2. Two FES accounts of faith

3. A contextualist account

We think the lesson we can draw from the failure of the Kierkegaardian account is that something more than evidence is required in order to explain felicitous and infelicitous uses of the term “faith” in the sentences discussed above. We suggest that this further element is context. In developing our contextualist proposal, we are inspired by two influential accounts in epistemology: Relevant alternatives theory of knowledge (RAT) and contextualism about knowledge.Footnote ⁵ We briefly discuss these accounts with the help of two paradigm examples.

Kevin takes his son, Sam, to the zoo to see zebras. When Sam asks which animal they are, Kevin answers that they are zebras. Kevin has several pieces of evidence that they are zebras (they look like zebras, they are in a pen clearly marked “Zebras,” etc.). Now suppose Sam asks this question: aren’t they mules cleverly disguised by the zoo authorities to look like zebras? The proposition that they are mules cleverly disguised is a relevant alternative to what Kevin believes. According to RAT, in order to have knowledge that these animals are zebras, Kevin should rule out this salient relevant alternative. We don’t presuppose RAT as a theory of knowledge, but we need the notion of “salient relevant alternative” in our account of ascriptions of faith.

Let’s turn to contextualism about ascriptions of knowledge. Consider the following scenario. Alex, a professor of philosophy, and his wife want to take a trip for Christmas. Unfortunately, they have a fight before beginning the trip. Then Alex asks his wife if she can carry his bag. She angrily responds: do you know that you have hands and can carry your bag? Alex angrily answers: yes, I know that I have hands, but I have pain in my hand and cannot carry it. After returning from holiday, Alex goes to the class to teach epistemology and particularly skeptical arguments like the brain in a vat thought experiment. He asks students: do I know that I have hands and therefore I am not a brain in a vat? According to contextualism about ascriptions of knowledge, in the first context in everyday life, Alex felicitously ascribes knowledge that he has hands to himself. However, in the context of an epistemology class when discussing the skeptical scenarios, to the extent that he does not rule out the skeptical argument, Alex is not justified in ascribing this knowledge to himself. Thus, in one context, the ascription of knowledge that P to a subject is justified and, in another context, is not justified. Again, we don’t assume that contextualism about ascriptions of knowledge is the best theory of knowledge ascription. We only draw inspiration from this contextualism to advocate a contextualism about ascriptions of faith.

We now have the conceptual tools for characterizing our proposal. Here is our proposal for ascriptions of faith:

There are two clarifications in order. The first is an emphasis on the point that, in advocating contextualism about ascriptions of faith, we don’t presuppose RAT or contextualism about ascriptions of knowledge. Therefore, depending on the theory of knowledge we choose, the subject S for whom a relevant alternative to P is salient and who has faith that P may or may not have knowledge that P. We will return to this consideration in the next section.

We present the second clarification in an objection-reply. Consider again the case of Kevin and Sam. The proposition that the mentioned animals are colored mules is a relevant alternative to the proposition that the mentioned animals are zebras. Let us suppose that Kevin answers Sam’s question in this way:

1. 13- I have faith that they are zebras.

We think this is a weird usage of the term “faith.” Seemingly, something goes wrong in the employment of faith in the present context. However, one may worry that our contextualist account fails to explain what is problematic in the ascription of faith in this context. There is a salient alternative for the proposition in which Kevin has faith, and therefore, according to our proposal, it must be appropriate to ascribe faith to him. Why do we feel something goes wrong in this ascription of faith? In reply, notice that there is a consensus in the literature on faith that someone has faith that P only if she has a positive evaluation of P. As an example, Howard-Snyder (Reference Howard-Snyder2013: 367) writes:

However, in the case at hand, whether the animals are zebras or colored mules seems not to have any significance for Kevin and Sam. To illustrate the point, let us change the scenario of the case in the following way. Suppose that Kevin and Sam have gone to the zoo along with all classmates of Sam. In fact, Kevin has taken them to the zoo to see zebras. Kevin begins to present some information about zebras, and when faced with the question of whether they are zebras or colored mules, he becomes confused. If the animals are not zebras, Kevin’s plan would be ridiculous. In this context, Sam whispers to Kevin:

1. 14- Don’t worry dad, I have faith that they are zebras.

