Introduction
While legal mobilization through litigation and legislative reform has been extensively studied (Hilson Reference Hilson2002; McCann Reference McCann2006; Taylor and Tarrow Reference Taylor and Tarrow2024), the strategies employed by social actors during constitution-making processes have received comparatively less scholarly attention (Son Reference Son2018). This gap can be attributed, in part, to the exceptional nature of constitutional replacement processes (Arato Reference Arato2017). However, Latin America stands out globally for the frequency with which countries in the region have replaced their constitutions (Negretto Reference Negretto2018; Hartlyn and Stoyan Reference Hartyln and Stoyan2020), making it a particularly significant context for examining the role of different political and social actors in such transformative moments. Although constitutional texts have long been used by political elites in the region to symbolically address social inequality by enshrining social rights (Gargarella Reference Gargarella2022), the landscape began to shift in the 1990s. Facing institutional inaction,Reference Hartyln and Stoyan2020 diverse activist groups have increasingly turned to constitution-making itself as a means of advancing their demands when executive, legislative, or judicial channels prove unresponsive (Negretto Reference Negretto2018).
Constitutional mobilization has been defined by Son (Reference Son2018: 117) as a process by which “social actors employ constitutional norms and discourses to advocate for constitutional change.” Unlike conventional legal mobilization, which tends to operate within established legal frameworks, constitutional mobilization – especially during efforts to fully replace one constitution with another – enables actors not only to reinterpret norms but to potentially also shape substantive constitutional principles and institutional designs (Blokker and Thornhill Reference Blokker, Thornhill, Thornhill and Thornhill2017; López Reference Lopez Moreno2025). While constitutional mobilization is often associated with rights-expanding movements (Son Reference Son2018; della Porta Reference della Porta2020), it can also become a strategic resource for anti-rights actors operating within adverse institutional and normative contexts.
One such contested policy domain concerns reproductive rights. While these rights have long featured in legal and constitutional mobilization (Escoffier and Vivaldi Reference Escoffier, Vivaldi, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023; Lehoucq Reference Lehoucq2021; NeJaime Reference NeJaime2012; Scheppele Reference Scheppelle, Githens and Stetson1996; Taylor and Tarrow Reference Taylor and Tarrow2024), existing scholarship has primarily focused on litigation and judicial advocacy, including legal mobilization disputing constitutional principles and interpretations (Taylor and Tarrow Reference Taylor and Tarrow2024). Accordingly, limited attention has been given to how anti-abortion rights actors mobilize within constitution-making processes, especially those that aim to replace the constitution.
This article examines the constitutional mobilization undertaken by anti-abortion groups during Chile’s 2020–2023 constitutional replacement process, with a particular focus on the first attempt to replace the constitution (2021–2022).Footnote 1 The decision by Chile’s political parties with parliamentary representation to initiate a constitutional replacement process was a response to the mass protests that erupted in October 2019 and the subsequent political crisis. After a plebiscite in October 2020, in which nearly 80% of voters supported launching a constitutional process, a gender-balanced Constitutional Convention was elected in May 2021 (Larraín et al. Reference Larraín, Negretto and Voigt2023). Of the Convention’s 155 seats, one-third were held by feminist activists, who advanced a reproductive rights agenda grounded in more than a decade of mobilization led by a revitalized feminist movement and gender-sensitive administrations (Heiss and Mokre Reference Heiss, Mokre and Welp2023). During the Constitutional Convention debates, feminist activists succeeded in securing a pro-abortion provision in the draft constitution (Cuadros Reference Cuadros2023).
Anti-abortion groups in Chile also faced growing barriers to conventional legal mobilization prior to the constitutional process. Following the 2017 legalization of abortion in three limited circumstances – rape, risk to the mother’s life, and fatal fetal anomaly – conservative actors failed to overturn the law in the Constitutional Court and lacked the legislative majorities needed to repeal it (Escoffier and Vivaldi Reference Escoffier, Vivaldi, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023). Judicial venues proved largely unresponsive, in part due to prevailing gender and human rights norms that shaped constitutional interpretation. Moreover, cultural shifts over the preceding decade had further marginalized anti-abortion frames within mainstream political discourse (Mascareño and Chuaqui Reference Mascareño and Chuaqui2024). Confronted with a Constitutional Convention marked by a strong feminist presence and with institutional and public opinion constraints seemingly adverse to their objectives, what strategies did anti-abortion groups develop to advance their agenda?
Drawing on interviews, official records from the constitutional process, protest event data, and descriptive trends in public opinion data from the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), we examine the strategies employed by anti-abortion rights actors during Chile’s 2021–2022 Constitutional Convention. We argue that the perceived risk of enshrining abortion rights in the new constitution motivated the employment of three main strategies by anti-rights groups to overturn what initially appeared to be an unfavorable situation within the Constitutional Convention: (1) the use of arguments not only grounded in religious and conservative values but also constitutional law, natural law theory, and international human rights law; (2) the strategic bundling of conservative causes with broader concerns such as the protection of life and property rights; and (3) the effective use of the 2021 referendum campaign to reframe the constitutional proposal as a threat to the prevailing social order and national identity.
We posit that constitutional mobilization in the context of constitutional replacement processes represents a specific form of legal mobilization, shaped by the unique features of constitution-making, including its rules, procedures, and participants. Drafting a new constitution compels mobilizing actors to engage in diverse and coordinated strategies. Importantly, our research illustrates that constitutional replacement processes offer anti-abortion actors a strategic avenue for contesting adverse political opportunity structures and for advancing objectives that routine legal mechanisms may fail to secure. Furthermore, we show that full constitution-making processes can intensify anti-rights mobilization precisely because an ostensibly inhospitable political climate amplifies moral panic frames and reduces the relative costs of re-litigating previously settled issues.
This article contributes to the broader study of legal mobilization by foregrounding the distinctiveness of constitutional mobilization, particularly, though not limited to, processes involving full constitutional replacement. It also bridges the literature on constitutional mobilization with the current debates on the “right against rights” (Payne et al. Reference Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023), which analyzes extra-institutional and institutional mobilization aimed at reversing specific rights promoted by previously marginalized groups. By showing how constitution-making moments can be leveraged by anti-rights actors to reclaim terrain lost in previous legal battles, we broaden the range of strategies that the right might employ in its anti-rights endeavors. These actors and arenas should therefore be incorporated into the broader debate on backlash politics (e.g. Alter and Zürn Reference Alter and Zürn2020; Braunstein Reference Braunstein2022) and current efforts to roll back hard-won rights, especially in domains where prior gains – such as reproductive rights, gender equality, environmental protection, and human rights – were thought to be consolidated.
Following this introduction, the article is structured as follows. The first section engages with contemporary debates on legal and constitutional mobilization and highlights that constitutional replacement arenas can serve as a pathway for the right against rights (Payne et al. Reference Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023), especially when it seeks to restrict or reverse advances in gender rights in general and reproductive rights in particular. The second section outlines the methodological approach used in our case study. Section three examines the gender and reproductive rights agenda in Chile prior to the Constitutional Convention, and section four examines how anti-rights groups mobilized during the 2021–2022 constitution-making process to oppose abortion rights. The article concludes by underscoring the specificity of constitutional mobilization, as illustrated by the Chilean case, and reflecting on the broader implications of our findings.
Legal and constitutional mobilization to advance and reverse rights
Legal mobilization
Progressive social movements have a long tradition of invoking legal norms and deploying legal strategies to advance their political and social objectives (Lehoucq and Taylor Reference Lehoucq and Taylor2020; McCann Reference McCann2006; Taylor and Tarrow Reference Taylor and Tarrow2024). This tendency is often grounded in the perceived effectiveness of legal mobilization not only in producing policy change but also in ensuring the durability of such change when achieved through legal mechanisms. Legal strategies enable activists to promote, legitimize, and safeguard their causes, often with greater institutional stability and symbolic authority (NeJaime Reference NeJaime2012; Taylor and Tarrow Reference Taylor and Tarrow2024).
