‘The law of contract is an area which is ripe for feminist analysis. Of the “core” common law subjects, it is the one most obviously imbued with values associated with the marginalisation of women and the feminine.’
(p. 1)Mulcahy’s provocative opening statement in Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law challenges us to reject classical and neoclassical notions which conceptualise contract as a series of historic rules governing discrete contemporary transactions within a competitive market environment where women are portrayed typically as manipulative or naïvely dependent on their husbands/partners. Instead, Mulcahy draws attention to the wealth of feminist literature which questions received wisdom, thereby allowing a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of contractual relationships and contract law.
Mulcahy highlights several strands within feminist literature which focus on contract: how the male voice dominates traditional judicial interpretation, particularly how historic precedent perpetuates female stereotypes and neglects other feminine values; also, how the feminine is suppressed in scholarship, both in terms of the key textbook writers’ gender and the focus on the individual transaction. New themes are also drawn out by feminist writers: they explore how legal language is gendered, particularly in judgments where discrete problem-solving takes precedence over preserving the on-going relationship between the parties; how apparently gender-neutral discussions of objectivity preserve male notions of reasonableness, rather than a more encompassing ideal; the rejection of the heterosexual paradigm through which oppressive bargaining behaviour is currently measured in areas like undue influence and duress; finally, the implications for traditional contract scholarship of using contractual notions to regulate ‘non-contract’ areas like intimate relationships. Bright light therefore shines into traditional contract scholarship revealing previously neglected issues and exposing flaws in dominant paradigms. Mulcahy and Wheeler’s book explores these themes through a series of nine articles written by eminent feminist and contract law scholars: the first eight articles concentrate on specific themes in contract, whereas the last contribution by David Campbell is a postscript and review article for the entire book.
Traditional treatises on contract lawFootnote 1 generally address the subject in the same way: there is a clearly recognisable pattern which focuses on individual componentsFootnote 2 which discuss the law’s scope as developed through case law and statute. This division is the same today as it was for many students graduating twenty years ago: offer/acceptance, consideration, duress/undue influence and remedies, for example, are all familiar chapter headings in contract textbooks. For students seeking an answer to the question ‘what is contract law?’, the response must be: it is an umbrella term for those topics within the textbook. Any attempt to undermine this orthodoxy by adding in additional subjects, including alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (Mulcahy), marriage (Chatterjee) or prenuptial agreements (Fehlberg and Smyth) would be viewed as ‘wrong’ because such subjects more readily form the basis of other subjects like dispute resolution more generally, or family law, for example.
To see contract law as a composite of those examples described in the traditional treatise is then to see it as a fixed doctrinal category into which modern life must be pushed, regardless of any incongruity which results (Simmonds, Reference Simmonds1982). However, as Simmonds notes (Reference Simmonds1982, p. 258), the subject scope of ‘Contract’ always flows from the author’s attempt to offer coherence to the doctrinal category: that is, her perception of how the various subjects relate to each other and the way they reflect a shared goal. Even the author who sees ‘contract’ in the same terms as the original treatise writers necessarily adopts a specific theoretical approach to enable the inclusion, or exclusion of subjects. This theoretical approach not only explains how to interpret the chosen subjects, it also forms the rationale for the creation of the category itself. In this sense, ‘contract’ is not a ‘neutral box…into which the law can be slotted’ (Simmonds, Reference Simmonds1982, p. 258) but instead embodies a view of how best to construct the category to represent the reality of contract-making as the author sees it. Subjects can be added or excluded as ideas of what contract is change or evolve over time.Footnote 3 For example, the author who sees contract as a device to promote commercial trade will adopt a construction of contract which only includes those subjects relevant for business purposes: formation of an agreement, remedies, and terms, for example. Whereas an author concerned with the needs of women may also be interested in those specific issues, she could add additional subjects, including prenuptial agreements, which have special resonance for that section of society. In both cases, the theoretical stance taken is not incidental to the categorisation, but is fundamental to their understanding of what contract is and how it should be understood.
Mulcahy and Wheeler’s choice of material for the book is not therefore ‘wrong’ but instead represents their theoretical approach to what ‘contract’ is for women. This is not to reduce the book’s contents to a single characterisation of the feminine,Footnote 4 but rather to say that Mulcahy and Wheeler’s theoretical approach governing the choice of subject content offers valuable insights into the notion of what ‘contract’ means now to twenty-first century society. Whilst it might seem odd to many contract scholars that Mulcahy and Wheeler have chosen to include subjects from what we now ‘know’ to be family law, to the legal historians of the future it may be that it was our single gendered vision of contract which is out of step, rather than the authors’ view in this book.Footnote 5
Important though this insight is on a general level, I do have reservations about the subject matter chosen by Mulcahy and Wheeler. The book’s title is Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law, which, at its broadest, points to an investigation into the various ways in which contract sustains patriarchal norms and ideas.Footnote 6 The reader anticipates contributions which address how feminist values are or could be incorporated into existing contractual areas, the degree to which rules and their interpretation are gendered, the implications for women of contract doctrine generally, as well as practical solutions to illustrations of stereotyping or gender bias. In many respects the book delivers on this promise.
