not to surrender Guinean citizens to the ICC affected bilateral relations for the worse.Footnote 31 Lastly, two respondents underscored the significance of OTP warnings in preventing or otherwise de-escalating violence before and after elections in 2010, 2013, and again 2015.Footnote 32 All in all, the situation of Guinea, not unlike other preliminary examinations conducted by the OTP, has been characterised by critical junctures that directly and suddenly affected state cooperation with ICC operations.Footnote 33
The Future of ICC–State Relations
The present section is interested in the ‘what next’ question. Now that the ICC's preliminary examination of Guinea has come to an end and the trial of key perpetrators is over, pending appeal, the last three questions hereby examined (Q8, Q9, and Q10) offer unique insight into what interviewees expect from domestic justice efforts and the OTP's decision to disengage and monitor the situation from afar. Their responses can therefore serve as a yardstick against which to gauge Khan's decision to close the 13-year preliminary examination and sign an MoU with Guinea's transitional government. Q8 tests interviewees' trust in the ongoing trial, asking if they deem it to be a genuine and fair attempt to mete out justice. Fourteen subjects (56%) replied to Q8 in the affirmative. A comment in particular is relevant to this study. For a politician and victim, the (then) ongoing trial was indeed genuine and fair owing to the fact that junta leaders had nothing to fear from it and, in turn, no reason to tamper therewith.Footnote 34 Moving forward, five interviewees (20%) claim to be unable to respond. Two contend that it is premature to draw conclusions from an ongoing trial; only upon completion it will be possible to appraise the proceeding's fairness and adherence to laws.Footnote 35 Another believes in the good faith of all judicial actors involved in the trial, but questions their competence and ability to handle such a high-profile case.Footnote 36 As for the remaining two, they argue that considerations about fairness and impartiality also call for the prosecution of those responsible for other episodes of mass violence. In other words, exclusive focus on one massacre affects discussions about impartiality and fuels speculations about the current junta's true intentions for holding the trial in the first place.Footnote 37 Fears of judicial corruption notwithstanding, only six participants (24%) had no trust in the trial's fairness and impartiality.Footnote 38 As to the reasons why they held such negative views, they criticised case selection along three lines. First, they failed to appreciate why only eleven defendants were standing trial, whereas numerous alleged perpetrators are still off the hook. Secondly, they fiercely disagreed with the choice of focusing on one episode of mass violence while consciously overlooking others. Finally, they wondered why international and domestic prosecutions alike are increasingly targeting African perpetrators whereas non-African ones, from former George Bush to Vladimir Putin, are seemingly above the law.
Q9 also tackles the fairness and impartiality of domestic prosecutions, but from a different point of view. In particular, Q9 asks whether participants preferred the ICC to take over and conduct criminal proceedings in The Hague. Six (24%) admit their preference for international over domestic prosecutions.Footnote 39 In their mind, conducting trials in The Hague would have solved numerous problems, including state capacity constraints, widespread corruption, and political interference in the judiciary. Three more (12%) have no preference on this particular issue.Footnote 40 Two of them never seriously considered the possibility of carrying out criminal proceedings outside of Guinea, whereas the last one rejects the international–domestic dichotomy, emphasising their complementary nature instead. Finally, the remaining sixteen (64%) are either very or somewhat pleased that the trial was held in Conakry's Kaloum district, about four miles from where the massacre occurred.Footnote 41 Considerations about institutional weakness and rampant corruption notwithstanding, all of the judges, public prosecutors, and government officials who took part in this study expressed their preference for domestic prosecutions. Within this subgroup, some claim the (then) ongoing trial was the long-awaited turning point in Guinea's fight against impunity and toward establishing the rule of law. Others underline the positive spillover effects on country reputation, in particular vis-à-vis neighbouring nations where a culture of impunity persists. Relatedly, two more endorse an ‘African solutions to African problems’ approach, stress the importance of endogenous state building, and aim to limit foreign intervention to providing technical assistance.Footnote 42