Legal mobilization presents important advantages over other forms of institutional engagement, particularly in terms of accessibility and effectiveness. As Lehoucq and Taylor (Reference Lehoucq and Taylor2020) have emphasized, courts are required to hear claims made by marginalized or disadvantaged groups – as long as these are articulated in the language of rights. The judiciary’s relative independence means that courts may be more responsive to social movement claims in cases where political institutions or other powerful actors have proven resistant. Moreover, court rulings can significantly reshape the sociopolitical landscape in which future mobilizations unfold, altering the range of available strategies and the perceived legitimacy of certain demands.
While the literature has shown how social movements attempt to influence the interpretation and creation of law, it has also emphasized the extent to which legislation shapes social movements. As Taylor and Tarrow (Reference Taylor and Tarrow2024: 25) have noted, “Movements are shaped by laws on the books, by access to the courts, and by judicial proclivities. Legal institutions and actors form part of the ‘opportunity structure’ for movements, shaping the strategic and tactical choices available to them.” Classic accounts, such as Epp (Reference Epp1990), highlight that legal opportunities can be leveraged only when groups possess sufficient organizational capacity and legal expertise. McCann (Reference McCann2006), for his part, has drawn attention to the symbolic and identity-forming dimensions of legal mobilization, stressing that the value of legal strategies lies not only in their instrumental potential but also in their expressive and performative functions. This dimension is particularly vital for marginalized or subordinated groups seeking recognition, empowerment, and discursive visibility.
Recent scholarship has emphasized the central role of material and symbolic resources in shaping the dynamics and outcomes of legal mobilization. For instance, studies on environmental litigation highlight that the capacity to initiate strategic legal action depends not only on formal legal frameworks but also on access to funding, legal expertise, and juridical information (Jodoin and Wewerinke-Singh, Reference Jodoin and Wewerinke-Singh2025). In the educational field, research shows that African American and Latino youth, despite experiencing rights violations, often refrain from formal legal action – revealing how social capital, institutional trust, and perceived costs influence decisions to mobilize the law (Morrill et al. Reference Morrill, Tyson, Edelman and Arum2010). In the Chilean context, recent work has shown that widespread institutional disillusionment following the 2019 protests has not prevented citizens from framing their demands in legalistic terms, though such expressions often reflect a disconnect between normative expectations and actual institutional or material conditions (Feddersen et al. Reference Feddersen, Wilenmann, Cavieres and Gambardella2024). These contributions underscore how legal mobilization is not merely a matter of legal opportunity, but one embedded in broader configurations of inequality, legitimacy, and access to institutional resources.
In sum, the literature on legal mobilization highlights the complex interplay between law and social movements, underscoring both the strategic potential of legal action and its embeddedness in broader material, institutional, and symbolic structures. While courts may provide marginalized actors with unique openings for advancing rights claims, the effectiveness of such mobilization is mediated by access to legal expertise, organizational capacity, and cultural legitimacy. Far from being a purely instrumental tactic, legal mobilization often carries expressive and identity-affirming dimensions that shape the long-term trajectories of political struggles.
Legal mobilization in the context of the pro- and anti-abortion debate
Among the various areas of legal mobilization, pro- and anti-abortion movements have one of the longest and most sustained histories of engagement (Machado Reference Machado2023). Globally, activists, legal advocates, and feminist organizations have employed judicial mechanisms to challenge existing laws, reinterpret constitutional rights, and push for broader reproductive freedoms (Boyle et al. Reference Boyle, Kim and Longhofer2015; Taylor and Tarrow Reference Taylor and Tarrow2024). By framing abortion as a matter of human rights, equality, and public health, legal mobilization has enabled the construction of compelling legal arguments that resonate across national and international legal systems (Davis Reference Davis2011). In many instances, legal mobilization by pro-choice groups has emerged as a response to rigid political or legislative systems unable or unwilling to integrate demands from civil society. In Colombia and Ecuador, for example, reproductive rights have been advanced primarily through constitutional courts, bypassing traditional legislative or electoral routes (Lemaitre and Sandvik Reference Lemaitre and Sandvik2015; Viteri Reference Viteri2020).
Legal mobilization has also been a central strategy employed by opponents of abortion rights. In various national contexts, institutional arenas – particularly after key legal victories by feminist movements – have become preferred battlegrounds for anti-abortion counter-mobilization. In the United States, religious groups have long sought to legitimize their claims through litigation, lobbying, and influence over judicial appointments, aiming to counteract established reproductive rights (Hoover and den Dulk Reference Hoover and den Dulk2004). In Eastern Europe, anti-abortion actors have similarly engaged in lobbying efforts to restrict abortion access through parliamentary initiatives (Beláňová Reference Beláňová2020). Across Latin America, both anti-abortion and pro-choice movements have resorted to legal strategies to advance their agendas (Machado Reference Machado2023; Zaremberg and Almeida Reference Zaremberg and de Almeida2022). In countries like Brazil and Argentina, anti-abortion groups have actively pursued judicial and legislative influence by framing abortion as a threat to religious and family values. While their immediate goals include preventing, limiting, or reversing abortion legalization (Escoffier and Vivaldi Reference Escoffier, Vivaldi, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023), these movements often adopt broader agendas. They oppose gender and sexual equality policies, such as same-sex marriage, transgender rights, and comprehensive sex education, consistently presenting themselves as defenders of traditional norms regarding sexuality, masculinity, femininity, and reproduction (Vaggione Reference Vaggione2005; Peñas Defago and Morán Faúndez Reference Peñas Defago and Manuel Morán Faúndes2014).
While litigation remains the predominant strategy among anti-abortion groups, particularly for contesting reproductive rights across judicial levels (NeJaime and Siegel Reference NeJaime and Siegel2021), some have also ventured into constitutional reform and replacement processes when opportunities arise. This shift acquires particular significance in constitutional replacement processes, such as Chile’s recent case, where anti-abortion mobilization had long faced repeated defeats in court (Escoffier and Vivaldi Reference Escoffier, Vivaldi, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023; León Reference León2014), and where the prospect of reshaping foundational legal frameworks through the constitutional process created a new arena for action.
Constitutional mobilization
While constitutional mobilization can be understood as a subtype of legal mobilization, recent scholarship has emphasized its distinctive features, particularly in light of the emergence of demands for constitutional reform during the global protest wave that followed the 2008 financial crisis in countries such as Tunisia, Iceland, Spain, and South Korea (Rodríguez et al. Reference Rodríguez, Soto and Cuadros2024; della Porta Reference della Porta2020; Blokker Reference Blokker2018; Son Reference Son2018).
In Latin America, constitutional mobilization has played a prominent role in recent political transformations. The region is notable for the frequency of constitutional replacements and reforms, often in response to social mobilizations and political crises (Angel-Cabo and Lovera Reference Angel-Cabo, Lovera Parmo, Alviar Garcia, Klare and Williams2014; Negretto Reference Negretto2018). Scholars have documented the active participation of social movements in constituent assemblies in countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, and Chile, where grassroots actors have viewed constitution-making as an opportunity to enshrine social, cultural, and collective rights previously excluded from institutional recognition (Silva Irarrázaval Reference Silva Irarrázaval2018; Schilling-Vacaflor Reference Schilling-Vacaflor2011). These mobilizations have contributed to a distinct strand of Latin American constitutionalism that combines formal legal transformation with participatory processes and a strong emphasis on social justice (Gargarella Reference Gargarella2015).
Son (Reference Son2018) conceptualizes constitutional mobilization as the effort by social actors to promote constitutional change through the strategic use of constitutional discourse and norms. According to Blokker (Reference Blokker2018), this form of mobilization can take multiple paths, including legal action through courts, political advocacy for constitutional amendments, grassroots protest during processes of constitutional revision, and acts of resistance that directly challenge the legitimacy of existing political orders. The effectiveness of these strategies often hinges on the institutional context and the resources available to the movements. Their impact can range from raising public awareness to influencing actual constitutional reforms (Blokker Reference Blokker2018).
Even though constitutional mobilization can be understood as a form of legal mobilization within constitutional arenas, the constitutional dimension introduces specific features that distinguish it from conventional forms of legal mobilization. Son (Reference Son2018) emphasizes that constitutional mobilization emerges in contexts of heightened political contention or institutional crisis, where actors perceive that conventional legal channels (such as judicial litigation or legislative lobbying) are insufficient or closed. In such contexts, constitutional mobilization becomes a way to redefine foundational norms or to contest the legitimacy of existing constitutional arrangements (Son Reference Son2018: 125). This form of mobilization is deeply shaped by the structure of political opportunities, including the availability of constitution-making arenas, the openness of political institutions, and the presence of legal or extra-legal mechanisms for constitutional change.