The usage of “faith” in sentence 14 is by far more appropriate than its usage in sentence 13. It is because, in the new context, there is a clear sense that it is good for Kevin and Sam that these animals are real zebras. As a result, there is a disanalogy between salient relevant alternatives in cases of ascription of knowledge and cases of ascription of faith. In the latter, unlike the former, the subject should have a positive evaluation of the content of his attitude and, therefore, a negative evaluation of its relevant alternative. Put otherwise, in the ascription of faith, an answer to the question of whether a proposition is a salient relevant alternative has evaluative as well as epistemic aspects.

We can now briefly look at how the contextualist account explains appropriate and inappropriate usages of faith in the sentences discussed above. Let’s begin with the case of Sarah, who suffers from cancer with a 90 percent chance of treatment. Her mother says to Sarah that:

1. 8- I have faith that you will be treated.

The contextualist account, unlike the first version of the Kierkegaardian account, explains why sentence 8 contains a semantically correct ascription of faith. Although Sarah has strong evidence that she will be treated, there is still a 10 percent danger of death. This relevant alternative with its high cost is salient for Sarah and her mother in the present context. Given this salient alternative, it is convenient to ascribe faith that Sarah will be treated to Sarah’s mother.

Turning to the case of Nathan, recall that if his solution to the mathematical problem is incorrect, the whole spaceship project will collapse. Thus, it makes sense that he worries about a possible mistake in his solution. In the present context, thus, there is a salient relevant alternative to the proposition that his solution is correct. This, according to contextualism, makes the following sentence by Nathan a felicitous attribution of faith:

1. 9- I have faith that my solution is correct and that everything goes well.

A similar explanation is available in the case of John and his father. He is in a crowded metro station, and it is plausible to consider the possibility that he errs in identifying his father. Thus, there is an alternative to his claim that he saw his father that is salient in the present context. In this way, the contextualist account properly explains why the following assertion contains a semantically appropriate ascription of faith:

1. 10- I saw him, I saw him; I have faith that I saw him.

In this way, the contextualist account, unlike the second version of the Kierkegaardian account, is successful in explaining the appropriateness of ascriptions of faith while having perceptual or mathematical evidence in the cases of Nathan and John.

Let’s move on and compare the contextualist account with the third version of the Kierkegaardian account. The motivation for this version of the Kierkegaardian account was that there are decisive types of evidence, for example, for the proposition that two plus two is four – that precludes ascriptions of faith. Contextualism too can explain why in everyday contexts an ascription of faith that two plus two is four is infelicitous. In such contexts, we have no reason to think that this proposition is false, and there is normally no relevant alternative to it that becomes salient for us. However, what contextualism, contrary to Kierkegaardian accounts, can explain is why Marvin can appropriately ascribe faith to himself in sentence 12:

1. 12- But I still have faith that two plus two is four.

In the context in which Marvin asserts this sentence, he and his friend discuss Descartes’ evil demon argument that claims that propositions we take to be mathematical truths are in fact false. This makes salient an alternative to the proposition that two plus two is four. Thus, contextualism makes clear why there are contexts in which having faith in propositionsFootnote ⁸ like two plus two is four, despite the most decisive evidence, is semantically appropriate.

Finally, we return to the case of George and its variations. In the original version of this case, before George has returned home, his parents are worried that he may not be alive. In this context, thus, there is a salient alternative to the proposition that George is alive. This explains why George’s mother’s ascription of faith in sentence 4 is convenient:

1. 4- I cannot imagine that he is dead; I have faith that he is alive.

However, the conversational context changes when George returns home. When his parents meet George, it is no longer plausible to question whether he is alive. After meeting him, they have no reason to take the option that he is dead seriously. Thus, in this new context, there is no salient alternative to the proposition that George is alive. Hence, the father of George does not use the term “faith” in an appropriate way when uttering sentence 6:

1. 6- I have faith that you are alive.