Unlike previous questions, Q10 is open-ended and allows respondents to answer based on their subjective knowledge of Guinean politics and society, past experiences and feelings, and understandings of whether their country is headed in the right (or wrong) direction. More specifically, Q10 invites respondents to share their thoughts and opinions on what they believe could have happened following the conclusion of the (then) ongoing trial. As such, their answers where not limited to a predetermined set of options. Of twenty-five interviewees, only one declined to partake in this exercise. Overall, it is fair to conclude that the domestic trial has set rather lofty expectations; numerous participants feel like they are witnessing history in the making. For clarity's sake, their comments can be grouped in five clusters. First of all, up to fourteen participants (56%) believe that, upon completion, the ongoing trial will set a precedent, boost judicial capacity, and instil a fear of punishment in wanna-be perpetrators.Footnote 43 In line with general deterrence theory, they are convinced that completing the trial would help preventing the occurrence of future atrocities. Relatedly, eleven people (44%) stress the importance of setting the historical record straight, establishing individual rather than state responsibility, and paying reparations to victims.Footnote 44 By doing so, they claim, the trial will generate both legal and social positive externalities for the Guinean people. But not everyone looks at the domestic trial solely through the lenses of criminal justice. Six participants (24%) are particularly concerned with the trial's impact on domestic politics and social peace.Footnote 45 According to them, the verdict should start off a much-needed process of national reconciliation in a country beset by ethnic tensions, with the Fulani community on the receiving end of systematic discrimination and the forestiers afraid of becoming the proverbial scapegoat and paying for everyone's crimes.Footnote 46 Furthermore, one interviewee maintains that the trial's completion fulfils the junta's mandate and should consequently pave the way for the return to civilian rule. All that said, five participants (20%) worry that riots might ensue once the verdict is announced and the trial is over, thus further exacerbating the aforesaid ethnic tensions.Footnote 47 Out of these five, three anticipate that supporters of the former junta will harass and threaten those victims who spoke up or took the stand in the trial.Footnote 48
Concluding Remarks
This article is the first comprehensive examination of ICC involvement in Guinea, covering the entire preliminary examination phase (2009–2022) and including developments in the two years following its official closure. To the author's knowledge, it is also the first study to empirically test claims about the ICC's impact on a nation plagued by recurrent episodes of political violence and unconstitutional changes in government. While parallels can be drawn with other countries under ICC scrutiny, Guinea presents unique characteristics that set it apart. First, Guinea represents a situation marked by one-sided violence perpetrated exclusively by state security forces, a distinct feature compared to the more multifaceted dynamics often seen in ICC cases. Adding complexity, the OTP operated in an environment where a UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry (COI) had already identified individuals deemed most responsible for the 28 September massacre. Despite this, the OTP largely adopted a ‘sovereignty-friendly’ approach, engaging constructively with state institutions rather than escalating confrontation.Footnote 49 Second, Guinea highlights the OTP's refined signalling strategies and use of high-level engagement to maintain pressure. Through frequent visits and strategic communication, the OTP consistently reminded Guinean leaders of their obligations under the Rome Statute while keeping the possibility of further ICC intervention on the table. Notably, all three ICC Chief Prosecutors met with Guinean authorities on multiple occasions, and OTP staffers working on this case visited Guinea twice yearly on average. Many interviewees praised the ICC's efforts, with particular acknowledgment of former Chief Prosecutor Bensouda for ‘putting Guinea on the map’ and for her prompt recognition of the 28 September events as crimes against humanity. Third, the Guinea case exemplifies the OTP's evolving, pragmatic approach to state incapacity. Instead of immediately declaring the country incapable of conducting genuine prosecutions, the OTP opted for a sustained engagement strategy. Since the fall of 2009, it has collaborated with major NGOs, UN agencies, and international donors to strengthen Guinea's judiciary. This long-term partnership ultimately enabled state courts to undertake complex criminal proceedings, demonstrating the potential for a more constructive complementarity model.
Finally, Guinea presents a scenario in which major powers, UN agencies and officials, regional organisations, and NGOs appeared united in their efforts, collectively pressuring the junta to promptly relinquish power and commit to prosecuting those responsible for the 28 September massacre. Amid global outcry, the junta leaders perceived the risk of prosecution in The Hague as both credible and imminent. This rare alignment of diverse actors significantly bolstered the ICC's credibility, though the Court must still be regarded as one element within a much broader and multifaceted international response to the crisis. Notably, among the various approaches to complementarity adopted by the OTP over time, interviewees consistently emphasised that complementary deterrence – the most coercive of these strategies – proved particularly effective during the early stages of ICC involvement in Guinea. This period, spanning from the announcement of the preliminary examination in mid-October 2009 to the formation of a transitional government of national unity by Konaté in January 2010, marked a critical juncture. Indeed, the eventual domestic trial would likely never have occurred without the ICC's sustained pressure and assistance over the years. By unpacking these unique dynamics, this article highlights how the ICC's strategies in Guinea can inform broader discussions about its role and effectiveness in fostering domestic accountability, particularly in politically volatile contexts across the African continent and beyond.