Moreover, constitutional mobilization relies not only on institutional access but also on what social movement scholarship has termed frame alignment (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000; Snow et al. Reference Snow, Vliegenthart, Ketelaars, Snow, Soule, Kriesi and McCammon2019). A frame is a scheme of interpretation that allows individuals and social movement organizations to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” reality, thereby motivating collective action (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000: 614). As the literature on social movements has long emphasized, the alignment of frames plays a pivotal role in shaping the resonance of collective action. This process involves linking two or more ideologically compatible, yet typically disconnected, collective action frames (Snow et al. Reference Snow, Vliegenthart, Ketelaars, Snow, Soule, Kriesi and McCammon2019). By constructing narratives that connect movement claims with widely held cultural values and interpretive schemata, activists are able to persuade not only their own members but also broader audiences. Effective frame alignment thus serves a dual purpose. It sustains internal cohesion and commitment among activists while simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of the movement’s demands in the public sphere.
In the context of constitution-making, actors must construct persuasive narratives that tie their political or social claims to constitutional principles such as democracy, sovereignty, or rights. These frames aim to confer normative legitimacy on their proposals and mobilize broader support. To frame constitutional arguments and demands,
social actors refer to distinctive constitutional language, ideas, norms, or symbols, which include: (1) fundamental constitutional principles (such as, the separation of power and judicial independence); (2) constitutional rights (which is to say a social actor’s general understanding of constitutional rights, principles of constitutional rights like proportionality, and specific constitutional rights); (3) constitutional institutions (the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary); (4) and constitutional procedures (such as judicial review and constitutional referendum). (Son Reference Son2018: 123)
Constitutional mobilization is thus both a legal and a political act: it seeks to inscribe a vision of social order into the highest legal norm and to do so by activating a broader repertoire of action than conventional legal mobilization allows (Son Reference Son2018).
Son and other scholars who have used the concept of constitutional mobilization have focused on the mobilization of pro-rights social actors (Blokker Reference Blokker2018; López Reference Lopez Moreno2025; Rodríguez et al. Reference Rodríguez, Soto and Cuadros2024; Son Reference Son2018). However, as the Chilean case illustrates, constitutional mobilization can also be undertaken by anti-abortion rights actors during constitutional replacement processes. In this article, we examine the strategies employed by these actors in this context.
Constitutional mobilization as a pathway for the right against rights aiming to reverse gains in gender and reproductive rights
To be sure, conservative reactions to progressive change are not a uniquely contemporary phenomenon. Classic works, such as Lipset and Raab’s (Reference Lipset Seymour and Raab1970) study of right-wing extremism in America and Faludi’s (Reference Faludi1991) analysis of antifeminism and post-feminism, are just two examples in a long lineage of similar processes. More recent developments – such as the global rise of far-right movements and parties (Caiani et al. Reference Caiani, Della Porta and Wagemann2012; Gattinara and Pirro Reference Gattinara and Pirro2025), which have emerged in response to the expansion and recognition of individual rights over recent decades, what Epp (Reference Epp1998) termed “the rights revolution” – have brought the issue of conservative responses to progressive change to the forefront of scholarly debate.
Recent work by Payne et al. (Reference Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023) has made a significant contribution to conceptualizing these conservative actors. The right against rights is defined as “collective extra-institutional and institutional mobilization to check, roll back, or reverse specific rights promoted by previously marginalized groups and communities (i.e. gender and sexuality, ethnic, race, environment, accountability for crimes against humanity) and to restore, promote, or advance a status quo ante of traditional political, social, economic, and cultural rights” (Escoffier et al. Reference Escoffier, Payne, Zulver, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023: 3). By including both extra-institutional and institutional actors in their definition of the right against rights, Payne et al.’s (Reference Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023) framework resonates with recent scholarship that underscores the porous boundaries between social movements and political parties and seeks to unpack their complex and evolving interactions (Della Porta et al. Reference Della Porta, Fernández, Kouki and Mosca2017; Goldstone Reference Goldstone and Goldstone2003; Heaney and Rojas Reference Heaney and Rojas2015; Mayka and Smith Reference Mayka and Smith2021; McAdam and Tarrow Reference McAdam and Tarrow2010; Pettinicchio Reference Pettinicchio2012; Tarrow Reference Tarrow2012; von Bülow and Bidegain Reference von Bülow, Bidegain Ponte, Almeida and Cordero Ulate2015). This is particularly relevant in the mobilization campaigns orchestrated by the right against rights, which often seek to challenge or dismantle emerging societal consensus on issues such as reproductive rights and environmental protection – efforts that typically require coordinated action across institutional and non-institutional arenas (Corredor Reference Corredor2021; Mayka and Smith Reference Mayka and Smith2021; Reuterswärd Reference Reuterswärd2021).
One example of what Payne et al. (Reference Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023) refer to as the right against rights is the evangelical movements in Brazil, which have played a pivotal role in shaping conservative politics, particularly through mobilizations against LGBTQ+ rights and reproductive freedoms promoted by left-wing governments led by the Workers’ Party. The right against rights in Latin America has also emerged in the absence of left-of-center governments. In Colombia, for example, anti-gender rights mobilization intensified following the 2016 peace accords with the FARC, which were portrayed by right-wing groups as a threat to traditional family values and national identity. In particular, these groups were critical of the peace agreement’s gender perspective, which sought the “inclusion and exercise of equal rights and conditions for all of society, specifically for women and the LGBT+ population,” and which they feared would enable the advancement of sexual diversity and gender identity rights (Corredor Reference Corredor, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023: 79).
Both cases illustrate how right-wing actors frame progressive rights as cultural and moral threats, strategically mobilizing to influence public opinion, policy outcomes, and institutional decisions. Recent research on the right against rights has thus focused on how it mobilizes in response to perceived threats to the normative agendas it seeks to promote, particularly during critical junctures such as elections, referenda, and legislative debates (Escoffier et al. Reference Escoffier, Payne, Zulver, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023: 35).
Despite their far-reaching implications, constitutional junctures – such as the constitutional process undertaken in Chile, where the possibility of enshrining the right to abortion arose – have received comparatively less scholarly attention in the debate on the right against rights. As previously argued, given its capacity to generate far-reaching outcomes, constitutional mobilization merits closer scholarly attention. This is especially pressing in the contemporary context, frequently described as an era of backlash politics (Alter and Zürn Reference Alter and Zürn2020; Braunstein Reference Braunstein2022). Alter and Zürn (Reference Alter and Zürn2020: 566) argue that backlash politics can be said to be taking place when a regressive vision that questions prevailing narratives becomes an integral component of public and political discourses (Alter and Zürn Reference Alter and Zürn2020: 566). Constitutional mobilization, especially in constitutional replacement processes, may serve as an effective mechanism for advancing this objective.
Data and methods
To investigate our case, we employed a qualitative approach that integrates document analysis, media review, ethnographic observation, and semi-structured interviews.Footnote 2 We also used protest events data from the Conflicts Observatory of COES and public opinion data (from the CEP and the LAPOP) to map the general context in which our case unfolded.
We began by reconstructing the political sequence that led to the rejection of the constitutional draft in September 2022. We focused on the period between July 10, 2021, and July 4, 2022, which encompasses the Convention’s inauguration, the drafting process, and the submission of the final text to President Gabriel Boric. We systematically reviewed the official website of the Constitutional Convention to track key moments such as public hearings and the submission of proposals by anti-rights groups (Convención Constitucional de Chile 2022). We also reviewed the citizen participation section of the same website to determine who engaged with the Convention and the intensity of their involvement. To complement this review, we conducted a media analysis of four national outlets – La Neta, El Mostrador, El Mercurio, and Radio Universidad de Chile for relevant articles covering the Convention and the plebiscite campaign. These sources were selected for their ideological diversity and consistent coverage of the process.
Our analysis of the reproductive rights debate centered on the official minutes from the Fundamental Rights Commission and plenary session transcripts (Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.). We reviewed the commission reports from the deliberative phase and identified plenary sessions where reproductive rights were discussed based on the commission’s agenda. We then conducted a thematic content analysis (Braun and Clarke Reference Braun and Clarke2021) using NVivo, focusing on key frames within the anti-abortion agenda – defense of life, conception, representations of women and the family, the body, and rights – interpreted through a constitutional lens.