We observe that, like the Kantian account, the contextualist account is able to explain why the usage of faith in sentence 6 is not correct. However, the advantage of the contextualist account is that, unlike the Kantian account, it is successful in explaining why the use of faith in sentence 7 by George’s father is absurd:

1. 7- I have faith that George is alive.

In the context of asserting sentence 7, although the person whom George’s father sees is not George, he himself thinks that he is George. As such, the context of conversation in which George’s father utters sentence 7 is similar in relevant respects to the context of conversation in which he asserts sentence 6. In both contexts, he doesn’t have any plausible reason to ask the question of whether George is alive. This question is settled for him since he thinks that he has met George. Therefore, there is no salient alternative to the proposition that George is alive in either context in which sentences 6 and 7 are asserted, meaning both of them contain infelicitous attributions of faith that George is alive. However, the context again shifts in the second variation of the case of George when his mother finds plausible reasons to doubt whether she really met George since some behaviors of the teenager she takes to be George are not similar to George’s. In this new context, the option that he may not be George and therefore George may not be alive becomes salient. Thus, sentence 11, expressed by George’s mother in this context, includes an appropriate ascription of faith:

1. 11- I have faith that he is George; I have faith that he is alive, and God has returned my son.

As a result, the contextualist account of ascriptions of faith, contrary to the Kantian account and the three versions of the Kierkegaardian account, can explain the semantically appropriate and inappropriate uses of the term “faith” in all sentences 4–14. In this way, we suggest that the contextualist account provides the best explanation of the discussed linguistic facts about ascriptions of faith.

4. FES versus A-FES accounts of faith

As stated in the introduction, the present article has two main objectives. The preceding section addressed the first objective of the article by developing a contextualist account of ascriptions of faith. In this section, we turn to achieving the second objective. As observed above, accounts of faith can be divided into two camps: FES accounts claim that possession of faith needs an epistemic shortcoming, while A-FES accounts deny this claim. The main aim of this section is to show how semantic contextualism about faith can be compatible with both FES and A-FES views. Before carrying out this task, recall the first linguistic fact, according to which there are meaningful sentences in which an ascription of faith that P is accompanied by an ascription of knowledge that P. Let’s take another look at two sample sentences containing such ascriptions:

1. 1- I know that she is not guilty; I have a firm faith that she has not committed any crime.

2. 3- I have faith that millions of believing Americans want that to happen. I know they want it.

In discussing how FES and A-FES views can become compatible with semantic contextualism about faith in what follows, we also address how each of these views accommodates the first linguistic fact.

5. An objection and reply

In this section, we discuss an important three-stage objection that helps us shed light on one crucial aspect of our account.

Here is the first stage of the objection. One might accommodate our suggestion that ascriptions of faith have a contextual element while still challenging our proposal in one significant respect. Particularly, one might object that we owe a precise criterion for how a proposition becomes a salient relevant alternative in one context. For example, why is an alternative to the proposition that two plus two is four salient in one context and not in another? Which elements of a context are responsible for causing an alternative to become salient and relevant? Without answering these questions, one might think that we don’t present an adequate account of ascriptions of faith.

In response, we make two points. The first is that we don’t intend to develop a comprehensive analysis of all elements of appropriate ascriptions of faith. Rather, we seek to provide a schematic account by highlighting the role of context. This can be fairly considered a step forward given that this role is highly significant and widely ignored in the literature.

The second point to make is that a similar objection has already been posed to RAT and contextualism about knowledge. In this respect, Ichikawa and Steup (Reference Ichikawa, Steup, Zalta and Nodelman2026) write: “the relevant alternatives theorist faces a challenge in attempting to articulate what determines which possibilities are relevant in a given situation.” For example, because of the inability to provide a general account of relevance, Sosa (Reference Sosa1986: 585) suggests that “the relevant alternative defense will remain unacceptably occult.” In contrast, Cohen doesn’t think that this objection undermines the RAT, at least insofar as it is a response to skepticism. The point is that competent users can intuitively employ the concept of knowledge in proper contexts without using any explicit criterion. In his own terms:

The inability to provide a general criterion for relevant alternative may originate from our fundamental limitation in analyzing knowledge.