Wheeler (pp. 21–50) looks at shopping as a phenomenon using contract as a mechanism through which to illustrate both the pleasure of shopping as an activity, and also as the basis of an alternative reading of case law on agreement formation. Auchmuty (pp. 51–74) and Gearey (pp. 91–108) both consider aspects of undue influence, criticising the doctrine’s extension to all forms of relationship including the heterosexual, and reconsidering the notion of inequality for the purposes of restitution, respectively. Goodrich (pp. 75–90) argues for a dynamic interpretation of the postal rule: rather than it merely being an anachronistic rule stipulating the point of acceptance for postal communication, he argues it marks the start of the division of contract from a single unitary notion, to a position where the contract is divided between the needs of one party over another (offeror and offeree). He argues this interpretation could lead to the detrimental treatment of women, but more importantly, it could allow the courts to protect one party over another, particularly in web-based transactions. Chatterjee (pp. 109–24) also takes up the web-based theme in her contribution, ‘Different Space, Same Place? Feminist Perspectives on Contracts in Cyberspace’. She contests received wisdom that cyberspace poses no doctrinal difficulties for contract formation and instead argues for a feminisation of the ‘space’ in which e-contracts are concluded.Footnote 7
Dispute resolution forms the basis of both Mulcahy’s second contribution to the book (pp. 141–60) and, to a limited sense in terms of enforcement, that of Fehlberg and Smyth (pp. 125–40). Building on themes raised in her first chapter, particularly Macneil’s observations on the relational nature of contract,Footnote 8 Mulcahy argues that mediation, as an alternative to litigation in contract disputes, represents broadly feminine values; its focus on the parties’ relationships and their respective bargaining power, for example, subject to reservations posed by other feminist scholars (pp. 141–2), has the potential to undermine traditional doctrinal scholarship’s patriarchal emphasis. Fehlberg and Smyth’s article evaluates the effectiveness of changes to the Australian Family Law Act 1975 permitting parties to enter into binding financial agreements before, during, or after marriage regulated outside the court environment.Footnote 9 Based on empirical research, Fehlberg and Smyth consider the binding nature of the agreements, enforceability, and difficulties encountered by users, clients and family lawyers.
Despite the strength of the individual contributions, the book, seen as a whole, appears to be a rather eclectic collection of disparate parts both in terms of subjects found in a traditional treatise on contract law, and also feminist contractual theory. In terms of subject content, for example, it is difficult to see why there would be two albeit excellent articles taking undue influence as their theme, but nothing on duress, which would seem to lend itself equally to feminist writing. The reader is left with the impression that the selection of material is somewhat random and reflects more the individual authors’ interests, rather a coherent thesis. This weakness is highlighted largely in Mulcahy’s opening chapter which is an excellent and interesting piece focusing on introducing an ethic of care into contract doctrine. While it stands strongly in its own right, it is less useful as an introduction to the book. It points the reader to some but not all chapters in the book and did not identify for me how those really fit in to any single idea of where the book is headed. This observation is not to criticise the idea of the book, but rather to go back to my earlier observations that the task of drawing doctrinal categories is an attempt by the authors to draw subjects together in a way which offers coherence to the category. In their construction, the authors inevitably adopt a theoretical approach which allows subjects to be placed within the category or outside it. To strengthen the thesis, particularly in the light of any criticism of ‘incorrect categorisation’ by traditional contract scholars who find the inclusion of ‘family law’ contracts problematic, Mulcahy’s chapter could have made more of how the subject matter has been selected.
A similar thought arises in relation to David Campbell’s contribution, ‘Afterword: Feminism, Liberalism and Utopianism in the Analysis of Contracting’ (pp. 161–73). I found this chapter difficult in terms both of its structure and its fit into the book’s general thesis. It is eloquently written and offers an important insight into the role of feminist enquiry into contract generally, but at times it also critiques individual chapters of the book (Auchmuty, Mulcahy and Wheeler, for example). It is difficult to decide whether its purpose is to offer a conclusion to the general themes in the book, or to offer new insights; it appears to be doing both. Perhaps this dual role was intended, but any uncertainty on the part of the reader could be alleviated by setting out the book’s overall structure a little more clearly at the beginning. This is again more a structural weakness of the book as a whole, rather than a comment on the thesis itself.
In terms of the individual contributions, I want to draw attention to Auchmuty’s excellent treatment of Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge. Her eloquent insight into the problematic extension of requisite relationship for the operation of undue influence to all forms of relationship, rather than merely the heterosexual is a very important contribution to this debate. As she rightly points out, by extending the requisite relationship to all forms of relationship, Lord Nicholls glosses over the fact that most cases involve male dominance over women/elderly people, most commonly seen in heterosexual relationships. Whilst her more radical conclusions – excluding the use of the marital home as security for debt in all cases and erosion of the institution of heterosexuality – may not be palatable to all, her call for a more nuanced interpretation of the dynamics within the requisite relationship is important.
In addition, Goodrich’s piece on the postal rule is a very different take on what is commonly regarded as an anachronism in current modes of communication. By concentrating on movement away from unitary ideas of contract and analysing the dispute in terms of distinct entities, Goodrich sees Adams v. Lindsell moving contract, at least in terms of agreement formation, towards a distinctly adversarial and consequently masculine interpretation. While I am inclined to agree with Goodrich’s own admission that he might be stretching the point, especially in the light of the brevity of the decision, his idea that an interpretation which considers the parties separately could be used in a positive way to redress the masculine/feminine imbalance is very interesting.
Overall, this book offers fascinating insights into contract scholarship. There are structural weaknesses and at times not all the contributions are wholly persuasive, but it fulfils its primary role very well: it forces all contract scholars to examine their own strongly held beliefs of what contract is and how individual subjects within it should be construed. In this sense, the book makes an important contribution to contract scholarship.