To deepen our analysis, we examined a purposive sample of 20 speeches delivered by Constitutional Convention delegates between March and June 2022, the period during which debates on reproductive rights took place. These speeches were selected for their explicit references to gender and reproductive rights, with a balanced representation of 10 pro-choice and 10 anti-abortion delegates. Thematic analysis of these speeches, using the abovementioned codes as well as some inductively defined ones, allowed us to identify the most salient arguments used during the plenary debates.
In addition to textual sources, this research builds on a broader ethnographic project that followed social movement mobilization around the Constitutional Convention over the course of the entire constitutional process. This involved direct observation in the Convention’s public patio, informal access to delegates, and the ethnographic monitoring of key live-streamed sessions throughout the Convention’s proceedings. Archival work and field notes were informed by this ethnographic engagement, which offers a contextualized understanding of both formal and informal dynamics of the process.
To understand strategic motivations and actor networks, we conducted six semi-structured interviews with politically active participants: four aligned with right-wing positions and two aligned with left-wing positions. Interviewees were identified through public records and media coverage and selected because they constituted key actors in the process under analysis. Five interviews were held via Zoom and one in person. All accounts presented in this article have been anonymized. To enhance the validity of our analysis, we used interviews to triangulate insights drawn from the discourses of Convention delegates, with a focus on actor coordination and strategic framing.
Finally, to situate constitutional mobilization within the broader sociopolitical field, we analyzed protest data and public opinion surveys. Regarding the former, we relied on protest data from the Conflicts Observatory of COES (Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies), which compiles protest events reported in eighteen national and regional newspapers, as well as two nationwide radio stations. Since 2008, the Observatory has recorded approximately 28,000 protest events across Chile, including demonstrations carried out by a wide variety of groups advancing diverse demands and employing a broad range of tactics. It is currently the most comprehensive dataset available for measuring contentious activity in Chile (Conflicts Observatory of COES). Public opinion data (CEP and LAPOP surveys) were used to contextualize cultural shifts concerning sexual and reproductive rights during the constitutional process.
The gender and reproductive rights agenda in Chile on the eve of the Constitutional Convention
Over the past decade, Chile has experienced a “progressive tsunami” in advancing gender and reproductive rights. This phenomenon encompassed changes on three key fronts: legislative (in the form of the approval of national laws designed to safeguard these rights), mobilization (led by feminist and sexual diversity organizations), and cultural (reflected in shifts in public opinion within society as a whole). Below, we present each front individually to offer a clear and distinct overview. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these advancements unfolded concurrently and mutually reinforced one another. We do not aim to establish any one front as causally preceding the others. Instead, this section seeks to outline the political and cultural context within which the 2021–2022 constitutional process unfolded to show that anti-rights groups faced an unfavorable political opportunity structure.
The legislative front
In recent years, Chilean political elites have expanded sexual and reproductive rights through key legislation. Notable laws include the 1999 decriminalization of “sodomy,” the 2012 anti-discrimination “Zamudio Law” protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientationFootnote 3 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2012), and the 2015 civil union law granting cohabiting couples, regardless of gender, access to health, pension, and inheritance rights (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2015). In 2018, the gender identity law allowed transgender individuals to amend their birth certificates, followed by the 2021 legalization of same-sex marriage (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2021). The achievement of these milestones, some under center-right administrations, signals an expanding tolerance for sexual diversity across diverse political sectors.
Significant legislative changes have protected women’s rights in Chile (Escoffier and Vivaldi Reference Escoffier, Vivaldi, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023). For example, in 2015, the gender quota law required 40% female representation in party parliamentary candidates (Arce-Riffo Reference Arce-Riffo2021). Until 2017, however, Chile remained one of the few Latin American countries with a total ban on abortion – a policy maintained in order to preserve the unity of the center-left Concertación coalition, which included the Christian Democratic Party (Thomas Reference Thomas and Friedman2018). Under President Michelle Bachelet’s leadership, a 2017 law decriminalized abortion in cases of rape, life-threatening conditions for the mother, and lethal fetal conditions, despite conservative opposition. In 2019, laws addressed sexual harassment, breastfeeding rights, and gender balance on public company boards. A 2020 law expanded the definition of femicide, and in 2022, new protections for sexual crime victims and improved child support measures were introduced. In 2023, protections were extended to minors who are children of femicide victims.
The mobilization front
Legislative changes have paralleled a surge in mobilizations led by feminist and LGBTQ+ organizations in the past decades in Chile. Paredes and Reyes-Householder (Reference Paredes and Reyes-Housholder2020) show that, since 2009, protests grew around issues such as violence against women, LGBTQ+ rights, reproductive rights, and gender equality. This rise intensified post-2018, particularly for demands on violence against women and economic equality. Gender-related protests also increased as a share of total protests, reaching 10% in 2018. Additionally, these demonstrations became larger, with over 30% of gender-related protests in 2019 drawing more than a thousand participants (Paredes and Reyes-Householder Reference Paredes and Reyes-Housholder2020).
Paredes and Reyes-Housholder (Reference Paredes and Reyes-Housholder2020) note that a few anti-rights protests sought to maintain the status quo, especially in 2015 against President Michelle Bachelet’s abortion decriminalization proposal, approved in 2017. However, aside from 2015, “progressive” gender protests consistently outnumbered anti-rights ones. Transnational movements like #NiUnaMenos and #MeToo also influenced Chile’s activism landscape (Paredes Reference Paredes2018).
In 2018, feminist mobilizations took place primarily on university campuses (Lamadrid and Navarrete Reference Lamadrid and Navarrete2019; Miranda and Roque Reference Miranda and Roque2021). Organized female students conducted marches and occupied university buildings to protest against gender-based violence and advocate for gender-neutral education (Ponce Lara Reference Ponce Lara2020). As a result, some universities implemented policies for the prevention of sexual violence (Vergara et al. Reference Vergara, Vargas and Sepúlveda-Páez2024). Concurrently, multiple allegations of harassment and sexual abuse against women, involving individuals from academic and entertainment spheres, were brought to public attention (González-Ramírez Reference González-Ramírez2024; Muñoz Rojas Reference Muñoz Rojas2024).
The feminist mobilizations also held a significant place within the wide array of demands expressed during the social uprising of October 2019, which persisted with varying intensity until January 2020. The participation of women as a social category increased in the protests of this period (Joignant et al. Reference Joignant, Somma, Garretón and Campos2020). Also, women from different social strata organized instances of protest and reflection in response to sexual violence perpetrated by the police during the uprising (Araujo Reference Araujo2020). In November 2019, the artistic group Las Tesis released the song and choreography “A rapist in your way,” which was translated and staged by women from around the world in their respective countries and languages (Hinsliff Reference Hinsliff2020).
The Constitutional Convention of the 2021–2022 period, which institutionalized some of the demands of the social uprising, also represented a boost to feminist ideas. In addition to the convention having, by design, a balanced gender composition, feminist demands were very much present in its text (Cuadros Reference Cuadros2023; Interview with left-wing delegate (INT-05), interview by author, November 16, 2023; Interview with right-wing delegate (INT-01), interview by author, September 13, 2023). Additionally, the government of President Gabriel Boric, who took office in March 2022, defined itself as a “feminist government” and was inaugurated with more women than men in cabinet positions.Footnote 4
The cultural front
The legislative changes and mobilizations for sexual and reproductive rights were accompanied by growing support for these causes in the general population. Without this cultural shift, the legislative and activist fronts would be incomprehensible. As Figure 1 shows, according to different surveys conducted by the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP 1999; 2014, 2017; 2023a; 2023b), the percentage of Chilean adults who agree that abortion “should always be prohibited” has significantly decreased over the past two and a half decades, dropping from 55% in 1999 to 18% or 19% by late 2022 and mid-2023. Concurrently, the percentage in favor of allowing abortion “only in special cases” increased (from 35% in 1999 to 48% or 49% in 2022–23), as well as the support for it to be an “option for women in any case” (rising from 10% to 30% or 31% over the same period according to CEP’s surveys).
Which idea best represents your views regarding abortion?.