We can draw inspiration from this response to answer the present objection to contextualism about ascriptions of faith. In cases of faith ascriptions, similar to cases of knowledge ascriptions, the relevance and non-relevance of alternatives are data provided by our intuitive judgments regarding faith ascriptions. We intuitively recognize, for example, that context shifts when Marvin faces the skeptical scenario and know that it makes sense, in the new context, to have faith that two plus two is four. It is possible and plausible, again similar to cases of knowledge ascription, that the inability to provide a general account of the criteria of relevant alternatives in faith ascriptions derives from our inability to provide a general account of the criteria of faith. Even without such criteria, contextualism should be considered, we think, a significant partial account insofar as it highlights the role of context as an unexplored element of the appropriate way of ascribing faith.

Let us turn to the second stage of the objection. One might suggest that, while we don’t explicitly employ a criterion to identify relevant and salient alternatives, there is nevertheless an implicit criterion at work. This assumption could pose a challenge to our proposal if an objector argues as follows. It is some sort of epistemic shortcoming of the evidential situation that favors the proposition in which one has faith that implicitly makes certain alternatives relevant and salient. If so, then contrary to our claim in the previous section, the linguistic facts we discussed in this article favor FES over A-FE.Footnote ¹¹

In response, as noted in the introduction and detailed in the preceding section, one aim of the present project is to show that the semantics of faith can be compatible with both FES and A-FES accounts. Therefore, it is vital to demonstrate that A-FES is not necessarily ruled out merely by appealing to the linguistic facts of faith ascriptions. If, as the objector claims, an implicit criterion is at work that renders a faith ascription semantically appropriate solely in virtue of a shortcoming in the subject’s epistemic status, then A-FES is no longer tenable. Consequently, we must present some (potential) criterion that leaves room for A-FES accounts.

Inspired by prominent proponents of epistemic contextualism (Lewis Reference Lewis1996; Cohen Reference Cohen1988), we hold that enabling a proposition to become relevant and salient to a subject in a context is tied to attention. However, when an ascription of faith that P to a subject S is at issue, to which precise epistemic property of the epistemic situation does S attend? We tentatively suggest that attention to fallibility may play the central role in this respect. More precisely, in a context where S directs her attention to the fallibility of her positive epistemic attitude toward P, the alternative possibility that P may not be the case becomes salient and relevant for her. In virtue of this, it makes sense to ascribe faith that P to S.

To illustrate the point, consider again the case of Nathan, the senior software engineer at NASA. While he possesses mathematical evidence that his solution is correct, it still makes sense to ascribe to him the faith that it is correct. According to our suggestion, this is a meaningful ascription of faith since Nathan has attended to the fallibility of his solution as an alternative scenario. Even when Nathan lacks specific evidence that he has made a mistake, it is reasonable for him to remain a fallibilist about his solution. When thinking about this fallibilism, Nathan can meaningfully have faith that his solution is correct. The same goes for the case of Marvin. In an everyday context, no one treats the fallibility of two plus two is four as a reasonable option. However, the context shifts during the philosophical debate when Marvin faces the skeptical scenario and becomes aware of the fallibility of two plus two is four as a reasonable option. When attending to this fallibilism, Marvin can appropriately have faith that two plus two is four.

The crucial point in response to the objection is that most contemporary epistemologists believe that fallibilism is compatible with epistemic achievements, such as knowledge and understanding. Put differently, one can reasonably have knowledge that P while remaining a fallibilist about that knowledge. In Reed’s terms (Reference Reed2012: 585):

For example, given his strong mathematical evidence, Nathan can know that his solution is correct and, at the same time, be a fallibilist about his knowledge. It is in virtue of this fallibilism that he can also meaningfully have faith that this solution is correct. In this way, Nathan simultaneously has both knowledge and faith regarding the same proposition. As such, we present a tentative criterion for determining when an alternative becomes relevant and salient, one that successfully accommodates A-FES accounts. Attention to the fallibility of our epistemic attitudes, while rendering ascriptions of faith semantically appropriate, does not inherently constitute an epistemic shortcoming.