The same CEP surveys also show that Chile has become much more tolerant of homosexuality in recent decades. In 1998, a majority (87%) considered homosexual relationships between adults to be “always or almost always incorrect.” This percentage decreased to 48% in 2018. At the same time, the percentage of those who believe that homosexuality is “in no way incorrect” increased from 5% in 1998 to 35% in 2018 (CEP survey). Consistent with this shift, the survey conducted by the LAPOP (Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project). reveals that, on a scale of 0–100, the approval rating for same-sex marriage in Chile increased from 40 points in 2010 to 61 points in 2018 – a remarkable change in just 8 years.
All in all, as various opinion studies have shown, over the last 10 years, Chile has experienced a prevailing favorable opinion toward sexual and reproductive rights, such as abortion under certain circumstances (but not free abortion). In fact, this favorable climate of opinion began to show a significant increase during the legislative debate over the law that was eventually passed in 2017. This trend, which remains consistent today according to the latest CEP survey, represents a shift compared to the 1990s when opinion on abortion was largely unfavorable (Mascareño and Chuaqui Reference Mascareño and Chuaqui2024).
To understand these cultural changes, one must consider not only legislative changes and collective actions but also the broader context of secularization in Chilean society. Since the late 1990s, the percentage of people identified as Catholics in Chile has declined (although they still constitute most of the population), and the number of irreligious individuals has increased, while the Evangelical population has stabilized (Bargsted and De la Cerda Reference Bargsted and Cerda2019; Somma et al. Reference Somma, Bargsted and Valenzuela2017). Data from LAPOP consistently demonstrate that since 2008, attendance at meetings in religious organizations and services has decreased to the point where only a minority do so regularly. As Christian religions have traditionally held views contrary to abortion and homosexual relationships, the decline of their influence in the general population can partially explain the attitudinal changes on these topics. Of course, the opposite causal path may also hold – individuals may have adopted more liberal views on these issues, thereby feeling less attracted to Christian religions. Interestingly, the study by Bargsted and De la Cerda (Reference Bargsted and Cerda2019) reveals that within the practicing Catholic population, right-wing stances have persisted, suggesting a reaction to an increasingly liberal environment.
The anti-gender and reproductive rights counter-mobilization
Against the backdrop of expanding gender and reproductive rights, the past two decades have witnessed the mobilization of various actors in Chile opposing abortion rights. These actors include religious institutions (both Catholic and Pentecostal), NGOs, think tanks, constitutional lawyers, doctors, and politicians (Blofield Reference Blofield2013; Casas and Vivaldi Reference Casas and Vivaldi2014; Escoffier and Vivaldi Reference Escoffier, Vivaldi, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023). These mobilization efforts have been mainly reactive to a progressive agenda and have not achieved their intended goals. As shown by Escoffier and Vivaldi (Reference Escoffier, Vivaldi, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023), the structure of political opportunity for anti-abortion groups had been unfavorable long before the constitutional process began.
Indeed, opposition movements to sexual and reproductive rights have not gained traction comparable to that of the feminist movement and the wave of progressive legislative reforms. Data from the Conflicts Observatory of the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES), which tracks Chilean protests since 2008, show that out of over 28,000 recorded events, only 122 opposed abortion, and just 35 opposed sexual diversity. Most of these anti-reproductive rights protests occurred between 2014 and 2017, during Michelle Bachelet’s government, when significant gains were made in these areas. Anti-reproductive rights protests rose briefly but remained far smaller in scale than progressive demonstrations (Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies COES 2020).
Although limited in scale, anti-rights mobilization displayed distinct characteristics. Only 25% of protests occurred in the Metropolitan Region, with the rest spread across Valparaíso, La Araucanía, and Los Lagos. While religious organizations were often involved, groups such as “Women in White” and “Doctors for Life” employed secular framings (Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies COES 2020). According to the Observatory of Conflicts data, these mobilizations demonstrated high organizational capacity – 80% were backed by formal organizations, compared to 50% across all protest types – suggesting strong mobilization resources. Despite their smaller number, a significant portion of these events (30%) drew over 500 participants and remained largely peaceful, relying on repertoires of action such as marches and chants, which contributed to low levels of police repression.
In sum, although a conservative reaction to legislative and cultural shifts over the past decade became visible, it remained comparatively limited in both scale and influence. However, the constitutional arena opened a new opportunity to oppose rights in this policy area. Moreover, as we will show, anti‑abortion forces leveraged the appearance of progressive consensus to construct a moral‑panic narrative, an approach that proved particularly effective during the 2022 referendum campaign to approve or reject the constitutional proposal.
Mobilizing actors during the constitutional process
Civil society organizations
Various anti-abortion actors mobilized at different stages during the constitutional process. Religious civil society organizations, think tanks, academics, and constitutional lawyers made presentations during public hearings in both the plenary of the Constitutional Convention and the Fundamental Rights Committee, from July 2021 to March 2022 (Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.). Furthermore, non-religious anti-abortion organizers participated in demonstrations outside the Constitutional Convention when the abortion law was being discussed in the plenary, starting in March 2022. It is worth noting that the participation of anti-abortion civil society organizations was relatively limited compared to that of scholars and experts. These organizations included: (1) Family Action (active in advocating for family values); (2) The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and (3) National Evangelical Commission focused on family and life-related issues (Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.).
Additionally, academic institutions, scholars, and constitutional lawyers were actively engaged in the constitutional debate within the Convention. The following institutions supported the ideas presented by anti-abortion organizations and provided arguments, scientific evidence, and data to counter the pro-abortion agendaFootnote 5: (1) Educate Action: comprising former ministers from the (former president) Sebastián Piñera administration, this institution actively contributed to documents supporting the Always for Life movement; (2) Constitutional Forum of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile; (3) Constitutional Observatory of the Universidad de los Andes; (4) Institute for the Study of Society and Liberty Institute. The last two institutions did not focus exclusively on abortion or gender issues within the Constitutional Convention, but their agendas touched upon these topics. They also published materials in support of pro-life and pro-unborn rights ideas (Convención Constitucional de Chile 2022).
Two organizations gained prominence for their significance in the constitutional debate within the Convention: Community and Justice, and Always for Life. These two organizations launched the Right to Life Popular Initiative of Norm, using the available citizen participation mechanism to propose changes, corrections, deletions, or additions to the draft constitution. To be considered by the Constitutional Convention, the proposal required at least 15,000 supporting signatures. Importantly, they acted on different fronts when defending the rights of the unborn. While Community and Justice and its lawyers presented and defended the norm within the Constitutional Convention, providing constitutional arguments, activists from Always for Life organized public demonstrations outside the Convention building (Cruz et al. Reference Cruz, Aguirre-Díaz and Eguren-Álvarez2024).
Street mobilization
As in previous mobilizations, anti-abortion groups organized disruptive demonstrations and engaged in acts of anti-civic intimidation during the constitutional debate. On August 31, 2021, Conventional Francisca Linconao was insulted and attacked by members of the group Family, Faith, and Life (Cisternas Reference Cisternas2021: 202). This group advocates for the prohibition of abortion and the prevention of sexual education in educational institutions and opposes the prioritization of public education over private education (Siempre por la Vida n.d.). Among the aggressors, Christel Felmer and Carolina Garate were identified (El Mostrador 2021). They were candidates for the Chamber of Deputies for the Partido Republicano, one of Chile’s far-right parties (Díaz et al. Reference Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser and Zanotti2023).
The most significant public demonstration occurred outside the former Congress building, which served as the venue for the Constitutional Convention. On March 28, 2021, activists from Always for Life, a group of university and high school students mobilizing for the right to life from the moment of conception, organized a demonstration to coincide with the Day of the Unborn Child (La Neta 2022). The purpose of this demonstration was to express their opposition to the provisions of the draft of the new Constitution, recently approved by the convention, which related to voluntary abortion. “No to abortion, yes to life; the Constituent Assembly has become a murderer” was one of the slogans chanted by the protesters as they left the former congress building (Cruz et al. Reference Cruz, Aguirre-Díaz and Eguren-Álvarez2024).