Let us shift to the third and final stage of the objection. One might argue against the criterion of attention to fallibilism in the following way. Consider, for example, faith that God exists. There are numerous persons of faith who never concede that their beliefs in the existence of God are fallible. They are not fallibilists, in any reasonable sense of the term, with respect to the belief that God exists. If we apply the suggested criterion to the cases at hand, the absurd consequence follows that ascriptions of faith that God exists to such genuine persons of faith are not semantically appropriate.

In response, notice that the implicit criterion for determining relevant and salient alternatives may have a disjunctive nature. In some contexts, and regarding certain contents, one criterion may be at work, and in other contexts and concerning distinct contents, another may be at work. Bearing this insight in mind, we propose a second tentative criterion. According to our suggestion, at least in some contexts and with respect to some contents, attention to the fact that the truth of the content is a matter of disagreement may play the central role in making it an appropriate content of faith. More precisely, in some contexts, when a subject S turns her implicit attention to the fact that the truth of P is a matter of disagreement, the alternative possibility that P may not be the case becomes salient and relevant for S. Even if the subject is infallibilist with respect to her belief that P, the fact that other people believe that not-P may cause this option to become salient for her. In virtue of her implicit attention to disagreement about P, it makes sense for subject S to have faith that P is the case.

Consider again the case of persons of faith who never concede that their belief in God’s existence may be fallible. Given that the existence of God is a contested idea in ordinary contexts, they are, at least implicitly, aware of the fact that the truth of their belief is a matter of disagreement. According to our proposal, it is this implicit attention that makes the ascription of faith to them in ordinary contexts meaningful. This criterion can also explain our intuitions in some cases involving a shift in context. Consider Marvin again. In ordinary contexts, the truth of the proposition that two plus two is four is never a matter of disagreement, and therefore there is no room for an appropriate ascription of faith in this proposition in such contexts. However, when Marvin reads Descartes’ Meditations, the context shifts since he attends to the fact that even the proposition that two plus two is four can be a subject of disagreement. In this new context, he can appropriately have faith that two plus two is four.

The crucial point is that, like fallibilism, the fact that a proposition is a matter of disagreement does not necessarily constitute an epistemic shortcoming. There are numerous situations in which awareness of disagreement about P does not change the justificatory profile of our epistemic attitudes toward P. According to most epistemologists, such cases of disagreement are possible and prevalent. For example, citing Kelly (Reference Kelly, Gendler and Hawthorne2005), Frances and Matheson (Reference Frances, Matheson, Zalta and Nodelman2024) write:

For example, consider a subject who knows that God exists. She can also meaningfully have faith that God exists in virtue of attending implicitly to the fact that the existence of God is a matter of disagreement. It is plausible to think that she can retain her knowledge insofar as this implicit attention has not affected her evidential status regarding the existence of God. Therefore, according to the criterion of implicit attention to disagreement, a person can simultaneously have knowledge of and faith in the truth of a proposition. As such, like the first criterion, the second criterion we suggest makes room for A-FES accounts, showing that the objector’s assumption in the second and third stages of the objection is not tenable.

Given the above discussion, it should be clear that the criterion we tentatively suggest has a disjunctive nature:

We observed that the ascription of faith in the case of persons of faith who reject the fallibility of belief in God’s existence can be best explained in terms of the second (and not the first) part of this disjunctive criterion. In addition, we suggest that the ascription of faith in the case of George’s mother when she doubts that the person who came home is really George is best explained in virtue of the first (and not the second) part of the disjunctive criterion. When the mother becomes suspicious of the person’s behavior and attends to the fallibility of her belief that he is George, this belief is not yet a subject of disagreement.

As a result, according to our tentative suggestion, the appropriateness of a faith ascription is accounted for by either the first disjunct (i.e., attention to fallibilism) or the second disjunct (i.e., attention to disagreement).Footnote ¹² Contrary to the objector’s assumption, neither of the disjuncts necessarily constitutes an epistemic shortcoming since each of them can allow for the compatibility of faith and knowledge. Therefore, there is one plausible (disjunctive) criterion on the table that makes room for A-FES accounts.Footnote ¹³