Political parties inside and outside the Constitutional Convention
The 2021–22 Constitutional Convention in Chile was characterized by a predominantly non-partisan composition, with many delegates unaffiliated with traditional political parties. Out of the 155 elected members, 104 were elected as independent candidates, either running on party lists or representing lists of social movement activists and independent candidates (Larraín et al. Reference Larraín, Negretto and Voigt2023). In contrast to left-wing social movements, anti-abortion civil society organizations refrained from presenting candidates in the delegate elections. Instead, they aimed to influence the constitutional debate through public hearings, street demonstrations, and, to a lesser extent, by lobbying members of political parties within the Constitutional Convention (Rodríguez et al. Reference Rodríguez, Soto and Cuadros2024).
In addition to anti-abortion civil society organizations, two other groups advocated for this agenda within the Constitutional Convention: the traditional right-wing parties and the far right, as represented by the Partido Republicano (Convención Constitutional de Chile 2022). While the traditional right elected 37 members – falling short of the 52 seats required to form one-third of the convention and block proposals – the Republicano party did not secure any of their 4 candidates (Heiss and Mokre Reference Heiss, Mokre and Welp2023). Yet, they officially supported five candidates from the traditional right who were elected as delegates.
The role of political parties within the Convention was key in championing the anti-abortion agenda. We did not identify systematic collaboration and direct affiliations between the convention delegates and pro-life organizations. Yet there were manifestations of support. For example, when Always for Life staged protests within the Constitutional Convention, they were received by delegates such as Carol Bown, Ruth Hurtado, Alfredo Moreno, Katerine Montealegre, Pablo Toloza, and Arturo Zúñiga (Interview with right-wing delegate (INT-04), interview by author, August 31, 2023; Interview with right-wing delegate (INT-02), interview by author, August 30, 2023). At the same time, members of the Partido Republicano also actively participated in these demonstrations (Swissinfo 2022). It is also worth noting that Pía Adriasola – director of the Cuide Chile Foundation, which advocates for family values, the protection of life, and parents’ rights to educate their children – is the wife of José Antonio Kast, leader of the Partido Republicano and, since March 2026, President of Chile. The foundation actively sought to participate in the Convention’s hearings; however, its request was denied on the grounds that it promoted denialism regarding human rights violations, a stance explicitly prohibited by the Convention’s ethics committee (La Neta 2021). Most representatives from the right and center-right coalition Chile Vamos coalition included a manifesto from their respective sponsoring party when campaigning to become a Convention delegateFootnote 6 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.). Unión Demócrata Independiente, for example, emphasized the “right to life,” while Renovación Nacional articulated the idea of “life and human dignity deserving respect from conception to death.” On the other hand, some candidates formulated their own campaign programs. For instance, Roberto Vega, an independent delegate closely aligned with the right, pledged to defend the “right to life and physical integrity” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.a). Similarly, Luis Mayol (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.b) – former regional governor of the Araucanía Region and a prominent figure in the rejection of the constitutional proposal campaign – and Paulina Veloso (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.c), a delegate from Renovación Nacional, advocated for the “protection of human life from conception” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.b.). Luciano Silva, an evangelical pastor, also emphasized the “right to life from the womb,” which, among other provisions, included protections for the family, the preferential right of parents to educate their children, and the right to life from conception (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.d).
Mobilizing inside the Constitutional Convention: constitutional arguments and frames
Despite being a minority in the Convention, right-wing and far-right delegates actively participated in the debate and used the available participatory tools to try to influence it. It was through the use of the Convention’s own participatory mechanisms that an early alliance emerged between anti-abortion activists and politically aligned party delegates. One of the most widely used mechanisms during the process – and one strategically employed by anti-abortion groups – was the Popular Initiative for Norms, a citizen participation mechanism that allowed civil society groups to propose constitutional norms to the plenary of the convention if they gathered the required number of signatures (15,000 signatures) (Delamaza Reference Delamaza2025). These norms typically emerged from participatory processes involving multiple civil society organizations and contained concrete proposals for inclusion in the new constitution. In this sense, they functioned as campaigns or programmatic platforms: they were both the product of collective deliberation and vehicles for advancing specific constitutional proposals. Anti-abortion groups submitted one initiative – the “Right to Live” norm – while feminist groups submitted two initiatives related to the right to abortion: “It Will Become a Constitutional Law” and “For the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health with a Gender, Feminist, Intersectional, and Pluralistic Approach.” While the feminist initiatives were admitted for debate, the anti-abortion proposal was rejected by the plenary and therefore not discussed in that instance (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile n.d.a.).
Pro-life legal lawyers and scholars from various law faculties presented arguments grounded in constitutional law, natural law theory, and international human rights law. As illustrated by the remarks of Vicente Hargous, lawyer and representative of Community and Justice, during one of the hearings before the Commission on Fundamental Rights: “If dignity is intrinsic to human life, then it should be found at the very origin of our existence, even if this existence is a non-conscious one: the zygote is a human being, a biological human being distinct from its mother” (Convención Constitucional 2022a, 0:34).
Pro-life lawyers also contended that the Chilean Constitution – historically protective of the right to life – extended such protections to the unborn, making any attempt to legalize abortion incompatible with Chile’s legal tradition. Moreover, they highlighted the contradiction of advocating rights involving issues like the protection of nature and the environment while simultaneously denying the unborn the right to life. As Juan Antonio Montes, representative of Family Action – an organization that promotes the Christian and natural family, as well as the subsidiary role of the State – put it: “It is contradictory to grant legal recognition to nature and to guarantee buen vivir [living well], while simultaneously denying the inviolability of the right to be born from the moment of conception” (FLACSO Chile 2022, 161).
The structure of the discourse, as it unfolded in the constitutional debate, encompassed ideological, legal, and constitutional dimensions. On the ideological front, anti-abortion delegates emphasized the principles of the right to life and human dignity, grounding their arguments in natural rights theory. Legally, these concepts were framed in terms of human rights and the right to non-discrimination. Soledad Bertelsen, a law professor at the University of the Andes and a vocal opponent of abortion rights, posed a provocative question: “Would a 36-week fetus who has not yet been born not be considered a rights-holder, while a premature baby born at 32 weeks would? Both lack autonomy, yet both belong to the human species and should be recognized as bearers of rights” (FLACSO Chile 2022, 68).
According to proponents of anti-abortion views, human life begins at conception, so interrupting a pregnancy is perceived as discrimination against a defenseless human being and an affront to its dignity. The anti-abortion Popular Initiative of Norm elaborated by Always for Life asserted that
constitutional and legal protection of the right to life can contribute to ensuring that the right to life of every Chilean is socially respected. Conversely, if the laws and the Constitution do not recognize that we are all equal in dignity and rights, it can contribute to the social problem of arbitrarily discriminating against the unborn. (Convención Constitucional de Chile 2022)
On the constitutional front, the debate centered on a more specific issue: the proposal for unrestricted or unlimited abortion put forth by feminist organizations. Recognizing an unfavorable political opportunity structure (Interview with right-wing delegate (INT-04), interview by author, August 31, 2023), right-wing delegates within the Convention aimed to convey the idea that allowing abortion without explicit regulation at the constitutional level would practically grant women the choice to terminate a pregnancy regardless of its stage of development. As Ruth Hurtado, delegate of Republicanos, stated in the plenary of the Constitutional Convention and the Fundamental Rights Committee on March 10, 2022:
With regard to abortion – something so important, yet inexcusable – what the Commission on Fundamental Rights presents to us is the proposal for free abortion. Yes, free abortion. They have tried to convince the public that this proposal, which is meant to become law, is not free abortion, arguing that a subsequent law would regulate all the time limits or grounds (…) The supposed law that would limit it is entirely hypothetical and, if introduced, could be declared unconstitutional. (Hurtado Reference Hurtado2022)
To support their anti-free abortion stance, anti-abortion delegates referred to human rights treaties signed by Chile.
The tone and content of the constitutional arguments against the abortion norm can be illustrated by the remarks made by delegate Katherine Montealegre on January 26, 2022, during a session of the Fundamental Rights Committee. In this session, the conservative delegate discussed the abortion norm “It will become a constitutional law” as presented by the Permanent Assembly for the Legalization of Abortion.
You have stated that there is no international standard for abortion when, in today’s world, the right to life and the protection of the unborn are enshrined in various international instruments, such as Article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights (…) I ask you to be precise, and do not lie: you are not terminating a pregnancy; you are ending the life of a human being. From the first paragraph, we can draw the following conclusions: this norm establishes unrestricted abortion as a right, allowing for the termination of an 8-month-old fetus, a matter not addressed in any treaty or constitution (…) So, with the understanding that we are no longer talking about decriminalization only, as argued in the three circumstances, but rather about direct legalization and state provision, my question to you is as follows: Do you intend for all Chileans, including the more than 20,000 who signed the proposal for the right to life of the unborn, to finance with public resources the performance of abortions on demand whenever you want, and those who oppose it, such as healthcare professionals, will be coerced into performing an action they consider absolutely illegitimate in conscience?
(Katerine Montealegre, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile n.d.e)
As the quote demonstrates, political arguments also played a significant role, particularly those related to institutional and individual objections to abortion. The principle of autonomy – invoked by pro-abortion delegates to defend women’s self-determination – was also mobilized to protect health-care personnel from being coerced by the state into performing abortions against their will. In addition to this political aspect, anti-rights groups also put forth an economic argument, contending that individuals who disagreed with abortion would be compelled to bear the financial burden of enacting a law they deemed illegitimate.
Furthermore, when the abortion discussion was placed within the broader context of sexual and reproductive rights, anti-abortion delegates connected the concept of procreation to that of family and love:
When one has an abortion, one does not choose whether to be a mother or not, one chooses whether to be the mother of a living child or a dead child. That is the truth. Now, to the women who are listening to us, probably from their homes, and who might be in difficult situations, I want to speak to you as a mother, as a woman, and tell you that if you are going through a tough time, if you are suffering, if you are facing doubts on this matter, try to seek support. The support you need to carry your pregnancy to term, because there are many things in life we regret. I have an endless list of things I regret and wish I hadn’t done, but having each of my children is not one of them.
(Teresa Marinovic, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. n.d.f.)
Finally, anti-abortion rights actors articulated a vision of societal structure grounded in the values of love and family, while still acknowledging the legitimacy of individual pleasure. Yet, pleasure, when divorced from love and procreation, was presented as egoistic, hedonistic, and contrary to social and emotional stability:
We do not despise sexual life, nor do we make sex a taboo. On the contrary, we understand that, beyond its procreative function, sex has the potential to unite in love, and that pleasure is an essential part of the sexual experience. For those of us who are believers, this anthropological aspect of the human being is part of God’s creation. Therefore, we may differ from those who reduce sexual life to encounters devoid of meaning, but we respect their decision. If someone wishes to devalue sexuality and only take a part of it, renouncing all the gratifications that a broader perspective offers, that is not our concern. That is why, I repeat, we do not want the State in our bedroom. (Rocío Cantuarias, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. n.d.g.)
In sum, when compared to previous episodes of mobilization (Cruz et al. Reference Cruz, Aguirre-Díaz and Eguren-Álvarez2024; Escoffier and Vivaldi Reference Escoffier, Vivaldi, Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023), the analysis of the anti-abortion agenda during Chile’s 2021–2022 Constitutional Convention reveals that it was grounded in a Catholic-inspired belief in the sanctity of fetal life, conceptualized as a child of God endowed with inherent natural rights. From this perspective, abortion was framed as the taking of innocent human life. Although the discourse drew upon both religious and secular arguments, secular reasoning predominated in the deliberations within the Convention. Importantly, however, the institutional setting in which these claims were advanced differed from previous arenas of mobilization. As we argue in the following section, this shift had implications for both the opportunity to block the recognition of reproductive rights and the strategies adopted to pursue that objective.
The Rechazo campaign and the rejection of the new proposed constitution
Despite their efforts, right-wing delegates were unable to prevent the incorporation of the feminist constitutional provision into the final draft of the new constitutional proposal. This defeat within the Constitutional Convention, however, was followed by an active social media campaign to gain the support of the citizenry and attempt to have the specific norm on sexual and reproductive rights rejected, this time by rejecting the entire proposal (Fuentes Reference Fuentes2023). As one right-wing delegate of the Constitutional Convention and one of the minds behind the Rechazo campaign’s rhetoric, states:
I proposed structuring the narrative from our side. Considering the minority that we were, rather than in the antagonistic right-left divide, which we wouldn’t be able to do much about, given the context we were in I suggested framing it as the divide between democrats and non-democrats. As the process became more complex in terms of proposals, which, in our view, affected democracy and could attract certain sectors, some of whom, while not considering themselves right-wing, believed that certain fundamental principles of liberal democracy were at stake. This divide gained more and more strength, and I believe it was significant (…), if you look at it, it wasn’t just the right-wing that rejected it. (Interview with right-wing adviser (INT-03), interview by author, August 31, 2023)
As noted by Frei et al. (Reference Frei, Cordero, Lang, Rozas and Rodríguez2024), the social media campaign also employed other framing tactics, including manipulation and distortion, which is often seen in anti-rights groups (Payne et al. Reference Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023). The core of the pro-choice norm was the right of women to autonomously decide to terminate a pregnancy, explicitly stating that the specific circumstances under which this right should be exercised would be subject to further regulation by Congress (Convención Constitucional 2022b). However, the lack of any reference to the specific circumstances under which abortion would be permitted allowed anti-abortion delegates, politicians, and activists to claim that the new constitution would legalize abortion even up to 9 months of pregnancy. This message was disseminated through various media, social networks (such as Twitter and WhatsApp), and during the TV referendum campaign (Interview with left-wing adviser (INT-03), interview by author, August 31, 2023).
After the Constitutional Convention had completed its work, anti-abortion campaigners discursively reframed reproductive rights within a broader set of conservative concerns, such as the defense of private property and the rejection of the proposed pluri-national state. Cruz et al. (Reference Cruz, Aguirre-Díaz and Eguren-Álvarez2024) show the extent to which pro-life activists strategically linked their opposition to abortion with other values they perceived to be under threat in the draft constitution – namely, the right to private property, the traditional family, the principle of equality, which they argued was undermined by the recognition of Indigenous group rights and, importantly, a threat to national unity. In doing so, they became part of a broader coalition – ranging from the far right to segments of the center-left – that mobilized around the Rechazo option in the national plebiscite (Frei et al. Reference Frei, Cordero, Lang, Rozas and Rodríguez2024). Ultimately, anti-abortion actors folded the defense of the unborn into a wider repertoire of “other reasons to reject” the draft, shifting their focus from a single policy issue to a comprehensive rejection of the proposed constitution.
The campaign for delegitimizing the Convention’s work was successful. Public opinion polls reflected a gradual decline in the perceived legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention’s work overtime. For example, according to the Pulso Ciudadano survey, in June 2021 only 27% of respondents reported having “no trust or little trust” in the Constitutional Convention. However, by July, this figure had risen to 46% and remained at that level – or higher – through the end of the year (Ortiz Reference Ortiz2022). This decline in legitimacy was accompanied by increasingly negative public sentiment toward the Convention. According to the Ipsos-Espacio Público (2022) survey, between February 2021 and July 2022, there was a marked decrease in the proportion of people who associated the constitutional process with positive emotions such as “hope” and “joy.” At the same time, the share of those who associated it with negative ones like “uncertainty” and “distrust” increased. In the July 2022 wave – just 2 months before the exit plebiscite – 38% believed that approval of the draft would bring “many negative changes” to Chile over the next decade, while only 23% expected it would bring “many positive changes” (Ipsos-Espacio Público 2022). At the same time, there was a consistent rise in preferences against the constitutional proposal between January and August 2022 – just weeks before the exit plebiscite (Plaza Pública CADEM 2022). During this period, support for the “approval” vote dropped from 56% to 38%, while support for “rejection” rose from 33% to 46%, anticipating the defeat of the proposal (Plaza Pública CADEM 2022).
As mentioned in the introduction, the draft proposed by the Constitutional Convention was rejected by 62%, a result celebrated as a victory by anti-abortion groups in particular and anti-rights factions of the right-wing in general. The outcome, influenced by the Rejection campaign, was also significantly mediated by aspects of the institutional design of the process (Escudero Reference Escudero2024; Heiss and Suárez-Cao Reference Heiss and Suárez-Cao2024). Among the most important factors was the change in electoral rules between the entry referendum, which was conducted with voluntary voting and had a 50.95% turnout, and the exit or ratification referendum, conducted with mandatory voting, where turnout reached 85.56%. Due to this change, the Rejection campaign found a universe of 5,459,657 new voters who were not counted in the entry referendum, allowing it to grow and consolidate its support base.Footnote 7 In referendums, electoral volatility is greater than in regular elections (Schuck and de Vreese Reference Schuck and Vreese2009). Relatedly, some authors have pointed to the underrepresentation of the right in the Constitutional Convention and a circumstantial majority of progressive forces as explanatory factors for the rejection of the proposal (Larraín et al. Reference Larraín, Negretto and Voigt2023). Additionally, combined with the inherent uncertainty of high-risk votes for new voters, such as referendums, is the fact that what is put to a vote in a constitutional replacement process is the proposal for a new constitution as a whole, in a dichotomous structure (acceptance or rejection of the entire proposal). This implies a “winner-takes-all” logic. As Roberto Gargarella (Reference Gargarella2022) explains in relation to the Bolivian case of 2009, Bolivians were asked to approve or reject a Constitution that bundled unpopular presidential re-election clauses with highly desired social rights. Voters were then forced to accept unwanted provisions in order to secure the rights they valued most. This was also the case in the Chilean process.
The anti-abortion campaigners in the new process: the end of a cycle?
After the victory of the Rechazo option in September 2022, a second constitutional process was initiated. In the election to select new delegates, a significant majority of right-wing and far-right candidates were elected (La Neta 2023). Consequently, the second attempt to change the constitution, named Constitutional Council to differentiate it from the first process, was driven by politicians who opposed the sexual and reproductive rights proposals advocated by feminist groups in the prior process (Sanhueza Reference Sanhueza2023). Out of the 50 Council members, 33 were against the right to abortion (Lee Reference Lee2023). This made it possible for the Constitutional Council to introduce the phrasing “The law protects the life of the one who is about to be born,” seeking to replace “that” with “who” in the Constitution. This apparently minor linguistic modification was intended to undermine the constitutionality of the current law permitting abortion under three circumstances, thereby reigniting the broader political and legal struggle over reproductive rights (Interferencia 2023). This offensive can be understood as the continuation and culmination of the strategies deployed over the last 10 years by pro-life groups. Never had these anti-rights groups been in a better position to imprint their ideology on the country’s fundamental charter. The arguments were the same as those used in the previous process, with the caveat that these same arguments found more resonance and less opposition within the Council due to its composition. However, the draft constitution prepared by the Constitutional Council was rejected by 56% of voters in the December 2023 plebiscite.Footnote 8
The second constitutional process can thus be understood as a continuation of anti-rights mobilization by other means, this time with a majority presence within the newly formed Constitutional Council. In this case, these groups clearly perceived the political opportunity structure as favorable, and their mobilization did not arise in response to any perceived threat. On the contrary, this time, it was feminist groups that mobilized to resist the advance of anti-rights forces.
Conclusion
Our analysis shows that many of the strategies employed by anti-rights actors during Chile’s 2021–2022 constitutional process involved conventional forms of legal and political advocacy – such as lobbying, expert testimony, and grassroots mobilization. What makes these actions distinctive, however, is not the tactics themselves but the institutional setting in which they unfolded: the exceptional arena of constitutional replacement. Following Son (Reference Son2018) and Blokker (Reference Blokker2018), we argue that constitutional mobilization constitutes a distinct form of political engagement that arises when the foundational rules of the legal and political order are subject to revision.
From this perspective, actions such as submitting proposals to the Convention, participating in public hearings, framing anti-abortion positions as rights-based claims, and mobilizing around the referendum must be understood as strategies aimed at shaping the nation’s constitutional blueprint rather than influencing existing policy. For instance, the use of secularized arguments in defense of fetal life – grounded in natural law theory or human dignity frameworks – sought to embed conservative moral worldviews into the new constitutional text. Similarly, reframing abortion rights as incompatible with principles such as equality or environmental protection represented an effort to reorder the hierarchy of constitutional values.
Constitutional mobilization unfolds in a procedurally distinct and temporally exceptional moment – one in which the constitutional order is not only questioned but actively rewritten. Unlike legislative lobbying or court-based litigation, which operate within stable procedural constraints, constitution-making suspends or redefines the rules of the game. This situation creates openings for actors – especially those who have lost ground in legal arenas – to rearticulate their worldviews as foundational principles and social contracts. As McCann (1994) noted, legal mobilization often involves struggles over constitutional meaning; yet the Chilean case demonstrates how full constitution-writing affords even greater leverage, allowing actors to redefine the very boundaries of rights rather than merely reinterpret existing norms.
This dynamic is not unique to Chile. In the United States, for instance, anti-rights legal activism surged after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization – a context where foundational stakes were comparably high, though without the procedural suspension of constitution-making (Ziegler Reference Ziegler2023). The Chilean experience thus illustrates how anti-rights mobilization adapts to different institutional contexts: while U.S. litigation centered on constitutional reinterpretation, Chilean actors pursued constitutional inscription. In both cases, the struggle extended beyond policy content to contest the deeper architecture of constitutional meaning.
Chile’s constitutional reform process (2021–2023) offered a rare opportunity for progressive actors to pursue the constitutionalization of gender and reproductive rights. Yet it also opened a strategic window for anti-abortion groups to resist and ultimately block these advances. Despite their limited presence in the 2021–2022 Constitutional Convention, anti-rights actors engaged actively through public hearings, small-scale demonstrations, and formal opposition to reproductive rights clauses, often employing secular and technical arguments. Although these efforts failed to shape the draft – which incorporated progressive provisions on gender and reproductive rights – conservative forces regrouped and prevailed in the referendum campaign. A broad coalition of right-wing and centrist parties, think tanks, legal scholars, and civil society organizations criticized key elements of the draft, from plurinationalism to property rights. This bundling of issues under a shared oppositional frame proved decisive, and the rejection of the draft in September 2022 ultimately prevented the constitutionalization of abortion rights.
The Chilean experience underscores how constitution-making differs from conventional legal mobilization, which typically unfolds in judicial or legislative arenas governed by stable procedures. In the constitutional context, the rules themselves are fluid, and the stakes concern the foundational design of the political community. Such processes enable actors to reopen previously settled debates and align diverse agendas under a common project. Even within an unfavorable political opportunity structure inside the Convention, anti-rights groups leveraged the broader institutional process – especially the referendum – to shift the trajectory of constitutional reform.
This article contributes to the literature on legal mobilization by extending its scope to constitution-making as a distinct site of contention. Whereas legal mobilization often centers on litigation and judicial claims (Hilson Reference Hilson2002; McCann Reference McCann2006), constitutional mobilization unfolds in more fluid and uncertain arenas, where the definition of rights and the legal order itself are at stake. Three features distinguish it from other forms of legal mobilization. First, the incentive to mobilize is heightened, since what is contested is not a specific law but the constitutional framework that shapes all future laws. Second, successful strategies require the articulation of shared collective action frames that bridge institutional and extra-institutional actors within the procedural dynamics of constitution-making. Third, constitutional claims tend to be bundled and scaled up, reflecting the systemic reordering of values and institutions that such moments of foundational reform make possible.
In polarized democracies, constituent processes thus represent not only opportunities for progressive transformation but also battlegrounds for what Payne et al. (Reference Payne, Zulver and Escoffier2023) term the “right against rights.” Understanding these dynamics is crucial for grasping the political significance of constitutional reform in an era defined by backlash politics.
Acknowledgements
We thank the editors of this special issue and the reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive comments, which have greatly improved the quality of our work.
Funding statement
This research was funded by the Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (ANID), Chile, through the following research grants: The Center for Social and Cohesion Studies (COES ANID/FONDAP/15130009 and COES ANID/FONDAP/15130009); the Millenium Institute for Authority and Social Regulation (ASOR) (ANID-Milenio NICS2025_002), the Millenium Nucleus of Political Crises in Latin America (CRISPOL) (ANID-Milenio NCS2024_065), the Millennium Nucleus on Labor Policy and Family and Collective Life (LABOFAM) (ANID-Milenio NCS2024_019), and three Fondecyt Regular grants (ANID/FONDECYT Regular/1240777; ANID/FONDECYT Regular/1240960; ANID/FONDECYT Regular/1251330).
Conflict of interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
